Bush Administration's Approach Research Articles

Apologists for Power: The Yoo Brief, Executive Power and the State of Exception

This paper examines the legal and political arguments of those who support an expansive interpretation of US executive power in the face of threats to the state, taking a comparative historical perspective. It discusses the rationale for this approach by locating its historical origins in international and American jurisprudence, thereby placing them in a modern context. Attention is paid to the points made by various legal representatives of the Bush administration such as John Choon Yoo and Jay S. Bybee. Their views on an expansive response to state emergencies are based on a reading of executive power that informs the Bush administration's approach to law between 2001 and 2008. But this paper goes further in arguing that a common political-juridical ground exists between various critics of the Bush administration, and those who formulated the policies of torture and rendition. This common ground on the subject of executive power in response to emergency lies primarily in the examination of the state of exception examined by Giorgio Agamben. This approach has various implications as to the general exercise of power by the executive in a democratic system. Legem non habet necessitas. Necessity knows no law. Augustine, Soliloquium, 2.

The politics of US missile defence cooperation with Europe and Russia

Pushed by the realities of domestic politics to proceed with plans to deploy a US missile defense (MD) capability in Europe, the Obama administration has made cooperation on MD a key element in its strategy for engaging both NATO and Russia. While addressing many of the shortcomings of the Bush administration's approach, the current US vision underestimates both the technical and political obstacles ahead. European states and NATO see MD as a lower priority, particularly in the aftermath of the conflicts in Afghanistan and Libya, and are unlikely to commit the resources necessary to making a shared NATO MD architecture a reality. Russia's cautious support for MD cooperation is based on a desire to create a more inclusive model of European security, an idea that has limited support in Washington and the European capitals. By trying to do too much with MD cooperation, the Obama administration risks the whole effort collapsing. Given domestic constraints, the administration cannot pull back from its European MD plans, but should nudge them off centre stage in its conversations on security with both NATO allies and the Russians.

The United States and the Responsibility to Protect: Impediment, Bystander, or Norm Leader?

AbstractThe US has always reserved the right to use military force to save strangers – unilaterally, if necessary. Yet successive US Administrations have perceived this right as an option to intervene, and not as a general duty toward endangered civilians that is exercised in a more or less consistent fashion. The responsibility to protect is thus a double-edged sword for the United States: on the one hand, it legitimises the use of military means as a last resort to protect civilians from the worst human rights abuses. On the other hand, however, it limits US freedom of action by establishing clear guidelines for the use of force and by creating an expectation to act when human rights are being violated on a massive scale and all other non-military means have been exhausted. Unsurprisingly then, US engagement with the responsibility to protect has been rather ambivalent. This article reviews the Bush Administration's position on R2P in theory and practice, taking the Darfur crisis as a showcase of the Bush Administration's wavering commitment to atrocity prevention. The second part of the article discusses whether the Obama Presidency has departed from the Bush Administration's approach and assesses to what extent it will provide new impetus to the development of R2P.

U.S. Sanctions and Treasury Department Actions Against North Korea from 1955 to October 2007

OverviewThe history of U.S. sanctions against DPRK can be divided into six stages. The U.S. maintained fairly comprehensive economic sanctions from time of Korean War until 1989, occasionally increasing level of restriction during this period. Between 1989 and 1995 export of goods from U.S. commercial sector was permitted solely for purpose of meeting basic human needs. A more extensive easing of sanctions accompanied negotiation of Agreed Framework in 1994.In 2000, President Clinton eased many remaining trade and travel sanctions in response to DPRK's 1999 voluntary halt in missile testing. Licensing and trade regulations on most items for civilian use were significantly relaxed at this time.Although George W. Bush administration's approach to DPRK differed considerably from that of Clinton administration, no economic sanctions were re-imposed during President Bush's first term, although two North Korean companies were cited for WMD and missile proliferation (Rennack).In March 2005, North Korea declared that because the DPRK-U.S. dialogue on which missile test moratorium was based had been totally suspended when Bush administration took office in 2001, DPRK is bound to moratorium on missile launch at present. The DPRK then tested short range missiles first on May 1, 2005, and again on March 8, 2006. These short range tests, which did not break any international laws, garnered only limited public attention and condemnation from United States and international community, and no U.S. economic sanctions were re-imposed.Instead, in this fifth phase, U.S. administration focused on financial sanc- tions, including assets of individual companies suspected of proliferating weapons of mass destruction (WMD). On June 28, 2005, United States froze assets under U.S. jurisdiction of three DPRK firms that it accused of engaging in WMD proliferation, and in October 2005 froze assets of an additional eight firms (Rennack).In September 2005 U.S. Department of Treasury designated Banco Delta Asia as a bank of primary money laundry concern. This action, coupled with a December 2005 Treasury Department advisory warning financial institutions against transactions with DPRK, proved to have considerable impact on DPRK's ability to do business, and may have had a greater impact than sanctions that had been lifted during Clinton administration.In March 2006, U.S. Department of Treasury accused a Swiss company of doing business with one of sanctioned North Korean firms, and froze assets of Swiss company and its owner and banned U.S. entities from doing business with firm or owner. In April 2006 Department of Treasury issued an Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) regulation banning U.S. persons from owning or leasing North Korean-flagged vessels.On July 5, 2006, DPRK test-launched an array of ballistic missiles, including a long-range Taepodong-2. The United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1695 ten days later, although, as with earlier short-range tests, long range test broke no international laws. Even with adoption of 1695, Bush Administration did not immediately re-impose sanctions lifted by Clinton administration in exchange for moratorium.North Korea tested a nuclear device on October 9, 2006, after which UN Security Council quickly adopted UN Resolution 1718 in response. In January 2007, Bush administration re-imposed some of sanctions lifted in Clinton era, and published a list of luxury items prohibited for export to DPRK, ushering in a sixth phase of sanctions.In Initial Actions agreement signed by Six Parties on February 13, 2007, United States agreed to begin process of removing designation of DPRK as a state sponsor of terrorism and advance process of terminating application of Trading with Enemy Act with respect to DPRK. …

