Center For Migration Studies Research Articles

Ready to Stay: A Comprehensive Analysis of the US Foreign-Born Populations Eligible for Special Legal Status Programs and for Legalization Under Pending Bills

Ready to Stay: A Comprehensive Analysis of the US Foreign-Born Populations Eligible for Special Legal Status Programs and for Legalization Under Pending Bills

The Italian American Studies Association at Fifty-Five: 1966–2021

The Italian American Studies Association at Fifty-Five: 1966–2021

Jerry WILLIAMS, And Yet They Come: Portuguese Immigration from the Azores to the United States, New York, Center for Migration Studies, 1983. 177 pages, cartes, bibliographie, index, 9,95$ U.S.

Jerry WILLIAMS, And Yet They Come: Portuguese Immigration from the Azores to the United States, New York, Center for Migration Studies, 1983. 177 pages, cartes, bibliographie, index, 9,95$ U.S.. An article from journal Culture (Volume 6, Number 1, 1986, pp. 3-90), on Érudit.

Correction: US Foreign-Born Workers in the Global Pandemic: Essential and Marginalized

This article provides detailed estimates of foreign-born (immigrant) workers in the United States who are employed in “essential critical infrastructure” sectors, as defined by the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) of the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) (DHS 2020). Building on earlier work by the Center for Migration Studies (CMS), the article offers exhaustive estimates on essential workers on a national level, by state, for large metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs), and for smaller communities that heavily rely on immigrant labor. It also reports on these workers by job sector; immigration status; eligibility for tax rebates under the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act); and other characteristics. It finds that: Sixty-nine percent of all immigrants in the US labor force and 74 percent of undocumented workers are essential workers, compared to 65 percent of the native-born labor force. Seventy percent of refugees and 78 percent of Black refugees are essential workers. In all but eight US states, the foreign-born share of the essential workforce equals or exceeds that of all foreign-born workers, indicating that immigrant essential workers are disproportionately represented in the labor force. The percentage of undocumented essential workers exceeds that of native-born essential workers by nine percentage points in the 15 states with the largest labor force. In the ten largest MSAs, the percentages of undocumented and naturalized essential workers exceed the percentage of native-born essential workers by 12 and 6 percent, respectively. A total of 6.2 million essential workers are not eligible for relief payments under the CARES Act, as well as large numbers of their 3.8 million US citizen children (younger than age 17), including 1.2 million US citizen children living in households below the poverty level. The foreign-born comprise 33 percent of health care workers in New York State, 32 percent in California, 31 percent in New Jersey, 28 percent in Florida, 25 percent in Nevada and Maryland, 24 percent in Hawaii, 23 percent in Massachusetts, and 19 percent in Texas. Section I of the article describes the central policy paradox for foreign-born workers during the COVID-19 pandemic: that they are “essential” at very high rates, but many lack status and they have been marginalized by US immigration and COVID-19-related policies. Section II sets forth the article’s main findings. Section III outlines major policy recommendations.

US Foreign-Born Workers in the Global Pandemic: Essential and Marginalized

Executive Summary This article provides detailed estimates of foreign-born (immigrant) workers in the United States who are employed in “essential critical infrastructure” sectors, as defined by the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) of the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) (DHS 2020). Building on earlier work by the Center for Migration Studies (CMS), the article offers exhaustive estimates on essential workers on a national level, by state, for large metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs), and for smaller communities that heavily rely on immigrant labor. It also reports on these workers by job sector; immigration status; eligibility for tax rebates under the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act); and other characteristics. It finds that: Sixty-nine percent of all immigrants in the US labor force and 74 percent of undocumented workers are essential workers, compared to 65 percent of the native-born labor force. Seventy percent of refugees and 78 percent of Black refugees are essential workers. In all but eight US states, the foreign-born share of the essential workforce equals or exceeds that of all foreign-born workers, indicating that immigrant essential workers are disproportionately represented in the labor force. The percentage of undocumented essential workers exceeds that of native-born essential workers by nine percentage points in the 15 states with the largest labor force. In the ten largest MSAs, the percentages of undocumented and naturalized essential workers exceed the percentage of native-born essential workers by 12 and 6 percent, respectively. A total of 6.2 million essential workers are not eligible for relief payments under the CARES Act, as well as large numbers of their 3.8 million US citizen children (younger than age 17), including 1.2 million US citizen children living in households below the poverty level. The foreign-born comprise 33 percent of health care workers in New York State, 32 percent in California, 31 percent in New Jersey, 28 percent in Florida, 25 percent in Nevada and Maryland, 24 percent in Hawaii, 23 percent in Massachusetts, and 19 percent in Texas. Section I of the article describes the central policy paradox for foreign-born workers during the COVID-19 pandemic: that they are “essential” at very high rates, but many lack status and they have been marginalized by US immigration and COVID-19-related policies. Section II sets forth the article’s main findings. Section III outlines major policy recommendations.

