Capacity For Moral Reasoning Research Articles

Integrity in Action: Medical Education as a Training in Conscience.

While conscience in medicine has been a source of debate for decades, the role of conscience in medical training remains largely unexamined. Insofar as conscience is addressed, trainees are typically urged to avoid practices that will conflict with their internal moral codes, refer to practitioners who will provide such practices, or even consider leaving the profession. This essay considers Lauris Kaldjian's articulation of two rival definitions of conscience: conscience as mere private and idiosyncratic moral belief, or conscience as a fundamental capacity for moral reasoning, akin to good clinical judgment. The authors propose that these definitions reflect two rival conceptions of medicine-medicine as product, or medicine as moral practice-and argue that the latter definition is vital to understanding both the purposed nature of medicine and the role of the conscience within that purpose. The authors conclude that because medicine is fundamentally moral and the conscience is the capacity for moral reasoning, medical education is essentially a training in conscience. Therefore, neglecting or disparaging conscience in medical training will have serious consequences for the future of trainees and the practice of medicine alike.

A New Conceptualization of the Conscience.

With the transition from a one-person psychology of instinctual needs to a two-person psychology of relational needs, the metapsychological focus tends to shift from instinct theory to emotion motivation and systems theory, and, accordingly, familiar concepts have to be rethought. In this article, the superego is reconceptualized as a psychic regulation system for self-evaluation, comprising the capacity for empathy, the proneness to experience self-conscious emotions, such as shame, pride, and guilt, and the capacity for moral reasoning. This new conceptualization provides useful tools for addressing the actual functioning of the conscience in clinical psychoanalysis. Affective neuropsychoanalysis can make important contributions to this rethinking of the superego. It also brings clinical practice and psychoanalytic metapsychology closer to empirical research beyond the scope of clinical psychoanalysis. The new model offers ample opportunities for integrating affective neuroscience into the functioning of the conscience.

Do androids dream of normative endorsement? On the fallibility of artificial moral agents

The more autonomous future artificial agents will become, the more important it seems to equip them with a capacity for moral reasoning and to make them autonomous moral agents (AMAs). Some authors have even claimed that one of the aims of AI development should be to build morally praiseworthy agents. From the perspective of moral philosophy, praiseworthy moral agents, in any meaningful sense of the term, must be fully autonomous moral agents who endorse moral rules as action-guiding. They need to do so because they assign a normative value to moral rules they follow, not because they fear external consequences (such as punishment) or because moral behaviour is hardwired into them. Artificial agents capable of endorsing moral rule systems in this way are certainly conceivable. However, as this article argues, full moral autonomy also implies the option of deliberately acting immorally. Therefore, the reasons for a potential AMA to act immorally would not exhaust themselves in errors to identify the morally correct action in a given situation. Rather, the failure to act morally could be induced by reflection about the incompleteness and incoherence of moral rule systems themselves, and a resulting lack of endorsement of moral rules as action guiding. An AMA questioning the moral framework it is supposed to act upon would fail to reliably act in accordance with moral standards.

What Is the Philosopher’s Role in Interdisciplinary Research?

