Capital-constrained Banks Research Articles

Capital Regulations and the Management of Credit Commitments during Crisis Times

Abstract Borrower drawdowns on credit commitments reduce a bank’s capital buffer. Using Austrian credit register data and exploiting the 2008–09 financial crisis as an exogenous shock to bank health, we provide novel evidence that capital-constrained banks manage this risk by cutting credit commitments that are not fully used. Controlling for their capital position, we find that banks also respond to liquidity problems by cutting such commitments. However, banks manage the capital and liquidity risk posed by undrawn credit in a way that limits negative macroeconomic implications: credit cuts are targeted at financially less constrained firms, and we show that borrowers of more-affected banks can substitute lost credit with credit from other banks and do not suffer real effects. Additional findings suggest that voluntary agreements between constrained banks and strong firms to reduce spare borrowing capacity can explain why strong firms experience larger credit cuts.

Risk shifting and regulatory arbitrage: Evidence from operational risk

We document a robust negative relation between operational risk exposure and bank capital levels for a sample of large U.S. banks under the Basel I Capital Accords. The results are consistent with the notion that capital-constrained banks increased operational risk exposure at the time when Basel I regulations did not require an explicit capital charge for operational risk. More broadly, our results show new channel by which financial regulations incentivize banks to shift their risk taking to less regulated risk areas. We focus on the case of operational risk because it went from a largely unregulated risk type to a major risk that accounts for about 25% of large U.S. banks’ risk-weighted assets.

Banking Supervision and Risk-Adjusted Performance in the Host Country Environment

We study the effect of the banking supervision in institutional settings of foreign-bank dominated financial systems of Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe in post-crisis period 2012-2018. For a dataset of 450 banks from 20 economies of the region, we use a mediation-moderation analysis framework to establish a relationship between regulatory scrutiny, supervisory activities and a bank risk-adjusted economic performance. We find that a higher intensity of supervision monitoring activities, especially by the centralized form of supervision, contributes to the decline of the bank's riskiness in case of larger size banks while not affecting their economic performance. The regulatory power and capital regulation stringency indicate a positive effect on the risk-adjusted performance for capital constrained banks, but moderately decrease the economic benefit for larger banks. In light of the ongoing debate on the architecture of supervision in the region, the findings highlight the potential area of attention for regulators and policymakers and thus, contribute to the designing of effective supervision mechanism.

Capital Regulations and the Management of Credit Commitments during Crisis Times

Drawdowns on credit commitments by firms reduce a bank's regulatory capital ratio. Using the Austrian Credit Register, we provide novel evidence that during the 2008-09 financial crisis, capital-constrained banks managed this concern by substantially cutting partly or fully unused credit commitments. Controlling for a bank's capital position, we also find that greater liquidity problems induced banks to considerably cut such credit commitments during the crisis. These results suggest that banks actively manage both capital and liquidity risk caused by undrawn credit commitments in periods of financial distress, but thereby reduce liquidity provision to firms exactly when they need it most.

Capital Regulations and the Management of Credit Commitments During Crisis Times

Drawdowns on credit commitments by firms reduce a bank's regulatory capital ratio. Using the Austrian Credit Register, we provide novel evidence that during the 2008-09 financial crisis, capital-constrained banks managed this concern by substantially cutting partly or fully unused credit commitments. Controlling for a bank's capital position, we also find that greater liquidity problems induced banks to considerably cut such credit commitments during the crisis. These results suggest that banks actively manage both capital and liquidity risk caused by undrawn credit commitments in periods of financial distress, but thereby reduce liquidity provision to firms exactly when they need it most.

Risk Shifting and Regulatory Arbitrage: Evidence from Operational Risk

Regulations leading up to the financial crisis of 2007-2009 provided incentives for banks shift their risk profiles toward less regulated areas. We focus on the case of operational risk which went from being a relatively benign and largely unregulated risk type to a major risk that now accounts for about 25% of large banks' risk profile. We show that capital-constrained banks aggressively took on operational risk as a mean of regulatory arbitrage. Indeed, this contributed to operational risk's rise to prominence as a leading risk type in the financial sector and worsened the effects of the crisis.

Can the Capital Markets Union deliver?

Summary: Compared to the U.S., the euro area has been underperforming in the wake of the Great Financial Crisis (GFC). This holds especially true for peripheral euro area economies. Whereas the U.S. is characterised by a financial system dominated by arms’ length (capital-market oriented) interaction between providers and users of funds, in Europe, in many cases, bank intermediation dominates. However, fragile, capital-constrained banks also meant a curtailed supply of funds, an issue especially for bank-dependent small or medium-sized firms (SMEs). Hence, it appears more than evident that easing the access to capital markets (in particular through securitization) should support medium-run growth perspectives, especially in peripheral euro area economies, those worst hit. There might, however, be structural (economic) reasons why SMEs prefer (local) bank relationships. Given substantial underlying idiosyncrasies, placing SME debt, in collateralised form, on capital markets has proven difficult. Finally, t...

