Capitalist Developmental State Research Articles

Dictators, Democrats and Development in Southeast Asia: Implications for the Rest

Getting growth going has been rare in the developing world-since 1960 only nine developing countries have succeeded in sustaining high growth. The aim of Dictators, Democrats and Development in Southeast Asia is to examine how dictators and democrats in three of the nine fast growers -Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand, hereafter IMT-built and sustained pro-growth political coalitions that enabled them to adopt policies that ushered in sustained high growth. The focus is on IMT because circa 1960 few thought the three were candidates for high growth and because the three have factor endowments, ethnic heterogeneity, and forms of governance that resemble the Rest. These similarities suggest the Rest may have much to learn from IMT. The focus is unabashedly on the politics of development in IMT because dictators and democrats in IMT built and sustained pro-growth political coalitions that enabled them to link their long term political survival with delivering development. How and why they did so should be of keen interest to the Rest. Because dictators and democrats in IMT were committed to capitalist, industrial and open economy development strategies but deeply suspicious of a laissez faire approach to development, none of the three ever adopted a Washington Consensus style growth strategy. While all three toyed with a Northeast style capitalist developmental state approach to growth, because governments in IMT lacked the political requisites to make this strategy work, none really stuck to this approach to growth either. Instead dictators and democrats in IMT implemented highly pragmatic growth and development strategies. When markets worked, governments used them. When interventions worked governments relied on them. When either failed to deliver expected results, governments weeded out bad investments to sustain high growth. Such a pragmatic, trial and error approach to development should also be of keen interest to the Rest.

A hard slog, not a leap frog: Globalization and sustainability transitions in developing Asia

How does globalization influence transitions toward more sustainable socio-technical regimes in the developing world? This paper argues that transformations of regimes, the networks and institutions governing technological and environmental practices in an industry, can be positively influenced by globalization but it depends on how global forces interact with local socio-political landscapes—the political–economic institutions, values, and regulations broadly guiding an economy and its relationship to the environment. We evaluate these relationships through a comparison of two kinds of socio-political landscapes—the neo-liberal export-led development model commonly found in the developing world and the uniquely Asian capitalist developmental state. We first show how the neo-liberal model overemphasizes the power of market forces to facilitate upgrading and more sustainable industrialization. We then argue that capitalist developmental states in East and Southeast Asia have been better able to harness global economic forces for technological and sustainability transitions through an openness to trade and investment and effective public–private institutions able to link cleaner technologies and environmental standards to production activities in firms. We buttress this argument with firm-level evidence showing the evolution of socio-technical regimes in two industries—cement and electronics. The case studies demonstrate how interactions with OECD firms can contribute to environmental technique effects provided the socio-political landscape is amenable to changes in an industry's regime. Ultimately, we find the process of transition to be complex and contingent; a hard slog not a leap frog toward a potentially more sustainable future. We close by considering the limitations on the capitalist developmental state model and with comments about what else needs to be learned about globalization's role in sustainability transitions.

Taiwan's Developmental State: After the Economic and Political Turmoil

Taiwan was a typical Capitalist Developmental State (CDS) from the 1960s through the 1980s. In this article the effects of the Asian Financial Crisis and the two political shocks that it sandwiched are assessed. We find that Taiwan's CDS structure has been seriously undermined for political, not for economic, reasons.

Has Central Tokyo Experienced Uneven Development? An Examination of Tokyo’s 23 Ku Relative to America’s Largest Urban Centers

:Does uneven development exist within central Tokyo? This study assesses the degree of place stratification by income, population, and private employment among the 23 Ku of Tokyo over the past 30 years. It then compares these levels among the Ku for the 1990s relative to those for New York’s five boroughs and among census-defined places within the central counties of Los Angeles, Chicago, and Detroit. It finds that income, population, and private employment growth were more unevenly distributed among the Ku during the 1990s than they were in 1970s and 1980s; this was especially true for population change and income. Additionally, it finds that although the distributions of income and private employment growth among the Ku were noticeably lower than within America’s largest urban core counties, population change actually occurred more unevenly among the Ku than in these areas during the 1990s. Therefore, it concludes that the 23 Ku did experience a notable degree of uneven residential development during the 1990s. The study then argues that the development strategies of the Tokyo Metropolitan Government (TMG), which have become increasingly entrepreneurial since the mid-1980s, were the lead catalysts fostering this situation. Its approach, however, was not an attempt to circumvent the central state. In fact, its activities remain tightly nested within the Japanese Capitalist Developmental State. The TMG’s recent policymaking represents a Japanized version or offshoot of Harvey and Jessop’s entrepreneurial city, which is sanctioned, guided, encouraged, and sometimes even led by the Japanese Government’s desire to improve Tokyo’s international competitiveness.