Immigrants’ access to care under the Affordable Care Act: An examination of California

ABSTRACT Background: Welfare provision for noncitizens has been at the center of political debates. Understanding how Californian noncitizens and undocumented immigrants access health care would provide useful information to guide health policies. Method: The neighborhood-level Census data were used to learn the factors related to insurance coverage. LA County is identified as a case study to understand the status quo of health care access for noncitizen immigrants. Data from the Center for Migration Studies was used to derive the unmet demand of My Health LA, a county program that aims to cover the uninsured. Result: Two main factors that predict the extent of local insurance coverage, especially for noncitizens, are the percentage of Latino foreign-born and their chance of naturalization. The paper also finds that in 2014, approximately 61% of undocumented immigrants and 49% of noncitizens were uninsured in LA county, compared with less than 20% for citizens. Conclusion: Improving health care access among the undocumented would effectively reduce overall uninsured rates. This study advocates expanding county indigent programs to achieve higher health care coverage of the undocumented. Using lower-bound estimates, if My Health LA were to cover the entire potential patient pool, the cap must be increased by approximately 60%.

DREAM Act-Eligible Poised to Build on the Investments Made in Them

This paper presents the results of a study by the Center for Migration Studies (CMS) on potential beneficiaries of the DREAM Act of 2017 (the “DREAM Act” or “Act”). The study reveals a long-term, h...

DREAM Act-Eligible Poised to Build on the Investments Made in Them

This paper presents the results of a study by the Center for Migration Studies (CMS) on potential beneficiaries of the DREAM Act of 2017 (the “DREAM Act” or “Act”). The study reveals a long-term, highly productive population, with deep ties to the United States. In particular, it finds that: • More than 2.2 million US residents would qualify for conditional residence under the DREAM Act. • An additional 929,000 — who are now age 18 and over — arrived when they were under 18, but have not graduated from high school and are not enrolled in school and, thus, would not currently qualify for status under the Act. • The DREAM Act-eligible can be found in large numbers (5,000 or more) in 41 states and more than 30 counties, metropolitan areas, and cities. • Potential DREAM Act recipients have lived in the United States for an average of 14 years. • Sixty-five percent (age 16 and above) participate in the labor force, with far higher rates in Wisconsin, Massachusetts, Utah, Arkansas, Illinois, Tennessee, and Oregon. • This population works heavily in sales and related occupations; food preparation and serving; construction and extracting; office and administrative support; production; transportation and material moving; and building/grounds cleaning and maintenance. • Many of the DREAM Act-eligible are highly skilled and credentialed. • 70,500 are self-employed. • Eighty-eight percent speaks English exclusively, very well, or well. • 392,500 have US-citizen children, and more than 100,000 are married to a US citizen or lawful permanent resident. • Twenty-nine percent has attended college or received a college degree. • The DREAM Act-eligible include 50,700 Temporary Protected Status (TPS) recipients from El Salvador, Haiti, and Honduras, 45 percent of whom live in the Miami metro area, Los Angeles County, the Washington, DC area, Houston, New York City, the San Francisco metro area, and the City of Dallas. The study also underscores the immense investment — $150 billion — that states and localities have already made in educating these young Americans. It argues that over time and with a path to citizenship the return on this investment will increase by virtually every indicia of integration — education levels, employment rates, self-employment numbers, US family members, and English language proficiency.

