Central-provincial Relations Research Articles

Eyalet'ten Vilayet'e, 19. yüzyılda Bağdat'ta Osmanlı idari Düzenlemeleri

In the 19th century, while the Ottoman Empire entered a western-style modernization process in the central-provincial relations and administrative organization of the state, on the other hand, it began to fall under the political and economic influence of the industrialized European states.
 Baghdad, which governed as a salyaneli province in the Ottoman administrative organization since the 16th century, has seen a series of new administrative regulations after the removal of the Governor of Baghdad, Davut Pasha in 1831 and during the implementation of the Tanzimat process and the province system.
 In this study, we will emphasize the administrative changes and administrative regulations implemented by the Ottoman Empire in the 19th century in Baghdad, during and after the transition from the state system to the new province system.

Localism in Retreat? Central-Provincial Relations in the Xi Jinping Era

ABSTRACT Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption drive, personnel reshuffles, and institutional overhauls seem to mark a turning point in Beijing’s long-running fight against ‘localism’ (difangzhuyi). Yet, key questions remain about the scope and effectiveness of efforts to rein in China’s subnational officials. Has the Xi administration effectively combated localism by appointing more outsiders to provincial leadership teams? Or have strengthened oversight institutions made subnational officials more responsive to the center regardless of their individual backgrounds? To address these questions, this article distinguishes between different types of localism in contemporary China and the varying personnel ‘risk factors’ underlying them. Comparing the makeup of provincial party standing committees under Xi Jinping’s 18th CPC Central Committee (2012–2017) with those from the 15–17th CPC Central Committees under Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao (1997–2012), the analysis finds that Xi has accelerated personnel changes to address multiple forms of localism. At the same time, gaps in governance outcomes between local cadres and outsiders have faded since 2012 in several domains, implying that Xi-era institutional reforms have also played a role in curbing localism. Even under Xi, however, important personnel risk factors for localism have persisted and in some domains local-outsider differences in governance outcomes have actually increased.

A Coin for China? The Monetary Standards Debate at the End of the Qing Dynasty, 1900–1912

This article examines debates about monetary standards in the final years of the Qing dynasty. As silver depreciated on the world market, Qing statesmen discussed whether to adopt the gold-exchange standard or to stay on the silver standard. These debates took place on a conceptual and practical level: Should and could the Qing dynasty adopt the gold-exchange standard and what were the economic, political, and symbolic implications of doing so? The article contributes to the history of the late Qing dynasty by focusing on the monetary thought of figures more famous for their other roles: Zhang Zhidong, Liang Qichao, and Kang Youwei. It shows how the monetary standards debate had complex links to international finance, conceptions of sovereignty, central-provincial relations, and public finance. The article concludes by demonstrating how these debates continued in the next decades, becoming a central issue in modern Chinese history.

Central-provincial relations amid greater centralization in China

This article examines central—provincial relations in the context of greater centralization. Focusing on the background of provincial leaders, the leadership management system, and the fiscal system, it suggests that there has been an unmistakable trend toward greater central control. However, greater centralization has coexisted with decentralization in many areas of governance. While greater centralization has not completely changed the particularistic character of central— provincial interactions, the arena has shifted to bargaining and lobbying for central largess. Provincial bargaining now occurs in a context in which the central government is in control of considerably greater resources and more capable of setting the rules of the game. This study of the central—provincial relations helps to contextualize the study of Hong Kong’s relationship with Beijing first by pointing to their different natures and characters. At the same time, salient developments in central—provincial relations in the main body politics also form the context for Hong Kong’s relationship with Beijing.

Why do Similar Areas Adopt Different Developmental Strategies? A study of two puzzling Chinese provinces

Focusing on Guizhou and Yunnan, two provinces with similar geographies, institutions and natural resource endowments, this paper asks why provincial leaders adopted markedly disparate economic strategies. Using data from the early 1980s to 2003 gathered from fieldwork and secondary sources, it focuses on three political factors purported to explain differences in provincial policy: (a) constraints and opportunities from central authorities; (b) characteristics of the provinces; and (c) attributes of individual provincial leaders. I argue that while the center constrains and encourages certain actions and approaches in the provinces, the experiences and background of individual provincial leaders further affects the choice of strategies implemented there. Moreover, once a particular course is set and receives central support, a form of path dependency can encourage the strategy to continue even after the original leaders have departed. While emphasizing the importance of characteristics of local leaders and their relationship with the center, the paper questions the assumptions on which research focusing on elite characteristics has so far been based, and suggests alternative approaches. The results have implications for our understanding not only of these two provinces, but also central–provincial relations and the origins of the economic policies of Chinese President Hu Jintao.

