Central-local Government Relations Research Articles

The Shift from Paradiplomacy to Protodiplomacy: A Comparative Study of Catalonia and Kurdistan

This article explored the transition from paradiplomacy to protodiplomacy in Catalonia and Kurdistan, two regions at the forefront of this shift. Protodiplomacy involves the direct participation of subnational entities in diplomatic activities akin to those of recognized nation-states, challenging traditional diplomatic hierarchies and altering the global diplomatic landscape. Catalonia has greater autonomy in matters such as governance and economy, while Kurdistan has more limited autonomy in matters such as security and governance. As such, this research showed that paradiplomacy could serve as a means to increase regional engagement in international politics. This research provided an in-depth analysis of how the South Sulawesi Provincial Government's paradiplomacy initiative impacts the export of agricultural products to Egypt. Through a comparative analysis of Catalonia and Kurdistan, this study elucidated the motivations, consequences, and challenges associated with this transition. It emphasized the significance of effective paradiplomacy practices between central and local governments. Catalonia and Iraqi Kurdistan exemplified modern paradiplomacy, showcasing their capabilities on an international stage. The research identified high Iraqi Kurdish nationalism as a key driver of the shift towards protodiplomacy in Kurdistan. It also highlighted the internal structural factors within Iraq that propelled Iraqi Kurdistan's diplomatic efforts, culminating in a referendum that marked a peak in separatist interest. This research underscored the dynamic nature of protodiplomacy, highlighting the motivations behind subnational diplomatic endeavors and the transformative implications for central-local government relations.

Central-Local Government Relations in Regional Planning and Budgeting in Indonesia: Between Autonomy and Control

This article analyzes the relationship between central and local governments in regional planning and budgeting policies, while exploring the direction of central government control over regions through regional planning and budgeting policies. The issue of relations between central and regional governments in regional planning and budgeting is finding the right balance between autonomy and control. The research methods used are regulatory content analysis and interviews with policymakers. The results showed that the central government uses planning and budgeting to control the implementation of local government affairs and functions through guidance, detection, coercion, and evaluation of existing regulations. These findings fill the discussion gap regarding central government control of regional governments not only through guidance and supervision but through planning and budgeting policies. This study provides insight into the forms of central government control over regional governments, contributing to the trend of central and regional government relations. The practical benefit of this research is as input in improving regional planning and budgeting system policies for the government.

Fight against indiscipline? The governance of street trader displacements in Oshodi Market, Lagos

This article examines the process of urban governance through the lens of street trader displacements, a common policy adopted by city authorities in Africa. Whilst some knowledge exists on how central-local government relations affect urban governance, the combined effect of the nature of sub-national governance and local political dynamics on the process of urban governance requires deeper consideration. Drawing on in-depth qualitative case study research in Lagos, Nigeria, this article analyses how urban governance processes produce street trader displacements. From the “war against indiscipline” (WAI) policy by the Nigerian government to the “kick against indiscipline” (KAI) taskforce set up by Lagos State Government to implement its zero-tolerance policy against informal economy workers, street traders in Lagos have continuously suffered under unfavourable government policies. This legacy led up to the large-scale street trader displacements around the popular Oshodi Market in Lagos in 2009. Based on an analysis of urban governance through the lens of the displacements in Oshodi, this paper reveals how the overwhelming influence of city authorities and state-society relationships combine to produce displacements, with existing market trader associations unable to contest street trader displacements due to their political co-option by city authorities. The paper furthers knowledge on how politics shapes urban development and highlights the need for a careful consideration of enduring complex underlying relationships for a grounded understanding of urban governance in the African context.

The Distortion of Public–Private Partnerships in China: An Institutional Perspective of Central–Local Government Relations

How to explain the distortion of public–private partnerships (PPPs) is underexplored. Drawing on principal–agent theory, this article proposes an institutional incentive-driven framework. Based on a case study of PPPs in China, this article finds that central–local government relationships play a crucial role in shaping PPP performance. Goal incongruence and information asymmetry lead to two types of distortion. First, PPPs become a political task for local governments to respond to higher-level governments’ needs. Second, PPPs serve as financing tools to create political achievements. These opportunistic behaviors violate the goals of the central government’s PPP policy and increase government debt risks.

