Cabinet Formation Research Articles

Más allá del partido: empresarios, tecnócratas y agentes políticos en los gabinetes ministeriales dominicanos

Objective/context: This study analyzes the partisan connections of individuals who attain ministerial positions in the Dominican Republic, identifying the influence of political parties, economic elites, and technical profiles in the formation of presidential cabinets. Methodology: Following the typology proposed by Camerlo and Castaldo, we categorize the partisan profiles of the governments of the Dominican Liberation Party (PLD) from 2016 to 2020, and the Modern Revolutionary Party (PRM) from 2020 to 2024. This aims to characterize their internal variation in scenarios of low formal institutionalization that are not captured by traditional dichotomous classifications. Conclusions: The heterogeneity in the influence of party leadership illustrates how Dominican parties diverge from the party government model. The predominance of non-partisan profiles in the core planning ministries, along with the presence of politician- businessmen in the rest of the portfolios, highlights the risk of political capture in this country. Originality: These results call into question the influence of the party as the center of power in dominant presidentialism.

Poderes partidarios y reclutamiento ministerial. El caso argentino

Objective/context: Party recruitment is a crucial governance tool in contemporary democracies. Presidential and parliamentary heads of government distribute ministerial portfolios to party members in exchange for essential political resources, such as legislative support. This article explores the relationship between government formation and political parties, with parties that are not very institutionalized. In particular, it examines the extent to which arguments about presidential cabinet formation hold up when the hierarchical level of party ministers is considered. Methodology: This statistical study uses a generalized linear model (GLM) with a binomial distribution and a logit link function with robust standard errors. It aims to carry out causality exploration to test the original indicators of the proposed dependent variables. Conclusions: Hierarchy and partisan powers are relevant factors to complement existing explanations of ministerial recruitment strategies. Originality: Comparative research on government formation and its connection to political parties has made significant progress, focusing on the distinction between ministers affiliated and not affiliated with a party. However, this dichotomous approach neglects consideration of the hierarchical position within the party structure, a fundamental aspect of the governing party model underlying parliamentary democracies. This article presents a trichotomous measure that considers the hierarchical level of ministers.

Bureaucratic professionalization and cabinet management: How civil servants in presidential democracies are treated differently

AbstractHow does bureaucratic structure shape presidential strategy in managing top executive posts? The comparative literature on cabinet formation focuses heavily on presidential legislative strategy, largely overlooking the administrative dimension of cabinet management. This article fills this gap by examining how bureaucratic professionalization shapes the president's strategy in distributing and managing cabinet posts. We argue that as bureaucracies become more autonomous via professionalization, ministers from the bureaucracy are more likely to be central players in presidential cabinet management. Our analysis of original data on 1538 ministers' cabinet careers from 26 presidential administrations in four Asian democracies shows that bureaucrats are more likely to receive and retain cabinet posts in key policy areas as bureaucratic professionalization increases, whereas they are less likely to do so with decreasing bureaucratic professionalization. This finding suggests that presidential cabinet management follows a different set of rules according to the level of bureaucratic professionalization.

Cabinet formation under semi-presidentialism: European countries in comparison

Abstract The article demonstrates that the rules and practices of cabinet formation and investitures should be taken into account to better grasp the variety of semi-presidentialism in Europe. This is extremely important, since semi-presidentialism as a constitutional system of government (primarily according to a minimalist approach to the definition) is the most common form of inter-institutional and political relations in European countries. The former is most often understood as a constitutional design of inter-institutional relations with a president popularly elected for a fixed term, as well as with a cabinet headed by a prime minister who are collectively responsible to parliament. Thus, not only presidents and parliaments, but cabinets too play a crucial role in the constitutional and political practice of semi-presidentialism, since the latter are collectively responsible to parliaments (or simultaneously to presidents), but are characterised by distinctive parameters of formation. The assumption and hypothesis are that options of cabinet formation and inter-institutional relations in this regard can structure European semi-presidentialism, even without affecting the definition of this constitutional design, but probably depending on the roles and powers of presidents and parliaments in cabinet formation, as well as types of semi-presidentialism regarding the consideration of who can dismiss the cabinet. Based on comparison and systematisation of the cases of European semi-presidentialism, it is justified that cabinet formation (including within various types and consequences of parliamentary votes of investiture in cabinets, as well as their absence) is typically focused on a junction of relations between presidents and parliaments, and are likely to serve as a classification indicator of semi-presidentialism. This is important for constitutional engineering, since detailing the optionality of semi-presidentialism as a constitutional design and system of government, particularly regarding cabinet formation, should extend the horizons, as well as systematise the idea of the options and effects of various institutional designs (in addition to presidentialism and parliamentarism) and political regimes (including democratic, autocratic and hybrid).