Strengthening the Global Refugee Protection System: Recommendations for the Global Compact on Refugees

On September 19, 2016, the United Nations (UN) General Assembly adopted the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants. This document launched a two-year process to develop a Global Compact on Responsibility Sharing on Refugees (“Global Compact on Refugees”) and a Global Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration. With a record 65 million displaced persons in the world, the global community must come together to fashion a stronger protection regime for persons on the move. This paper outlines broad themes and specific recommendations that the Global Compact on Refugees should adopt on how to strengthen the global refugee protection system. The recommendations fall into several categories: (1) responsibility sharing for the protection of refugees; (2) filling in protection gaps; (3) balancing and replacing deterrence strategies with protection solutions; (4) refugee resettlement; and (5) building refugee self-sufficiency. Some of the key recommendations include:the development of a responsibility-sharing formula to respond to large movements of refugees;the development of an early warning system to identify and respond to nations in crisis;the adoption of principles included in the Nansen and Migrants in Countries of Crisis initiatives;the use of temporary protection measures to protect populations that flee natural disaster;the adoption of model processes that ensure safe and voluntary return;cooperation between destination and transit countries to expand refugee protections;the provision of asylum and due process protections at borders;the use of development assistance to ensure the self-sufficiency of refugees;the adoption of a goal to resettle 10 percent of the global refugee population each year;the establishment of a refugee matching system between refugees and resettlement countries; andthe adoption of coherent strategies, involving all sectors, to address large movements of refugees.This paper draws heavily, albeit not exclusively, from a series of papers published as a special collection in the Journal on Migration and Human Security[1] on strengthening the global system of refugee protection.[1] Rethinking the Global Refugee Protection System, Journal on Migration and Human Security, Center for Migration Studies, 2016-2017. See http://cmsny.org/cms_research/refugeeproject/.

DHS Overestimates Visa Overstays for 2016; Overstay Population Growth Near Zero During the Year

For years, noncitizens who fail to abide by the terms of their nonimmigrant (temporary) visas were not widely recognized as major contributors to the US undocumented population. Yet since 2005, the ratio of overstays to illegal entries across the border has increased rapidly as the number of border crossings dropped to 1970s levels. As a result, the inflow of overstays has exceeded border crossers for nearly a decade. These developments highlight the importance of accurate and timely estimates of overstays.In 2017, the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) released a report, Fiscal Year 2016 Entry/Exit Overstay Report, showing estimates of overstays, by country, for the 50.4 million nonimmigrants admitted in fiscal year 2016 (DHS 2017). At the end of the fiscal year, DHS had not verified the departure of 628,799 nonimmigrants.[1]The Center for Migration Studies (CMS) compared the DHS overstay estimates to CMS’s estimates of the number of undocumented residents that arrived in the past few years. Data were available to make the comparisons for 133 countries; these countries account for 99 percent of all overstays. The major findings include the following:For 90 of the 133 countries, the DHS and CMS estimates differ by less than 2,000, and the correlation between the estimates for those 90 countries is .97, which indicates a very close mutual relationship.The DHS estimates of overstays for Canada are far too high.The DHS estimates greatly exceed the CMS estimates for about 30 countries, half of them participants in the US Visa Waiver Program (VWP).[2]Slightly more than half of the 628,799 reported to be overstays by DHS actually left the country but their departures were not recorded.After adjusting the DHS estimates to take account of unrecorded departures, as well as departures in 2016 of overstays that lived here in 2015, overstay population growth was near zero in 2016.Thus, while overstays account for a large percentage of the newly undocumented, they represent less than half (44 percent) of the overall undocumented population, and they are less likely than illegal border crossers to be long-term residents.The country-specific figures shown here should help DHS focus its efforts on improving the verification of departures of temporary visitors. Finally, these comparisons indicate that the DHS estimates do not provide a sound basis for making decisions about admission to, or continuation in, the VWP. [1] The 628,799 figure refers to nonimmigrants that arrived in 2016 and whose departure had not been verified by the end of 2016. Thus, as demonstrated in this paper, it includes nonimmigrant admissions whose departure was not verified and actual overstays.[2] The US Visa Waiver Program (VWP) is described at https://www.dhs.gov/visa-waiver-program, as follows: “The VWP, which is administered by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in consultation with the State Department, permits citizens of 38 countriesto travel to the United States for business or tourism for stays of up to 90 days without a visa. In return, those 38 countries must permit US citizens and nationals to travel to their countries for a similar length of time without a visa for business or tourism purposes.”

