Cabinet Size Research Articles

Design and FEM modeling of a fire resistant cabinet for fusion environment

Diagnostic systems in fusion environments need to satisfy stringent requirements, often involving radiation and electromagnetic shielding as well as fire protection. A conceptual design of a multilayer cabinet for the RNC (Radial Neutron Camera) diagnostic systems, located in the equatorial port (EP) #01 in ITER, with a required fire rating REI-120 (R - integrity, E - leak tightness to hot gasses and flames, I – thermal) was analyzed from the thermal insulation (I) point of view during external fire scenario (Tmax=805 ℃ for 2 h). The modeling of the fire was based on the convective heat transfer represented by a HTC (heat transfer coefficient) of 35 W/m2K and radiative heat transfer with unit emissivity according to ISO-834. Focusing on the thermal criterion prescribed by the REI requirement, the objective was to demonstrate that the temperatures will remain below specified limits for at least 120 min subjected to given fire loads. The adopted strategy was to exploit an advanced microporous incombustible material – Microtherm® overstitched – selected for the fire insulation and being applicable for the ITER environment. A parametric 3D model was developed and solved using the Finite Element Method (FEM) and the ANSYS code, including not only the heat conduction but internal radiation via SURF252 elements and internal convection via LINK34 elements. The relation between the thickness of fire protection and the maximum temperature after 2 h of fire was analyzed for two types of designs: with internal and external fire protection. In addition to the ideal thermal connection between the layers of the cabinet, the effects of imperfect thermal contacts were analyzed by varying the thermal conductance of CONTA174 elements. The effect of the boundary conditions: adiabatic versus specified temperature was analyzed, as well as the need for protecting the supports of the cabinet. The effect of the cabinet size at constant thickness of the walls was analyzed parametrically revealing increasing temperatures for smaller cabinets – more fire insulation needed. An analytical model used to explain the size effect relate to the competing effects of increasing heat transfer area and increasing heat capacity. The developed methodology provides an easy tool for early dimensioning of the necessary fire protection layer often needed before the start of the detailed CAD design. The necessary thickness of external protection layer for the analyzed cabinet resulted in 10 mm.

Determinants of the cabinet size in presidential systems

AbstractThe composition of cabinets under presidential regimes has constituted one of the top topics of the litterature in political science in recent years. However, nothing has been said about the proper size of those cabinets. That is, why some cabinets are 37 ministers large when other is formed by just 13 members? We carry on a theory of cabinet size under presidential regimes, using insights from both parliamentarist and presidentialist literature. Our model is composed of five hypotheses relying on an original dataset of 161 observations across 19 presidential countries of the Americas. Our main finding is that the inclusion of independents and/or technocrats impacts significantly on lowering cabinets' size.

Kinder, gentler – and crisis-proof? Consensus democracy, inclusive institutions and COVID-19 pandemic performance

Which patterns of democracy perform best? Although a decades-long research tradition has fairly robustly suggested that consensual democracies outperform their Westminster-style majoritarian counterparts, the scope of previous studies has been limited to ‘normal times’. In this article, the endogenous context of the COVID-19 pandemic is leveraged to study whether the alleged superiority of consensualism also holds during crises. It is hypothesised that, in addition to consensus democracy, inclusive institutions – i.e. cabinet size and interest-group corporatism – enhance crisis-related performance. Drawing on new and original data, cross-sectional and hierarchical time-series regression analyses show that horizontal power-sharing and the number of ministers substantively reduced excess mortality, while the structure of the interest-group system had no effect. Although established consensus democracies can draw on their built-in institutional assets even during crises, our findings indicate that majoritarian systems may, as a compensatory performance-enhancing tool, flexibly gear up for crisis-induced necessities by adding more ministers to the cabinet.

Cabinet size and governance in Sub‐Saharan Africa

AbstractThere is frequent public and media concern over the cost of bloated cabinets in many Sub‐Saharan African countries. Scholarship on elite clientelism links cabinet positions with corruption and practices that undermine sound policymaking. This article presents new data on the number of ministers in African governments and documents a robust negative association with several measures of governance, both across countries and in a regression framework that exploits within‐country variation over time and accounts for various potential confounders. This suggests policymakers, donors, investors, and citizens should pay close attention to the number of ministers appointed to the cabinet. Although the article cautions against simplistic policy prescriptions, a sizable increase in the number of ministers is likely bad news for governance.

