Cassius Dio Research Articles

Cassius Dio and Contemporary History (on A. Scott, An Age of Iron and Rust: Cassius Dio and the History of His Time.)

Cassius Dio and Contemporary History (on A. Scott, An Age of Iron and Rust: Cassius Dio and the History of His Time.)

Imperial Homecoming(s) and the Ara Pacis Augustae in 13 BC

AbstractAfter reflecting on the many dimensions that homecoming involves both in the present and in antiquity, the ceremonial enhancement of various returns of Caesar Augustus from military campaigns are briefly rehearsed through the Res Gestae Divi Augusti (4. 1–2) and other sources. These include the triumph following the battle of Actium (31/29 BC) and the celebration after the re-establishment of peace with the Parthians, which resulted in the cult of Fortuna Redux (19 BC). The Ara Pacis Augustae was decreed after Augustus' victories in Gaul (Res Gestae 12; Cassius Dio 54. 25. 1–4). The famous procession friezes have often been regarded as depicting the emperor's arrival celebrated as a ‘thanksgiving’ (supplicatio) in July 13 BC, but are better understood as memorializing the day on which the sacred space for the Ara Pacis was inaugurated in September. The friezes depict the emperor's family members as well as divine and mythical figures; while presented as naturalistic or historical, they are open to symbolic readings. In a certain sense, the senators enshrined the motif of Augustus' homecoming into the cult of Roman Peace (and Prosperity) and eternalized the ritualized blessing that this should bring to the Roman people. Cassius Dio's highly conflated account of the Senate's decrees in honour of the returning emperor was composed as criticism against servile flattering, but indirectly confirms the ideas underlying the Senate's decrees on the Actian Triumph, the cult for Fortuna Redux, and the sanctuary of the Ara Pacis: the salutary effect of Augustus' victorious return(s) to Rome should become a permanent blessing irrespective of the singular historical events.

“Cassius Dio, A Bithynian ‘exiled’ to Rome?”

AbstractFirst, we will retrace the life and brilliant career of this Roman senator of Bithynian origins who came from an ancient family of public figures and who had served five or six emperors and been friends with several of them, having been twice appointed to the role of consul.Then we will consider the nature of his role as Senator coming from an Eastern province and its relationship with Roman power. We will come to see that he represents the perfect example of his theory of the association of provincial élites coming to power, which was developed at length in his work, Roman History, which he produced in Greek for a Greek readership.Finally, rather paradoxically, we will consider how he sees himself in a largely bi-lingual and bi-cultural empire and how he speaks of his homeland with a view to determining whether his attachment to his ‘little country’ is the stronger and if his numerous sojourns in Rome amount to little more than a ‘golden exile’ for him.

THE BATTLE OF CHAERONEA: 86 BCE

In 86 BCE Proconsul Lucius Cornelius Sulla’s (138-78 BCE) looked over the potential battlefield at the broad plain near Chaeronea. He heard horses neigh, and men rumble as they set up camp. Sulla knew the upcoming engagement of his 30,000 legionnaires against the 120,000-man army of Mithridates VI (135-78 BCE) (Appian 12.3.17, 12.6.41) of Pontus would be bloody, brutal, and deadly. General Archelaus commanded the Pontic forces. Sulla may have reflected on the cascade of events which placed him in this dire situation.In 107 BCE. Consul Gaius Marius (157-86 BCE) initiated policies designed to enhance the efficacy of the Roman army. One of these reforms placed the responsibility to supply and manage an army under the authority of the commanding general, rather than the Consul and Senate. This change allowed charismatic, ambitious generals to divert the primary loyalty of soldiers to themselves rather than the State. Sulla used this change in loyalty to march on Rome in 88 BCE and 82 BCE. (Plutarch 2.3.1)In 89 BCE Mithridates embarked on a policy of military expansionism. He invaded Bithynia and Cappadocia, even though Roman officials warned him to respect Bithynia’s sovereignty. The Roman Senate declared war on Pontus, appointed Sulla to prosecute the war, and the First Mithridatic War began (89-84 BCE). (Appian 12.4.22, 12.5.30) Mithridates’ army overran Roman provinces in Asia Minor. Cassius Dio reported: “All the Asiatic, at the bidding of Mithridates massacred the Romans.” (Dio 31.101) Mithridates then invaded the Roman province of Greece. The seizure of Roman territory and murder of Roman citizens was a grievous affront to the honor of Senatus Populusque Romanus (the Senate and People of Rome). Mithridates must have known from the history of Carthage what fate awaited him and Pontus if his military adventurism failed. Either he must destroy the Roman Republic, or it would destroy Pontus and humiliate, then kill him. Control over the region of the Eastern Mediterranean was at stake. Civil War diverted Sulla’s attention, but he finally advanced against Pontic armies in Greece in 87 BCE. He quickly drove two Mithridatic armies into the fortifications of Athens and the Piraeus. Then he successfully moved against these two fortifications. Archelaus escaped by sea to Boeotia. Sulla followed him with his army to Chaeronea, in central Greece. He had Legates Sulpicious Galba, Licinious Murena, and Lucius Hortensius under his command (Plutarch 15.17).