Urban Governance in Bangladesh: A Study on Inter-Organisational Coordination Problems and Its Impact on Service Delivery

In the urban areas of Bangladesh, besides formal urban local governments, special government bodies, some special purpose authorities and special development authorities exist to meet the growing demand for certain urban services and planning. This study aims to provide a better understanding of the inter-organisational coordination problems among these urban bodies and how they impact the service delivery to urban people in Bangladesh. Based on a study performed on the Cumilla City Corporation and Lakshmipur Paurashava area, the available data show that there are huge coordination problems among the urban local government bodies and other governments agencies. This study illustrates that overlapping functions and different accountability patterns of urban bodies, limited autonomy of urban local government, lack of formal framework for coordination, political influences and controlled central–local government relations are affecting inter-organisational coordination. This study is on the basis of embedded case-oriented qualitative research. Both primary and secondary data were considered to carry out this study. The article argues that the lack of coordination among the urban local bodies, government agencies and departments hamper the policy execution, which ultimately affects the service delivery negatively.

What has been done and what has not – the government of Canada’s economic policy response to the coronavirus pandemic

PurposeThis paper aims to examine Canadian government measures to support country’s economic recovery and sustainable development. The goal is to examine whether all orders of government are working well to deliver the required help to Canadians.Design/methodology/approachThe theoretical foundations for this article are drawn from liberal and institutionalist approaches to comparative politics. Specifically, the proposed study draws on political tensions that occur because of actions of self-centered regional (provincial) governments who legitimize individual policies based on their self-centered economic and political objectives.FindingsNowadays, we can observe the primary role of the state in supporting and regulating the health governance systems, the economy and social life. Many informal groups have unstructured approach, which does not require them to follow existing strategies. The challenges caused by COVID-19 have led to the resurgence of collective, state-based approaches to the recovery. The key findings illuminate the importance of crisis communication activities which should be implemented properly. This implies that all disclosures must be timely and truthful.Practical implicationsThe study helps to better understand the events that disrupt parts of the Canadian economy during pandemic. It reviews the essential functions that are critical for reliable operation of infrastructure services to ensure safety and well-being of the population. During the COVID-19, federal–provincial–territorial collaboration runs into resistance because of competing interests, resource constraints, legacies from past conflicts and lack of coordination. In contrast to managers, who often focus on tangible short-term results, today’s leadership more often seeks intangible long-term results. This means that the central–local government relations tend to be more informal.Originality/valueIn the face of external shock, such as COVID-19, it did not take much time for Canadian provincial governments to realize that they cannot cope with a wide range of challenges alone. In these circumstances, the narratives of how governments work together during the challenging time to impact their desired outcomes are of crucial importance.

Political institutions, state capacity, and crisis management: A comparison of China and South Korea

How do political institutions influence crisis management? By comparing responses to COVID-19 in China and South Korea, this article argues that different political institutions affect countries’ responses to crises by shaping state capacity. First, the article proposes a state capacity-driven crisis management framework including four types of capacity: information capacity, decision-making and implementation capacity, coercive capacity, and mobilization and cooperation capacity. Second, the article contributes to the literature by making linkages between different forms of state capacity and regime type. Combinations of state capacity are different in democracies and authoritarian regimes because state capacities are shaped by two different institutional arrangements: central–local government relations and state–society relations. Additionally, the article finds that the impacts of political institutions on crisis management through different state capacities are contingent on scenarios such as the different stages of a crisis.

Public Management Development in England: New Right, New Left and Third Way

This article aims to evaluate the changing notions of public services as expressed in NPM, and to place these in the context of the emergence of new political ideas which are associated with the New Right, New Left and Third Way. There have been different attempts to theorise and formulate the rapidly changing nature of political and managerial re-organisation in Britain. Additionally, there have been different ways of defining and describing these developments. However, similar themes have been emphasized and an agenda of common concerns are recognised that can be articulated as a modernisation movement seeking to enhance democratic governance and effective public service delivery. Among new ideas, most emphasis was placed on corporate management, strategic planning, performance measurement and fundamental corporate review, quality management and administrative accountability. There is also a new emphasis on central-local government relations.

중앙-지방 관계와 지방정부의 정책결정 : 저탄소 녹색성장정책을 중심으로

중앙-지방 관계와 지방정부의 정책결정 : 저탄소 녹색성장정책을 중심으로

Assessing Central-Local Government Relations in Contemporary South Korea: An Application of Page & Goldsmith’s Comparative Framework

This paper has two main purposes: first, it measures the level and degree of decentralisation in contemporary Korea, and, second, it explains why decentralisation is slow or stagnant. To measure the level of decentralisation in Korea, this paper uses Page & Goldsmith’s triple measures of function, discretion, and access, which were developed to examine the extent of centralisation and decentralisation in any given polity. The results suggest that Korea is both legally and politically centralised. In Korea, a centralised party system has combined with other factors to drive centralisation, overcoming the decentralising forces that focus mainly on local elected and appointed officials. Centralising forces include the bureaucratic elitism of national officials, cultural disdain for local governments, and local people’s feeble affective attachment to local identities and communities.