Cabinet size, power-sharing and ethnic exclusion in Africa

While it is often pointed out that African countries have large government cabinets that underpin economic performance, lesser is known about the factors behind the size of government cabinets in Africa. Using an original database of the number of ministerial appointments in government offices in 35 African states, this paper establishes a robust negative relationship between the size of the government cabinet and the exclusion based on ethnicity. This result suggests that the governments that are more inclusive tend to be the largest, independent to the number of ethnic groups present in the country, namely, the state of the ethno-linguistic fractionalization. However, the results also show that this inclusion is in favor of powerless positions, suggesting that inclusion might be less about power-sharing than it is about resource-sharing, since the incumbent controls the key positions, while the included ethnic groups have peripheral positions with, however, an access to public rents. The results are robust to various sensitivity analyses.

Population-Dependence of Cabinet Sizes

Cabinet size may affect efficiency. We find that population (\P) accounts for 40\% of the variation in cabinet sizes (C}) in 189 countries. Individual country values vary up to -50 \% from the average pattern, C=40/(1 39P^-1/4, which is simple logistic in terms of the logarithm of P. This differs from the format of the cube root law of assembly sizes, which has no ceiling. It remains to be elucidated on logical grounds why the constants should have the values 40 and 1/4. Cabinets tend to be larger than average in Afro-MENA and Caribbean countries and smaller in Latin America. No other factor has been found to affect cabinet size. In particular, corruption doesn’t, once the geographic region is taken into account.

Decentralisation and regional cabinet size: the Spanish case (1979–2015)

This article explores under what conditions regional governments tend to have larger or smaller cabinets. The main contention is that cross-regional variation in cabinet size is partly explained by the dynamics set up by the multilevel system of government, mainly territorial decentralisation, multilevel government (in)congruence or the existence of nationally distinct regions. The hypotheses are tested with a new and original dataset built upon the Spanish case (1979–2015). Findings show that regions with more welfare state policies, especially when the region’s economic capacity is high, and nationally distinct regions tend to have bigger executives. In contrast, decentralisation in the form of basic state functions and government incongruence do not have a significant effect. Results have important implications for our understanding of sub-national territorial institutions and their interaction with decentralisation dynamics.

Loudspeaker design and analysis

This presentation will demonstrate the planning, construction, testing, and final performance of a student designed loudspeaker system. The purpose of this project was to create a 2.1 channel, high quality sound system that produces a bandwidth just short of the full range of human hearing, which is then cut off and sent to the appropriate speakers. This system consists of 2 two-way speakers utilizing a woofer and tweeter, arranged in unison with one sole subwoofer. The function of this particular sound system is to reproduce sound faithfully in a 350–400 square foot room, yet still be lightweight and maneuverable. The performance characteristics of this system will be presented through frequency response and linearity testing results. These tests were used to help warrant modifications made to the cabinet size and shape while adhering to a strict budget of $1,200. The analysis of every performance will also reveal data for different electrical component values in designing the Linkwitz-Riley crossovers. The aim of this presentation is to highlight the various key factors that are important in loudspeaker design.

Experimental performance of a new design of solar dryer for drying osmotically dehydrated cherry tomatoes

The performance of a new design of a solar dryer for drying osmotically dehydrated cherry tomatoes is presented. The dryer consists of drying cabinet, heat exchanger, 16-m2 water type solar collector, and water type heat storage unit. The cabinet size is 1.0 m wide × 3.0 m long × 1.4 m high with the load capacity of 100 kg for osmotically dehydrated cherry tomatoes. Three batches of osmotically dehydrated cherry tomatoes were dried in this dryer during May–June, 2014. For each batch, 100 kg of osmotically dehydrated cherry tomatoes were dried. There was a considerable reduction in drying time in the new solar dryer as compared to natural sun drying. The dried products were completely protected from rains and insects and were of high quality dried products. The efficiencies of the solar collector was 21%–69%. The pay-back period of the dryer is estimated to be 1.37 years.