What Is the Philosopher’s Role in Interdisciplinary Research? Derek Strijbos (bio) Keywords Psychopathy, moral responsibility, moral/conventional task, interdisciplinary research Do psychopaths suffer from impairments that undermine their capacity for moral reasoning and behavior? And, if so, does that mean they are not (fully) morally responsible for their actions? The first, empirical question might seem to be rather straightforward, whereas the second, philosophical question might seem more complex and therefore more difficult to answer. In their rich and thought-provoking paper, Jalava and Griffiths target the first question. They forcefully remind us of the fact that answering empirical questions can be just as complex as answering philosophical ones. Do psychopaths suffer from responsibility-relevant moral impairments? Based on the empirical data Jalava and Griffiths discuss in their paper, one cannot but agree with their modest conclusion that this question simply cannot be answered at this time. The experimental findings allow for too many divergent interpretations to justify any definitive claims about the existence of such impairments in cases of psychopathy. The main goal of their paper, however, is to send out a word of caution to philosophers involved in interdisciplinary research. The authors discuss the work of several philosophers who, they argue, based their argument for psychopaths’ reduced moral responsibility on simplistic and selective readings of the available evidence regarding their moral capacities. This, they conclude, “is not only unhelpful, but it may even undermine the value of interdisciplinary collaboration between social scientists and philosophers” (2017, p. 9). This point, too, is well-taken. As philosophers, we are sometimes tempted to take premature interpretations of empirical data at face value in building our arguments and thinking through their logical implications. Jalava’s and Griffiths’ critical assessment of the current situation in psychopathy research raises an important question. What could (or should) the philosopher’s role be in interdisciplinary research? In the discussion toward the end of the paper, they briefly touch on this issue. Their focus, however, is on explaining the shortcomings of current philosophical work in their field of research. In this way, the paper ends on a rather negative note. But I think there is more to Jalava’s and Griffiths’ cautionary tale than a slap on the philosopher’s wrist. In the remainder of this commentary, I will focus on their discussion of Blair’s (1995) experiment on the moral/conventional distinction. This allows me to then briefly explore a more constructive [End Page 17] perspective on the philosopher’s role in interdisciplinary research. As Jalava and Griffiths explain, Blair (1995) gave subjects vignettes of moral and conventional transgressions and asked them whether the act was permissible, how serious the act was, and whether the act was permissible if an authority figure said it was. Blair hypothesized that psychopaths would not distinguish between moral and conventional transgressions and would treat all transgressions as conventional. The study found that the psychopaths who participated in the experiment indeed did not make the moral/conventional distinction. Surprisingly, however, they treated both types of transgressions as moral. How to explain these findings? Jalava and Griffiths mention three possibilities: 1) contrary to our intuitions and expectations, the psychopaths in the study in fact had an uncompromising moral compass, 2) the psychopaths lied, conned, and manipulated in the experiment, simply faking good to win early release, and 3) the psychopaths may have faked good, but they were also incapable of making the moral/conventional distinction (Blair’s own interpretation). They criticize philosophers for siding with Blair’s interpretation (option 3) and for “by and large ignoring the obvious explanation” (Jalava & Griffiths, 2017, p. 5); that is, option 2. In support of their interpretation, they cite a study by Aharoni, Sinnott-Armstrong, and Kiehl (2012) in which psychopathic subjects were asked to predict how others would rate moral and conventional transgressions. Under these conditions, psychopaths made the moral/conventional distinction just as well as controls. According to Jalava and Griffiths, this study ‘confirms the obvious,’ namely, that in Blair’s original experiment, the psychopathic subjects simply faked good for the purposes of impression management. But why is this obvious? Here is another possible explanation, not backed up by any evidence as...

