Bush Won Research Articles

Balancing Act: <i>The Other Wilsonianism</i>

John McCain has made this much clear: The 2008 election will be about Barack Obama will discuss the economy, where he has an edge. He will even discuss Iraq, where his position enjoys public support. But McCain will broaden the discussion to the larger question of how the two candidates see the world. That was how George W. Bush won reelection in 2004. According to exit polls, voters who identified Iraq as their primary issue opposed Bush en masse. But he made up for that by handily winning over voters who cited terror ism. Today, even as majorities oppose the war in Iraq, polls show that Republi cans still maintain the lead on the broader issue of national security. McCain's candidacy depends on that advantage. To counter McCain, Obama must do what Kerry could not: define what a liberal foreign policy is. His answer cannot be a laundry list; it must be an over arching theory of how America should relate to the world. For close to a century, American liberals have had such a theory, even if at times it has been submerged by events. That theory has not been rendered moot by the passage of decades; to the contrary, it has never been more relevant. It is called The phrase collective security will forever be linked to Woodrow Wilson, the leader who presided over America's emergence as a great power. Wilson was a progressive, which meant, among other things, that he was an optimist about

Congressional Leadership on the Front Lines: Committee Chairs, Electoral Security, and Ideology

During the 2006 campaign, many on the political right expressed anxiety about the slate of Democratic representatives and senators poised to become committee chairs in the event of a Democratic victory. After the election, despite post-election promises of “unity” and “bipartisanship” among congressional Democrats, the question remained: How well would this progressive group of “old bulls” work with the new majority, the existence of which was due in part to the 61 Democrats representing House districts that President George W. Bush won in 2004? (Greenblatt 2007, 524) In this paper, we investigate the claim that Democratic committee leaders in the 110thCongress are out of step with their party caucus by comparing the ideological leadership profiles of chairs in the 110thCongress with those of their Republican predecessors in the 109th, as well as those of Democratic chairs from the “Textbook,” “Reform,” and early “Post-reform” eras. We show that Democratic chairs in the 110thCongress are primarily drawn from the most liberal ranks of the Democratic Caucus, particularly in the House. The authors wish to thank Sara Callow for her excellent and timely research assistance.

Tactics, Turnout, and Timing in the Elections of 2004

At 5 p.m. on election day, 2 November 2004, the John Zogby Polling Organization posted on its web site a projection for the outcome of the fiercely contested presidential contest: Massachusetts Democratic Senator John Kerry would win the presidency with 311 electoral votes. Zogby was wrong. President George W. Bush won re-election with 286 electoral votes to 252 for Kerry, the slimmest electoral margin for any incumbent president since Woodrow Wilson. As the spate of books on the election indicates, partisans, pundits, and professors are still pondering how he did it— and what the win means for the future of American politics. For Republicans the election of 2004 was a validation and a vindication. Voters, they claimed, had endorsed President Bush’s war on terrorism, his preemptive invasion of Iraq, his tax cuts, and his vigorous social conservatism. In addition, in a sense, they had ratified the Supreme Court decision settling the election of 2000, in which Al Gore had garnered 540,000 more popular votes than Bush. For uber-strategist Karl Rove, even more was at stake. Early in his career, Rove took as his role model Marcus Hanna, the businessman-cumcampaign manager behind William McKinley’s ascension to the Oval Office in 1896—an election that ushered in a 36 year period of Republican dominance in national politics. With a (two-term) Bush in the hand, Rove set his sights on reformulating American politics by breaking the two-party deadlock that has prevailed for the last 30 years to create a new, enduring Republican majority. Some say the dream is about to be realized. In The Elections of 2004 (2005), Michael Nelson, for example, concludes that a “new Republican majority” (3) has consolidated control of Congress, a majority of governorships and state legislatures, as well as a plurality of voters. Bush’s re-election was no “lonely

Critical Perspectives: Did Prosperity Contribute to the South's Abandonment of the Democratic Party?

During the past generation the South largely has abandoned its traditional commitment to the Democratic Party and emerged as an increasingly strong bastion of the Republican party. In 2004, George Bush won 58 percent in the South but only 48 percent in the rest of the country. (Throughout this article the South is defined as the former Confederate states plus Kentucky and Oklahoma.) In contrast, as recently as 1960, John Kennedy carried the South; excluding the South, Nixon beat Kennedy. The South's commitment to the Democrats lasted more than 150 years, from the days of Thomas Jefferson until the 1960s. How, then, do we explain the decline of the Democrats and the rise of the Republicans in the South in the past forty years?