Centralization, neoliberalism, and housing policy central–local government relations and residential development in Israel

In recent decades, many countries have experienced decentralization and neoliberal processes. The literature usually refers to decentralization as an outcome of growing neoliberalism, but are these two processes analytically connected? This study answers the question by examining the relationship between central and local government in Israel in the context of housing policy. It focuses on a housing policy called Heskem Gag (“umbrella agreement”), an agreement between the government and local authorities to rapidly increase the supply of housing units. Whereas Heskem Gag might seem an act of decentralization, in-depth analysis paints a mixed picture: although some terms of the agreement promote fiscal and administrative autonomy, others curb it and have a strong centralizing effect. The study discusses the possibility of a hybrid model of neoliberal centralism, and its problematic ramifications for the interests of local residents, especially the disadvantaged. Although the findings are based on the Israeli case, they are relevant to many countries with a neoliberal economy that have undergone decentralization in recent decades, especially at times of national crises.

“Supervision by Public Opinion” or by Government Officials? Media Criticism and Central-Local Government Relations in China

Despite the sophisticated control of media in China, criticism of the party-state is not uncommon. Why does the authoritarian regime allow criticism? This article offers an explanation based on political institutions. It examines central-local government relations and finds that criticism can help advance the interests of different political actors. Criticism of local government bureaus and officials can help the central government ensure local compliance and create favorable public opinion. Local leaders can also use criticism to establish political authority over their subordinates and impress superiors, thus enhancing their chances to advance their career. Despite formal institutional arrangements, both central and local leaders have used informal measures such as criticism to achieve their political objectives. This underscores the importance of informal measures in the operation of China’s authoritarian regime.

Key Features of Central-Local Government Relations in South Korea: A Governance Perspective

Key Features of Central-Local Government Relations in South Korea: A Governance Perspective

Frameworks for CentrallLocal Government Relations and Fiscal Sustainability

Sustainable and inclusive growth in emerging Asian economies requires continued high levels of public sector investment in areas such as infrastructure, education, health, and social services. These responsibilities, especially with regard to infrastructure investment, need to be devolved increasingly to the regional government level. However, growth of sources of revenue and financing for local governments has not necessarily kept pace, forcing them, in some cases, to increase borrowing or cut spending below needed levels.This paper reviews alternative models of the relationship between central and local governments, and provides an overview and assessment of different financing mechanisms for local governments, including tax revenues, central government transfers, bank loans, and bond issuance, with a focus on the context of emerging Asian economies. The paper also reviews financing mechanisms for local governments and mechanisms for maintaining fiscal stability and sustainability at both the central and local government levels. Based upon the evidence on the decentralization process in Asia, it proposes some policy implications for improving central-local government relations and fiscal sustainability.

Fiscal decentralization and tax incentives in the developing world

ABSTRACTMany developing countries use tax incentives to attract foreign direct investment, sacrificing immediate revenue from foreign capital, even though the effects of tax incentives on investment, growth, and revenue are empirically dubious. This leads to the puzzle of why states adopt tax incentives. Extant studies of tax incentive adoption overlook the fact that many countries have decentralized fiscal authority, allowing subnational governments to offer tax incentives. Public finance scholars argue that fiscal federalism intensifies tax competition among regions. Hence, drawing on the public finance scholarship, one may ask: Does fiscal decentralization lead to a race to the top among subnational governments and an oversupply of tax incentives in a country? This article argues that fiscal decentralization affects tax incentives in complex ways. When subnational governments are authorized to set tax policies, their politicians have economic and political incentives to engage in tax competition for mobile capital, providing more tax incentives in a country. However, the politicians are less likely to do so if they are held accountable and have to fund most expenditures through own-source tax revenues. An empirical analysis of over 50 developing countries in early 2000s produces robust supporting evidence. This research challenges both the view that fiscal decentralization is always beneficial and the view that horizontal competition invariably produces inefficiently low tax rates. The impact of fiscal decentralization on tax incentives and by implication, revenue mobilization depends on the design of the central–local government relations.

The development of China’s solar photovoltaic industry: why industrial policy failed: Table 1.