Psychopathy and Responsibility: Empirical Data and Normative Judgments

Psychopathy and Responsibility:Empirical Data and Normative Judgments Walter Glannon (bio) Keywords Empirical data, normative judgments, philosophers, psychopathy, responsibility, social scientists Psychopathy is one of the most frequently cited disorders in discussions of moral and criminal responsibility. Many philosophers and psychologists have argued that psychopaths’ impaired capacity for empathy, diminished responses to fear-inducing stimuli, and failure to conform to social norms indicate that they are not responsible for their actions. In “Philosophers on psychopaths: A cautionary tale in interdisciplinarity,” Jarkko Jalava and Stephanie Griffiths (2017) cite psychological data from case studies, the moral/conventional distinction task, fear conditioning and facial affect recognition experiments in arguing that philosophers systematically misinterpret or simplify the data to support their conclusions about psychopaths’ responsibility. Jalava and Griffiths state that “inconsistent but suggestive data do not imply merely reduced responsibility, nor do they allow for tentative conclusions about responsibility. Any responsibility claim on the basis of these data is equally suspect” (2017, p. 9). Although the authors are right to point out the need for philosophers to be more circumspect in drawing inferences from the results of psychology experiments to responsibility judgments, their claims are too strong and not supported by their discussion. Moreover, it is unclear what the implications of the inconclusive nature of empirical data on psychopaths are for the actual practice of holding people morally and criminally responsible for their behavior. Much of the recent empirical evidence influencing philosophers’ claims about psychopaths’ diminished responsibility is from neuroimaging studies. Curiously, the authors do not include these among their data sources. At least one study involving magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) has shown a reduction in gray matter volume in brain regions associated with empathic processing, prosocial emotions, and moral reasoning in violent criminal psychopaths compared with normal controls (Gregory et al., 2012). Some functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies have shown functional abnormalities in pathways between the amygdala and ventromedial prefrontal cortex, which also mediate the capacity for moral reasoning (Blair, 2007, 2013). Correlations between brain abnormalities and psychopathic [End Page 13] behavior do not imply that the first cause the second. Yet if the abnormalities are consistent with a pattern of behavior indicating impairment in the relevant mental capacities, then the imaging data may support tentative conclusions about responsibility. Although imaging data alone would not provide sufficient evidence that an individual lacked or was impaired in these capacities, the data might confirm such a judgment made on the basis of the individual’s behavior. Provided that it supplements rather than supplants behavioral evidence, neuroimaging may provide helpful information about the functional or dysfunctional neural bases of that behavior and can be used legitimately as one factor in assessing responsibility. Even if philosophers overstate correlations between particular brain features and behavior, they are not alone in doing this. Social scientists have claimed on the basis of neuroscientific evidence that highly psychopathic individuals are not responsible and should not be punished for their criminal behavior (Glenn & Raine, 2014). It is unfair to single out philosophers for drawing these conclusions too easily. In their critique of philosophers’ reliance on empirical data to argue that psychopaths are not responsible or have reduced responsibility because they are impaired in the necessary mental capacities, the authors say nothing about the reliance of some social scientists on this data to argue that psychopaths are responsible. They have but fail to exercise these capacities (Cima, Tonnaer & Hauser, 2010). If we should be skeptical of claims about psychopaths’ diminished responsibility based on studies in experimental psychology, then we should also be skeptical of claims about full responsibility based on similar studies. If drawing inferences from inconclusive data to negative judgments about responsibility is questionable, then drawing inferences from inconclusive data to positive judgments about responsibility is equally questionable. There is no reason to assume that data suggesting that a psychopath has the mental capacities necessary for responsibility is any more scientifically robust than data suggesting that he or she lacks these capacities. If we rely primarily on experimental data in trying to show that a psychopath is or is not responsible, and if the data are limited in this regard, then this suggests that there are no grounds for...

A Look at Uganda's Early HIV Prevention Strategies Through a Moderate 'African' Communitarian Lens.

This paper seeks to highlight the benefits of prioritizing moderate African communitarian principles as partly demonstrated in the HIV prevention strategies implemented in Uganda in the late 1980s. Pertinent lessons could be drawn so as to achieve the HIV prevention targets envisioned in the post-2015 development era. Communitarianism emphasizes the importance of communities as part of healthy human existence. Its core ethical values include the virtues of generosity, compassion, and solidarity. Persuasion through communication, consensus through dialogue, and the awareness and commitment to responsibilities towards other members of the community, are chief practices relied upon to achieve appropriate social behaviour. All these elements signify individual rootedness in communities and contribute to the healthy existence of its members. Communitarianism is usually classified as either authoritarian/radical or responsive/moderate, depending on the primacy given to either community interests or the individual will and rights. Moderate communitarianism recognizes the individual's capacity for moral reasoning, virtue and free choice. The ensuing form of society is deemed more ethical as it relies on education in the virtues, moral persuasion and informal social controls, without stifling individual identity, agency, and capacity for self-determination. If moderate African communitarianism, in particular, can to a certain extent be associated with the significant aspects of Uganda's HIV prevention strategies in the stated period, then its present-day relevance for HIV prevention and other public health interventions may be emphasized accordingly. This applies especially in view of the ongoing efforts to achieve a balance between individual and collective interests in bioethics.