DHS Overestimates Visa Overstays for 2016; Overstay Population Growth near Zero during the Year

For years, noncitizens who fail to abide by the terms of their nonimmigrant (temporary) visas were not widely recognized as major contributors to the US undocumented population. Yet since 2005, the ratio of overstays to illegal entries across the border has increased rapidly as the number of border crossings dropped to 1970s levels. As a result, the inflow of overstays has exceeded border crossers for nearly a decade. These developments highlight the importance of accurate and timely estimates of overstays. In 2017, the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) released a report, Fiscal Year 2016 Entry/Exit Overstay Report, showing estimates of overstays, by country, for the 50.4 million nonimmigrants admitted in fiscal year 2016 (DHS 2017). At the end of the fiscal year, DHS had not verified the departure of 628,799 nonimmigrants.1 The Center for Migration Studies (CMS) compared the DHS overstay estimates to CMS's estimates of the number of undocumented residents that arrived in the past few years. Data were available to make the comparisons for 133 countries; these countries account for 99 percent of all overstays. The major findings include the following: • For 90 of the 133 countries, the DHS and CMS estimates differ by less than 2,000, and the correlation between the estimates for those 90 countries is .97, which indicates a very close mutual relationship. • The DHS estimates of overstays for Canada are far too high. • The DHS estimates greatly exceed the CMS estimates for about 30 countries, half of them participants in the US Visa Waiver Program (VWP).2 • Slightly more than half of the 628,799 reported to be overstays by DHS actually left the country but their departures were not recorded. • After adjusting the DHS estimates to take account of unrecorded departures, as well as departures in 2016 of overstays that lived here in 2015, overstay population growth was near zero in 2016. • Thus, while overstays account for a large percentage of the newly undocumented, they represent less than half (44 percent) of the overall undocumented population, and they are less likely than illegal border crossers to be long-term residents. • The country-specific figures shown here should help DHS focus its efforts on improving the verification of departures of temporary visitors. • Finally, these comparisons indicate that the DHS estimates do not provide a sound basis for making decisions about admission to, or continuation in, the VWP.

The economic contribution of unauthorized workers: An industry analysis

This paper provides a quantitative assessment of the economic contribution of unauthorized workers to the U.S. economy, and the potential gains from legalization. We employ a theoretical framework that allows for multiple industries and a heterogeneous workforce. Capital and labor are the inputs in production and the different types of labor are combined in a multi-nest CES framework that builds on Borjas (2003) and Ottaviano and Peri (2012). The model is calibrated using data on the characteristics of the workforce, including an indicator for imputed unauthorized status (Center for Migration Studies, 2014), and industry output from the BEA. Our results show that the economic contribution of unauthorized workers to the U.S. economy is substantial, at approximately 3.1% of GDP annually, which amounts to roughly $6 trillion over a 10-year period. These effects on production are smaller than the share of unauthorized workers in employment, which is close to 5%. The reason is that unauthorized workers are less skilled and appear to be less productive, on average, than natives and legal immigrants with the same observable skills. We also find that legalization of unauthorized workers would increase their contribution to 4.8% of private-sector GDP. The source of these gains stems from the productivity increase arising from the expanded labor market opportunities for these workers which, in turn, would lead to an increase in capital investment by employers.

Undocumented Immigration, Drug Problems, and Driving Under the Influence in the United States, 1990-2014.

To examine the influence of undocumented immigration in the United States on 4 different metrics of drug and alcohol problems: drug arrests, drug overdose fatalities, driving under the influence (DUI) arrests, and DUI deaths. We combined newly developed state-level estimates of the undocumented population between 1990 and 2014 from the Center for Migration Studies with arrest data from the Federal Bureau of Investigation Uniform Crime Reports and fatality information from the Fatality Analysis Reporting System and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Underlying Cause of Death database. We used fixed-effects regression models to examine the longitudinal association between increased undocumented immigration and drug problems and drunk driving. Increased undocumented immigration was significantly associated with reductions in drug arrests, drug overdose deaths, and DUI arrests, net of other factors. There was no significant relationship between increased undocumented immigration and DUI deaths. This study provides evidence that undocumented immigration has not increased the prevalence of drug or alcohol problems, but may be associated with reductions in these public health concerns.

The 2,000 Mile Wall in Search of a Purpose: Since 2007 Visa Overstays have Outnumbered Undocumented Border Crossers by a Half Million

