Cas Mudde Research Articles

Cas Mudde: “O termo populismo não é apenas um eufemismo. Falta-lhe clareza e temos termos melhores para descrever o mesmo fenômeno”

n this interview, Cas Mudde, one of the most influential political scientists in the United States and an international reference in the study of populism and right-wing extremism, criticizes the concept of populism and emphasizes why his current work is focused on the concept of far-right. Mudde also compares the far-right in the Global South and the Global North and explains what he understands by mainstreaming and normalization. Finally, the political scientist warns about the threats to liberal democracy.

Populism and Its Expression in Italy

The political practice of populism has long existed in Europe, in recent years, the concept of populism has received increasing attention and it has frequently appeared on the political stage in various European countries. Populism is especially popular and typical in Italy, while problems also emerge with different forms. Whats more, this ideology always appears as a discourse of two opposing groups. The paper explores the development of populism in Italy, its impact on Italy and Europe as a whole by using a case study of Italian populist political parties and adopting Cas Mudde's definition of populism. As a result, populism could be illustrated as a tool for regulating the European society when there is a democratic imbalance. In the end, we can find the pattern of populism, try to predict its future development and its effects in different spheres in Europe, and then gain some awareness of the predicament of European society.

In the Name of “Endangered Nations” and “Unsovereign States”? Official Discourses of Radical Right Movement Parties and Social Movement Organizations in Poland and Germany

AbstractThe political landscape of the radical right has long been a major discussion point in the political and social sciences. By considering the variety of radical right organizations (movement parties and non-parliamentary organizations) and the particular national and transnational political and discursive opportunity structures, the paper aims at a comparative analysis of the main discursive frames present in political programs and manifestoes of radical right social movement organizations and movement parties in Poland (Konfederacja Wolność i Niepodległość and Obóz Narodowo-Radykalny) and Germany (Alternative für Deutschland and Identitäre Bewegung Deutschland). Moreover, based on approaches developed by Cas Mudde and Jens Rydgren, this article analyses how the features presumed essential to the radical right (nativism, authoritarianism and populism) are reflected and interconnected in the official discourses of the selected radical right organizations.

Understanding Civilizational Populism in Europe and North America: The United States, France, and Poland

This article tests the salience of the concept of “civilizational populism” in the European and North American contexts. Right-wing populism is increasingly successful across a range of countries in Europe and North America. While right-wing populism is oriented toward nationalism and nativism, many right-wing populist parties increasingly perceive, as Brubaker puts it, the “opposition between self and other” and “the boundaries of belonging” not in narrow “national but in broader civilizational terms”. Yilmaz and Morieson describe this phenomenon as “civilizational populism”. Using Cas Mudde’s ideological/ideational definition of populism, Yilmaz and Morieson describe civilizational populism as “a group of ideas that together considers that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people, and society to be ultimately separated into two homogenous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’ who collaborate with the dangerous others belonging to other civilizations that are hostile and present a clear and present danger to the civilization and way of life of the pure people”. Civilizational populism appears to be widespread across Europe, and it is also present in the United States, although there is curiously little research on this phenomenon, and Yilmaz and Morieson’s conception of civilizational populism has not been extensively tested. To test the salience of this concept, this article examines three distinct manifestations of civilizational rhetoric in three different countries: the Trump administration in the United States, National Rally in France, and PiS in Poland. The article asks the following two questions. What role does civilizationalism play in populist discourses? How do the civilizational populists in France, Poland, and the United States define “the people”, “elites”, and “others”, and what are the similarities and differences between the parties/movements examined? The article finds that all three parties/movements may be termed “civilizational populists” under the definition given by Yilmaz and Morieson. It finds that the civilizational populists examined in the article posit that “elites” are immoral insofar as they have both turned away from the “good” religion-derived cultural values of “the people” and permitted or desired the immigration of people who do not share the culture and values as “the people”, instead belonging to a foreign civilization—Islam—with different and even antithetical values. However, the article finds that “the people”, “elites”, and “others” are described by Trump, Le Pen, and Kaczyński in significantly different ways.

