Categorical Norms Research Articles

Why Aristotle Isn’t a Virtue Ethicist. Living Well and Virtuously in Aristotelian and Contemporary Aretaic Ethics

Drawing on Anscombe, in this essay I argue that we should not take Aristotle to be a moral philosopher, nor a virtue ethicist. This is because contemporary virtue ethics has little to do with Aristotelian ethics. While contemporary virtue ethics (or aretaic moral theory, as one may call it) operates on the level of moral and thus categorical norms, Aristotelian ethics—an aretaic life ethics—is primarily concerned with pragmatic norms. The main question for Aristotle is what a good general conduct of life is. The major concern of aretaic moral theory, on the other hand, is to provide a criterion of morally right action and hence to define the concepts of the morally right, the impermissible and moral duty in aretaic terms. This shows that contemporary authors assume a primacy of virtue, while Aristotle assumes a primacy of eudaimonia. I illustrate this distinction by addressing the question of how the virtues benefit their possessor.

Addiction as a Loss of Inner Freedom

The aim of this paper is to present the addiction phenomenon as a loss of inner freedom (the freedom of making a decision). The theses that we present in this paper are the result of observations made through many years of work with addicts of all kinds (both substantial – drugs, alcohol, and nonsubstantial ones – gambling, internet). Losing the freedom of making a decision by constant and repetitive defeat by the means of pleasure has the aftermath of also losing the sense of an addict’s own existence, which is based on the feeling of building a wanted future for a person and his/her surroundings [1], and reinforces the circulus vitiosus of addiction. The understanding of these metaphysical principles is an important part of the recovery of an addict who wants to build a logical system of opinion to make a balance between psycho-biological needs on one side, and heterogeneous possibilities of freedom through the categorical norms of mind on the opposite.

Why Ought We Be Good?

In this paper, I argue for the necessity of including what I call “categorical norms” in Thomas Aquinas’s account of the ground of obligation (normativity theory) by drawing on the value phenomenology of Dietrich von Hildebrand. A categorical norm is one conceptually irreducible to any non-normative concept and which obligates us irrespective of pre-existing aims, goals, or desires. I show that Thomistic normativity theory on any plausible reading of Aquinas lacks categorical norms and then raise two serious objections which constitute master arguments against it. The upshot is that this theory requires reform. I end by proposing work remaining for such reform, namely, an expansion of the Thomistic metaphysic and anthropology.

Is there a Distinct Metaphilosophical Companions in Guilt Argument (and Does it Work)?

Companions in guilt arguments are widespread in defenses of moral realism and criticisms of error theory. Recently, a number of philosophers have argued that the companions in guilt argument fails because it makes untenable assumptions about the existence of categorical epistemic reasons. In this article, I develop an alternative version of the companions in guilt argument that does not succumb to this criticism, as it begins with the claim that there is a presumptive case in favor of attributing a belief in categorical norms of philosophical argumentation to proponents of the error theory. I then point to an instability in the error-theoretic position and explore the extent to which this instability poses a serious philosophical problem. While this argument has a narrower scope than the traditional companions in guilt arguments, I conclude that it nonetheless poses a significant challenge to any philosophical attempt to deny the categoricity of moral reasons.

Preschoolers, but not adults, treat instrumental norms as categorical imperatives

Hypothetical norms apply only when agents have specific goals, whereas categorical norms apply regardless of what agents want. Deciding whether a rule is hypothetical or categorical is crucial for navigating many social situations encountered by children and adults. The current research investigated whether preschoolers viewed instrumental norms (about how to accomplish practical tasks), prudential norms (pertaining to agent welfare), and moral norms (pertaining to others’ welfare) as hypothetical or categorical. A second main question was whether preschoolers draw distinctions between instrumental and other norms. Participants were interviewed about norm violations in which the agent did or did not have the relevant goal. The goal manipulation had no effect on children’s judgments of permissibility; most children treated all three norm types as categorical. Nevertheless, children distinguished instrumental events from prudential and moral events along several dimensions. In contrast, participants in two adult samples treated instrumental norms, and some prudential norms, as hypothetical, but treated moral norms as categorical (applicable regardless of agent goal). These findings suggest that preschoolers do not yet reliably distinguish between hypothetical and categorical norms, yet do view rules of instrumental rationality as a distinct type of norms.

Categorical Norms and Convention-Relativism about Epistemic Discourse

Allan Hazlett has recently developed an alternative to the most popular form of anti-realism about epistemic normativity, epistemic expressivism. He calls it “convention-relativism about epistemic discourse”. The view deserves more attention. In this paper, I give it attention in the form of an objection. Specifically, my objection turns on a distinction between inescapable and categorical norms. While I agree with Hazlett that convention-relativism is consistent with inescapable epistemic norms, I argue that it is not consistent with categorical epistemic norms. I then argue that Hazlett's account of a controversial upshot of convention-relativism – namely, that epistemic discourse is not “normative” – should, but does not, adequately address the question of whether epistemic norms are categorical. This leads to a more general discussion of anti-realism in epistemology.