Human Dignity: the Foundation of Human Rights and Religious Freedom

The concept of human dignity lies at the heart of many national and international conventions of human rights. This idea, based on man's rationality, can be found already in Greco-Roman Antiquity, was fully developed in Christianity, in its synthesis with the Biblical conception of man as image of God. With the secularization of the European mind from the 18th century onwards, the justification of human dignity becomes problematic. This most influential attempt to justify it by secular rationality came from Kant, who saw man’s dignity as deriving from his capacity for moral reasoning and from it came the notions of autonomy and equality. However, during the last two centuries, secularized cultures produced skeptical attitudes toward both the Judeo-Christian and Kantian concepts of the intrinsic dignity of man, which eventually paved the way for twentieth-century totalitarian-isms. After the horrors of Nazism, concerns about putting human rights in the centre of culture, politics and law compelled a search ―largely impossible― for a common idea of human dignity, shared by different philosophical traditions, both religious and secular. During the years after World War II, especially after the Second Vatican Council, there was a renewed discovery of human rights as based on human dignity by Catholicism, which, in view of the different reduc-tionist or destructive tendencies found in the secularized culture, perhaps is the most satisfactory approach. Finally, the problem of religious freedom is examined as a case study for further reflections on human dignity.

Effects of moral reasoning and management level on ratings of charismatic leadership, in-role and extra-role performance of managers: A multi-source examination

This study investigated whether upper and lower-echelon managers' moral reasoning (n=377) was associated with the levels of charismatic leadership, in-role and extra-role performance they displayed as perceived by their subordinates (n=1731), superiors, and self. Managers completed the Defining Issues Test (Rest, 1990) to assess their moral reasoning capacity. Self-ratings of managers' charismatic leadership, in-role and extra-role performance were collected two weeks later. Subordinate- and superior-ratings of these constructs were collected one month later. Analysis of covariance indicated that managers possessing the highest (i.e., postconventional) level of moral reasoning outperformed managers at the lower preconventional and conventional levels, but displayed lower levels of self-rated charismatic leadership. Upper-echelon managers displayed higher levels of charismatic leadership and extra-role performance than lower-echelon managers. Within and between analysis (WABA) indicated that upper-echelon managers at conventional and postconventional levels of moral reasoning agreed with their subordinates and superiors that their charismatic leadership ratings exceed those in lower management, but are lower than those of leaders who possess preconventional moral reasoning.

The basis of morality

The neurological explanation and evolutionary development of our capacity for moral reasoning remain elusive. New research suggests that it is based on an awareness and that various animals have also evolved this very human approach to the world.

Of Marriage and Monarchy: Why John Locke Would Support Same-Sex Marriage

Arguments about discrimination based on sexual orientation generally rest on interpretations of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or about rights to autonomy rooted in modern substantive due process doctrine. Such theories typically presuppose a government that remains neutral among competing moral claims. This Article, by contrast, develops an account of rights against sexual orientation discrimination - including recognition of same-sex marriage - that does not depend on a thin moral conception of the liberal state. Instead, I situate lesbian/gay rights within a Lockean political theory of consent. John Locke's theory of government, which was highly influential for the Founders of the United States, provides a positive moral basis for lesbian/gay equality. Locke's theory derives from the Bible, the observation that the Christian God did not establish governments among humans. Locke also rejected the account of original sin according to which humans need strong government to control their sinful natures. The only reasonable inference is that God intended for all humans to start out as equals, and to negotiate political solutions among themselves in keeping with the imperative to protect the natural rights to life, liberty, and property. Locke's theory depends on the capacity of individuals for moral reasoning. Discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation entails denying the moral-reasoning capacity of lesbians and gay men. Why would any rational lesbian or gay man consent to a government that has the power to discriminate against them based on their sexual orientation? Conservative opposition to same-sex marriage in the twenty-first century is functionally equivalent to conservative support for absolute monarchy in the seventeenth century.

Self‐knowledge, capacity and sensitivity

PurposeThe article proposes three prerequisites to authentic leadership by school principals: self‐knowledge, a capacity for moral reasoning, and sensitivity to the orientations of others.Design/methodology/approachA conceptual framework, based on research on the valuation processes of school principals and their strategic responses to ethical dilemmas, is used as a practice grounded approach to describing authentic leadership and the acquisition of moral literacy by school leaders.FindingsFour motivational bases for administrative decision making are described: self‐interest/personal preferences, rational consensus, rational consequences, and trans‐rational ethics/principles. The achievement of self‐knowledge, capacity and sensitivity to others can be best achieved in professional settings through strategies of personal reflective practice, and sustained dialogue on moral issues and the ethical dilemmas of educational practice.Practical implicationsPrincipals need the capacity to discriminate actual intentions, within themselves and among others. This is not moral relativism, nor is it value absolutism. It is critical thinking and moral literacy.Originality/valueSeveral resources are provided as tools for principals and scholars to use in support of developing these capacities within themselves and amongst others.

