Canadian Militia Research Articles

Impeded by Informality: The War Office, the Admiralty, the Canadian Militia and War Plans to Capture the French Islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon, 1898–1903

In November 1897, the Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C) North America and West Indies Station, Vice-Admiral Sir John Fisher, initiated plans to capture the French North American island group of St Pierre and Miquelon, using British garrison troops stationed at Halifax, Nova Scotia, and the Canadian Militia in a supporting role. His staff developed the scheme without consulting the Government of Canada or the War Office, and only brought the Halifax garrison commander into the planning process in October 1898, when the Fashola Crisis was in full swing. The War Office and the government of Canada eventually learned of the plans, which slumped along until 1903, but no one seemed sure who had the authority to deploy the Canadian Militia abroad. The plans were never executed, but the episode reveals a great deal about the dysfunctional state of British strategic planning in the late-Victorian period, especially between the War Office and the Admiralty, and the evolution of the dominion-imperial relations.

The ‘Nation in Arms’, ‘Attempted Rearmament’ and the ‘Brigade of Guards’, 1936–1939

This article is an enquiry into the voluntary and part-time nature, as well as the Britishness, of the Canadian militia, especially the Non-Permanent Active Militia (NPAM), in an interwar ‘nation-in-arms’. Major-General Maurice Pope’s insights are revisited through the eyes of regimental histories, print media, memoirs and other sources. After reviewing the role of voluntarism, unpaid service and improved training, three themes will be considered. The first is a type of training known as close-order drill, singled out by Joseph Pope as a mark of English-speaking regimental culture. The creation in 1937 of a Canadian Guards brigade, part of a wider Guards tradition across the British World, ties into a second theme briefly considered: NPAM participation in the royal tour of 1939 in communities across Canada, which merits a more detailed study. Third, there follows a case study of one exemplary but lesser-known interwar officer in Ottawa, Lieutenant-Colonel Edward Lisle of the Governor General’s Foot Guards, who, like so many men across the country, as well as his civilian day-job, pursued a lifelong part-time army career as a reserve unit officer and realist contributor to the Canadian Defence Quarterly.

“Remember Me to Friends If I Have Any”

Colonel W.W. Dodge, an American citizen in the Canadian Rebellion.was among the crew of a schooner captured by Canadian militia off Fort Malden on the Detroit River. He was wounded, imprisoned at Fort Malden, Toronto and Quebec in succession, and made a daring escape from the latter location with Dr. Edward A. Theller. One or two of his letters, written while incarcerated in Canada, were published in a few newspapers at the time, but now new letters have been found. These documents, which are presented here, enhance our understanding of the Patriot War.

Upper Canada Preserved

Following the end of the War of 1812, there was a conscious effort on the part of prominent Upper Canadians to immortalize the deeds and contributions of the Canadian Militia. Hugely overstating their meagre efforts, these figures claimed the lions share of victory for the citizen soldiers, ignoring the far more meaningful and significant effect that British redcoats and Indigenous warriors had in defeating the Americans. By creating this myth these prominent men, many of whom served in the militia, sought to enrich and entrench their positions in Upper Canadian society. Additionally, this Militia Myth helped form a new sense of Canadian identity (a specifically British version of it), that would be crucial in fostering a new nationalism that would emerge in mid-19th century Upper Canada.

Эдвард Хаттон и его концепция модернизации канадской милиции (1898-1900 гг.)

Эдвард Хаттон и его концепция модернизации канадской милиции (1898-1900 гг.)

‘Byng Boys’: A Profile of Senior Commanders of Canadian Combat Units on the Somme, 1916

This study provides a profile of the 107 officers who led Canadian combat units of battalion size or larger on the Somme, in 1916. It demonstrates that Canadian Militia officers dominated the command ranks, but they generally had limited or no formal military training or active service prior to the war. It highlights important differences in the rate of promotion, selection process, and influence of politics between the infantry and technical arms. The study also finds Canadian and Australian battalion commanders shared similar profiles and patterns in comparison to British battalion commanders.

Cutting its coat according to the cloth: the Canadian Militia and staff training before the Great War

In 1909, Canada established the Militia Staff Course (MSC) to provide reserve officers with the basic staff skills they would need upon mobilization. At the time, the Militia severely lacked properly trained staff officers to run formations and draft mobilization plans. Although the course provided only elementary staff training, it reinforced the latent command and staff potential of a generation of officers, as later suggested by their effective and often exceptional service in the First World War. The MSC ultimately proved the first step towards developing a tradition of formal command and staff training in the Canadian Army.