Parties or Portfolio? The Economic Consequences of Africa’s Big Cabinets

Does cabinet size have an impact on economic policy in Africa? The average number of ministers has increased steadily for four decades, yet we know little about the economic effects of new portfolios, despite popular complaints about costly cabinets. Comparative studies generate conflicting expectations, either blaming coalition governments for patronage or crediting them with economic restraint. Using data on 45 Sub-Saharan African countries between 1971 and 2006, our empirical analysis links parties and portfolios to budgetary policy performance. We show that cabinets with more ministries are associated with budget surpluses, but they are also slightly more likely to engage in patronage spending. Next, we find that cabinets governing through multiparty coalitions have no consistent impact on budget surpluses. However, they are strongly associated with less extractive government and lower rates of patronage spending compared with single-party cabinets. These results hold after controlling for the type of colonial legacy, economic conditions, population size, constraints on executives, level of democracy, oil income, type of party system and ethnic and religious fractionalization. We conclude that parties and portfolios are both important but they have different effects: adding portfolios to the cabinet may improve economic outcomes by enhancing specialization, but governance through multiparty cabinets generates incentives to both limit extraction and restrain patronage spending.

How Cabinet Size and Legislative Control Shape the Strength of Transparency Laws

Prevailing thinking surrounding the politics of secrecy and transparency is biased by assumptions regarding single‐party and small coalition governments. Here, the “politics of secrecy” dominates: Leaders delay or resist strong transparency and freedom of information (FOI) policies when they control parliament, and yield to strong laws because of imposition, symbolic ambition, or concessions when they do not. In effect, leaders weigh the benefits of secrecy against gains in monitorial capacity. Their support for strong transparency policies grows as the number of parties in their cabinet rises. So while the costs of surrendering secrecy trump the benefits of strong transparency reforms in single‐party governments, in broad multiparty coalitions leaders trade secrecy for tools to monitor coalition “allies.” Drawing on vivid international examples, patterns of FOI reform in Latin America, and an in‐depth study of FOI in Brazil, this article generates new theoretical insights into transparency and the “politics of monitoring.”

Legislative Dissent without Reprisal? An Alternative View of Speaker Selection

Very little research has been devoted to examining the nature of Speaker selection in legislatures. This article attempts to provide a new perspective in which future research could examine the election of Speakers. A collective action perspective is put forward, which sees three groups of actors execute separate strategies to reach their own ends: the backbench, the executive and the opposition. These factors are tested on the Speaker selection exercises in the Ontario legislature. In the case study, it was found that the executive rarely gets their choice of Speaker, and three factors identified in the legislative dissent literature are utilised to examine these private acts of dissent: party popularity, cabinet size and the percentage of new legislators entering the party at each legislative term. It was found that the Speaker selection process involves three groups, each with their own preference order in decision-making.

Coalition governments, cabinet size, and the common pool problem: Evidence from the German states

The theoretical literature on common pool problems in fiscal policy suggests that government fragmentation increases public expenditures. In parliamentary regimes, the fragmentation hypothesis refers to (i) coalition governments and (ii) cabinet size. This paper explores the effect of coalition governments and cabinet size on public expenditures with panel data covering all 16 German states over the period 1975–2010. Identification is facilitated by the large within-variation in the incidence of coalition governments and the size of the cabinet in the German states. In addition, I exploit a feature of state electoral laws to construct a credible instrument for the likelihood of coalition governments.

Determinants of cabinet size

AbstractA large literature examines the composition of cabinets in parliamentary systems, but very little attention has been paid to the size of those cabinets. Yet not only is the size of the cabinet related to the division of portfolios that may take place, cabinet size is also related to policy outcomes. In this article, a theory of party size is considered which examines how coalition bargaining considerations, intra‐party politics and efficiency concerns affect the size of cabinets. Hypotheses derived from the theory are examined using an extensive cross‐national dataset on coalition governments which allows us to track changes in cabinet size and membership both across and within cabinets.

Coalition Governments, Cabinet Size, and the Common Pool Problem: Evidence from the German States

The theoretical literature on common pool problems in fiscal policy suggests that government fragmentation increases public expenditures. In parliamentary regimes, the fragmentation hypothesis refers to (i) coalition governments and (ii) cabinet size. This paper explores the effect of coalition governments and cabinet size on public expenditures with panel data covering all 16 German States over the period 1975-2010. Identification is facilitated by the large within-variation in the incidence of coalition governments and the size of the cabinet in the German States. In addition, I exploit a feature of state electoral laws to construct a credible instrument for the likelihood of coalition governments.