The Trump administration has made the construction of an “impregnable” 2,000-mile wall across the length of the US-Mexico border a centerpiece of its executive orders on immigration and its broader immigration enforcement strategy. This initiative has been broadly criticized based on: Escalating cost projections: an internal Department of Homeland Security (DHS) study recently set the cost at $21.6 billion over three and a half years; Its necessity given the many other enforcement tools — video surveillance, drones, ground sensors, and radar technologies — and Border Patrol personnel, that cover the US-Mexico border: former DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff and other experts have argued that a wall does not add enforcement value except in heavy crossing areas near towns, highways, or other “vanishing points” (Kerwin 2016); Its cost-effectiveness given diminished Border Patrol apprehensions (to roughly one-fourth the level of historic highs) and reduced illegal entries (to roughly one-tenth the 2005 level according to an internal DHS study) (Martinez 2016); Its efficacy as an enforcement tool: between FY 2010 and FY 2015, the current 654-mile pedestrian wall was breached 9,287 times (GAO 2017, 22); Its inability to meet the administration’s goal of securing “operational control” of the border, defined as “the prevention of all unlawful entries to the United States” (White House 2017); Its deleterious impact on bi-national border communities, the environment, and property rights (Heyman 2013); and Opportunity costs in the form of foregone investments in addressing the conditions that drive large-scale migration, as well as in more effective national security and immigration enforcement strategies. The Center for Migration Studies (CMS) has reported on the dramatic decline in the US undocumented population between 2008 and 2014 (Warren 2016). In addition, a growing percentage of border crossers in recent years have originated in the Northern Triangle states of Central America (CBP 2016). These migrants are fleeing pervasive violence, persecution, and poverty, and a large number do not seek to evade arrest, but present themselves to border officials and request political asylum. Many are de facto refugees, not illegal border crossers. This report speaks to another reason to question the necessity and value of a 2,000-mile wall: It does not reflect the reality of how the large majority of persons now become undocumented. It finds that two-thirds of those who arrived in 2014 did not illegally cross a border, but were admitted (after screening) on non-immigrant (temporary) visas, and then overstayed their period of admission or otherwise violated the terms of their visas. Moreover, this trend in increasing percentages of visa overstays will likely continue into the foreseeable future. The report presents information about the mode of arrival of the undocumented population that resided in the United States in 2014. To simplify the presentation, it divides the 2014 population into two groups: overstays and entries without inspection (EWIs). The term overstay, as used in this paper, refers to undocumented residents who entered the United States with valid temporary visas and subsequently established residence without authorization. The term EWI refers to undocumented residents who entered without proper immigration documents across the southern border. The estimates are based primarily on detailed estimates of the undocumented population in 2014 compiled by CMS and estimates of overstays for 2015 derived by DHS. Major findings include the following: In 2014, about 4.5 million US residents, or 42 percent of the total undocumented population, were overstays. Overstays accounted for about two-thirds (66 percent) of those who arrived (i.e., joined the undocumented population) in 2014. Overstays have exceeded EWIs every year since 2007, and 600,000 more overstays than EWIs have arrived since 2007. Mexico is the leading country for both overstays and EWIs; about one- third of undocumented arrivals from Mexico in 2014 were overstays. California has the largest number of overstays (890,000), followed by New York (520,000), Texas (475,000), and Florida (435,000). Two states had 47 percent of the 6.4 million EWIs in 2014: California (1.7 million) and Texas (1.3 million). The percentage of overstays varies widely by state: more than two-thirds of the undocumented who live in Hawaii, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Pennsylvania are overstays. By contrast, the undocumented population in Kansas, Arkansas, and New Mexico consists of fewer than 25 percent overstays.

Mass Deportations Would Impoverish US Families and Create Immense Social Costs

Executive Summary1 This paper provides a statistical portrait of the US undocumented population, with an emphasis on the social and economic condition of mixed-status households - that is, households that contain a US citizen and an undocumented resident. It is based primarily on data compiled by the Center for Migration Studies (CMS). Major findings include the following: • There were 3.3 million mixed-status households in the United States in 2014. • 6.6 million US-born citizens share 3 million households with undocumented residents (mostly their parents). Of these US-born citizens, 5.7 million are children (under age 18). • 2.9 million undocumented residents were 14 years old or younger when they were brought to the United States. • Three-quarters of a million undocumented residents are self-employed, having created their own jobs and in the process, creating jobs for many others. • A total of 1.3 million, or 13 percent of the undocumented over age 18, have college degrees. • Of those with college degrees, two-thirds, or 855,000, have degrees in four fields: engineering, business, communications, and social sciences. • Six million undocumented residents, or 55 percent of the total, speak English well, very well, or only English. • The unemployment rate for the undocumented was 6.6 percent, the same as the national rate in January 2014.2 • Seventy-three percent had incomes at or above the poverty level. • Sixty-two percent have lived in the United States for 10 years or more. • Their median household income was $41,000, about $12,700 lower than the national figure of $53,700 in 2014 (US Census Bureau 2015). Based on this profile, a massive deportation program can be expected to have the following major consequences: • Removing undocumented residents from mixed-status households would reduce median household income from $41,300 to $22,000, a drop of $19,300, or 47 percent, which would plunge millions of US families into poverty. • If just one-third of the US-born children of undocumented residents remained in the United States following a mass deportation program, which is a very low estimate, the cost of raising those children through their minority would total $118 billion. • The nation's housing market would be jeopardized because a high percentage of the 1.2 million mortgages held by households with undocumented immigrants would be in peril. • Gross domestic product (GDP) would be reduced by 1.4 percent in the first year, and cumulative GDP would be reduced by $4.7 trillion over 10 years. CMS derived its population estimates for 2014 using a series of statistical procedures that involved the analysis of data collected by the US Census Bureau's American Community Survey (ACS). The privacy of all respondents in the survey is legally mandated, and, for the reasons listed in the Appendix, the identity of undocumented residents cannot be derived from the data. A detailed description of the methodology used to develop the estimates is available at the CMS website.3

