Influence Of Central Bank Research Articles

Influence of Central Bank of Nigeria Digital Currency on Financial Inclusion of Lecturers and Students of the Three Public Colleges of Education in Kano State

Purpose: The study aimed to investigate the influence of the Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC) e-Naira policy on financial inclusion, with a specific focus on its impact on the access and usage of financial services among lecturers and students in Colleges of Education in Kano State.Methodology: The study adopted a descriptive survey method, and a sample size of 279 was selected using simple random sampling techniques from a population of 989 individuals. The participants were drawn from three public Colleges of Education in Kano State. Data were collected through a 4-point Likert scale questionnaire, and the analysis was done using the mean and standard deviation with the support of SPSS. Findings: The study's findings revealed that the CBDC (e-Naira) policy does not significantly influence the access to financial services for lecturers and students in Colleges of Education in Kano State. Additionally, the results indicated that the policy does not have a significant impact on the usage of financial services by this group. Unique contribution to Theory, Practice, and Policy: The study's unique contribution lies in the discovery that the CBDC (e-Naira) policy has no significant influence on the access and usage of financial services among lecturers and students in Colleges of Education in Kano State. Based on these findings, the researchers recommend an aggressive awareness campaign be conducted by service providers, policymakers, and other stakeholders.

Central bank mandates: How differences can influence the content and tone of central bank communication

Using modern text mining methods, we analyze the influence of central bank mandates on the content and tone of communication via speeches. Relatedly, we also examine empirically how inflation and unemployment expectations affect the tone of speeches relative to past macroeconomic developments. We compare speeches given by senior officials of the Federal Reserve (FED) against ones of the European Central Bank (ECB). We find evidence that the mandate of the central bank does affect speech sentiment. That said, speeches by both central banks display greater similarities before the Great Financial Crisis (GFC), than afterwards. We also find that, especially since the GFC, unemployment expectations drive the tone of FED speeches while inflation expectations influence the tone of ECB speeches.

Determinants of Management of Central Bank to Provide the Economic Growth: an Application of Structural Equation Modeling

The country's domestic economic expansion is becoming increasingly important, especially in the context of the epidemic and financial crises, both within individual countries and the world. To provide this growth, it is relevant to the strategy of the central bank's activities for overcoming extern in the context of epidemical and internal threats with specific regulatory approaches and monetary instruments. The paper summarizes the arguments and counterarguments within the discussion of the question regarding the central bank's influence on the country's economic growth. The study's primary purpose is to determine the relationship between the indicators that characterize the central bank's activities and the country's economic development. The systematization of literary sources and approaches related to this issue confirms the mediated relationship between the activities of the central bank and the economic growth on a long-term basis. The relevance of this topic is closely connected with the changing role of the central bank and the expansion of its powers, tasks, responsibilities, and its place in the country's economy. This research's objective is the economies of the countries predominantly of the European Union, which has different levels of economic development. The structural modeling method is used in STATA 12.0 (based on data on 11 variables for the period of 1998-2016 for 24 countries). The results of the study confirm the correlation between the role of central banks and domestic economic expansion.

The Influence of Central Bank's Digital Currency on Electronic Payment

On September 24, 2019, the Governor of the People’s Bank of China, Yi Gang, said at an event celebrating the 70th anniversary of the People’s Republic of China that the People’s Bank of China has made positive progress in research on digital currencies. The People’s Bank of China plans to combine the central bank’s digital currency (hereinafter referred to as DCEP) with electronic payment tools, calling it a digital currency and electronic payment package. This paper aims to discuss the current business model and structure of our country's electronic payment industry and related electronic authentication and financial network security industries, as well as the possible impact of the central bank's digital currency after it enters the market.

The value added of the Bank of Japan's range forecasts

AbstractThis study investigates whether the Bank of Japan's (BOJ's) interval forecast publications have an added value relative to its point forecast publications by focusing on the range forecasts released by its policy board members. We find that the width of the BOJ's range forecasts has additional information for predicting inflation over point forecasts for the policy decision periods of 12–18 months. The predictive power of the range forecast is robust to the state of the economy, the recently introduced negative interest rate policy, and economic uncertainty measures. Furthermore, both the point and range forecasts influence professional forecasts. Our findings suggest that the source of the central bank's influence is closely related to its information content, not to forecasting accuracy. Therefore, range forecasts are important tools for monetary policy communication.

INVESTING IN CRYPTOCURRENCYES: BITCOIN - “RAT POISON” OR NEW ASSET CLASS?