THE EMPEROR AND THE HISTORIAN: AN ANALYSIS OF ELA-GABALUS’ IMAGE CONSIDERING CASSIUS DIO’S TRAJECTORY AND POINT OF VIEW

In the work Roman History (Ῥωμαϊκὴ Ἱστορία), the historian and senator Cassius Dio constructs a highly negative image of the emperor Marcus Aurelius Antoninus (218-222), traditionally known as Elagabalus. This image of Elagabalus reverberated in modern uncritical historiographical studies and was passed down through a long tradition in a resignified form, arriving as a feminine and anarchic image of Elagabalus in artistic works. Knowing the importance that Cassius Dio's work seems to have had in the construction of the image of Elagabalus that will reach our contemporary times, it draws our attention to think about the relationship that Dio had with Elagabalus. In view of this, the objective of this text is to construct, as far as possible, the political trajectory of Cassius Dio, his cursus honorum, as well as to analyze some characters that he mentions in his work taking a prominent role in certain functions of Elagabalus' government. Having done this, we will seek to question possible relationships between Cassius Dio's career, his view on the rise of certain agents alongside Elagabalus and his highly negative construction of this emperor's political image.

СДЕРЖКИ БЕЗ ПРОТИВОВЕСОВ: ИДЕЯ «СМЕШЕНИЯ МОНАРХИИ И ДЕМОКРАТИИ» В «РИМСКОЙ ИСТОРИИ» КАССИЯ ДИОНА

In the third century AD, the historian Cassius Dio Cocceianus, in his "Roman History," proposes a blueprint for an ideal political constitution: the state that combines monarchy and democracy. Book 56 characterizes such regime as "a mixture of monarchy and democracy." Modern authors may draw an analogy with the concept of plebiscitary democracy. This paper, however, is aimed at preventing such analogies as despite the external similarities, the institutional content of the two models is different. The paper reveals the functions of the monarch, the people, and the Senate in the mixed constitution of Cassius Dio in two aspects: how they were intended to be presented to the addressees of the project, and the actual set of powers of each institution. The political project is examined in the context of Dio's ideas on the worst situations in politics such as civil war and 'dunasteia'. The author compares Cassius Dion's mixed constitution with the Caesarist model. The results show that while modern plebiscitary regimes involve two parts of the system - the elected ruler and the acclamating people - Dio's model consists essentially of three elements: the monarch, the people, and the Senate.

Xiphilinus and the Causes for the Outbreak of the Bar Kokhba Revolt

The Epitome of Xiphilinus, an abbreviation of books 36-80 of Cassius Dio’s Roman History created in eleventh-century Byzantium, because of the incomplete state of preservation of the latter is an extremely important narrative source for contemporary researchers of ancient Rome during the Principate period. This is also the case with the Bar Kokhba uprising, a conflict relatively poorly documented in narrative sources. The greatest debates revolve around the causes of this conflict for which the Epitome of Xiphilinus constitutes the most extensive surviving narrative source. The fact that Dio’s work has not been preserved in the original makes scholars question the account presented by Xiphilinus, whom they perceive as a Byzantine monk writing from a Christian and even anti-Jewish perspective.

Recepcja Historii rzymskiej Kasjusza Diona w rozdziale Epitome Jana Ksyfi linosa poświęconym Pompejuszowi

Xiphilinos’ Epitome constitutes one of the most understudied Byzantine sources despite its great importance and role as a transmitter of the unpreserved parts of Cassius Dio’s Roman History. Until recently it was mainly perceived as an unoriginal product whose author was only a passive and often incompetent copyist. For scholars of Ancient Rome Epitome was seen only as a substitute for Dio, while Byzantinists deemed Xiphilinos as an uninteresting author. Analysis of Epitome’s first chapter devoted to Pompey shows that in fact, he was an author who actively shaped his work according to his own literary tastes and trends functioning in eleventh-century Byzantine historiography. Epitome, a didactic work dedicated to the emperor Michael VII Doukas, was an intellectual product of an era where the ancient roots of Byzantium started to play an increasingly important role in contemporary political discourse. It was also the first work of Byzantine historiography which devoted as much space to Roman history before the establishment of imperial monarchy.

