Campaign Disclosure Research Articles

The Public Function in The Regulation of Food: Ethics and Prevention

The restriction of transgenic components of high toxicity, the use of contaminated irrigation water with poisonous pesticides, as well the indiscriminate comestible animals fed with synthetic hormones, should be prohibited and sanctioned by the sanitary authorities under a World Health Council of Public Health, regulated by a group of international observers, not financed by the private food industry, either by transnational linked to the edible industry, with authority to sanction irregularities and compel government media campaign disclosure to the population on consumption risks.

The Effects of Increased Campaign Finance Disclosure: Evaluating Reform Proposals

Campaign disclosure requirements vary considerably across the United States. In some states, it is difficult to learn much about outside group spending in non-federal elections; other states have recently passed disclosure laws that go beyond federal requirements. This study builds upon a growing body of research on the impact of anonymous spending to address two questions about campaign finance disclosure: what types of disclosure information voters pay attention to and whether there are partisan differences in responsiveness to campaign finance data. We address these questions via an experiment in which people are randomly assigned to receive additional information about the donors to an outside group. We find some evidence that campaign finance information affected candidate evaluations and vote choice, but that subjects’ evaluations were particularly sensitive to whether they were told that out-of-state donors were behind the outside group. Further, we find little evidence that partisan identification conditioned these treatment effects; Republicans, Democrats, and Independents responded to our experimental stimuli in much the same way.

Anonymous Speech and Section 527 of the Internal Revenue Code

In an attempt to avoid the traditional constitutional problems associated with campaign finance disclosure laws, campaign finance reform advocates took an alternative approach. Reformers amended the Internal Revenue Code and used the tax status of political organizations as a mechanism for encouraging campaign disclosure of campaign related spending. The reformers conditioned a political organization's tax-exempt status on the willingness of the organization to disclose its contributors and expenditures. This article deals with the constitutionality and wisdom of the recently enacted legislation and suggests possible alternatives.

Campaign Disclosure and Tax-Exempt Entities: A Quick Repair to the Regulatory Plumbing

Abstract This article argues that there are some quick regulatory fixes the Treasury can implement to ensure that tax-exempt organizations are operating within the rules and that aggressive tax planning is not being used as a way to obfuscate rules for political organizations requiring disclosure. The article recommends that Treasury promulgate new regulations to require disclosure by tax-exempt entities of expenditures and contributions in excess of $25,000. The article also proposes that Treasury institute procedures to require tax-exempt organizations to file for exempt status, and to provide procedures for ensuring that these organizations meet the requirements in the statute and are not being used as a mechanism to avoid disclosure provisions in the Internal Revenue Code.

Campaign Disclosure and Tax-Exempt Entities: A Quick Repair to the Regulatory Plumbing

This article argues that the are some quick regulatory fixes the Treasury can implement to ensure that tax-exempt organizations (especially 501(c)(4) social welfare organizations) are operating within the rules and that aggressive tax planning is not being used as a way to obfuscate rules designed to require disclosure of contributions and expenditures of political organizations. The article recommends that Treasury promulgate new regulations to require disclosure of contributions and expenditures in excess of $25,000 by tax-exempt entities. The article also proposes that Treasury institute procedures to require tax-exempt organizations to file for exempt status, and to provide procedures for ensuring that these organizations meet the requirements in the statute and are not being used as a mechanism to avoid disclosure provisions in the Internal Revenue Code.

E-Disclosure of Campaign Finance Information: Divergent Interests in the States

This study examines factors that influence transparency and access in e-disclosure of state campaign finances. Although e-disclosure has the potential to increase campaign finance transparency and real-time public access to information, little research has been conducted on the factors that have influenced the extent of state e-disclosure practices. E-disclosure practices are analyzed from 2003 through 2007 for the 50 states using multivariate cross-sectional time series analysis and data from the Campaign Disclosure Project. Findings indicate the positive influence of legislative professionalism and state resources on more comprehensive and transparent e-disclosure approaches. Findings also indicate the importance of political factors not found to be salient in earlier e-government research and an ideological divergence between political elites and the general public on the value of disclosure.