Populist Skirmishers: Frontrunners of Populist Radical Right in Poland

Mainstream parties, like PiS in Poland, have to cater to broad segments of society to sustain broad support. Cultivation of populist radical right ideologies of authoritarianism, traditionalism, religiosity, and nativism—all interlaced with gender as a nemesis and the nation as a deity—takes highly motivated, confrontational politicians who prepare the ground for radical populist ideas to take root in the electorate’s minds, who mobilize voters through radicalization. This article introduces the concept of “populist skirmishers” to the literature on populism, adding this to Cas Mudde’s basket of major mobilizing forces of populism, that is, a populist leader, a social movement, and a political party. Though it might be considered an unnecessary elevation of a profession that perverts the rules of civility in the public sphere, polarizes electorates, and does whatever it takes to derail the project of European integration, I argue that understanding the modus operandi and functions of populist skirmishers is indispensable to furthering our understanding of populism.

Radical, Nativist, Authoritarian—Or All of These? Assessing Recent Cases of Right-Wing Populism in Latin America

In the light of a series of right-wing populist successes, some observers concluded that there is a kind of populist contagion going on and that the global wave of radical right populism (RRP) has finally reached Latin America. Yet, a premature categorization based on outward similarities eventually leads to omitting important differences. The aim of this article is a typological assessment of four recent cases of right-wing populism in Latin America—Jair Bolsonaro (Brazil), José António Kast (Chile), Guido Manini Ríos (Uruguay), and Javier Milei (Argentina)—to clarify their correspondence with Cas Mudde’s concept of RRP. The questions to be addressed are the following: Are these four leaders and their parties radically right? Are they right-wing in cultural terms (nativist and authoritarian)? Are they populist? And do they have sufficient features in common to speak of a right-wing populist wave?

The Role of Economy in Right-wing Populism: Two Differing Approaches

Populism has been one of the concepts that attract conflicting opinions from scholars. These debates revolve around many different aspects such as who votes for populist parties, what constitutes a populist leader, which institutional factors help populist parties come to power, and even on how populism should be defined. This conflicting opinion then matters for social scientists since differing opinions about the question of what populism is would then lead to different research and different results. This article analyzes the two different populism definitions: Populism as an ideology, and populism as a discursive style and shows how two definitions yield different results in explaining the economic nexus that drives populist parties. This article shows two seminal works on populism literature; Cas Mudde, and Norris and Inglehart have differing opinions on the economic reasoning behind populist parties solely because of the definitions they attribute to populism.

Populist discourses and conflicts of democratic legitimacy: the Bolivian political crisis of 2019

ABSTRACT This article supports the thesis that so-called ‘populist’ and ‘anti-populist’ discourses are really demo-legitimist discourses, i.e. discourses in which political actors defend their own democratic legitimacy and attack the democratic legitimacy of their antagonist. To support this thesis, using a qualitative-narratological approach, we analysed the speeches of political leaders of the two opposing sides in the 2019 political crisis in Bolivia. The narrative structures of those speeches are identical in that they correspond to what Cas Mudde identifies as populism. We conclude, therefore, that populist and anti-populist discourses are very similar in that they both reflect demo-legitimist currents that come into opposition in conjunctural or structural situations of crises in democratic legitimacy.

Lessons for Left-Wing Populism from the 2010s Austerity Wave in Europe

Lessons for Left-Wing Populism from the 2010s Austerity Wave in Europe

Populism and the Crisis of American Methodism

A rich literature on ‘populism’ and ‘religion’ has flourished in the preceding decade. Following a now consensual vision of ‘populism’ as ‘anti-pluralism’, scholars such as Cas Mudde, Daniel Steinmetz-Jenkins, and Duncan McDonnell have homed in on how populists weaponize religious themes and live off the decline of organized religiosity. This paper revisits these theses through a re-examination of the first self-declared populist movement in history, the American People’s Party of the late nineteenth century and two of its most prominent political personalities – Georgia Populist Thomas E. Watson and Boston radical Benjamin O. Flower. Both Watson and Flower were convinced Methodists all their lives and saw Populist farming associations in the 1890s as a natural extension of previous church networks. After the movement’s defeat in 1896, however, both remodulated their Methodism for specific ends: anti-Catholicism, opposition to Protestant missionary efforts, anti-vaccination sentiment and, in case of Watson, aggressive anti-Semitism. Rather than seeing these instances as deviations from a populist creed, this paper investigates how Flower and Watson’s Populism saw the crisis of American Methodism as part of a broader republican decline, and how this insight can inform contemporary discussion on the interrelation between populism, pluralism, democracy, and religion.