The war on terror in American grand strategy

The 9/11 attacks made the war on terror the central plank of American grand strategy. Yet despite its importance in shaping US policy choices, there has been considerable confusion over how the war on terror relates to foreign policy goals. This article attempts to locate the war on terror within American grand strategy and makes three claims. First, it argues that the Bush administration's approach to the war on terror rests on a false analogy between terrorism and fascism or communism. This has led to misinterpretations of the goals of the war on terror and to a persistent misuse of American power. Second, it suggests that the central purpose of the war on terror should be to de-legitimize terror as a tactic and to induce states to assume responsibility for controlling terrorists within their borders. American grand strategy should be focused on creating a normative anti-terror regime with costly commitments by linchpin states—defined as great powers and crucial but endangered allies such as Pakistan and Saudi Arabia—rather than on conducting regime change against rogue states on the margins of the international system. Success in the war on terror should be measured not by the perceived legitimacy of discrete US policy choices, but by the number of these crucial states who accept the de-legitimation of terrorism as a core foreign policy principle and act accordingly. Third, it argues that bilateral enforcement of an anti-terror regime imposes high costs for US power and puts other elements of American grand strategy— including the promotion of democracy and the promotion of human rights—at risk. To reduce these costs and to preserve American power over the long-term, the US should attempt to institutionalize cooperation in the war on terror and to scale back ambitious policy choices (such as achieving a democratic revolution in the Middle East) which increase the risks of state defection from the anti-terror regime.

The Expansion of Federal Power and the Politics of Implementing the No Child Left behind Act

The federal No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB) expanded the federal role in American education, and by doing so altered the distribution of power among the federal government, states, and local districts. When the law was enacted, it was unclear how this change in the distribution of power would play itself out. This study examines the developing set of relationships between federal, state, and local officials under the new law and the factors that have contributed to a growing conflict over implementation. To fully understand the implications of NCLB requires examining these interactions as well as understanding the substantive educational issues it raises. We identify three factors that contributed to the growing dissatisfaction with the law, namely, the Bush administration's approach to federalism, the states’ limited capacity to meet the new requirements, and the fiscal constraints facing state governments. We argue that these factors have contributed to the conflict with federal officials, eroded state commitment to the law, and complicated implementation efforts.

‘Real men want to go to Tehran’: Bush, pre-emption and the Iranian nuclear challenge

The desire for regime change in Iran has coloured the Bush administration's approach to the challenge presented by Tehran's apparent desire to build a nuclear weapons capability. Yet the threat of military force either to destroy Iran's nuclear infrastructure and/or to eff ect regime change has proved counterproductive to the simultaneous eff orts to stop the Iranian programme through diplomacy. Indeed, the entire Bush policy towards Iran of simultaneously wishing to coerce, undermine and replace the regime while also seeking to persuade it to abandon its nuclear programme through diplomacy has proved both strategically inconsistent and consistently counterproductive. In failing to decide whether it prioritizes a change of regime or a change of behaviour it has got neither. This article elucidates the rationale behind the Bush administration's policy approach, demonstrating how in seeking both objectives simultaneously it has achieved neither. It sets out instead a set of policies to regain the initiative in US-Iranian relations and to prioritize and coordinate American policy goals within a broader Middle East policy.

The Bush Administration and Climate Change

U.S. Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham's Policy Forum “The Bush administration's approach to climate change” (30 July, p. 616) is founded on an error of omission and an error of economic understanding. The error of omission is to imply that President Bush's policy to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) intensity will meaningfully slow GHG emissions. GHG intensity naturally declines in the increasingly service-oriented U.S. economy. For example, even as actual GHG emissions increased by 22.5% from 1990 to 2000, GHG intensity decreased by 34.7% (1). The nonpartisan General Accounting Office (GAO) projects that between 2001 and 2012, GHG intensity will decline 14% even with no emission reduction policy in place. Bush's voluntary approach, if successful, will lead to an additional reduction in GHG intensity in 2012 of only 4% and an actual increase in GHG emissions of over 13%.