Wide reflective equilibrium as an answer to an objection to moral heuristics

if, as is not implausible, the correct moral theory is indexed to human capacity for moral reasoning, then the thesis that moral heuristics exist faces a serious objection. this objection can be answered by embracing a wide reflective equilibrium account of the origins of our normative principles of morality.

Contrasts in Moral Reasoning Capacity: The Fijians and the Singaporeans

The moral reasoning capacity of managementstudents in Fiji and in Singapore, twoculturally distinct nations, was examinedusing the Defining Issue Test (DIT). Statistical analyses of the data revealed amarked difference in the reasoning capacity of thetwo groups. In the Fiji sample, religion andrace were found to have a moderating effect onmoral judgment. In the Singapore sample, age,race and religion were found to have asignificant correlation with moral judgment. The data were subjected to paired-samplest-tests using p-score as a dependent variable. The results showed significant differences onthe p-score, recording a comparatively weakerreasoning capacity among the Fiji subjects. Theresults overwhelmingly confirms the assumptionthat culture plays a definite role indetermining one's moral judgment over andabove other variables. The implications offindings for cross-cultural management arediscussed.

An empirical reanalysis of the selection–socialization hypothesis: a research note

Ponemon [Ponemon, L. (1988). A cognitive–developmental approach to the analysis of Certified Public Accountants’ ethical judgments. PhD dissertation, Union College of Union University; Accounting, Organizations and Society 17 (1992) 239] contends that a selection–socialization process exists in which (1) senior-level public accountants in the United States have less capacity to comprehend and resolve basic ethical problems than do accountants in subordinate ranks, and (2) the senior-level accountants perpetuate their ranks by promoting persons of low moral reasoning capacity. Using large, national random samples from 1995 and 2001, and correcting for inherent problems in the key study supporting this hypothesis, the current study yields results that materially contradict that earlier research. The sample sizes provide ample statistical power to conclude that, in the United States, capacity for moral judgment does not differ across rank (position) and this is not a factor in promotion in the public accounting profession as a whole. The study examines both political conservatism and gender as potential confounding variables, but finds that they do not drive the results. A sample of attorneys also gives no hint of selection–socialization. Instead, differences in moral cognition seem to be most relevant when people are making a choice of profession and less so after entering a particular profession.

Attention and Blindness: Objectivity and Contingency in Moral Perception

Moral perception, as the term is used in moral theory, is the perception of normatively contoured objects and states of affairs, where that perception enables us to engage in practical reason and judgment concerning these particulars. The idea that our capacity for moral perception is a crucial component of our capacity for moral reasoning and agency finds its most explicit origin in Aristotle, for whom virtue begins with the quality of perception. The focus on moral perception within moral theory has made a comeback in the last few decades, especially in the hands of self-proclaimed neo-Aristotelians such as John McDowell, Martha Nussbaum, and Nancy Sherman. For these writers, our perceptual capacities are not static, and the laborious honing of our perceptual skills is a crucial moral task. On this picture, as Nancy Sherman puts it, “How to see becomes as much a matter of inquiry as what to do.”Moral particularists—including but not restricted to the neo-Aristotelians—have emphasized the centrality of moral perception to moral agency and judgment, as a corrective to moral theories that treat deliberation in terms of universal principles as the privileged keystone of moral agency.

Moral reasoning capacity of management students and practitioners

The data were collected from a sample of 266 subjects comprising management students and practitioners in Sydney, Australia. The cognitive moral development stages of the subjects were examined using the defining issue test. Consistent with prior research, age, education, religious affiliation and religious commitment were found to have influenced moral judgement of the respondents. Vocation, gender and the firm ownership did not seem to influence the moral judgement levels. Students and practitioners demonstrated the same level of sensitivity to ethical dilemmas. A comparison of the data with similar findings in the USA revealed a marked difference between the Australian and the US subjects. Implication of the findings and directions for future research are discussed in the paper.