Although the world of finance has been existing for only ten years, the fact is that Bitcoin (BTC) has unstoppably triggered significant changes in the global financial market and has opened up numerous controversies. There is debate over whether BTC could become a new global currency that will not be subject to inflation or central bank influence. At the same time, decentralization and lack of regulations, which were considered a major asset, were characterized as the main cause of the high volatility of BTC, whose price depends solely on the supply-demand ratio. Like every time, when it comes to revolutionary technologies and issues of their impact on the world of finance, the public is divided, this time into BTC pessimists and BTC optimists. The former claim that BTC is broken and will suffer an inevitable and spectacular collapse, calling it "rat poison". However, optimists are of the view that the BTC era is just beginning and that it will change its payment method, economy and even politics around the world, and they consider it a new asset class worth investing in. In the midst of all these discussions around BTC, there seems to be no topic that is more media-covered, but less discovered. The aim of this paper is to come to the truth by analyzing recent scientific papers dealing with this issue, that is, to try to answer the research question: is BTC a "rat poison" or a new asset class worth investing in?

The effect of the central bank’s standing facilities on interbank lending and bank liquidity holding

How does the central bank influence interbank lending? The central bank’s policy rates determine the attractiveness of the standing facilities compared with the interbank market. Therefore, by choosing the policy rates the central bank affects the number of banks using the standing facilities and the number of banks using the interbank market. There is also a second channel. The policy rates may influence bank liquidity holding and thus the chances that interbank lending occurs. To address both channels, bank liquidity holding is endogenous in the presented model. The results show that liquidity is not held to insure against idiosyncratic risk but to lend to the interbank market in case counterparty risk is not too high. If banks expect interbank lending to be sufficiently likely and profitable, a smooth liquidity transfer at the interbank market is guaranteed. The central bank can create such a situation under the constraint that counterparty risk is moderate and counterparty risk perceptions are not too distorted. If, however, counterparty risk is perceived to be too large, this may result in liquidity hoarding.

Bitcoin: Speculative Bubble or Future Value?

Created in 2009, bitcoin reaches record heights every week, having hit $17,000 on 11 December 2017 - the first day a bitcoin futures contract traded at the CBOE - versus $1,000 in early 2017 and $1 in 2001. Yet there is still no consensus among economists whether bitcoin comprises a new decentralised currency free of central bank influence, or is a purely speculative instrument.

The Effect of the Central Bank's Standing Facilities on Interbank Lending and Bank Liquidity Holding

How does the central bank influence interbank lending? The central bank’s policy rates determine the attractiveness of the standing facilities compared with the interbank market. Therefore, by choosing the policy rates the central bank affects the number of banks using the standing facilities and the number of banks using the interbank market. There is also a second channel. The policy rates may influence bank liquidity holding and thus the chances that interbank lending occurs. To address both channels, bank liquidity holding is endogenous in the presented model. The results show that liquidity is not held to insure against idiosyncratic risk but to lend to the interbank market in case counterparty risk is not too high. If banks expect interbank lending to be sufficiently likely and profitable, a smooth liquidity transfer at the interbank market is guaranteed. The central bank can create such a situation under the constraint that counterparty risk is moderate and counterparty risk perceptions are not too distorted. If, however, counterparty risk is perceived to be too large, this may result in liquidity hoarding.

ECB Monetary Policy and Small Open Economiess Stock Markets: Estimating Actions and Communication Spillovers

Despite being at the core of central bankers' and investors' interest, the question of the European Central Bank's influence on global stock markets has not yet been fully answered. This paper aims to fill the gap by examining the influence of ECB monetary policy on 49 small open economies' stock markets around the world. Using the data from the Swiss Economic Institute's Monetary Policy Communicator, a differentiation is made between ECB actions and future policy communication effects. Contractionary ECB monetary policy proves to exert a negative impact on stock markets worldwide, with the results being statistically significant for 44 out of 49 countries. A positive 50 b.p. shock to the ECB interest rate leads to a 2.9% fall in stock markets on average when looking at the two-month window after the shock. A corresponding communication shock results in a 3.8% fall. Results imply that the inclusion of a communication variable is crucial for estimating the full effects of ECB monetary policy. The final answer this paper has to offer to the question posed in the title is a firm yes.