Italy: Political Developments and Data in 2022

AbstractThe year 2022 was (again) a year of intense political change in Italy. The President of the Republic was (re)elected in January, Prime Minister Mario Draghi resigned in July, and new elections were held in September, amidst energy and economic crises, growing inflation and the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The electoral victory of the centre‐right coalition, and in particular the success of Brothers of Italy, not only marked the rise to power of a prominent European far‐right party but also led to the nomination of the first female Prime Minister of the Italian Republic. The fall of Draghi's government and the formation of the first Meloni Cabinet raised questions about Italy's relationship with EU institutions, NATO and the transatlantic partnership.

Э. ЮНГЕР И УТВЕРЖДЕНИЕ НАЦИСТСКОГО ПРАВИТЕЛЬСТВА: СТРАТЕГИЯ ВЫЖИВАНИЯ ИНТЕЛЛЕКТУАЛА В ГОДЫ НАЦИСТСКОГО ГОСПОДСТВА

The article discusses the issues of developing a strategy of behavior and survival of an intellectual in the conditions of the Nazi dictatorship on the example of the German conservative thinker and writer Ernst Junger. The formation of the Nazi government in January 1933 marked the end of the deep crisis of the Weimar Republic in the early 1930s. As a result of the formation of Hitler's Nazi-conservative coalition cabinet in the German state, the process of structural transformation of the state towards the Fuhrer state, assuming total control and management of the entire life of society, began. Under these conditions, the existence of an intellectual required a choice between conformity and nonconformism. The example of Ernst Junger, a well-known nationalist publicist, shows how non-trivial the ways of existence of a thinker can be in the conditions of the beginning regulation of public life and repression against opposition forces and ideas.

The only way is up: proportions and portfolios for women in cabinet in Malaysia, 2008–2023

ABSTRACT The inclusion of women ministers in cabinet is vital in redistributing political power and increasing participation. However, increasing the number of women ministers is insufficient; the type of portfolios also matters. In Malaysia, following the 14th general election, the number of women ministers almost doubled; this increase survived government turn-overs between 2020–2022, and the 15th general election. Using cabinet composition and budget data, and a customised typology of portfolio salience, this paper analyses women’s cabinet representation between 2008–2023, finding significant improvements after the 15th general election, and identifying imperatives for cabinet formation if participation is to be increased.

FIFTH PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS IN BULGARIA

The article discusses the prerequisites and results of the fifth elections to the People’s Assembly called during the two year period and held on April 2, 2023 It analyses the dispositions of the electorate in view of the Eurobarometer polls data and the election results. The past vote, despite some changes in the party structure of the People’s Assembly, testified once again to the deep disappointment of the weary Bulgarian voter in the entire political class. At the same time, it has recreated the stalemate in Parliament. The leaders of the warring majority camps (GERB-SDS vs «We Continue the changes» – «Democratic Bulgaria») already fear of being branded as the culprits of a new failure leading to appointment of one more temporary technocratic government by the president and the next snap elections. Such a prospect does not bode well for them, while their coalition is potential of seriously damaging their reputation. In such circumstances, the fighting forces are trying to find a magic formula for formation of a coalition cabinet. The near future will show whether the instinct of self-preservation will work or selfish party interests will prevail followed by déjà vu. However, in any development no change in the general anti-Russian vector of Bulgarian foreign policy is expected.

Super partes? Ideological leaning of heads of state and their distance from prime ministers

ABSTRACT Presidents in parliamentary democracies are commonly perceived as neutral actors, with limited influence on everyday politics. However, Italian heads of state have the widest set of powers among European parliamentary democracies. Recent episodes occurring during the presidential terms of Giorgio Napolitano and Sergio Mattarella suggest that heads of state can indeed play a political role, influencing cabinet formation and day-to-day political events and processes. This article examines whether Italian heads of state can be considered non-partisan political actors or whether, in contrast, their ideological leanings can be inferred from their public speeches and declarations. By compiling and analysing a new and original dataset based on content analysis of presidents’ investiture speeches and New Year’s Eve messages, we mapped the political positions of Italian heads of state over 76 years (1946–2022). As such, the article investigates the conditions under which the position of the President is closer to that of the Prime Minister on the ideological left-right scale and on foreign policy. The analysis reveals that the ideological distance between them is lower when both belong to the same ideological party family and when the Prime Minister has been appointed to form a president’s cabinet, closer to the preferences of the head of state.