The Revolution Within: State Institutions and Unarmed Resistance in Palestine. By Yael Zeira. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2019. 240p. $99.99 cloth, $29.99 paper. - The Israeli Settler Movement: Assessing and Explaining Social Movement Success. By Sivan Hirsch-Hoefler and Cas Mudde. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2020. 280p. $99.99 cloth.

The Revolution Within: State Institutions and Unarmed Resistance in Palestine. By Yael Zeira. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2019. 240p. 29.99 paper. - The Israeli Settler Movement: Assessing and Explaining Social Movement Success. By Sivan Hirsch-Hoefler and Cas Mudde. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2020. 280p. $99.99 cloth. - Volume 20 Issue 1

Right-wing populist affective governing: a frame analysis of Austrian parliamentary debates on migration

ABSTRACT In the aftermath of the ‘summer of migration’ of 2015, right-wing populist discourses became increasingly commonplace. This article by Thiele, Sauer and Penz investigates the resurgence of nativist and anti-migration attitudes in Austria by focusing on parliamentary debates between 2015 and 2019 concerned with migration, asylum policies and integration measures. Their theoretical approach builds first on Cas Mudde’s conception of right-wing populism—which proceeds from the premise of corrupt ‘elites’ and threatening Others—and then combines it with theories on the politics of emotion and affects. By employing a critical affective frame analysis, the study examines how right-wing populist arguments by political actors are always intertwined with affects, like anger, fear and hope, in order to mobilize followers and voters. They regard these connections as governing strategy aiming at right-wing exclusion, a mode of governing through affects, which tends to change the affective atmosphere in Austria, that is, what is conceivable, speakable and feelable with regard to migration and refugees. As it turns out, not only the notorious Freedom Party (FPÖ) (with a longstanding far-right tradition) but also the refurbished People’s Party (ÖVP) under their new leader Sebastian Kurz, draw on discourses that are exclusionary as well as affective, encouraging the Austrian population rather to fear migrants and to feel anger, in order to mobilize them against threatening ‘migration waves’ and ‘illegal immigration’.

From populism to democratic legitimism: towards a radical reconsideration of populism as a political category

ABSTRACT This article argues that the political category of populism has been constituted, historically, on the basis of political parties and leaders who, in complex performative processes, have been defined as populists. Those performative processes have been implemented in hegemonic academic, media and political discourses that are underpinned by ideological biases and political stratagems. As a consequence, the political category of populism is incoherent and diffuse, while the predominant explanations of populism, deriving mainly from Cas Mudde and Ernesto Laclau, have led to broad and generic definitions. Those definitions are inconsistent, given that they not only can be applied to political leaders and parties designated as populist, but also to almost any other political party or leader who, in their specific historical context, questions the democratic credentials of an existing political system, while proposing themselves as the standard bearer for the only legitimate and true democracy. Proposed in this article, therefore, is the creation of a new political category called ‘democratic legitimism’ or ‘demo-legitimism’, which would include populist discourse as just one of many types of demo-legitimist discourses. Use of the term ‘demo-legitimism’ rather than the term ‘populism’ may foster a more open debate on democracy.

Taking stock of the field of populism research: Are ideational approaches ‘moralistic’ and post-foundational discursive approaches ‘normative’?

This article sets out to examine two claims that have increasingly come to define the dividing lines between the ideational and the post-foundational discursive approaches to populism: namely, that the former is moralistic and the latter is normative in orientation. The article considers the conceptual merits of both critiques while using them to further examine some of the implicit assumptions and pitfalls within Cas Mudde’s and Ernesto Laclau’s paradigmatic conceptualizations of populism. It is argued that ideational scholars’ attribution of a moralistic particularity to populism runs the risk of pathologizing the latter for characteristics that are arguably constitutive of all politics, while the danger of a certain crypto-normativity can be seen in Laclau’s tendency to equate populism with the political and simultaneously emphasize its emancipatory effects. The key difference between the two approaches ultimately consists in the location that they assign to populism within the wider topography of politics itself.