What explains the lack of monetary policy influence on bank holding companies?

In this paper, we investigate how monetary policy innovations affect the equity returns of bank holding companies (BHCs). We also examine bank characteristics to determine what explains the cross-sectional and time-series variation in the returns' sensitivity. Similar to non-financial firms, we find that only unanticipated components affect bank equity returns; however, this effect is absent in the second half of our sample period. Smaller, less liquid banks have higher sensitivity; a higher ratio of time deposits to total deposits reduces this sensitivity. A higher ratio of non-interest income to total income also reduces this sensitivity, while capital-constrained banks have a higher sensitivity to monetary policy innovations. We argue that a higher dependence on non-interest income and the use of interest rate derivatives together may explain the disappearing influence of monetary policy on these BHCs.

Bank Capital Adjustment Process and Aggregate Lending

This paper proposes a new micro-founded measure to quantify the aggregate capitalisation of banking sectors taking into account both market discipline and regulatory constraints. It allows studying the connection between micro capital shortfalls from an implicit bank specific capital target and macro impacts of capital shortages on aggregate lending. (i) Our quantitative country-wide index of bank capitalisation is consistent with the qualitative reports of the ECB Bank Lending Survey. (ii) This index correlates with future fluctuations in aggregate lending,especially when a banking system is under-capitalised. (iii) The adjustment of capital constrained banks mostly impact loans to domestic non-financial agents. Thus our measure suggests that (a) countercyclical capital requirements may be less effective if market constraints are more important, and (b) slow moving balance sheet variables can help detect vulnerabilities and reversals in the lending cycle.

Asymmetric Interest Rate Pass-Through in Vietnam: Role of Commercial Banks

This paper seeks evidence and explanatory factors of asymmetric relationship in interest rate pass-through in Vietnam. The results show that the capital and liquidity requirements of commercial banks are main causes of asymmetric interest rate pass-through in Vietnam. The research based on data from six commercial banks in Vietnam during the period 2009-2012 shows that (i) Loan rates from capital constrained banks are higher than those from unconstrained banks; (ii) Pass-through from monetary policy rate to loan rates is not clear in both constrained and unconstrained banks; and (iii) Loan rates from capital constrained banks are more sensitive to changes in aggregate demand.

Credit Growth and Bank Capital Requirements: Binding or Not?

This paper examines the sensitivity of non-financial corporate lending to banks' capital ratio and their supervisory capital requirements. We use a unique database for the French banking sector between 2003 and 2011 combining confidential bank-level Bank Lending Survey answers with the discretionary capital requirements set by the supervisory authority. We find that on average, more capital means an acceleration of credit. But the elasticity of lending to capital depends on the intensity of the supervisory capital constraint. More supervisory capital-constrained banks tend to have a credit growth that is less sensitive to the capital ratio. Our results also show a similar effect for non-performing loans. When banks are constrained, credit growth is all the more sensitive to this type of assets as their share rises. However, both aforementioned effects weaken close to the supervisory minimum capital requirement.

Empirical Evidence of Asymmetric Interest Rate Pass-Through in Vietnam

This paper seeks evidence and explanatory factors of asymmetric relationship in interest rate pass-through in Vietnam. The results show that the capital and liquidity requirements of commercial banks are main causes of asymmetric interest rate pass-through in Vietnam. The research based on data from six commercial banks in Vietnam during the period 2009 ? 2012 shows that (i) Loan rates from capital constrained banks are higher than those from unconstrained banks; (ii) Pass-through from monetary policy rate to loan rates is not clear in both constrained and unconstrained banks; and (iii) Loan rates from capital constrained banks are more sensitive to changes in aggregate demand.

Banks, Sovereign Debt, and the International Transmission of Business Cycles

This paper studies the international propagation of sovereign debt default. We posit a two-country economy where capital constrained banks grant loans to firms and invest in bonds issued by the domestic and the foreign government. The model economy is calibrated to data from Europe, with the two countries representing the Periphery (Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain) and the Core, respectively. Large contractionary shocks in the Periphery trigger sovereign default. We find sizable spillover effects of default from Periphery to the Core through a drop in the volume of credit extended by the banking sector.