Sunshine Laws and the Press: The Effect of Campaign Disclosure on News Reporting in the American States

This study examines the relationship between the quality of campaign finance disclosure in the American states and print news coverage of campaign finance. Does better disclosure of money in politics have an effect on the quantity, content, and timing of news articles? The implications are important for the effectiveness of disclosure in informing voters about the role of money in politics and holding politicians accountable. In theory, better disclosure should decrease the cost of information, allowing journalists to write more articles in a timely manner and move beyond the typical horserace story about which candidate has more money. The findings provide strong evidence that better disclosure regimes tend to reduce horserace coverage but do not necessarily increase the number of articles that focus on potentially improper political contributions or expenditures. While there is a slight increase in the quantity of news articles about political money, there is no evidence that better disclosure improves timeliness of news reporting. A discussion follows about the implications of these findings for regulating money in politics, and proposes further research to evaluate the link between campaign finance transparency and political accountability.

Disclosure Rules: How Institutions Influence Campaign Finance Regulation

Political institutions influence a legislator's preferences on campaign disclosure in two ways. First, institutions determine how useful campaign donations are for running effective campaigns. When money is more useful than certain types of campaign appeals, such as emphasizing policy differences, strong political candidates, usually incumbents, have an incentive to favor weak disclosure rules. Second, institutions influence the trade-offs that electionminded politicians face when presenting themselves to their constituencies. As the durability of personal ties between politicians and their supporters increases, the cost associated with opaque campaign disclosure requirements declines. Similarly, as the vote share necessary to secure reelection declines, the cost associated with opaque campaign disclosure requirements declines. Preferences over campaign disclosure requirements in Japan were altered by the adoption of an electoral system dominated by single-member districts and more transparent campaign finance regulations. This shift increased the electoral costs associated with the earlier, more opaque campaign donation disclosure regime. The result has been an inability of incumbents to push for a return to the old regime despite favoring it.

Not Just a Private Matter: The Purposes of Disclosure in an Expanded Regulatory System

Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and PolicyVol. 6, No. 1 Campaign Disclosure Project Symposium—Part TwoNot Just a Private Matter: The Purposes of Disclosure in an Expanded Regulatory SystemRobert F. BauerRobert F. BauerSearch for more papers by this authorPublished Online:13 Feb 2007https://doi.org/10.1089/elj.2006.6004AboutSectionsPDF/EPUB Permissions & CitationsPermissionsDownload CitationsTrack CitationsAdd to favorites Back To Publication ShareShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditEmail FiguresReferencesRelatedDetailsCited byPolicy and oversight of corporate political activities and the cost of equity capitalJournal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics, Vol. 18, No. 2Improving Corporate Political Donations Disclosure: Lessons from Australia5 June 2017 | Social and Environmental Accountability Journal, Vol. 37, No. 3Administering Politics: Rediscovering Campaign Finance and Public Administration28 July 2016 | Administrative Theory & Praxis, Vol. 38, No. 3Managing the Risks of Corporate Political Donations: A Utilitarian Perspective20 December 2012 | Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 118, No. 2Sunshine Laws and the Press: The Effect of Campaign Disclosure on News Reporting in the American States Raymond J. La Raja13 August 2007 | Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and Policy, Vol. 6, No. 3The Scope of Corruption: Lessons from Comparative Campaign Finance Disclosure Stephen Ansolabehere9 May 2007 | Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and Policy, Vol. 6, No. 2 Volume 6Issue 1Mar 2007 InformationCopyright 2007, Mary Ann Liebert, Inc.To cite this article:Robert F. Bauer.Not Just a Private Matter: The Purposes of Disclosure in an Expanded Regulatory System.Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and Policy.Mar 2007.38-55.http://doi.org/10.1089/elj.2006.6004Published in Volume: 6 Issue 1: February 13, 2007PDF download

Introduction

Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and PolicyVol. 6, No. 1 Campaign Disclosure Project Symposium—Part TwoIntroductionJoseph W. Doherty and Daniel H. LowensteinJoseph W. DohertySearch for more papers by this author and Daniel H. LowensteinSearch for more papers by this authorPublished Online:13 Feb 2007https://doi.org/10.1089/elj.2006.6003AboutSectionsPDF/EPUB Permissions & CitationsPermissionsDownload CitationsTrack CitationsAdd to favorites Back To Publication ShareShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditEmail "Introduction." , 6(1), pp. 36–37FiguresReferencesRelatedDetails Volume 6Issue 1Mar 2007 InformationCopyright 2007, Mary Ann Liebert, Inc.To cite this article:Joseph W. Doherty and Daniel H. Lowenstein.Introduction.Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and Policy.Mar 2007.36-37.http://doi.org/10.1089/elj.2006.6003Published in Volume: 6 Issue 1: February 13, 2007PDF download