Central–Provincial Relations at the CCP Central Committees: Institutions, Measurement and Empirical Trends, 1978–2002

What is the nature of central–provincial relations in China? How have they evolved during the era of reform and opening? How can we begin to measure and assess the dynamic changes empirically and consistently? This article tackles these questions by examining year-to-year changes in aggregate trends of provincial presence at the Communist Party Central Committee from 1978 to 2002. After first sketching its formal workings, it highlights how the centre is institutionally empowered to exert political leverage over the provinces at the Central Committee. Drawing upon a new dataset that differentiates among three types of Central Committee membership, it shows evidence of declining provincial shares in full Central Committee membership, a conventionally used indicator of provincial clout at the centre, but rising shares in its alternate membership and Politburo full membership. It concludes, on balance, that central political strength remains resilient in this period.

Provincial Discretion and National Power: Investment Policy in Guangdong and Shanghai, 1978–93

Central-provincial relations are an old issue which have plagued successive Chinese leaderships both before and after 1949. Indeed the spatial dimension, with its ramifications regarding power distribution and the complications around policy formulation and implementation, has been a perennial issue of concern in comparative politics. This old interest has been, in recent years, intensified by incessant central-provincial conflicts since reform, to the extent that the integration of the Chinese state has been called into question.

Studies of Central–Provincial Relations in the People's Republic of China: A Mid-Term Appraisal

Spatial aspects of power have been relatively neglected in the field of political science in general, with the notable exception of federalism. Many have argued that the study of political power has generally confined itself to the national level and paid scant attention to the interactions between the central government on the one hand and regional and local authorities on the other. Several tendencies have worked against the flourishing of political research on central-local government relations in the last three decades. First, in methodological terms, the “behavioural revolution” that swept the discipline caused a sudden premature end to the institutional analysis so crucial to central-local government relations. Secondly, in thematic terms, political scientists have been overly preoccupied with central-level processes of decision-making while neglecting the politics of central-local relations. Thirdly, in conceptual terms, the rise of “state” as an encompassing concept was facilitated largely at the expense of complex intra-governmental dynamics.

Changing Central-Local Relations in China: Reform and State Capacity.

Introduction, Jia Hao and Lin Zhimin. Part 1 Historical perspective and overview: China's central-local relationship - a historical perspective, Zhao Suisheng market and state - changing central-local relations in China, Jia and Wang Mingxia institutional reorganization and its impact on decentralization, Gong Ting and Chen Feng. Part 2 The functional dimension: central-local fiscal politics in China, Wang Shaoguang rural reform and the rise of regionalism, Luo Xiaopeng central-local relations from the perspective of state and non-state industries, Xiao Gang foreign trade decentralization and its impact on central-local relations, Zhang Amei and Zou Gang. Part 3 Regional differentiation and case studies: regional inequality variations and central government policy, 1978-1988, Huo Shitao the case of Guangdong in central-provincial relations, Peter Tsan-yin Cheung reform and Shanghai - changing central-local fiscal relations, Lin.

The Evolution of Central–Provincial Fiscal Relations in China, 1971–1984 The Formal System

Central–provincial budgetary relations are among the most significant, intricate and obscure facets of Chinese governmental procedures. Audrey Donnithorne and Nicholas Lardy illuminated central–provincial budgetary relations to 1959, and more recent writings by Donnithorne, Barry Naughton and Dorothy Solinger have brought aspects of the story forward. Based on recently-published Chinese materials, this article traces the evolution of the formal system in central-provincial relations from 1971 to 1984. A new fiscal regime was supposed to begin in 1985 but was never fully implemented because lack of progress in the reform to replace enterprise profits with taxes. The regime since 1984 has been largely a continuation of the 1980–84 fiscal management system, with some new incentives for provinces to collect more revenue. The post-1984 arrangements are well described to collect more revenue. The post-1984 arrangements are well described in a recent World Bank study. This argicle, therefore, fills a gap in the current literature and untagles the complicated and rather obscure story for the 1971 to 1984 era.