Japan's Interventionist State: Bringing Agriculture Back In

One of the perennial controversies in the study of Japanese political economy has centred on the role of the government in the economy and in Japan's economic growth. The best-known model of Japanese political economy is the ‘capitalist developmental state’, which offers both a descriptive model of Japanese political economy and an explanation for Japan's postwar economic miracle in terms of bureaucracy-led intervention. As a descriptive model, the ‘capitalist developmental state’ both over-generalises and under-generalises key features of Japan's political economy. It over-generalises because it builds a model of Japanese political economy based on government-business relations in a number of large-scale, export-oriented manufacturing industries ignoring inefficient or ‘laggard’ sectors or admitting them only as system supports. The model under-generalises Japanese political economy because types and modes of bureaucratic intervention are consistent across different sectors of the economy, and in fact are more prevalent in weaker sectors, such as agriculture.

Rethinking the Developmental State Model: Divided Leviathan and Subnational Comparisons in India

For some time, concept of developmental has been at center of debate in comparative political economy.1 It encompasses view that intervention is necessary not merely to correct for market failures arising out of scarce capital, externalities, and technological improvement but also to achieve long-term capital accumulation and society-wide developmental goals. While history of concept of developmental may lie with economist Friedrich List, its recent reincarnation was implicit in writings of post-World War II development economists.2 It owes its current usage to Chalmers Johnson, who, in addition to socialist and free market systems, posited a third category, capitalist developmental state. Johnson used this conceptual innovation to offer a revisionist account of Japan's rise to power.3 The concept has survived public choice onslaught because of its empirical robustness in explaining East Asian countries.4 The World Bank for first time in 1993 recognized that played a role in sustaining high growth, and subsequently its 1997 world development report was devoted to analyzing role of the in changing world.5 India, regarded as a developmental failure, seems to challenge this emerging consensus by confirming public choice position that states negatively affect growth by constraining private activity and generating rent-seeking. Amidst other relatively prosperous Asian nations, negative images depict Indian as at once weak, predatory, and interventionist. India has become model of failure that helped usher in antistate, promarket Zeitgeist of 1980s. Krueger's analysis of rent-seeking state originated in Indian experience.6 The dirigiste developmental in India outlined a powerful vision of state-led industrialization for whole nation-state in 1947, embodied in autonomous bureaucratic agencies, regulations, and legislation. One high official in New Delhi is reported to have told a friend: If you want me to move file faster, I am not sure I can help you; but if you want me to stop a file I can do it immediately.7 The common and dominant view was that central was responsible for India's slow growth rate.8 India's unenviable reputation as a negative case continues to this day. While economic reforms in 1991 ushered in a more promising scenario, their success is interpreted

Global City Formation in a Capitalist Developmental State: Tokyo and the Waterfront Sub-centre Project

It is widely believed that the integration of the global economy and the development of information technology have led to the creation of the world city as a centre of command-and-control functions in the world economy. However, as each city is nested in its national and regional context, such a simple deterministic logic is not satisfactory. This article explores the world city formation of Tokyo by investigating the decision-making process of the Tokyo waterfront sub-centre, one of the flagship urban development projects. The author argues that the institutional relations among the national and local governments, and the business community in Tokyo were grounded in the country's unique tradition of a state-capital relationship which can be explained by capitalist developmental state theory.

Booty Socialism, Bureau-Preneurs, and the State in Transition: Organizational Corruption in China

Corruption by public officials has long been regarded as a cancer of polity, demoralizing and destablizing society and politics. It occurs in almost all societies, but often for different reasons and with varying consequences. Despite the flourishing of studies in recent years, we have yet to come to grips with the complexity and pervasiveness of corruption in contemporary China. For one thing, while some old patterns of corruption persist, new patterns have emerged. In this article, I address the issues of the changing role of the under reform and persistent bureaucratic indiscipline by focusing on one particular form of corruption, that by public agencies. For lack of a better term, I will call it organizational corruption. I believe the study of organizational corruption in China bears two sets of theoretical implications. First, it yields telling clues about the changing role of the in a transitional regime; second, it can afford us a better understanding of the nature of corruption. Two bodies of literature provide theoretical reference points for this paper. The first concerns the state's role in promoting economic development. Studies in this genre attempt to capture the nature of the in a reforming Communist regime. Though differing in their depictions of the state, scholars tend to base their view on the successful economic growth that China has experienced in recent years. They argue that, unlike the conventional belief held by neoclassical economists, the can adapt itself to the newly emerging markets and can even play an active role in leading marketization. This argument is different, however, from capitalist developmental states, where the structure of the economy and property rights is decidedly different. In what has been variously called the socialist developmental state',' corporatism,2 entrepreneurial state,3 and state entrepreneurialism,'4 the Chinese is portrayed as an adaptive and positive force in guiding the transformation of the economy. These studies usually focus on the growth-promoting and market-friendly role of the state, especially that of the local government. They treat the Chinese as distinct from both predatory states in developing countries mired in economic stagnation and developmental states in the East Asian newly industrializing economies. In China the acts as either an independent promoter of the local economy (as in the socialist developmental state) or a collaborator with local enterprises (as in corporatism) or an entrepreneur itself directly involved in profit-making activities (as in state entrepreneurialism).