Political Disclosure Regulation in Australia: Lackadaisical Law

POLITICAL FINANCE LAW in Australia consists of just two pillars of regulation. There is the carrot of public funding; and there is the obligation—it is hardly a stick—of disclosure. Both pillars offer some modest civilizing benefits to the jungle of unfettered electoral competition and money politics. Disclosure lets a little sunshine in, in the hope of better informing electoral choices and deterring some undue influence. Public funding levels the playing field a little, given that the major parties attract the major donations. (“Major parties” here refers to the duopolistic parties of government, i.e., the ALP or Australian Labor Party, and the conservative coalition of Liberal and National Parties. Their dominance is virtually guaranteed by a majoritarian electoral system.) Public funding also may relieve some of the desperation that otherwise leads politicians and fund-raisers to let their thirst for finance trump their ethical sense. In this article I will argue that disclosure law in Australia drifts lackadaisically, in a laissezfaire culture. It is laissez-faire in two regards. First, the legal framework allows for unbridled campaign expenditure and donations unlimited in source or size, while the courts defer to parliament in electoral law matters. Second, there is a cultural lack—among political actors, those responsible for enforcement, the media, and the electorate at large—that combines to ensure disclosure is neither transparent nor a first order issue. The article proceeds in several stages. In the second section, I situate the Australian constitutional and political systems in relation to their two chief influences, the United States and Britain, noting the trend to import features of electoral politics from the former more so than from the latter. This section is partly to aid readers unfamiliar with the Australian landscape: others may skip to the third section. But it is also to set up a contrast between the relatively unregulated nature of political finances that prevails in Australia as opposed to other English speaking democracies. The third section gives a broad overview of campaign finance law in Australia. The essential features of the disclosure regime are then described at the head of the fourth section, prior to a discussion of some of the more egregious difficulties with the regime and the relatively weak enforcement mechanisms. A case study of the “cash-for-visa” imbroglio of 2003–04 is used as an illustration of the desuetude of disclosure in Australia. The article finishes with reflections on the cultural factors that help explain the laissezfaire approach to political finance regulation in Associate Professor, University of Queensland Law School (from 2007); formerly Associate Professor, Griffith Law School, Brisbane, Australia. The author is indebted to Daniel Lowenstein and Joseph Doherty of UCLA Law School and their Campaign Disclosure Project (sponsored by The Pew Charitable Trusts). He also thanks Greg Dale for his, as ever, excellent research assistance and the Socio-Legal Research Centre, Griffith University for its support. Legislation cited here is Australian: ‘(Cth)’ means Commonwealth of Australia, i.e., federal legislation. The dollar values for disclosure are as recently increased by the Electoral Referendum Amendment (Electoral Integrity and Other Measures) Act 2006 (Cth).

Designing Campaign Finance Disclosure in the States: Tracing the Tributaries of Campaign Finance

Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and PolicyVol. 4, No. 4 Campaign Disclosure Project Symposium Part OneDesigning Campaign Finance Disclosure in the States: Tracing the Tributaries of Campaign FinanceProfessor Clyde WilcoxProfessor Clyde WilcoxSearch for more papers by this authorPublished Online:17 Nov 2005https://doi.org/10.1089/elj.2005.4.371AboutSectionsPDF/EPUB Permissions & CitationsPermissionsDownload CitationsTrack CitationsAdd to favorites Back To Publication ShareShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditEmail FiguresReferencesRelatedDetailsCited byCampaign Finance DisclosureAnnual Review of Law and Social Science, Vol. 14, No. 1Improving Corporate Political Donations Disclosure: Lessons from Australia5 June 2017 | Social and Environmental Accountability Journal, Vol. 37, No. 3I Know What You Did Last Cycle: Improving the Detection of State Campaign Finance Violations Ellen C. Seljan, Todd Lochner, Maya Gold, and Walker Davis1 September 2016 | Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and Policy, Vol. 15, No. 3The distinctive politics of campaign finance reform23 October 2012 | Party Politics, Vol. 20, No. 6Managing the Risks of Corporate Political Donations: A Utilitarian Perspective20 December 2012 | Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 118, No. 2Does It Matter Who’s Behind the Curtain? Anonymity in Political Advertising and the Effects of Campaign Finance Disclosure22 April 2013 | American Politics Research, Vol. 41, No. 6The price of transparency: do campaign finance disclosure laws discourage political participation by citizens’ groups?4 February 2010 | Public Choice, Vol. 146, No. 3-4Divergent Disclosure: The Value of Uniformity in State Campaign Finance Disclosure Laws Grant Davis-Denny17 November 2005 | Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and Policy, Vol. 4, No. 4 Volume 4Issue 4Dec 2005 InformationCopyright 2005, Mary Ann Liebert, Inc.To cite this article:Professor Clyde Wilcox.Designing Campaign Finance Disclosure in the States: Tracing the Tributaries of Campaign Finance.Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and Policy.Dec 2005.371-386.http://doi.org/10.1089/elj.2005.4.371Published in Volume: 4 Issue 4: November 17, 2005PDF download