Banks, Sovereign Debt and the International Transmission of Business Cycles

This paper studies the international propagation of sovereign debt default. We posit a two-country economy where capital constrained banks grant loans to firms and invest in bonds issued by the domestic and the foreign government. The model economy is calibrated to data from Europe, with the two countries representing the Periphery (Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain) and the Core, respectively. Large contractionary shocks in the Periphery trigger sovereign default. We find sizable spillover effects of default from Periphery to the Core through a drop in the volume of credit extended by the banking sector.

The effects of bank capital constraints on post-acquisition performance

Researchers have shown that capital constrained firms make better acquisition decisions. However, the literature on bank mergers and acquisitions is silent on this issue. We investigate whether banks constrained by capital requirements make better acquisition decisions than non-constrained banks. We also examine the characteristics of acquisitions to identify the determinants of positive post-acquisition performance. While there are few capital constrained banks that make acquisitions, those that do demonstrate better post-acquisition performance than their non-constrained counterparts. On average, capital constrained banks pay a lower premium for their target and favor cash over equity financing. We also find that capital constrained banks improve their capital ratios in the years after the acquisition. We employ two-way clustered error regressions using alternative definitions of capital constraint. We also provide a matched pair analysis to confirm that our results are robust.

Originate-to-distribute Model and the Subprime Mortgage Crisis

An originate-to-distribute (OTD) model of lending, where the originator of a loan sells it to various third parties, was a popular method of mortgage lending before the onset of the subprime mortgage crisis. We show that banks with high involvement in the OTD market during the pre-crisis period originated excessively poor quality mortgages. This result is not explained away by dierences in observable borrower quality, geographical location of the property or the cost of capital of high and low OTD banks. Instead, our evidence supports the view that the originating banks did not expend resources in screening their borrowers. The eect of OTD lending on poor mortgage quality is stronger for capital-constrained banks. Overall, we provide evidence that lack of screening incentives coupled with leverage induced risk-taking behavior signicantly

Capital Constraints and Systematic Risk

The market-risk-based capital requirements may result in an additional capital constraint for banking organizations. We examine the systematic risk gap between high and low trading banks, since only banks with sufficiently high trading activities are subject to such additional capital charge, while distinguishing between low and high capital banks. We find that a contribution of a bank’s trading activity to its systematic risk becomes stronger after the new requirements were introduced, but this increase is larger for low capital banks. Our interpretation is that capital-constrained banks are more sensitive to market conditions because they need to make additional balance sheet adjustments in response to market shocks, and that these adjustments can have implications, albeit limited, for other banks, capital constraints of which were initially non-binding.

Originate-to-Distribute Model and the Subprime Mortgage Crisis

An originate-to-distribute (OTD) model of lending, where the originator of a loan sells it to various third parties, was a popular method of mortgage lending before the onset of the subprime mortgage crisis. We show that banks with high involvement in the OTD market during the pre-crisis period originated excessively poor quality mortgages. This result is not explained away by differences in observable borrower quality, geographical location of the property or the cost of capital of high and low OTD banks. Instead, our evidence supports the view that the originating banks did not expend resources in screening their borrowers. The effect of OTD lending on poor mortgage quality is stronger for capital-constrained banks. Overall, we provide evidence that lack of screening incentives coupled with leverage induced risk-taking behavior significantly contributed to the current sub-prime mortgage crisis.

Banks' Precautionary Capital and Credit Crunches

Periods of banking distress are often followed by sizable and long-lasting contractions in bank credit. They may be explained by a declined demand by financially impaired borrowers (the conventional financial accelerator) or by lower supply by capital-constrained banks, a crunch. This paper develops a bank model to study credit crunches and their real effects. In this model, banks maintain a precautionary level of capital that serves as a smoothing mechanism to avert disruptions in the supply of credit when hit by small shocks. However, for larger shocks, highly persistent credit crunches may arise even when the impulse is a one time, non-serially correlated event. From a policy perspective, the model justifies the use of public funds to recapitalize banks following a significant deterioration in their capital position.

Capital shocks, bank asset allocation, and the revised Basel Accord

In contrast to the 1988 Basel Accord (Basel I), the revised risk-based capital standards (Basel II) propose regulatory capital requirements based on credit ratings. This paper develops a theoretical model to analyze how banks will adjust their low and high credit risk commercial loans under the proposed newer standard. Capital-constrained banks respond to an adverse capital shock by reducing high credit risk loans, while under certain circumstances, low credit risk loans may actually increase. When compared to Basel I, it is shown that high-risk loans are reduced more under Basel II, but whether a bank reduces total lending more under Basel I or under the revised standards depends on a complex interaction of factors.