The 2,000 Mile Wall in Search of a Purpose: Since 2007 Visa Overstays have Outnumbered Undocumented Border Crossers by a Half Million

The Trump administration has made the construction of an “impregnable” 2,000-mile wall across the length of the US-Mexico border a centerpiece of its executive orders on immigration and its broader immigration enforcement strategy. This initiative has been broadly criticized based on: • Escalating cost projections: an internal Department of Homeland Security (DHS) study recently set the cost at $21.6 billion over three and a half years; • Its necessity given the many other enforcement tools — video surveillance, drones, ground sensors, and radar technologies — and Border Patrol personnel, that cover the US-Mexico border: former DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff and other experts have argued that a wall does not add enforcement value except in heavy crossing areas near towns, highways, or other “vanishing points” (Kerwin 2016); • Its cost-effectiveness given diminished Border Patrol apprehensions (to roughly one-fourth the level of historic highs) and reduced illegal entries (to roughly one-tenth the 2005 level according to an internal DHS study) (Martinez 2016); • Its efficacy as an enforcement tool: between FY 2010 and FY 2015, the current 654-mile pedestrian wall was breached 9,287 times (GAO 2017, 22); • Its inability to meet the administration's goal of securing “operational control” of the border, defined as “the prevention of all unlawful entries to the United States” (White House 2017); • Its deleterious impact on bi-national border communities, the environment, and property rights (Heyman 2013); and • Opportunity costs in the form of foregone investments in addressing the conditions that drive large-scale migration, as well as in more effective national security and immigration enforcement strategies. The Center for Migration Studies (CMS) has reported on the dramatic decline in the US undocumented population between 2008 and 2014 (Warren 2016). In addition, a growing percentage of border crossers in recent years have originated in the Northern Triangle states of Central America (CBP 2016). These migrants are fleeing pervasive violence, persecution, and poverty, and a large number do not seek to evade arrest, but present themselves to border officials and request political asylum. Many are de facto refugees, not illegal border crossers. This report speaks to another reason to question the necessity and value of a 2,000-mile wall: It does not reflect the reality of how the large majority of persons now become undocumented. It finds that two-thirds of those who arrived in 2014 did not illegally cross a border, but were admitted (after screening) on non-immigrant (temporary) visas, and then overstayed their period of admission or otherwise violated the terms of their visas. Moreover, this trend in increasing percentages of visa overstays will likely continue into the foreseeable future. The report presents information about the mode of arrival of the undocumented population that resided in the United States in 2014. To simplify the presentation, it divides the 2014 population into two groups: overstays and entries without inspection (EWIs). The term overstay, as used in this paper, refers to undocumented residents who entered the United States with valid temporary visas and subsequently established residence without authorization. The term EWI refers to undocumented residents who entered without proper immigration documents across the southern border. The estimates are based primarily on detailed estimates of the undocumented population in 2014 compiled by CMS and estimates of overstays for 2015 derived by DHS. Major findings include the following: • In 2014, about 4.5 million US residents, or 42 percent of the total undocumented population, were overstays. • Overstays accounted for about two-thirds (66 percent) of those who arrived (i.e., joined the undocumented population) in 2014. • Overstays have exceeded EWIs every year since 2007, and 600,000 more overstays than EWIs have arrived since 2007. • Mexico is the leading country for both overstays and EWIs; about one-third of undocumented arrivals from Mexico in 2014 were overstays. • California has the largest number of overstays (890,000), followed by New York (520,000), Texas (475,000), and Florida (435,000). • Two states had 47 percent of the 6.4 million EWIs in 2014: California (1.7 million) and Texas (1.3 million). • The percentage of overstays varies widely by state: more than two-thirds of the undocumented who live in Hawaii, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Pennsylvania are overstays. By contrast, the undocumented population in Kansas, Arkansas, and New Mexico consists of fewer than 25 percent overstays.