Authoritarianism in the Hypermasculinized State: Hybridity, Patriarchy, and Capitalism in Korea

Authoritarianism in East Asia's capitalist developmental state (CDS) is highly gendered. A hybrid product of Western masculinist capitalism and Confucian parental governance, CDS authoritarianism takes on a hypermasculinized developmentalism that assumes all the rights and privileges of classical Confucian patriarchy for the state while assigning to society the characteristics of classical Confucian womanhood: diligence, discipline, and deference. Society subsequently bears the burden of economic development without equal access to political representation or voice. Women in the CDS now face three tiers of patriarchal authority and exploitation: family, state, and economy. Nevertheless, new opportunities for democratization may arise even in the hypermasculinized state. We suggest: (1) emphasizing substantive, not just procedural, democratization, (2) exercising a maternalized discourse of dissent, and (3) applying hybrid strategies of social mobilization across states, societies, cultures, and movements. South Korea during the 1960s–1970s serves as our case study.

China: Developmental state or dysfunctional development?

Since 1978 the Chinese Communist Party (ccp) leadership has implemented a series of reforms designed to restore the party's legitimacy by moving from a politically to a more economically mobilised society. This strategy has entailed the gradual dismantling of the instruments of state planning, and their replacement with market mechanisms, in an attempt to increase economic efficiency and productivity. With China's internal Maoist model of development and other socialist developmental models now essentially moribund, some within China, and even among the ccP itself, have looked East for inspiration-or for aspirations. Where reform in much of Eastern Europe had resulted in a decline in party authority and the descent into economic chaos, China's East Asian neighbours appeared to provide shining examples of how rapid economic growth could be compatible with continued authoritarian government. While it is true that the Chinese reform experiment does contain some similarities with the capitalist developmental states of East Asia, we should not conclude from this that China is following a coherent strategy of emulating the NICS. China's developmental trajectory has been to a large extent dysfunctional. There are three key factors here which this paper will explore in detail. The first is the way that political demands-both from within the party-state structure itself and from other societal groups-have obstructed the formulation of a coherent and effective national economic development strategy. In the words of the title of Susan Shirk's excellent interpretation of reform in China, we must assess 'The political logic of economic reform'.' Second, the reform process has resulted in a significant redistribution of economic decision-making power, primarily from central to local level authorities. The central authorities have granted local governments across China varying degrees of financial autonomy. In addition, some have exploited growing international contacts to find further sources of extra-budgetary investment

The Role of the Local State in China's Transitional Economy

All states have a role in development, but this varies widely. The spectrum is defined at one end by thelaissez faireminimalist state whose role is limited to ensuring a stable and secure environment so that contracts, property rights and other institutions of the market can be honoured. At the opposite end are the centrally planned Leninist states that directly replace the market with bureaucratic allocation and planning. Between these two extremes are the capitalist developmental states of Japan and the East Asian Newly Industrializing Countries (NICs) that are neither Communist norlaissez faire, but exhibit characteristics of both. The state plays an activist, rather than a minimalist, role; there is planning, but it is geared toward creating maximum competitive and comparative advantage for manufacturers within a market economy.

The State and Liberalization: The Airline Industry in the East Asian NICs

This study of airline liberalization in South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia examines the evolving relationships between states and carriers. The airline industry of East Asia has been an arena for significant liberalization initiatives in the last decade. State-owned carriers have been privatized; new carriers have been allowed to enter domestic and international markets; and government controls over such dimensions of airline competition as equipment choice, fares, and route selection have been eased. Yet, the state remains deeply engaged in the airline industry. Indeed, the most striking feature of airline liberalization in the region is its incompleteness. States have, for example, stopped short of relinquishing ultimate control of flag carriers to the private sector. The liberalization process has been influenced by a variety of factors. Among these are the size and growth of markets, the need to improve the competitiveness of state-owned carriers, the political environment, and the relationship of the airline industry to economic development. For the capitalist developmental states in these newly industrializing countries (NICs), the airline industry's contribution to economic development is of paramount importance. Given the importance of this industry, the region's governments have sought to balance the risks and benefits of liberalization via policies that are selective, incremental, pragmatic, and deliberative.

The “Internationalization” of the Japanese Economy

Foreign businesspeople have experienced difficulty in selling to or investing in the Japanese market. Often, they explain their frustration in terms of Japan's allegedly “closed” economy. This article explores why and how Japan's economy was closed and details efforts made in recent years to open it. It rejects the argument that Japan's culture is itself a nontariff barrier to trade and instead argues that Japanese government policy has been the main barrier. Underlying this analysis is a comparison of the Japanese capitalist developmental state and the American regulatory state.