Veiled Political Actors and Campaign Disclosure Laws in Direct Democracy

295 DISCLOSURE STATUTES are ubiquitous in the regulatory landscape of political campaigns. Disclosure is the primary kind of campaign finance regulation affecting initiative and referendum elections, and it may be the only regulation that is constitutionally permissible in this context. Disclosure elicits fairly widespread support; those who oppose contribution or expenditure limits are often willing to support disclosure statutes.1 Those who support more extensive campaign finance regulation usually favor disclosure as a necessary component that serves the traditional objective in candidate elections of combating corruption and also provides necessary information to voters in both candidate and issue elections. The willingness of the majority and most dissenting justices to uphold the disclosure provisions in the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) suggests that disclosure statutes are likely to continue to withstand constitutional scrutiny in the wake of McConnell v. Federal Election Commission.2 Notwithstanding this broad support, disclosure statutes have not received much scholarly attention, particularly in the legal academy. This lack of attention is unfortunate because the design of disclosure laws is crucial in several ways. First, the constitutional test applied to campaign finance laws, including disclosure, requires that statutes be substantially related to important state interests. Thus, if disclosure is justified because it provides useful information to citizens, the information elicited should be the most helpful to voters. In addition, targeting is important for the effectiveness of disclosure laws. Voters have limited time and attention, so they should be provided the information most crucial to improving their ability to vote consistently with their preferences. Finally, entities adopt strategies to circumvent campaign finance restrictions, so statutes must be drafted to reduce opportunities for evasion. Although subterfuge may be even more common when the law also imposes limitations on contributions and expenditures, experience on the state level in issue campaigns, where regulation is almost entirely through disclosure, sug-

Surveying the Landscape of State Campaign Finance Enforcement: A Preliminary Analysis

Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and PolicyVol. 4, No. 4 Campaign Disclosure Project Symposium Part OneSurveying the Landscape of State Campaign Finance Enforcement: A Preliminary AnalysisAssistant Professor Todd LochnerAssistant Professor Todd LochnerSearch for more papers by this authorPublished Online:17 Nov 2005https://doi.org/10.1089/elj.2005.4.329AboutSectionsPDF/EPUB ToolsPermissionsDownload CitationsTrack CitationsAdd to favorites Back To Publication ShareShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditEmail FiguresReferencesRelatedDetailsCited ByThe Federalist Safeguards of PoliticsSSRN Electronic Journal, Vol. 98 Volume 4Issue 4Dec 2005 InformationCopyright 2005, Mary Ann Liebert, Inc.To cite this article:Assistant Professor Todd Lochner.Surveying the Landscape of State Campaign Finance Enforcement: A Preliminary Analysis.Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and Policy.Dec 2005.329-348.http://doi.org/10.1089/elj.2005.4.329Published in Volume: 4 Issue 4: November 17, 2005PDF download