An individual with Sarmatian-related ancestry in Roman Britain

In the second century CE the Roman Empire had increasing contact with Sarmatians, nomadic Iranian speakers occupying an area stretching from the Pontic-Caspian steppe to the Carpathian mountains, both in the Caucasus and in the Danubian borders of the empire.1,2,3 In 175 CE, following their defeat in the Marcomannic Wars, emperor Marcus Aurelius drafted Sarmatian cavalry into Roman legions and deployed 5,500 Sarmatian soldiers to Britain, as recorded by contemporary historian Cassius Dio.4,5 Little is known about where the Sarmatian cavalry were stationed, and no individuals connected with this historically attested event have been identified to date, leaving its impact on Britain largely unknown. Here we document Caucasus- and Sarmatian-related ancestry in the whole genome of a Roman-period individual (126-228 calibrated [cal.] CE)-an outlier without traceable ancestry related to local populations in Britain-recovered from a farmstead site in present-day Cambridgeshire, UK. Stable isotopes support a life history of mobility during childhood. Although several scenarios are possible, the historical deployment of Sarmatians to Britain provides a parsimonious explanation for this individual's extraordinary life history. Regardless of the factors behind his migrations, these results highlight how long-range mobility facilitated by the Roman Empire impacted provincial locations outside of urban centers.

VATICANVS GRAECVS 156, CASSIUS DIO AND THELVDI SAECVLARESOFa.d.204

AbstractA scholium in codex Vaticanus graecus 156 provides evidence that Cassius Dio'sRoman Historyonce contained an explicit reference to theludi saecularesofa.d. 204, something that has been denied in recent scholarship.

A Tripod ‘Worth Seeing’ in the Olympieion at Athens (Paus. 1.18.8)

AbstractThis study proposes a new reconstruction of the tripod that Pausanias (1.18.8) recorded in the Olympieion at Athens. According to his brief description, the bronze tripod was supported by Persians made from Phrygian marble. A sculptor's sketch found during the excavations of the Athenian Agora is identified as a representation of that monument. The sketch, carved from poros limestone, depicts a standing male figure dressed in eastern attire supporting the foot of a tripod. The figural type finds its closest parallels among the colossal statues from the Forum of Trajan in Rome, suggesting a new date and context for the monument in the Olympieion. The scenario favoured here is that the tripod was dedicated following Trajan's victories in Parthia, perhaps completed or commissioned by Hadrian. Cassius Dio (68.17.2) records that Trajan departed for his Parthian campaigns from Athens, where memories of Persian defeat were actively curated.

Commentaria archaeologica et historica (V). 1. About the Legionary Fort at Sarmizegetusa in AD 102–205 (Cassius Dio 68.9.7). 2. The Destiny of the “Dacian Gold”. About a Koson Type Coin Reused in the 16th Century in a Christian (Renaissance) Context

Commentaria archaeologica et historica (V). 1. About the Legionary Fort at Sarmizegetusa in AD 102–205 (Cassius Dio 68.9.7). 2. The Destiny of the “Dacian Gold”. About a Koson Type Coin Reused in the 16th Century in a Christian (Renaissance) Context

Rome, Parthia, and the Politics of Peace: The Origins of War in the Ancient Middle East by Jason M. Schlude