Did somebody say populism? Towards a renewal and reorientation of populism studies

ABSTRACTResponding to the recent explosion in scholarly analysis of populism, this paper offers a conceptual mapping and critique of the dominant schools of thought within the burgeoning field of populism studies. In the first half of the paper we suggest that two broad conceptions of populism – one associated with Cas Mudde, the other with Ernesto Laclau – have come to dominate the field. Yet neither of these approaches, we argue, are able to satisfactorily capture the specificity of contemporary forms of radical politics. Thus, the second part of the paper examines possible responses to this conceptual impasse. On the one hand, we recommend a move towards more theoretically and sociologically enriched accounts of populism, by drawing on the insights and concepts of political sociology, political theory and cultural studies. On the other, drawing on recent work by Benjamin De Cleen, Jason Glynos and Aurelien Mondon, we suggest a partial reorientation of populism towards thinking about populism as a signifier (rather than as a concept). In so doing, we conclude with a call for greater sensitivity to, and awareness of, the role that discourses about populism (including scholarly discourses) play in sustaining existing relations of power and ideology.

Why Does Populism Have a Future?

The following research aims to present Populism as a phenomenon and the reasons why it has a future all over the world. The XXI - st century is also known as the "Populist era" (Cas Mudde). Both the left and the right have nothing more to offer and give the people who want something new. The change should also give them security. Populism has a future because it is not an ideology. It "borrows" the most appropriate from the left and the right ideologies and "adjusts" them to people’s problems and gives solutions. Populism is a global phenomenon. Today we are witnessing the 4-th wave which is spreading all over the world. The former 3 waves have been mainly in Latin America, the place which is also considered its cradle, as Ernesto Laclua argues. Many political scientists such as Cas Mudde, have warned about the threat of the rising Populism, at the beginning of the century, but nobody paid attention. Why is Populism becoming more and more popular? The main reason is that it constantly changes. It’s different in every country and always has "the right solutions" to the different problems of the different societies. Hence, it aims not only those who don’t sympathize any political party, but also those who are disappointed, have doubts and those who don’t feel represented. Secondly, the populist leader is always close to the people: he dresses like them, understands their problems, walks among the people and doesn’t have bodyguards. He doesn’t need to say "I am one of you!" because it is obvious. The political scientists talk about "Left Populism" and "Right Populism". The first one is typical for countries with serious social problems – mainly in Latin America. Whereas the second type characterizes the countries with well-developed economies – in Western Europe and the USA. There are not many researches made about the Populism in Bulgaria. Political scientists start using the word in the last decade and it is applicable to all parties. Georgi Karasimeonov and Daniel Smilov, argue that Simeon Saxe-Coburg-Gotha is the first Bulgarian populist leader. Even after his government, the people still look for someone "to save" them, which only proves that Populism is not over and it is something useful because it brings hope. The used methods are: sociological research, taking interviews, analyzing data and deduction. The paper contains the author’s personal researches, made in the University of Sao Paulo, in Brazil Keywords: Populism, Left Populism, Right Populism, Ideology, Leader, Bulgaria, Latin America, Western Europe, USA

Neo-Populism: Applying Paul Taggart’s Heartland to the Italian Five Star Movement and League parties