This article studies China’s central-local government relations in the formation and implementation of an industry policy. In China, the central government is responsible for policy formation and the local governments are responsible for policy implementation, where local governments are allowed ample flexibility in the ways to achieve the policy mandate. This arrangement is conducive to local competition, but there is no built-in mechanism in the system to regulate such competition. The system is defective in the execution of an industrial policy in that it fails to discipline the recipients of policy favours and to make efficient exit selections. Because local competition involves policy resources as well as economic resources, the outcome of competition is not necessarily consistent with the comparative advantage of the region. The more that policy is emphasised in industrial development, the more that competition tends to favour large and rich cities. After a certain period of hands-off local competition, the timing of which is unpredictable but will come when the industry runs into troubles, the central government holds the ultimate power to determine the winners. The central government typically picks the ‘large and strong’ firms as the winners, which are crowned as a national team and became eligible for further policy support. This institutional set-up produces a rapidly growing industry, which often results in over-capacity but not necessarily a competitive industry. I use the case of China’s solar photovoltaic industry to illustrate these points.

Water pollution control history in Japan, effluent standards, and central–local government relations

Water pollution is a significant environmental problem. Success or failure of water pollution control policy depends primarily on effluent standards, monitoring systems, and central–local government relations. This paper focuses on the relationship between the central government and the Kanagawa Prefecture government in Japan concerning the history of water pollution control policy from the 1950s to the early 1970s. Kanagawa Prefecture is next to Tokyo, and the Kanagawa Prefecture government has been a leader regarding environmental policy at the local level in Japan. This paper examines two aspects of water pollution control history in Japan. The first is the reason behind the implementation of a unique water pollution control policy by the Kanagawa Prefecture government against the central government, although two of its governors were conservatives. In other words, this paper examines what other historical factors exist to promote or formulate water pollution control policy, other than ideology. The second aspect involves examining what central–local government relations mean, how they change, when and how national policy change affects local policy change, and vice versa.

Local initiative, central oversight, provincial perspective: governing police forces in nineteenth-century Leeds

This article examines police administration as a branch of urban government, based on a case study of Leeds between 1815 and 1900. Making extensive use of local government and police records, it takes a longer-term view of ‘reform’ than most existing studies, and privileges the more routine aspects of everyday governance. It thus provides an original exploration of central-local government relations, as well as conflict and negotiation between distinct bodies of self-government within the locality. Previous studies have rightly emphasized that urban police governance was primarily a local responsibility, yet this article also stresses the influence of central state oversight and an extra-local, provincial perspective, both of which modified the grip of localism on nineteenth-century government.

Central-local Government Relations: Implications on the Autonomy and Discretion of ZimbabweÂ’s Local Government

The study of central-local government relations presents a dynamic discourse into understanding political and administrative power dimensions and distribution between central government and local government. Central-local government relations reflects the horizontal and vertical power dynamics between central and local government and related consequences on autonomy and the degree of discretion that local government enjoy from central government control and direction. Zimbabwe being a unitary state have one source of state authority underpinned by a local government system decentralized (devolution in particular) to provide affordable services to a heterogeneous citizenry in geographically defined and demarcated areas of jurisdiction. Local authorities are creatures of statutes/Acts of parliament and therefore operate within the legislative framework enacted and promulgated by central government (legislature) as the primary legislative authority section 32 (1) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe, but also enjoy subsidiary or secondary legislative authority as provided in section 32 (2) of the constitution of Zimbabwe, section 228 of the Urban Councils Act, Chapter 29.15 for urban local authorities and section 88 of the Rural District Councils Act, Chapter 29.13. Local governance in Zimbabwe is a much contested discipline bringing diversity and controversy and the conduct of central government in dealing with local authorities have of late been shrouded by criticism from the independent media houses. Independent media houses and the opposition political parties blamed the minister of Local Government, Rural and Urban Development (MLGRUD) and central government’s intervention, legally though, as interference with local authorities’ affairs to the detriment of good governance in the latter institutions. This paper attempts therefore to evaluate the objectivity and rationality of such interventions.

From the social fund to local welfare assistance: Central–local government relations and ‘special expenses’

In Britain since the 1930s social assistance recipients have in certain circumstances been able to claim ‘exceptional expenses’ in addition to their weekly benefit income. From the 1940s these were administered by its central government. However, in April 2013 the then incarnation of such payments (the discretionary Social Fund) was partly replaced by locally administered Local Welfare Assistance. Drawing upon material held in files at Britain's National Archives and central government documents framing the development of Local Welfare Assistance, this paper examines how concerns raised in the 1980s meant it was not possible to then transfer responsibility for ‘exceptional expenses’ from central to local government. The paper explores those concerns and how in contemporary Britain they are no longer deemed to be problematic because of the Coalition government's emphasis upon localism and because of changing local government views on the possibility of delivering a mainstream social assistance function.