Question of Timing: Pre-Electoral Coalitions in Multiparty Presidential Regimes

This paper focuses on the timing of coalition formation under presidential systems. While elections in parliamentary regimes have recently been characterized by a high degree of uncertainty both in the results and the formation of cabinets, this is not the case for presidential politics. As a result, we argue that coalition cycles differ across systems of government. As a matter of fact, we argue that the process of coalition formation under presidentialism is more complicated. To test our claim, we look at forty-four multiparty governments in Latin America and Asia. We find that presidentialism — with its fixed mandate and its specific institutional mechanism for selecting the president — directly affects the ‘coalition life cycle’ and fosters a stronger propensity to pre-electoral agreements.

The formalisation of minority governments

The vast majority of elections in parliamentary systems result in minority situations. During cabinet formation, parties have three options: building a winning coalition, a genuine substantive minority cabinet without support, or a formal minority with institutionalised long-term support partnerships. Even though the use of permanent support partners has increased substantially, there is still comparatively little knowledge about the circumstances under which parties choose to enter such formalised support partnerships instead of winning coalitions. This article aims to close this gap by analysing how the party system, the institutional configuration, as well as the bargaining environment influence which cabinet type forms. The dataset includes 469 cabinets from 27 Eastern and Western European countries between 1970 and 2019. The hypotheses are tested with the help of multinomial model estimations. While only few of the traditional explanations can explain the formation of formal minority cabinets, the results show that there is a time-trend towards more formalisation.

PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS IN BULGARIA. «DEJA VU»?

This article analyzes the background and results of the fourth elections held within 18 months to elect members of the National Assembly (02.10.2022). As predicted, the coalition government formed on the third attempt and led by Kiril Petkov, a leader of the new movement «We Continue the Change» did not last long. It fell victim to a no-confidence vote initiated by its main opponent, the GERB party of ex-premier Boyko Borisov. The latter gained unexpected support from Slavi Trifonov’s «There is such a people» movement, a member of the previous multi-party cabinet. This election, despite some changes in the party structure of the National Assembly, actually testified to the deep disappointment of the disillusioned Bulgarian voters in the entire political spectre. At the same time, they replicated the stalemate in the Parliament. Under such conditions, the formation of a new coalition cabinet is extremely unlikely and one should expect «déjà vu»: another caretaker government appointed and next elections announced by the president. The general conclusion to be drawn from the present developments is that the political system with parties being called upon as the main subjects of the parliamentary model and diligently exercising in discrediting parliamentarism instead is deeply sick. There is seemingly no way out of the protracted political crisis!

Cabinet Formation and Coalition Governance: The Effect of Portfolio Allocation on Coalition Agreements

AbstractWhile coalition agreements are significant in structuring government behaviour, their comprehensiveness varies considerably across cabinets. We argue that the average correspondence between parties' priorities and portfolio allocation is important in explaining the comprehensiveness of coalition agreements because coalition parties that have obtained their preferred portfolios have less incentive to negotiate a detailed coalition agreement. We test our argument by combining newly collected data on coalition agreements drafted by 218 cabinets in 24 Western and Eastern European countries from 1945 to 2014 with data on the distribution of ministerial portfolios. We find that the shorter and less comprehensive the agreements, the higher the correspondence between parties' priorities and portfolio allocation. Our results have important implications for our understanding of coalition governments and the relationship between government formation and cabinet governance.

Separation of powers, opposition strength, and chief executives' strategy

AbstractOne of the main questions about presidential democracies is to what extent the legislature influences executive governance. However, less well‐known in this literature is the influence of opposition parties in policy‐making and government formation processes. We argue that, in multiparty presidential governments, more concentrated opposition forces in the legislature, as opposed to more fragmented, lead to higher government spending and greater chances of coalition formation. Facing more united opposition, presidents who are concerned about passing their agenda in the legislature are willing to pay the price to hold their ruling party or governing coalition together in tighter unity. We test this logic by analyzing data on government spending and cabinet formation in all multiparty presidential democracies in East and Southeast Asia and find strong support for it, controlling for several political and economic variables. Our analysis further shows that chief executives' electoral incentives strongly shape their budget spending and cabinet appointments.