THE RATIONALE FOR THE APPLICATION OF THE INFLATION TARGETING REGIME IN UKRAINE

The purpose of the paper is the consideration of the basic choices of a monetary regime of monetary policy, which include the monetary targeting regime, the regime of exchange rate targeting, the inflation targeting regime, and a strategy without an explicit nominal anchor. The article also discusses their implementation in various countries of the world and the resulting consequences. The subject of research is the consideration of the existing monetary regimes and the rationale for the selection of one of them to ensure sustainable development of the economy of Ukraine. This research examines, among other things, such unresolved parts of the general problem as the search for ways how to increase the degree of the Central Bank influence on the economy by changing the existing monetary regime to more optimal. Methodology. The research is based on a comparison of data on the effectiveness of monetary policy in different countries in specific time periods. Given the consequences of the implementation of certain monetary regimes in different countries, there are drawn conclusions about the appropriateness of the choice of a specific regime for the Ukrainian economy. The results of the comparison showed that the most suitable choice for the economy of Ukraine is the choice of the inflation targeting regime, since it generates the inflation expectations at a low level, in most cases allows reducing inflation in the short term, contributes to strengthening the Central Bank independence and credibility, allows overcoming internal and external shocks, eliminates the contradictions connected with the objectives of monetary policy, reduces the likelihood of crises, as well as creates positive conditions for the development of the economy as a whole. Practical implications. Thoroughly examined the advantages and disadvantages of the underlying monetary regimes, conclusions were drawn concerning the promising directions of development of monetary policy in Ukraine, as well as recommendations on further actions of the state bodies of Ukraine. Value/originality. The conclusions of the research substantiate the benefits of inflation targeting regime to enhance the effectiveness of monetary policy, as well as provide recommendations concerning the further implementation of the inflation targeting regime in Ukraine.

Macro prudential governance and central banks: Facts and drivers

The Great Crisis has highlighted the importance of establishing macro prudential architectures to address problems of financial stability. Central banks are always part of macro prudential settings, but their role is far from being homogeneous across countries, reflecting the fact that according to economic theory there are pros and cons in extending central bank influence to macro prudential supervision. The issue is then genuinely empirical: are there any meaningful drivers explaining the actual choices made by policymakers about the central bank's role in macro prudential governance?We identify three potential drivers – micro supervision involvement, monetary policy discretion, overall institutional independence – and test for their relevance, by analysing current institutional settings in 31 advanced and emerging market economies. We find that central bankers already in charge of micro supervision and less politically independent are more likely to get extended macro prudential powers; the same is true, if they have low monetary policy discretion, being constrained by a monetary stability objective. We interpret these results by using a political economy perspective.

Do Central Bank Forecasts Influence Private Agents? Forecasting Performance versus Signals

Focusing on a set of central banks that publish inflation forecasts in real time, this paper aims to establish whether central bank inflation forecasts influence private inflation forecasts. The response is positive in the five countries studied: Sweden, the United Kingdom, Canada, Switzerland, and Japan. Three hypotheses may explain this central bank influence: central bank forecasts are more accurate than private ones, are based on different information sets, and/or convey signals about future policy decisions and policymakers’ preferences and objectives. We provide evidence that the source of these central banks’ influence is not linked to their forecasting performance.

Liquidity Regulation, the Central Bank and the Money Market

As reliance on excessively short-term wholesale funding has been one of the major causes for the 2007-2009 financial crisis, recent advances in global liquidity regulation try to curb the excessive reliance on short-term wholesale funding without being clear on how such an approach will affect the overall equilibrium on money markets. In particular, liquidity regulation may interfere with the central bank's influence on short-term money market rates. This paper tries to fill the gap in understanding the interaction between the money market, the central bank, and the regulator. Importantly, it shows that the existence of a central bank can be welfare-improving when the market equilibrium is driven by collateral constraints and asymmetric information. Regulation can be welfare-improving in the presence of an externality and also in case of collateral constraints, but reduces activity on the unsecured market. This implies that in case of collateral constraints the regulator can lead to a complete crowding out of the unsecured market which leads to an increased central bank intermediation need.

Postkeynesovské pojetí nezávislosti centrální banky a fungování komerčních bank

The post-Keynesian approach to the nature of money brings some other conclusion to the monetary policy, independence of a central bank and function of commercial banks. The source money is created by demand of businessmen especially. Loans create deposits, deposits create reserves. Central bank plays two roles: lender of last resort and inflation supervisor. Creditting by commercial banks and their credit policy in post-Keynesian economics is considered as credit rationing. If the role of central bank - lender of last resort - is not connected with changes of regulation, which reduce new practice of financial markets to avoid regulation, the influence of central bank to fight with inflation declines. Post-Keynesian economics is not directed against competence and independence of central bank. On the contrary, it welcomes the more direct influence of central bank on commercial banks and other financial institutions, however, with use of alternative limiting facilities.

Can a Central Bank Influence Its Currency's Real Value? The Swiss Case

HE SWISS National Bank (SNI3) is one of the few central banks that conducts monetary policy by announcing and generally achieving a targeted growth rate for the money stock. Policy is conducted in this manner because SNB officials, believing that excessive growth in the money stock is the cause of inflation, have established long-run price stability as the central banks primary objective. Moreover, because large, unexpected changes in money growth are thought to create uncertainty that can raise real interest rates and reduce output, SNB officials believe the average rate of money growth not only should be low (to achieve low inflation rates) but stable as well.1 Thus, in Switzerland, both rapid money growth and large, unexpected changes in the money stock have been rare.

Credit Risk and Credit Rationing

I. Approaches to credit rationing, 258. — II. The influence of credit risk on loan payoff, 259. — III. Implications for lender behavior and borrower access to credit, 267. — IV. The central bank's influence, 275.