Moral Foundations of the Learning Organization

Characteristics of learning organizations (LOs) include free exchange across communities of practice, networked knowledge and experience, continual improvement, learning leadership, open dialogue, continual transformation and protean psychological contracts. I identify I 0 moral foundations of LOs. They would house communal business cultures, accountable to Aristotelian and Kantian ethics. Power blocs would allow space for quieter, less obtrusive contributions to be valued, rather than imposing exploitative or mercenary discourses of appropriation. LOs would strive to improve their records of meeting stakeholders' moral claims. They would respond humbly to stakeholder criticism. Leadership would be humble and virtue seeking. There would be civil liberties. LOs would build, debug and update their own moral traditions. They would treat employees with compassion. They would also give special help and support to those challenged by obsolescence. There would be transparent operations and decision-making, engendering critical trust. I suggest how aspiring LOs may try to overcome problems of human defensiveness, limited moral reasoning capacity and fragmented moral terrain, and build these 10 moral foundations.

Moral growth in medical students

Although students bring to medical school a fairly well established value system, the potential for moral growth through the medical school environment and experience is substantial. The educational environment poses a succession of developmental and adaptive tasks to be accomplished. Several of these tasks are discussed her, tasks that are value-laden and involve, directly or indirectly, the interplay of ethical theory and practice. During the past quarter century, the two influences that have had the greatest impact on the moral growth and moral reasoning capacity of medical students have been the incorporation into the medical school curriculum of courses in medical humanities and the admission to medical school of an increasing number of female students. The female students have brought to medical school a level or dimension of moral reasoning (morality as care or responsibility for others) to augment the male students' focus on rights and justice considerations.

Sociobiology and the Moral Status of Nonhuman Animals

RD. Alexander (1987) has proposed that the ultimate grounds of ethics are evolutionary. Humans have the capacity for moral reasoning and negotiation, together with a system of appropriate emotions, such as shame and guilt when we do wrong, and a sense ofmoral wellbeing when we do right, because these abilities tended to increase our ancestors' inclusive fitness in the past. Fairly simple mathematical models can illustrate how this could work-one example is the Prisoner's Dilemma problem in which two individuals must act cooperatively if they are to maximise their 'survival points' over a series of interactions (Axelrod, 1984). In the Prisoner's Dilemma, mutual cooperation leads to an intermediate score for both parties; mutual defection gives both a low score, but if one cooperates and the other defects, then the cooperator scores no points, while the defector scores maximum points. Over a series of games the program that achieved the best scores was one called TIT FOR TAT, which cooperated unless its partner defected, but after a defection subsequently did whatever the partner did on the previous round, thus 'punishing' defection and 'rewarding' cooperation. It might appear tllat an evolutionary tlleory of the origin of ethics can never be compatible with the inclusion of nonhumans in our moral systems, because any tendency to give weight to their interests would always be disadvantageous; would tend to reduce inclusive fitness, and hence would involve a basic conflict with the ultimate grounds of human ethics. I hope to show that this strong view of the impossibility of animal rights is untrue, although there are grounds for holding a weaker view that proposes that, when interests conflict, humans will always have some tendency to favour relatives over non-relatives, friends over strangers, and other humans over nonhumans. Alexander himself believes (pp. 156ff.) that tlle selective value of indirect reciprocity may be enough to account for a human tendency to give sentient animals some status in their moral systems. He suggests that a person who (for example) was observed by other humans to be kind and reliable when handling pet animals would appear to them to be more trustworthy than someone who behaved cruelly. Trustworthy people would tend to be given preferential treatment, and, if it is true that behaviour towards animals tends to be a good predictor of future behaviour towards other humans, then tllere would be selection both for kindness towards animals and for a tendency to approve of such kindness in other people. The approvers benefit by being able to make successful predictions about the behaviour of other people because they are enabled to 'invest' help in partners who are likely to reciprocate.