Fiscal Reform, Elite Turnover and Central-Provincial Relations in Post-Mao China

Previous articleNext article No AccessStudiesFiscal Reform, Elite Turnover and Central-Provincial Relations in Post-Mao ChinaJames TongJames Tong Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by Volume 22Jul., 1989 Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.2307/2158844 Views: 6Total views on this site Citations: 19Citations are reported from Crossref Journal History This article was published in The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs (1979-1995), which is continued by The China Journal (1995-present). Copyright Australian Journal of Chinese AffairsPDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:Qin Pang The Chinese State’s Decentralized Response Towards the Confucian Revival and Its Institutional Base, (May 2018): 95–124.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-8312-9_3Qingjie Zeng Control, Discretion and Bargaining: the Politics of Provincial Leader Rotation in China, Chinese Political Science Review 1, no.44 (Oct 2016): 623–644.https://doi.org/10.1007/s41111-016-0045-8Ross Wilson Does Governance Cause Growth? Evidence from China, World Development 79 (Mar 2016): 138–151.https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2015.11.015Ka Ho Mok, Xiao Han The rise of transnational higher education and changing educational governance in China, International Journal of Comparative Education and Development 18, no.11 (Feb 2016): 19–39.https://doi.org/10.1108/IJCED-10-2015-0007Yang Su, Ye Qi, Zhouyan Xiao, Yu Wei Contributing institutional factors of rural environmental pollution in the process of modernization in China —In the perspective of the efficiency of environmental management system, Frontiers of Environmental Science & Engineering in China 3, no.11 (Nov 2008): 75–90.https://doi.org/10.1007/s11783-008-0075-zHenry Wai-chung Yeung, Weidong Liu Globalizing China: The Rise of Mainland Firms in the Global Economy, Eurasian Geography and Economics 49, no.11 (May 2013): 57–86.https://doi.org/10.2747/1539-7216.49.1.57Qingshan Tan Growth Disparity in China: Provincial causes, Journal of Contemporary China 11, no.3333 (Nov 2002): 735–759.https://doi.org/10.1080/1067056022000008896Andrew Wedeman Budgets, Extra-budgets, and Small Treasuries: Illegal monies and local autonomy in China, Journal of Contemporary China 9, no.2525 (Nov 2000): 489–511.https://doi.org/10.1080/713675947Shaun Breslin Decentralisation, Globalisation and China's Partial Re-engagement with the Global Economy, New Political Economy 5, no.22 (Aug 2010): 205–226.https://doi.org/10.1080/713687771Shaun Breslin Decentralisation, Globalisation and the "Creation" of Trans-National Economic Regions in the People's Republic of China, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2000).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.182785Andrew Wedeman Agency and fiscal dependence in central‐provincial relations in China, Journal of Contemporary China 8, no.2020 (Mar 1999): 103–122.https://doi.org/10.1080/10670569908724338Yasheng Huang Central-local relations in china during the reform era: The economic and institutional dimensions, World Development 24, no.44 (Apr 1996): 655–672.https://doi.org/10.1016/0305-750X(95)00160-EJae Ho Chung Studies of Central–Provincial Relations in the People's Republic of China: A Mid-Term Appraisal, The China Quarterly 142 (Feb 2009): 487–508.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0305741000035025Eric W.K. Tsang Threats and opportunities faced by private businesses in China, Journal of Business Venturing 9, no.66 (Nov 1994): 451–468.https://doi.org/10.1016/0883-9026(94)90016-7Gaye Christoffersen Xinjiang and the Great Islamic Circle: The Impact of Transnational Forces on Chinese Regional Economic Planning, The China Quarterly 133 (Feb 2009): 130–151.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0305741000018221Jean C. Oi Fiscal Reform and the Economic Foundations of Local State Corporatism in China, World Politics 45, no.11 (Jun 2011): 99–126.https://doi.org/10.2307/2010520Christine P.W. Wong Fiscal Reform and Local Industrialization, Modern China 18, no.22 (Aug 2016): 197–226.https://doi.org/10.1177/009770049201800204Christine P. W. Wong Central–Local Relations in an Era of Fiscal Decline: The Paradox of Fiscal Decentralization in Post-Mao China, The China Quarterly 128 (Feb 2009): 691–715.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0305741000004318Susan L. Shirk “Playing to the Provinces:” Deng Xiaoping's political strategy of economic reform, Studies in Comparative Communism 23, no.3-43-4 (Sep 1990): 227–258.https://doi.org/10.1016/0039-3592(90)90010-J

New Light on Central-Provincial Relations

Previous articleNext article No AccessCurrent IssuesNew Light on Central-Provincial RelationsAudrey DonnithorneAudrey Donnithorne Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by Volume 10Jul., 1983 Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.2307/2158751 Citations: 6Citations are reported from Crossref Journal History This article was published in The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs (1979-1995), which is continued by The China Journal (1995-present). Copyright Australian Journal of Chinese AffairsPDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:Becky P. Y. Loo A re‐examination of Lardy‐Donnithorne debate in the provincial context of Guangdong, 1949–1992, Journal of Contemporary China 7, no.1717 (Apr 2007): 61–87.https://doi.org/10.1080/10670569808724305Jae Ho Chung Studies of Central–Provincial Relations in the People's Republic of China: A Mid-Term Appraisal, The China Quarterly 142 (Feb 2009): 487–508.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0305741000035025 Thomas P. Lyons Interprovincial Disparities in China: Output and Consumption, 1952-1987, Economic Development and Cultural Change 39, no.33 (Oct 2015): 471–506.https://doi.org/10.1086/451887Mario I. Blejer, György Szápary Market-Oriented Reform and Fiscal Policy, (Jan 1991): 231–262.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-3882-6_12Mario I Blejer, Gyorgy Szapary The evolving role of tax policy in China, Journal of Comparative Economics 14, no.33 (Sep 1990): 452–472.https://doi.org/10.1016/0147-5967(90)90061-D International Monetary Fund The Evolving Role of Fiscal Policy in Centrally Planned Economies Under Reform: The Case of China, IMF Working Papers 89, no.2626 (Jan 1989): i.https://doi.org/10.5089/9781451981698.001