Writing the Event: The Impossible Possibility for Historiography

This essay argues that traditional historical methods elide the radical singularity of the event by subjecting the event to meaning by way of categorical norms that cannot—by definition—include the radical singularity of “what happened.” Such historiographical methods render every event significant only insofar as it becomes evidentiary to and subservient to a satisfying narrative with a proper beginning, middle, and end—all of which follow, chronologically, in a linear, logic of time. Relying on Jacques Derrida’s theorization of the event, specifically in “A Certain Impossible Possibility of Saying the Event,” this essay will address the impossible possibility of writing the event by way of a hospitable historiography—beyond the representational demand, appropriative impulse, and temporal mandate of traditional historical methods.

What We Talk About When We Talk About Free Exercise

This Article places conflict between Congress and Supreme Court over Religious Freedom Restoration Act in context of long-standing theoretical confusion about meaning and scope of the of Both courts and commentators are inclined to misjudge scope of freedom Clause guarantees. When courts overestimate extent of fully realized guaranty, they tend to retreat out of concern that recognizing right will dissolve social contract and create society in which each person is a law unto herself. When they underestimate Clause, they tend to interpret it in ways that strip it of any meaning independent of Free Speech and Establishment Clauses.The Article explores contours of principled definition of the of as liberty distinct from Constitution's protections of speech and freedom from establishment. It first discusses problems raised by defining religion. The two possible poles of such definition are Emile Durkheim's purely social and behavioral definition and William James's purely internal and individual definition. Some judges and commentators apparently believe should be limited to Judeo-Christian religious traditions. American history and case law, however, suggest fourth possible meaning-a religion is protected by Clause if it agrees to abide by same rules of civil society that American religions obey.A different problem is posed by words the exercise. Historical analysis of this term has proved inconclusive; Article proposes to educe principled meaning of term by viewing it in context of Constitution, as embodying liberty distinct from others guaranteed in document but limited by them. Such principled meaning must protect more than mere more than opinion and ritual behavior, and perhaps even more than opinion, ritual behavior, and non-ritual behavior with potential consequences in larger society. Some judges and commentators, in fact, have even extended their definitions to include coercive actions taken by believers against others who do not share their religious commitments.The attempt to define coercive practices as free exercise introduces idea of limitations on concept. Some are internal; that is, they arise out of logical meaning of term. Others are external; they flow not from logical meaning of the exercise but from values embodied in unrelated portions of Constitution. The most prominent is Establishment Clause, but courts and commentators have mounted arguments for other sections of Constitution.The Article then argues that concept of must be considered within context in which specific claim arises. Cases in which individuals assert their own rights against coercive power of state are different, in theory and practice, from cases in which religious organizations advocate for their corporate prerogatives. In addition, claims should be adjudicated differently depending on whether they arise in context of individualized determination, such as an unemployment compensation claim, or of what Article calls categorical norm-a legal rule that allows for no individualized exceptions. Challenges to categorical norms seem to implicate concern for anarchy mentioned above. The Article, however, argues that some norms are only pseudo-categorical in nature: that is, though by their language they seem to apply generally, their structure and history reveal desire to harm religious minority. When challenger confronts truly categorical norm, Article suggests, courts should ask whether challenge arises because religious belief asserted opposes very goal of norm or because it seeks sincerely to work in concert with norm by different path. Religious challenges to underlying goal of norm cannot be sustained by principled definition of free exercise. However, if believer can show that her religious practice seeks to further underlying goal embodied by norm, and, further, that granting an accommodation will not unduly complicate general problem of enforcement, courts should craft an exemption. The Article suggests that this kind of case will be far rarer than courts and commentators seem to fear, and that deciding it is within traditional institutional competence of judiciary.

A Social Identity Model of Deindividuation Phenomena

This chapter challenges traditional models of deindividuation. These are based on the assumption that such factors as immersion in a group and anonymity lead to a loss of selfhood and hence of control over behaviour. We argue that such models depend upon an individualistic conception of the self, viewed as a unitary construct referring to that which makes individuals unique. This is rejected in favour of the idea that self can be defined at various different levels including the categorical self as well as the personal self. Hence a social identity model of deindividuation (SIDE) is outlined. Evidence is presented to show that deindividuation manipulations gain effect, firstly, through the ways in which they affect the salience of social identity (and hence conformity to categorical norms) and, secondly, through their effects upon strategic considerations relating to the expression of social identities. We conclude that the classic deindividuation paradigm of anonymity within a social group, far from lead...

A Critique of Concepts of Workable Competition

Introduction, 380. — I. The nature of the theory of workable competition, 383. — II. The several concepts of workability, 386. — III. Performance norms and value judgments, 391. — IV. Necessary vs. sufficient conditions, 395. — V. Remediability vs. categorical norms, 402. — VI. The workability criterion reformulated, 410. — Appendix, 415.