An Illustrated Framework for the History of Catholic Immigrant Aid Societies

An Illustrated Framework for the History of Catholic Immigrant Aid Societies Mary Elizabeth Brown (bio) Exodus 23:9 commands “You shall not oppress a stranger, since you yourselves know the feelings of a stranger, for you also were strangers in the land of Egypt” (NASB). In response, Catholics have organized to assist migrants with issues they face in transit and resettlement. Over the years, these agencies have amassed records that document the forces shaping migration and their effect on human beings. An overview of three of the collections accessible to scholars at the Center for Migration Studies [CMS] in New York City outlines the development of Catholic immigrant aid agencies and identifies topics that might reward study. Sending Country-Based Migrant Aid The first Catholics to concern themselves with issues facing migrants were those in places with extensive emigration. In 1881 Charlotte Grace O’Brien, daughter of Irish patriot William Smith O’Brien, became concerned about the exploitation of Irish immigrant women. As customers of travel services, they were vulnerable to being overcharged, underserved, or defrauded, as laborers they could be underpaid and overworked, and in both situations they faced “moral dangers,” which was how nineteenth-century people described sexual harassment, rape, and prostitution.1 At O’Brien’s urging, the Archdiocese of New York established a parish, Our Lady of the Rosary, with a church at 7–8 State Street, across from the harbor. Its pastor directed the Mission of the Holy Rosary, in which capacity he met Irish women steerage passengers as they landed, first at Castle Garden and, after 1892, on Ellis Island. He helped those with American relatives [End Page 101] contact and travel to them, and provided space for employers of domestic servants to interview candidates, which gave him an opportunity to determine if the employment offered was legitimate and fair.2 German Catholics had been concerned about their co-religionists and compatriots earlier, and extended their work to New York City a few years later. In 1871 German merchant, parliamentarian and devout Catholic Peter Paul Cahensly helped found the Saint Raphael Society for the Protection of German Catholic Emigrants, naming it for the patron saint of travelers. Starting with an office in Hamburg, the Saint Raphael Society honored the pope at the time, Leo XIII, by opening Leo House, a hospice in New York City, in 1889, staffing it with German-speaking archdiocesan priests and Sisters of Saint Agnes from Fond du Lac, Wisconsin.3 One admirer of Cahensly’s work was John Baptist Scalabrini, Bishop of Piacenza in northwest Italy. In 1887 he founded a congregation of male religious, now known as the Scalabrini Fathers, to minister to migrants. Scalabrini and a lay associate, Giovanni Battista Volpe-Landi, organized the Saint Raphael Society for the Protection of Italian Immigrants. In 1892, Scalabrini sent Father Pietro Bandini to New York City to open a branch of the Saint Raphael Society. Founded at 113 Waverly Place in Greenwich Village, in 1901 the Italian Saint Raphael Society moved to 8–10 Charlton Street, where in addition to the services of a priest and an agent on Ellis Island, it offered a hospice staffed by Sisters of Charity Pallottine, the present day Pallottine Sisters of the Catholic Apostolate. Center for Migration Studies has the papers of the Italian Saint Raphael Society. The annual reports make real the phrase about “caring for immigrants.” Anecdotes highlight individual cases, such as that of the bride who lost her husband aboard the Titanic.4 Statistics indicate a more common story. The Saint Raphael Society annually saw more females than males and more adults than children, meaning the typical aid recipient was a woman traveling alone, usually to meet a husband or fiancé. The Saint Raphael Society helped women contact their menfolk, guided affianced couples through New York State [End Page 102] marriage paperwork, and provided a priest, chapel, and a community of nuns to witness the weddings.5 The stories of Holy Rosary, Leo House, and the Italian Saint Raphael Society suggest one reason why immigrant aid lagged behind other Catholic charities. Archbishop Michael Augustine Corrigan of New York supported immigrant aid, but his ideas on financing consisted of his personal...