McConnell v. FEC and Disclosure

Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and PolicyVol. 3, No. 2 CommentariesMcConnell v. FEC and DisclosureElizabeth GarrettElizabeth GarrettSearch for more papers by this authorPublished Online:6 Jul 2004https://doi.org/10.1089/153312904322907784AboutSectionsPDF/EPUB Permissions & CitationsPermissionsDownload CitationsTrack CitationsAdd to favorites Back To Publication ShareShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditEmail FiguresReferencesRelatedDetailsCited byCampaign Finance and American DemocracyAnnual Review of Political Science, Vol. 18, No. 1Does It Matter Who’s Behind the Curtain? Anonymity in Political Advertising and the Effects of Campaign Finance Disclosure22 April 2013 | American Politics Research, Vol. 41, No. 6Veiled Political Actors and Campaign Disclosure Laws in Direct Democracy Elizabeth Garrett and Daniel A. Smith17 November 2005 | Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and Policy, Vol. 4, No. 4The Surprisingly Easy Case for Disclosure of Contributions and Expenditures Funding Sham Issue Advocacy Richard L. Hasen6 July 2004 | Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and Policy, Vol. 3, No. 2 Volume 3Issue 2Jun 2004 To cite this article:Elizabeth Garrett.McConnell v. FEC and Disclosure.Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and Policy.Jun 2004.237-244.http://doi.org/10.1089/153312904322907784Published in Volume: 3 Issue 2: July 6, 2004PDF download

Veiled Political Actors: The Real Threat to Campaign Disclosure Statutes

Disclosure statutes have not been the focus of much scholarly attention, particularly in the legal academy. This lack of attention is unfortunate because the design of disclosure laws is crucial in several ways. First, the constitutional test applied to campaign finance laws, including disclosure, requires that statutes be narrowly tailored to serve an important state interest. In addition, targeting is important for the effectiveness of disclosure laws. Voters have limited time and attention, so they should be provided the information most crucial to improving their ability to vote consistently according to their preferences. Finally, current experience with campaign regulation demonstrates that entities adopt strategies to circumvent restrictions, so statutes must be drafted to reduce opportunities for evasion. This study sheds light on some of the evasive tactics by political entities that wish to avoid disclosure relating to the source and extent of their spending on ballot questions. These veiled political actors (VPAs) take advantage of regulatory loopholes to spend substantial amounts of money to influence the outcomes of initiative and referendum elections while avoiding publicity of their efforts. Part I describes the interest served by disclosure beyond enforcing other campaign finance regulations or exposing quid pro quo corruption of candidates. We argue that improving voter competence is the most persuasive rationale in direct democracy and leads to various conclusions about the structure of effective disclosure laws. In Part II, we assess the jurisprudence relating to disclosure statutes in direct democracy to provide a sense of the legal hurdles such statutes must overcome, hurdles that become more daunting the more burdensome disclosure is for political actors. The jurisprudence suggests that targeted disclosure statutes will survive judicial scrutiny. Part III presents our description and analysis of various VPAs organized under federal and state laws that are used currently to evade disclosure restrictions in initiative campaigns. Part IV provides preliminary conclusions.

When Political Contributions Become an Act of Civil Disobedience

Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and PolicyVol. 1, No. 4 ForumWhen Political Contributions Become an Act of Civil DisobedienceLarry LevineLarry LevineSearch for more papers by this authorPublished Online:6 Jul 2004https://doi.org/10.1089/153312902760403833AboutSectionsPDF/EPUB Permissions & CitationsPermissionsDownload CitationsTrack CitationsAdd to favorites Back To Publication ShareShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditEmail FiguresReferencesRelatedDetailsCited byVeiled Political Actors and Campaign Disclosure Laws in Direct Democracy Elizabeth Garrett and Daniel A. Smith17 November 2005 | Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and Policy, Vol. 4, No. 4 Volume 1Issue 4Dec 2002 To cite this article:Larry Levine.When Political Contributions Become an Act of Civil Disobedience.Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and Policy.Dec 2002.499-502.http://doi.org/10.1089/153312902760403833Published in Volume: 1 Issue 4: July 6, 2004PDF download

Court upholds and voids portions of political campaign disclosure legislation

Court upholds and voids portions of political campaign disclosure legislation

Table of Contents

AbstractIRS Contemplating Corporate Responsibility, Other Form 990 ChangesIRS Reverses Course on Treatment of Income Received by Cooperative's Wholly Owned SubsidiaryIRS Employees Immune from Personal Liability for Tax‐Exempt Organization AuditPrivilege Protects IRS Documents Concerning Denial of Tax‐Exempt Status from DisclosureIRS Rulings Denying Tax‐Exempt Status Not DisclosableCourt Upholds and Voids Portions of Political Campaign Disclosure LegislationNew York Times and the Law of Charitable Assistance for Victims of TerrorismMemo to IRS: Please Consider Revision of Form Letter