Arkansas: Still Swingin' in 2004

Arkansas-a state that George W. Bush won by just 50,000 votes in 2000-flirted in 2004 with joining Florida as a southern state with “battle-ground" potential. This status as a prospective swing state was driven, not just by the close 2000 presidential outcome, but also by the continued strength of Democratic candidates in Arkansas in recent election cycles. Mark Pryor, for example, was the sole Democrat to defeat an incumbent U.S. Senator in 2002, prevailing over Tim Hutchinson by eight percentage points. Moreover, Arkansas Republicanism continues to be geographically shackled to the fast growing communities of northwest Arkansas (from which the party gets its sole Arkansas U.S. Congressman) and the suburbs encircling Little Rock; the GOP only occasionally fields candidates, much less wins posts, elsewhere in the state. At a time then when Republicanism elsewhere in the South shows new strength with each election cycle, nearly three in four Arkansas state legislators continue to wear the Democratic label, and an even larger percentage of local officeholders remain in the Democratic fold.

Election 2004: how Bush won and what you can expect in the future

Election 2004: how Bush won and what you can expect in the future

Polarized Politics and the 2004 Congressional and Presidential Elections

The 2004 elections left the Republican Party in its strongest posi tion since Herbert Hoover was elected president seventy-six years ago. George W. Bush won reelection by a modest but unambiguous margin?Bush won the popular vote, but by the narrowest percentage of any reelected president in history?(50.7 percent to John Kerry's 48.3 percent of the popular vote), while the Republicans solidified their congressional majorities by adding three House seats and four Senate seats. The election was not, however, a ringing electoral endorsement of the administration's or the Republican Congress's performance, nor did it represent any global shift in public sentiment to the Republican side. Rather, it was the product of two salient features of present-day American poli tics: the substantial structural advantage Republicans now enjoy in the struggle for control of Congress, and the extraordinarily polarized public reactions to the Bush administration, sentiments that found their fullest expression in the presi dential contest but also spilled over into congressional races. Although strengthen ing the Republican grip on power, the outcome did not break the national stale mate reflected in election results and public opinion polls over the past decade, and it is likely to intensify rather than diminish the level of partisan conflict among leaders and ordinary Americans alike during the second Bush administration. Table 1 summarizes the congressional results. The election brought little change to the House. Only seven of the 402 incumbents who sought reelection were defeated, and four of the seven were victims of a Republican gerrymander in Texas (discussed below), not swings in voter sentiment. The party already in control held onto twenty-seven of the thirty-four open seats (those vacated by

Why Bush Won the Presidential Election of 2004: Incumbency, Ideology, Terrorism, and Turnout

More than 122 million Americans voted in the 2004 presidential election, nearly 17 million more than in 2000. This was a 16 percent increase in the total vote, the largest percentage increase in turnout since 1952. Of the more than 121 million who voted for a major-party candidate, 51.2 percent voted for President George W. Bush and 48.8 percent voted for his Democratic rival, Senator John Kerry. President Bush carried thirty-one states and accumulated 286 electoral votes, making him only the sixteenth president in American history to be elected to two terms in the White House—and only the fourth since 1960. Republicans have now won seven of the last ten presidential elections. Although the 2004 election was not as close as many observers had anticipated in the last weeks of the campaign nor as close as the election of 2000, it nonetheless ranks in the top tier of narrowly decided presidential elections. Of the thirty-five presidential contests since 1868, the 2004 election is one of only nine in which the winning presidential candidate received less than 51.5 percent of the two-party popular vote. President Bush received the narrowest popular

Why Kerry Lost and Where We Go from Here

For many social workers, defeat of John Kerry November 2004 presidential election came as bitter disappointment. NASW endorsed Kerry and Edwards, and social workers played an active role their campaign (Fred, 2005; http://www.socialworkersforkerryedwards.org/index.html). Until very end, Kerry victory seemed possible. The campaign and its supporters engaged massive organizing effort, resulting increased turnout among Democrats (Danner, 2005). Final polls showed race tightening and pointed to Kerry victory (http:// www.emergingdemocraticmajorityweblog.com/ donkeyrising/archives/000919.php). Kerry's defeat has placed conservatives position to block efforts for progressive reform and dismantle New Deal and Great Society legislation social workers have long supported. This does not bode well for our profession. Yet, we should not exaggerate extent of Kerry's defeat. President Bush's victory popular vote was relatively narrow, 50.73 percent versus 48.27 percent, or slightly more than 3 million votes (http://elections.gmu.edu/voter_turnout.htm). This election was not like those of 1972 and 1984, when Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan won landslide victories. George Bush won by narrower margin than any Republican president re-elected past century; contrast, Bill Clinton, 1996, had margin of victory of 8.5 percent (Danner, 2005). The president also failed to do as well as expected. Alan Abramowitz (2004b), political scientist at Emory University, has developed time-for-change model, which has successfully predicted presidential elections since 1988. Based on this model, which incorporates president's standing Gallup poll June of election year, economic growth during first half of that year, and length of time president's party has been White House, president should have won 53.7 percent of major party In reality, he won only 51.4 percent. Abramowitz's findings are consistent with those of four other academic models, which predicted president would win 53.8 percent or more of vote (http://www.apsanet. org/ps/oct04/toc.cfm). This column examines reasons for president's narrow victory and considers its implications for social workers. It concludes with discussion of three issues social workers and other progressives can organize around. THE ROLE OF VALUES In aftermath of election, many observers argued that values were driving force president's re-election. This conclusion derived from exit polling by National Election Pool (NEP), which respondents were asked to identify important issue determining their vote. Twenty-two percent chose moral values, more than economy/jobs (20 percent) or terrorism (19 percent) (http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2004/pages/results/states/US/P/00/ epolls.0.html). In hindsight, significance of these findings was exaggerated. First, results of NEP poll were questionable, because as late as 8 P.M. on election night, they showed Senator Kerry with strong lead, which, of course, did not hold up (Menand, 2004). Second, as Jan Van Lohuizen, leading Republican pollster noted, poll which the highest number is twenty-two ... means there is no consensus.... no one issue that drove election' (cited Menand, p. 58). Third, question itself was problematic. Voters had to choose from list of predetermined categories, which, according to Van Lohuizen, included a lot more places for Kerry voter to park [sic] than for Bush voter to park himself (cited Menand, p. 58). A postelection poll by Pew Research Center revealed limits of this type of closed question. In this poll, half participants chose from fixed list of categories, as NEP poll; other half put in their own words issues that most influenced their vote (http://people-press. …