About this Issue

About this Issue Nicholas Rademacher, Associate Editor This issue of American Catholic Studies includes essays that nicely complement one another—a pair of pairs. Two articles address the scholarship on women religious and two address Catholic responses to poverty in the developing world and at home. The articles by Joseph G. Mannard (Indiana University of Pennsylvania) and Deirdre Raftery (University College Dublin) focus on discrete dimensions of the scholarship on women religious in the United States. Mannard examines the proliferation of communities of women religious in antebellum America. He speaks of a “convent revolution” to argue that the three decades between 1830 and 1860 can be viewed as the starting point of the growth and influence of women religious in the United States. Raftery’s article turns readers’ attention to the future of scholarship on the history of women religious. The coming “third wave” of scholarship in this field will include advanced technological methods, equipping historians with new tools and, one anticipates, fresh insights into the lives of women religious. Edward T. Brett’s (La Roche College) article on Oscar Romero and Mary Elizabeth Brown’s (Marymount Manhattan College) cover essay on archival resources pertinent to U.S. Catholic immigrant aid societies both address matters of pressing contemporary concern, namely American Catholic attitudes toward poverty in the developing world and the U.S. Catholic reception of people fleeing poverty, violence, and political oppression. Brett investigates the contrasting views of Romero held by traditional, conservative elites and those who were influenced by Vatican II’s people of God ecclesiology and the preferential option for the poor. Brown provides an overview of archival collections available at the Center for Migration Studies in New York City, including papers of the Italian Saint Raphael Society, the National Catholic Welfare Conference (NCWC), and the American Committee for Italian Migration (ACIM). Scholars can use these important collections to track the various responses of U.S. Catholics to immigration. Taken together, the articles in this issue provide readers with fresh insights into and methodological resources for the study of subjects that remain pressing contemporary concerns. [End Page i] Copyright © 2017 American Catholic Historical Society

Reconnecting with the Center for Migration Studies

Reconnecting with the Center for Migration Studies

Potential Beneficiaries of the Obama Administration's Executive Action Programs Deeply Embedded in US Society

The Obama administration has developed two broad programs to defer immigration enforcement actions against undocumented persons living in the United States: (1) Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents (DAPA); and (2) Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA). The DACA program, which began in August 2012, was expanded on November 20, 2014. DAPA and the DACA expansion (hereinafter referred to as “DACA-plus”) are currently under review by the US Supreme Court and subject to an active injunction. This paper offers a statistical portrait of the intended direct beneficiaries of DAPA, DACA, and DACA-plus. It finds that potential DAPA, DACA, and DACA-plus recipients are deeply embedded in US society, with high employment rates, extensive US family ties, long tenure, and substantial rates of English-language proficiency. The paper also notes various groups that would benefit indirectly from the full implementation of DAPA and DACA or, conversely, would suffer from the removal of potential beneficiaries of these programs. For example, all those who would rely on the retirement programs of the US government will benefit from the high employment rates and relative youth of the DACA population, while many US citizens who rely on the income of a DAPA-eligible parent would fall into poverty or extreme poverty should that parent be removed from the United States. This paper offers an analysis of potential DAPA and DACA beneficiaries. In an earlier study, the authors made the case for immigration reform based on long-term trends related to the US undocumented population, including potential DAPA and DACA beneficiaries (Warren and Kerwin 2015). By contrast, this paper details the degree to which these populations have become embedded in US society. It also compares persons eligible for the original DACA program with those eligible for DACA-plus. As stated, the great majority of potential DAPA and DACA recipients enjoy strong family ties, long tenure, and high employment rates in the United States. Nearly one-half of the DAPA population and far higher percentages of the two DACA populations speak English well, very well, or exclusively. An unknown, albeit not insubstantial percentage of both the DAPA- and DACA-eligible may already qualify for an immigration benefit or relief that would put them on a path to permanent residency and US citizenship. These mostly low-wage populations have relatively high rates of poverty and low rates of health insurance. Not surprisingly, the educational attainment, school enrollment rates, and English-language proficiency of the DACA-eligible substantially exceed those of the DAPA-eligible. Both populations enjoy high levels of computer and Internet access. The Center for Migration Studies (CMS) derived its estimates on the DAPA- and DACA-eligible from statistics on the foreign-born population collected in the US Census Bureau's American Community Survey (ACS), as described in Warren (2016). It first derived detailed estimates for all undocumented residents, and then used the characteristics of this population (e.g., year of entry, age at entry, etc.) to tabulate the numbers of those who would be eligible for DAPA and DACA in 2014, which is the most recent year available.