Militia Chieftains: Profiling the Founders of the "Canadian Scottish"

Little academic study has been conducted into the backgrounds of the men who chose to found regiments of Canadian militia in the pre-1914 period which were influenced on Scottish military traditions. This article seeks to redress the balance by profiling the backgrounds of the founders of the four militia regiments which contributed officers and men to the 16th Battalion, CEF in 1914. By examining key areas such as place of birth, ethnicity, wealth, religion, military experience, and political affiliation, the article shows the “types” of men who became involved in the formation of Scottish-themed militia regiments and highlights the importance of Scottish associational culture in the regiments’ establishment.

The Good Neighbors and Their Undefended Fence: US–Canadian Cross-Border Military Excursions Before the First World War

This article analyzes US–Canadian military relations in the nineteenth and early-twentieth century through the lens of frequent cross-border visits between the Canadian Militia and the US National Guard. Beginning in 1857 and continuing until the eve of the First World War, Canadian and American citizen soldiers visited back and forth between cities across the continent, taking part in celebrations of Queen Victoria's birthday and the Fourth of July. After 1898 these recreational visits became an annual event for several regiments on both sides of the border, interrupted only occasionally by the vagaries of Anglo-American diplomacy, periodic shortages of regimental funds, or the disapproval of higher authorities in Ottawa or Washington. Although US–Canadian military relations in this period are typically remembered as being non-existent, with the two North American nations scarcely communicating unless it was through British intermediaries, this article explores the very friendly relations that existed between the Canadian Militia and their counterparts in the US National Guard.

“This Period of Desperate Enterprise”

This article looks at the reaction of the British military authorities in Kingston to the outbreak of the Upper Canada Rebellion in December 1837. The revolt had come at an awkward time. The vast majority of Kingston’s regular garrison had been earlier dispatched to quell the uprising in Lower Canada leaving the town open to Patriot attack. As well, Fort Henry, whose construction had begun in 1832 and the lynch pin of a proposed system of fortifications designed to protect the province’s chief military depot, Royal Navy dockyard and the entrance to the Rideau Canal, was not yet complete. Lead by Richard Bonnycastle of the Royal Engineers, a small cadre of British regulars and retired veterans took vigorous steps to organize and train the eager but raw Canadian militia and volunteers. The effectiveness of the training was realized in late February 1838 when the Patriots made their major attempt to capture Kingston.

Upper Canadians and Their Guns

The gun is an essential part of our images of pioneering and pioneer manliness. We picture the pioneer family surrounded by forest, its men and boys using guns for protection from threatening predators, for sport, and for hunting, as the family relied on an abundance of game to supplement its initially limited farm produce. On the other hand, descriptions of Upper Canadian militia musters and of the 1837 Rebellion suggest that many rural Upper Canadians had only limited experience in using guns or did not have usable firearms at all. Framed by these contrasting images, this paper seeks to read a sample of country store charge accounts of some ordinary Upper Canadian farmers and artisans (in Leeds and Peterborough counties) for indications of gun use. Based on the frequency and scale of purchases of gunpowder and shot, it seems that after the earliest years, the militia-based image is the more likely one. For many, perhaps most, rural Upper Canadians, firing a gun was an occasional more than a routine part of rural life. Among the reasons: a lack of time.

