Reviewed by: Errand Into the Wilderness of Mirrors: Religion and the History of the CIA by Michael Graziano Eva Payne Michael Graziano, Errand Into the Wilderness of Mirrors: Religion and the History of the CIA (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2021) Errand into the Wilderness of Mirrors examines the madcap and mundane ways that the US intelligence community sought to harness the power of religion to shape geopolitics. The book uses religious studies as both methodology and subject matter. Graziano frames the intelligence community much like a religious one—a group of people united by ideology and practices. He seeks to understand the worldview that shaped his actors' actions, much as scholars of religion do. But Graziano also focuses on why his historical actors thought that religion was the way to understand the people whom they wanted to control in the interest of US national security. The book traces the development of the "religious approach" to intelligence, a paradigm for understanding religions that paralleled the study of religion in the academy. While the book examines the faith that intelligence agents brought to their work, Graziano is more interested in how the religious approach shaped who the US intelligence community considered to be allies or enemies, how it attempted to sway nations to the side of the US and away from communism, and how it sold the subsequent conflicts to Americans at home. Organized chronologically, the chapters detail the shifting relationship between religion and US foreign intelligence organizations from WWII to the Iran hostage crisis. Chapter one shows how the founders of what would become [End Page 110] the Office of Strategic Services (OSS)—particularly Catholic William J. Donovan—brought a vision of American religious exceptionalism to US intelligence work from its inception. For Donovan, "religion was everywhere, free, and individual: a natural ally in war and diplomacy" (15), and the US was the place where religion had reached its apotheosis as a force for freedom. By developing an intelligence-sharing relationship between the Vatican and OSS, Donovan demonstrated to powerful Protestants that tolerating Catholicism was in the interest of national security, setting the stage for the post-War vision of the US as a bastion of religious pluralism. Chapter two tracks the growth of OSS-Catholic cooperation with Operation Pilgrim's Progress, through which the Catholic International Press shared on-the-ground intelligence from across Europe with the OSS. Chapter three surveys the US intelligence community's use of the religious approach to constrain Japanese imperialism in Asia. Intelligence officers saw Shinto and Buddhism as a means of understanding the "Japanese mind," while also stressing that those religions were incompatible with the Islam practiced by many in South Asia. They worked to convince Muslims to ally with the US and resist the Japanese by framing Islam and Christianity as siblings. Although President Truman dissolved the OSS in 1945, chapter four demonstrates that the religious approach lived on in the bureaucracies that superseded it as the intelligence community worked to fortify religion around the world. If the US was the land of religious freedom and pluralism, the logic went, then religious people everywhere would naturally ally with the US against communism. Chapter five details how the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) capitalized on the discourse of a "Tri-Faith America" to muster support for the Vietnam War at home and abroad. Catholic physician Thomas Dooley launched a propaganda campaign to develop American sympathy for Vietnamese Catholics, which in turn reaffirmed the place of Catholics in American life, allowing the CIA to project the image of American religious pluralism back out to the world. Chapter six traces the CIA's move from a tri-faith model to the "World Religions Paradigm," mirroring a shift in the academy. As the US launched counterinsurgency campaigns in the Philippines and Vietnam, the CIA sought to understand "Orientals" by understanding practices such as divination and soothsaying, which they believed to be central to Asian religions. Chapter seven explains how the religious approach made US intelligence officials unable to see the coming of the Iranian Revolution. The CIA understood religion and politics as fundamentally separate, and religion to be essentially anti-communist and pro-US. They thus attributed...
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