Causal Conditions of Lithuanian Government’s Stability

This article presents the results of qualitative comparative analysis of such causal factors of Lithuanian government’s stability as decision-making model, role of political parties, government ideology and parliamentary majority. The basic source of the research was the interviews with ministers who have served in different cabinets. The cabinets led by Kazimiera Prunskienė, Gediminas Vagnorius, Adolfas Šleţevičius, Laurynas Mindaugas Stankevičius, Rolandas Paksas, Andrius Kubilius, Algirdas Mykolas Brazauskas and Gediminas Kirkilas are analyzed in this article. The research showed that in most cases the governments, where decision-making model is monocratic and party influence in governmental decision-making process is weak; or those in which decision-making model is monocratic and which have support of the parliamentary majority, are stable. It was also revealed that a strong influence of ruling party (or parties) in the governmental decision-making process and the leftist ideology could lead to government stability. The governments might be classified into three homogeneous groups according to decision-making model, role of political parties in decision-making, ideology, size of parliamentary support and cabinet duration.DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5755/j01.ppaa.11.1.1403

Politicians: be killed or survive

In the course of history, a large number of politicians have been assassinated. To investigate this phenomenon, rational choice hypotheses are developed and tested using a large data set covering close to 100 countries over a period of 20 years. Several strategies, in addition to security measures, are shown to significantly reduce the probability of politicians being attacked or killed: extended institutional and governance quality, democracy, voice and accountability, a well-functioning system of law and order, decentralization via the division of power and federalism, larger cabinet size and a stronger civil society. There is also support for a contagion effect.

An Advanced NSSS Integrity Monitoring System for Shin-Kori Nuclear Units 3 and 4

The advanced design features of NSSS (Nuclear Steam Supply System) Integrity Monitoring System for Shin-Kori Nuclear Units 3 and 4 are summarized herein. During the overall system design and detailed component design processes, many design improvements have been made for the system. The major design changes are: 1) the application of a common software platform for all subsystems, 2) the implementation of remote access, control and monitoring capabilities, and 3) the equipment redesign and rearrangement that has simplified the system architecture. Changes give an effect on cabinet size, number of cables, cyber-security, graphic user interfaces, and interfaces with other monitoring systems. The system installation and operation for Shin-Kori Nuclear Units 3 and 4 will be more convenient than those for previous Korean nuclear units in view of its remote control capability, automated test functions, improved user interface functions, and much less cabling.

Patronage and Political Stability in Africa

Political conflict across Africa is often linked to the pervasive use of patronage in retaining control of the state. However, few sources of data have been available to systematically examine the relationship between a leader’s patronage strategies and the likelihood of an extraconstitutional change in power. This article employs ministerial appointments to the cabinet as a proxy for changes in the size of a leader’s patronage coalition. With time-series cross-section data on 40 African countries, this study shows that the size of cabinets varies systematically according to regime type, resource constraints, ethnic fractionalization, and total population. It then shows that African leaders extend their tenure in office by expanding their patronage coalition through cabinet appointments. A proportional hazards model of regime duration indicates that cabinet expansion lowers the probability of a leader’s being deposed through a coup. The appointment of one additional minister to the cabinet lowers a leader’s coup risk by a greater extent than does a 1-percentage-point increase in economic growth.

Do large cabinets favor large governments? Evidence on the fiscal commons problem for Swiss Cantons

The fiscal commons problem is one of the most prominent explanations of excessive spending in political economics. For a panel of the 26 Swiss cantons over the 1980–1998 periods, this paper explores the role of fragmented governments on fiscal policy outcomes. We distinguish between two variants of fragmented governments: cabinet size and coalition size. In addition, we analyze whether constitutional rules for executive and legislature as well as formal fiscal restraints shape the size of government and how different rules interact with fragmentation. The results indicate that the number of ministers in the cabinet is positively associated with the size of government. While fiscal referendums effectively restrict the size of government, there is also evidence that fiscal referendums relax the fiscal commons problem to some extent.