The Fenians in Montreal, 1862–68: Invasion, Intrigue, and Assassination

THE FENIANS IN MONTREAL, 1862–68: INVASION, INTRIGUE, AND ASSASSINATION1 DAVID A. WILSON during the winter of 1865–66 reports reached the Canadian government that the Fenians—the physical-force Irish republican revolutionaries with their headquarters in New York—were planning to invade British North America. After a stormy convention in Philadelphia and an acrimonious dispute over the control of funds toward the end of 1865, the Fenian movement had split in two. One wing, led by John O’Mahony, wanted the organization to focus its attention on Ireland itself; the idea was to send money, weapons, and Irish Civil War veterans across the Atlantic to link up with the revolutionary movement at home and to complete the unfinished business of 1798 and 1848. Members of the other wing, led by William Roberts, saw things very differently; in their view the route to liberating Ireland lay through Canada.2 Roberts and his supporters were convinced that the conditions were not ripe for a republican revolution in Ireland. But the Fenians in North America had large numbers of troops at their disposal, and Britain’s North American provinces offered a tempting target. A successful invasion of Canada, they argued, would transform the balance of power in the Atlantic. Irish revolutionaries would draw inspiration from their IrishAmerican allies; the Fenians would use Canada as a base from which to attack British shipping; Canada could even serve as a bargaining chip in negotiations for an independent Ireland. And if this seemed too farfetched , there was always the prospect that a Fenian invasion would trigFENIANS IN MONTREAL, 1862–68: INVASION, INTRIGUE, AND ASSASSINATIONS 109 1 This article is based on the Neil Willard Inaugural Lecture for the Canadian Irish Studies Foundation, delivered at Concordia University, Montreal, on 15 May 2003. 2 The classic treatments are William D’Arcy, The Fenian Movement in the United States, 1858–1886 (New York, 1947, reprinted 1971), and Wilfried Neidhardt, Fenianism in North America (University Park, Penn., 1975). ger an Anglo-American war.3 England’s difficulty would become Ireland’s opportunity, and the Fenians would reap the benefits. The invasion plans were drawn up by “fighting Tom Sweeny,” the onearmed general who had fought in both the Mexican and the Civil Wars. Studying the earlier American invasions of 1775 and 1812, Sweeny concluded that Canada East was the key to victory. A Fenian invasion force from Buffalo would compel British and Canadian soldiers to defend Toronto and thus “uncover Montreal.” The Fenian army in upstate New York and Vermont would then cross into Canada East, secure in the knowledge that the French would remain neutral, as they had supposedly been during the earlier campaigns. Having established a firm base in Canada East, the Fenians would then isolate the garrisons in Canada West and force their Orange enemies to “surrender in detail” or be “cut to pieces by our troops.”4 Rather than relying on massive Irish Canadian support, Sweeny’s war plans envisaged highly selective operations and local risings that would undermine the defense of Canada. Small groups of Canadian Fenians would cut the telegraph lines, destroy the railway bridge that connected Canada West and Canada East, infiltrate the Canadian militia, and suborn British soldiers. To coordinate activities Sweeny established his own “secret service corps in Canada”; from the Welland Canal to Quebec City, Irish Canadian Fenian agents such as Patrick McAndrew and Richard Slattery swore in members and prepared the ground for the impending invasion. Within this secret network, in the context of an overall strategy that hinged on holding Canada East, the Fenians of Montreal not only were in a pivotal position, but they were also among the most militant Irish revolutionaries on the continent.5 FENIANS IN MONTREAL, 1862–68: INVASION, INTRIGUE, AND ASSASSINATIONS 110 3 On the Anglo-American context, see Brian Jenkins, Fenians and Anglo-American Relations during Reconstruction (Ithaca, N.Y., 1969). 4 Memorandum from Thomas Sweeny to William Roberts, 1865 (Thomas William Sweeny Papers, New York Public Library, hereafter abbreviated as NYPL). 5 Receipt, New York, 16 Nov. 1865: “Received of Gen[era]l T.W. Sweeney, Sec[retary] of War F.B., the sum of fifteen hundred dollars for the...