Reviewed by: Rome, Parthia, and the Politics of Peace: The Origins of War in the Ancient Middle East by Jason M. Schlude Everett L. Wheeler Rome, Parthia, and the Politics of Peace: The Origins of War in the Ancient Middle East. By Jason M. Schlude. London, UK and New York, NY: Routledge, 2020. Pp. xvi+ 221. Hardback, $128.00. ISBN: 978-0-815-35370-6. From Antiquity on, nearly everyone has misinterpreted Roman-Parthian relations—even contemporaries like Tacitus and Cassius Dio, who experienced Parthian wars (9). Rather than hostility, we should consider peace and cooperation of the two major powers and frame supposed hostility within the effects of rhetorical posturing, largely for domestic consumption, which could then justify conflicts. This work departs from the victimology of the “no-Roman-strategy” school’s innocent, non-threatening Parthians beset by Roman aggression in conceding Parthian initiation of some conflicts, even if sometimes ripostes to Roman provocation. A “glory” motive for Roman campaigns, here “imperialist self-display,” is not entirely abandoned. Few specialists, however, will be deceived. The contrived arguments and myopic bibliographical gaze (largely anglophone) fail to capture the tension and delicacy of Roman-Parthian relations. Throughout, peace is assumed the norm, until disrupted by “troublemakers” like Crassus and Trajan. A certain naïveté about international relations permeates the volume, as if “peace” can be defined solely as the absence of armed conflict, thus ignoring the psychological dimensions of suspicion about a rival’s bona fides and potential threats, whether real or imagined. The author correctly recognizes that “peace” and mutual restraint coincided with practicality (13). Expediency might be the better term. After all, neither power realistically ever hoped to conquer the other except in rhetorical fantasies and Rome never attempted to advance beyond Mesopotamia into the Iranian plateau. Peace and cooperation are emphasized rather than limits on power, which for both states domestic issues and troublesome [End Page 479] frontiers elsewhere checked, even if both occasionally attempted to exploit the other’s woes. A larger context of Roman-Parthian relations is not addressed. Every generation from the 50s BCE to the 220s CE experienced a Parthian crisis or war. Yet Schlude’s “peaceful co-existence” of two rival powers misconstrues the situation. If head-on armed clashes were generally avoided, Armenia, the chief cause of Roman-Parthian conflicts directly or indirectly, became the circumscribed theater for proxy operations, where prestige could be won (or lost) at minimal risk.1 But the author’s superficial understanding of the Armenian problem is clear, particularly in treating the Neronian compromise (63 CE), termed “cooperative imperialism” (139 n.45). If Nero, like Augustus (20 BCE), disguised peace with images of conquest, Tiridates I’s crowning at Rome obscured a Parthian victory. Festus’ terse but accurate assessment (Brev. 20) is essentially ignored: “Nero lost Armenia.” Arsacid rule in Armenia reversed the policy from Augustus on of having an Armenian king with at least a drop of Artaxiad blood in his veins. Vologaeses I’s (temporary) withdrawal from the war with delivery of hostages in 55 reflected expediency, not restraint, as a pretender loomed besides a revolt in Hyrcania. Nor can Tacitus (Ann. 13.34.2, 37) be used to argue that the compromise of 63, already envisioned in the war’s early years, awaited only displays of Roman military might to obtain Parthian acceptance—revival of a view of the 1920s and 1930s (without acknowledgement). The war was originally thought to be over with the installation of Tigranes VI in 59.2 Nor will many favor an assertion (5) that East-West conflict begins with Carrhae (53 BCE), a notion generally associated with Herodotus’ view of the Persian Wars. Despite citation of some earlier bibliography (misguided in Schlude’s view), it remains unclear against whom the anti-hostility thesis is aimed, except for the claim in a popular book that Roman-Parthian conflict was “inevitable.”3 Should such weight be assigned to a popular book? No one has ever argued for a permanent state of war. [End Page 480] A decade’s gestation of the work from a 2009 Berkeley dissertation under Erich Gruen, whose stylistic influence can be discerned, did not...

How to Mix Monarchy with Democracy. Precepts from Roman History

The article deals with several aspects of the theory of mixed government (mixed constitution), given that many scholars, including Max Weber, considered such phenomenon of modern political systems as Ceasarism to be a mix of monarchy and democracy. In the beginning an analysis of a famous statement from the “Roman History” of Cassius Dio (who wrote that Augustus has “mixed monarchy with democracy”) is provided. Such terms from Ancient Greek as demokratia and monarchia had a very specific meaning during the time of writing of this book, i.e. 220–230 CE. But apart from studying the peculiarities of the historical meanings of the terms used to designate these forms of rule what is important is also how their juxtaposition or mixing was theorized. The article studies different terms used in such interpretations. Briefly, the term krasis meant a fusion of the components and thus a creation of a new substance with new qualities and homogeneity, while the term mixis could also mean that the components of the mixture retained their distinct existence, though acquiring an ability to influence each other. The second version of conceptualizing mixes eventually served as the basis for a famous theory of checks and balances within a political regime. Thus Dio, one could argue, uses the term mixis rather than krasis — and this makes his different from the other authors of the school of the Second Sophistic — because he wants to stress that one form of rule should check and balance another form, and they should not constitute a total fusion within a uniform political regime. In the end of th article, the conceptual vocabulary of Dio is tested in its felicity while describing present day political phenomena.