An Alternative Account of the 2004 Presidential Election

The consensus immediately following the 2004 presidential election was that Bush won because of support for "moral values." I challenge this interpretation by showing that Bush won because of widespread increase in his support among white and married women. I hypothesize that this is a response to concerns about domestic security rather than support for Bush's position against gay marriage. In addition, Bush was generally helped by higher turnout, though Kerry's efforts brought down the Republican vote share in battleground states.

The 1992 US Elections

The American Elections This Year Overturned conventional expectations. In March 1991 President Bush — leader of the free world during the fall of the Berlin wall and winner of the Gulf war — seemed invincible. With the troops home in victory parades, Bush's approval rating stood at 88 per cent in Gallup polls. Few thought he could lose against Governor Clinton, dogged by questions about the draft and marital fidelity, perceived as a second-rank Democratic contender from a small southern state. Yet President Bush won 37.7 per cent, the lowest share of the popular vote of any incumbent president since William Taft in 1912. Against most predictions, 19 per cent of the vote went to Ross Perot, the best result for a third party candidate since Teddy Roosevelt. Governor Clinton enjoyed a comfortable victory, with 43.2 per cent of the popular vote and 370 electoral college votes in 32 states. The result for Clinton was not a landslide, indeed his share of the popular vote was similar to Mondale's in 1984 and Carter's in 1980, and less than Dukakis's in 1988. But questions about a popular mandate are academic: Democrats now control both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue, and almost two-thirds of governorships and state legislative chambers.

How George Bush Won His Spurs

(1991). How George Bush Won His Spurs. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists: Vol. 47, No. 8, pp. 26-33.

Evaluation of Candidates' Characteristics during the Presidential Debates

Research (e.g., Kinder & Sears, 1985) has shown that viewers' perceptions of such characteristics as competence, honesty, and integrity in a political candidate will often affect their preferences for that candidate. To examine further the implications of such findings, a group of 48 undergraduates at a predominantly black university were asked to view the second president~al debate between Bush and Dukakis. The sample consisted of 30 young women and 18 young men whose mean age was 19 yr. All participants completed a set of questionnaires (see McIntosh, 1989) which included a measure of the viewers' evaluation of the two candidates on several characteristics as they debated the issues. This measure contained 14 items, seven assessing Bush's characteristics and seven assessing Dukakis' characteristics. Analysis showed that 33% of the viewers rated Dukakis as being very truthful in his answers to the panelists' questions while only 6% gave Bush such a rating. Almost 12% thought Bush showed good judgment in his responses, but this was far below the 23% who indicated that Dukakis showed good judgment in his responses. Twenty-seven percent rated Dukakis as likeable but only 4% rated Bush as such. In terms of expertise, 31% considered Dukakis to be an expert in discussing the issues, while only 6% considered Bush to be an expert. Twenty-seven percent of these viewers, however, saw Bush as being very confident in discussing those same issues. This was still below Dukakis' rating of 35%. Twentythree percent rated Dukakis as being very capable in dealing with policy issues, but only 6% rated Bush in the same light. Finally, only 10% of the viewers rated Bush's over-all debate performance as very successful while Dukahs's rartng was as high as 31%. Interestingly enough, Dukakis was perceived more favorably than Bush on all seven characteristics. It was not surprising that 35% of the viewers thought he won the debate while only 6% indicated that Bush won. It must be noted, however, that prior Democratic preference among these viewers may well have accounted for the extremely positive characteristics assigned Dukakis.