New cabinet of ministers in Serbia

On 3 April 2022, general elections were held in Serbia. The cabinet was not formed until seven months later, on 23 October. There was an intrigue whether Serbia would adhere to the position of not imposing sanctions on Russia. In addition, Serbian President Vucic has repeatedly stated that the cabinet formation went on under unprecedented pressure of the West.

The Role of PDK and PUK in the Formation of Parliament and Government Cabinet Between (1992-2006)

In 1992, for the first time, the Kurdistan region of Iraq went through political and societal change like the formation of parliament and government cabinet. This research is a theoretical one on the role of PDK and PUK in the building of parliament and government cabinet between (1992-2006). This research analyses the role of the both parties in the formation of the parliament in 1992 and 2005, and the government cabinet from the first to fifth. Additionally, this research focuses on the division of power between the two parties during (1992-2005) then the research concluded by the main findings such as, the Role of the both parties in the building of parliament and the government cabinet from the first two the fifth in the region and sharing power in the (1,2,5) government cabinets.

Florian Sawiczewski (1797–1876), founder of the pharmacognostic collection in Kraków

Abstract The historical collections of the Department of Pharmacognosy in the Jagiellonian University Medical College in Kraków hold a variety of educational and research specimens. The most valuable are those from the nineteenth-century Pharmacognostic Cabinet collection, founded by the professor of pharmacy and chemistry Florian Sawiczewski. This paper presents a review of Sawiczewski’s progress from practising in his father’s pharmacy to his appointment as university rector. It also provides some historical background for the establishment of the first Polish chair of pharmacy and materia medica in 1783 and describes the formation of the Pharmacognostic Cabinet in the years 1835–57.

Colonial Education, Political Elites, and Regional Political Inequality in Africa

Political elites tend to favor their home region when distributing resources. But what explains how political power is distributed across a country’s regions to begin with? Explanations of cabinet formation focus on short-term strategic bargaining and some emphasize that ministries are allocated equitably to minimize conflict. Using new data on the cabinet members (1960–2010) of 16 former British and French African colonies, I find that some regions have been systematically much more represented than others. Combining novel historical and geospatial records, I show that this regional political inequality derives not from colonial-era development in general but from colonial-era education in particular. I argue that post-colonial ministers are partly a byproduct of civil service recruitment practices among European administrators that focused on levels of literacy. Regional political inequality is an understudied pathway through which colonial legacies impact distributive politics and unequal development in Africa today. JEL: F54, I26, N37, N47

Expert Ministers in New Democracies: Delegation, Communist Legacies, or Technocratic Populism?

This article examines the appointments and survival of expert ministers (i.e., ministers with educational and professional expertise in the portfolio to which they are appointed) in new democracies. Using a novel data set on 11 Central and Eastern European countries from 1990 until 2012, I test competing hypotheses derived from delegation theory, communist legacies approach, technocratic populism studies, and semi-presidentialism literature. The first study shows that experts without political experience (technocrats) have specific cabinet appointment patterns distinguishing them from party politicians and politically experienced experts. For example, technocrats have high chances of being appointed during an economic downturn. The conditional risk set survival analysis has revealed that compared to their politically experienced colleagues, technocrats have higher chances of remaining in their positions if there was a change in the PM’s candidacy. Moreover, they have long careers independently of the continuity of the PM’s party in government and the PM’s partisan status. Strikingly, patterns of portfolio specialization from the communist period remained in place after the regime change (e.g., expert ministers holding the portfolios of finance and economy). However, holding these specific portfolios does not decrease the minister’s risk of being dismissed. These findings have ramifications for issues surrounding cabinet formation, institutional choice, and populism in new democracies.

Electoral incentives to coalition formation in multiparty presidential systems

Coalition theories of presidential regimes have frequently assumed that coalition formation is a mostly post-electoral phenomenon. We challenge this view by showing that pre-electoral bargaining shapes to a substantial extent minority presidents’ disposition to cooperate with the legislature by forming a majority cabinet. Examining a dataset of pre- and post-electoral coalitions from 18 Latin American countries, we find that majority coalition cabinets are more likely to occur when elected presidents form pre-electoral coalitions (PECs), to the extent that pre-electoral agreements create stronger incentives for cooperation, by relying on a broader set of rewards than any post-electoral agreement. Moreover, we find that the likelihood of majority coalition formation increases as the share of PEC seats increases, thus reducing the need to engage in post-electoral bargaining. Our findings carry important implications for the study of cabinet formation in presidential regimes by introducing pre-electoral agreements as a key determinant of cabinet formation.