Titus’ Plague, Hypotheses on its Origin and Causes: A Consilience Study

In the period between the years 77 and 81 CE, during the Principate of Titus, some catastrophic events occurred in the Roman Empire. Sources report: the eruption of Vesuvius, 79 CE, a devastating fire in the city of Rome, which alone caused the destruction of a large part of sacred and public buildings, and an epidemic, best known as the Titus’ plague. This would have occurred between the year 77 and the year 80 CE, perhaps over a period including more than a year. It is not entirely clear whether it was limited to the territory of the city of Rome or spread to other regions. Cassius Dio [2], Suetonius [3] and Jerome [4,5] and Baronius [6] placed the origin of the epidemic in the city of Rome. The relevance of the epidemic may have been very large, with a mortality rate of over 10,000 units per day [3-5]. This research investigated the causes of the epidemic, exploiting the philological analysis of the sources and by inferential statistics. Based on the information obtained from the sources, the identikit of the disease that could have been responsible for the epidemic was created. The information reported in the sources were considered as independent variables and some possible diseases as dependent variables, in a multiple regression test. Results show the influenza virus group as the most probable candidate for the genesis of the epidemic episode, with a test significance of F 7.6; P < .002. The historical news reported in the sources, with reference to the massive importation, killing and consumption of an impressive number of wild animals, including cranes, on the inauguration of the Flavian amphitheater (Colosseum), which took place in the year 80, also suggest the possible emergence of a lineage of H5N1 virus, commonly named avian flu, as a very likely etiological agent of the Titus' plague, with an even greater statistical significance: F 23.33; P < .001.

Ch. 7. Autopsy from a Broken Monarchy: Trauma-based Readings from Cassius Dio’s Contemporary Rome

Ch. 7. Autopsy from a Broken Monarchy: Trauma-based Readings from Cassius Dio’s Contemporary Rome

Josiah Osgood, Christopher Baron (Edd.): Cassius Dio and the Late Roman Republic.

Josiah Osgood, Christopher Baron (Edd.): Cassius Dio and the Late Roman Republic.

Dio’s Tiberian Books: A New Translation and Commentary (on C. T. Mallan, Cassius Dio, Roman History: Books 57 and 58 (The Reign of Tiberius))

Dio’s Tiberian Books: A New Translation and Commentary (on C. T. Mallan, Cassius Dio, Roman History: Books 57 and 58 (The Reign of Tiberius))

On Conspiracy Thinking: Conspiracist Ideology as a Modern Phenomenon

<p>Conspiracism is a well‐known topos in the history of humankind. Cassius Dio wrote about it as did anti‐Judaic authors in the Middle Ages. Nevertheless, from the dawn of modernity until today, we have faced the rise of a new phenomenon. Pretty much on the eve of the French Revolution, conspiracists began to tell anti‐Catholic and anti‐masonic narratives down to the last detail. Jews, later on, became a recurring foe in those anti‐modernist narratives. Conspiracism managed successfully to incorporate other forms of anti‐modernism to form a fairly new form of thinking that I call “conspiracist ideology.” While Enlightenment was the setting in which this amalgamation could take place, conspiracist ideology and its intellectual roots were characterized by a deep rejection of enlightenment thinking. The dialectical nature of conspiracist ideology is what makes it interesting from a historical perspective, in particular for the history of ideas.</p>

Zeugma’daki Poseidon Evi Emblemasından Skyros’taki Akhilleus: Caracalla ve Görüntülerin Gücü

This iconographic and iconological analysis has shown the existence of a long tradition about this subject, that is Achilles on Skyros in the emblema from the House of Poseidon at Zeugma. This tradition dates back to the 1st century AD and it concerns the Roman mosaic and painting. The model of Achilles on Skyros travelled from the West to the East, especially from Italy (Rome and Pompeii) towards the eastern part of the Roman Empire. This model arrived in Zeugma on the Euphrates at the beginning of the third century AD, under Caracalla (211-217 CE). The rich owner (dominus) and client of the Poseidon Villa was to be a high officer of Caracalla belonging to Legio IV Scythica or Parthica. In fact Zeugma became the settlement of this Roman legion and the outpost against the Parthians, above all during the reign of Septimius Severus (193-211 CE) and under his successor Caracalla. The dominus of the Poseidon Villa made the imperial propaganda his own by choosing the subject of Achilles on Skyros, which was very favourite by Caracalla on the ideological level, as the subject of Alexander the Great (Cfr. Cassius Dio, Herodian, Scriptores Historiae Augustae). The myth of Achilles on Skyros is very ancient (Cfr. Cypria, Pindar, Sophocles, Euripides) and privileged by Roman (Domus Aurea) and Pompeian painting and mosaic dating back to the emperor Nero, ardent admirer both Achilles and Alexander the Great, as Caracalla.