Canada and Egypt

Canada and Egypt have had diplomatic relations for over 40 years. During the first two decades the relationship had little bilateral content and was largely a byproduct of the Arab-Israeli conflict, of the cold war, and of United Nations efforts to promote international peace and security. In all three contexts, Canada and Egypt were more often than not on opposite sides of the fence, as became particularly evident during the three Arab-Israeli wars between 1956 and 1973. In the 1970s, however, major modifications in the foreign policies of Egypt and Canada, as well as in the international security and economic environments, resulted in a slow but fundamental change in the nature of the Canada-Egypt relationship which transformed it from one often characterized by antagonism into one whose hallmark today is bilateral and multilateral partnership. For Canada, this partnership with one of the largest and most influential countries in the Middle East is an invaluable asset in the pursuit of Canadian economic and security interests in the region as a whole.THE BEGINNINGSOfficial contacts between Canada and Egypt were anything but numerous before the second half of the twentieth century. The first semi-official contact occurred in 1884 when a contingent of 386 Canadian raftsmen and militia officers landed in Egypt to assist in transporting a British expeditionary force up the Nile to rescue the legendary General Gordon, then besieged in Khartoum.(f.1) The Canadian government, however, did not establish a resident presence in Egypt until 1945 when it opened a trade commissioner's office in Cairo, which was also responsible for trade promotion in the Sudan, Palestine, Cyprus, Iraq, Syria, Iran, and Turkey.(f.2)It was not until 1954 that the Canadian government decided to open embassies in Egypt, Israel, and Lebanon. The reasons given at the time for the decision are interesting: 'the need for Canadian representation in the region has been recognized for some time, particularly because of the frequency with which Middle Eastern affairs are discussed in the United Nations and because of the importance to the free world of maintaining peace in this strategic area.'(f.3) According to the official history of the Department of External Affairs, 'the reasons were the growing importance of the region in world affairs and the consequent need for the department to enhance its understanding of developments taking place there.'(f.4) When these statements are taken together, it seems evident that the embassies were not established primarily with a view to developing bilateral relations, but rather as observation posts from which Canadian diplomats could report back to Ottawa on regional developments of interest to Canada in either a United Nations or a cold war context.In the case of Egypt, it may have been just as well that Canada did not have any ambition towards closer bilateral relations. The policies pursued by the two countries in the Middle East were diametrically opposed in many respects and did not hold out much prospect for a meeting of minds or interests. Egyptian policy at the time was characterized by opposition to colonialism and imperialism, to Israel, and to conservative Arab regimes and by the promotion of pan-Arabism and Arab unity.(f.5) Insofar as Canada had a Middle Eastern policy specific to the region, it was centred on support for the creation and continued secure existence of the state of Israel, and it clearly reflected the sentiments of a majority of Canadians who had been moved by the Holocaust; it also reflected the existence in Canada of a well-organized and politically influential Jewish community.(f.6) Furthermore, the 'colonialist-imperialist' powers to which Egypt was most opposed were precisely those that were Canada's closest and most important allies -- the United States, Britain, and France.Divergences in the policies of Canada and Egypt became even more pronounced in 1955. …

War of 1812 Eyewitness Accounts: An Annotated Bibliography.

Preface Military Accounts U.S. Army British Army American Militia Canadian Militia Naval Accounts U.S. Navy Royal Navy American Privateers Canadian Sailors Civilian Accounts American Citizens British Subjects Foreign Nationals Documentary Sources Editor Index Subject Index

GRAY, William, Soldiers of the King. The Upper Canadian Militia, 1812-1815: a Reference Guide (Erin, Ont., Stoddart, Boston Mills Press Book, 1995), 288 p.

GRAY, William, Soldiers of the King. The Upper Canadian Militia, 1812-1815: a Reference Guide (Erin, Ont., Stoddart, Boston Mills Press Book, 1995), 288 p.. An article from journal Revue d'histoire de l'Amérique française (Volume 50, Number 4, printemps 1997, pp. 511-678), on Érudit.

Canadian Militia Mobilization and Deployment for War: The Iceland Experience of 1940

Current Canadian defense policies envision not only defense of the national territory, but a possible commitment of military forces overseas either through Canada's obligations as a member of NATO or the United Nations. In meeting these potential responsibilities, Ottawa would have to rely upon the reserves since the country's regular forces are small and time is required to raise, organize, equip, and train forces from a nonexisting prior base. Government declarations about the reserves have noted defects of which officers, regular and militia, are very cognizant. What would happen if Canada must send nonregular forces overseas under such conditions? This has occurred twice in the twentieth century; at the beginning of each conflict, Canadian forces were sent abroad, unprepared for war. This article will examine, as a case study, what happened in summer and autumn 1940 when one such brigade, "Z" Force, deployed to Iceland. Events are viewed from the perspective of an infantry ground force, "from the bottom up." An analysis of what occurred then can provide insight into what could happen when and if militia forces are again mobilized and deployed abroad before they are operationally ready for such service.

Book Review: A Heritage at Risk: The Canadian Militia as a Social Institution

Book Review: A Heritage at Risk: The Canadian Militia as a Social Institution

WILLETT, T. C., A Heritage At Risk: The Canadian Militia As a Social Institution. Boulder and London, Westview Press, 1987. 262 p.

WILLETT, T. C., A Heritage At Risk: The Canadian Militia As a Social Institution. Boulder and London, Westview Press, 1987. 262 p.

A Heritage at Risk: The Canadian Militia as a Social Institution.

A Heritage at Risk: The Canadian Militia as a Social Institution.

Ministers and Generals: Politics and the Canadian Militia, 1868-1904

Ministers and Generals: Politics and the Canadian Militia, 1868-1904