In the early 2000s the British academic and expert in the field of populism, Paul Taggart, conceptualised the heartland – which he defined as ‘a version of the past that celebrates a hypothetical, uncomplicated and non-political territory of imagination.’ The idea is that populists envision this return to an almost utopic, laborious, morally pure, and culturally homogenous ‘place’ where professional political administration is not completely rejected but certainly kept at a minimum. Applying Taggart’s heartland to leaders and parties allows us to build on an efficient comprehension of specific uses of populist dialogue, as well as their general discursive styles and political narratives. Those who have capitalised on the current populist zeitgeist (a term Cas Mudde often uses), such as the American President Donald J. Trump, have mobilised masses by implicitly calling for a return to the heartland with slogans such as ‘Make America Great Again’. However, Trump is not the only politician who has discursively framed the concept of heartland in the twenty-first century. Interestingly, the heartland can also be applied to ‘right-wing’ national- populists and ‘left-wing’ techno-populists in Italy. The League, believes that with their involvement, their country can return to be a safer, more stable, hard-working, producerist society. Similarly, the Five Star Movement pressures the elites for a more virtuous, honest, and transparent way of doing politics through the digital web and direct democracy practices. Those values are the ones that shape their idea of heartland. This piece untangles the two distinct versions of heartland that exist within the forma mentis of the two Italian populist parties, compares them, and contrasts them in the hope of contributing to the already existing literature that has presented little evidence so far on how Taggart’s relevant concept can be identified in populist discourse, monologue, and ideology. Also, some advice is given on how to deal with the new populists worldwide in a way that involves dialogue that is both constructive and inclusive.

The survival of the ‘Anti-Party Party Paradox’

As of June 1, 2018, Italy is governed by two populist factions: the Five Stars Movement (5SM) and the League. The former, being an anti-party party, has become the first political force in only nine years of existence by advocating for a desired change of Italian politics. The latter is instead an extreme-right wing populist faction that has previously ruled with Berlusconi’s Forza Italia party and was heavily involved in corruption scandals. At first sight, this governmental coalition seems antithetical with the proclaimed purity and difference of the 5SM from its ordinary political competitors. What is more, not only the 5SM has recently adopted internal rules which resemble those of established parties, but it has also performed behaviours which are in sharp contradiction with its ideology and values. In light of this contrast, this paper extends Cas Mudde’s (1996) anti-party party paradox to the 5SM by examining how anti-party parties behave in power with other populist factions. It adopts party routinisation theory to analyse how changes of internal organisation within the movement have effectively translated into external behaviours which are ‘party-like’. What emerges is that the Five Stars Movement, despite governing with another populist faction, has become internally and externally routinised as a normal party in the necessary limitations of the Italian political reality. As such, the anti-party party paradox survives even when compromise is achieved at the national level with another populist party.

Do We Need a Minimum Definition of Populism? An Appraisal of Mudde’s Conceptualization

Abstract This contribution discusses the advantages and disadvantages of Cas Mudde’s minimalist definition to study populism. It argues that his proposal might facilitate consensus among scholars, yet his conceptualization is an obstacle to grasp the complexity of populism in its diverse manifestations over space and time. Moreover, some underlying normative assumptions limit the reach of his concept to small rightwing populist European parties at the fringes of the political system. The article argues for the necessity to recognize pluralism and hybridism avoiding any reductionism in populism scholarship. Populism cannot be reduced to one of its components, like a moralist ideology. Populism is also a strategy, a political style, and a discursive frame.

Communist populism in Hungary

According to Cas Mudde, we live in a “populist Zeitgeist”. The paper argues that not just the 21st, but also the 20th century is about populism. In the first section I elaborate the theoretical background of populism, which is claimed to be a never-ending phenomenon: here, various notions of populism are analysed; I investigate the relationship between democracy and populism; and I refer to the biopolitical framework of populism (called biopopulism) as well. This theoretical framework will be used to analyse Communist populism in Hungary. I elaborate the populism of the Horthyera (1920-1944) in the context of Communist populism. Then I analyse the case of Communist populism in Hungary (1948-1989) according to the following aspects: in the context of the working class and the bourgeois elite; the biopolitical character of the regime; goulash Communism as populist legitimacy; and the viewpoint of socialist patriotism. The main aspect of Communist populism is summarized at the end of the third section, and I briefly refer to the afterlife of Communist populism as a nostalgic phenomenon. The regimes analysed in this study aimed to govern the entire life of the citizens, which is why biopopulism is a useful analytical concept. The biopopulist framework shows that the investigation of the historical backgrounds of populism is necessary to understand contemporary populist tendencies.