Using Parallel Strategies to Promote Change: Forest Policymaking under George W. Bush

AbstractThis study of policy change examines the parallel strategies the administration of President George W. Bush has used to substantially alter the direction of forest policy during his first term. Using the Healthy Forests Initiative as a case study, this analysis explains how, by framing the problem of wildfires and forest health in terms of process and pointing blame at environmental groups misusing appeal procedures, the administration was able to emphasize process, rather than the content of existing forest policy. It also provided a reasonable explanation for the president to take a lead in seeking both legislative as well as regulatory change. We contend that the use of two parallel policymaking paths—legislative and administrative—enabled the president to pursue policy change more rapidly, and, from a strategic standpoint, more effectively, than by relying upon the legislative process alone. We offer that the Bush administration's approach to changing forest policy represents a redirection that is likely to serve as a template for further environmental policy change.

Climate. The Bush administration's approach to climate change.

In this Policy Forum, U.S. Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham discusses the Bush administration9s strategy to achieve the U.N.9s Framework Convention on Climate Change objective of stabilizing greenhouse gases in the atmosphere at a level that avoids interference with the climate system. Over the short term, the administration has developed policies and voluntary programs to reduce the greenhouse gas intensity of the U.S. economy by 18% between 2002 and 2012. Longer term, the United States is laying the groundwork in climate science and technology to reduce uncertainties, clarify risks and benefits, and develop realistic mitigation options to meet the UNFCCC objective. Major research activities under the administration9s Climate Change Science Program and Climate Change Technology Program are described.

Myths, Motivations and ‘Misunderestimations’: the Bush Administration and Iraq

This article explores the myths and motivations behind US foreign policy towards Iraq in America's ‘war on terrorism’. It argues that the foreign policy of the Bush administration is widely misunderstood and that much of the debate about Iraq policy that has taken place has been conducted at an unhelpful level of analysis. It addresses arguments that the Bush administration is motivated by oil, revenge or hubris as well as the more mainstream arguments that an attack on Iraq would provoke instability through the entire Middle East, as well as encouraging further acts of and support for murderous terrorism; that there is no urgency to act against Iraq as containment and deterrence remain adequate means to manage this threat; and that Iraq should be a lower priority than dealing with North Korea. It does this by analysing the development of American foreign policy thinking on the war on terrorism, what motivates it, and why it rejects the arguments of its critics. The article explains the intellectual process by which the US decided upon this course of action and how Europe's failure to understand this process added to its incomprehension of American policy. It does not argue that European's opposition would have been swept aside had they better understood the Bush administration, the central disagreement about the necessity and prudence of military action versus containment remains, but that such an understanding would have allowed for a better and more focused level of debate than the one which has got us to this point. Nor does it argue that the Bush administration approach is necessarily persuasive or justified, merely that its case is reasoned and explicable in terms of America's foreign policy traditions.

Some European Thoughts in the Wake of 9/11

the events, the fallout from the atrocity of 9/11 has been immensely damaging. Despite the huge outpouring of compassion and moral solidarity in the immediate aftermath, the effect of the attack, the manner of the American response, and the international reaction to that response have made the world a more insecure place. Transatlantic relations between the U.S. and Europe have been among the casualties amid a climate of increasing, mutual distrust. American policymakers and commentators have been increasingly irritated by European criticisms of the Bush administration's approach to international relations, which the Europeans see as characterised by unilateralism, incoherence, and arrogance. In matters of defence and diplomacy, U.S. political leaders wonder how Europeans have the nerve to expect American protection, having failed lamentably to organize their own security for themselves, then bite the hand that feeds them. Europeans deeply resent the alternately patronising and hectoring tones in which they are sermonised by Washington about the need to get behind the U.S. in its unflagging defence of freedom, which Europeans interpret to mean defence of American interests first and foremost. The very many Europeans who have ties with the U.S. and admire much of what it represents-among whom I include myself-find the situation unutterably depressing. The first part of this article deals with some of the largely negative trends reinforced or set in train by 9/11. The second part makes a case for the European Union to reform

‘Forget the Rhetoric and Boost the Geopolitics’: Emerging Trends in the Bush Administration's Policy Towards Africa, 2001

This article assesses the Bush administration's self-proclaimed 'realist' policy towards Africa, the essential thrust of which is captured by the motto: 'Forget the rhetoric and boost the geopolitics'. Three essential elements of this approach include the strategic imperative of cultivating strong links with Africa's leading regional powers, most notably Nigeria and South Africa, harkening back to the Nixon administration's strategy of relying on such powers to ensure regional stability; building upon the Clinton administration's success in promoting US trade and investment with African countries, with a special focus on oil-producing countries; and underscoring the need for Africans to 'do more for themselves' in the realm of conflict resolution, suggesting a low-profile Bush administration approach to involvement in either peacekeeping or peacemaking operations. Emerging trends are analyzed by treating the US policymaking establishment as a series of three concentric circles: the inner circle of the White House; a second circle comprising the bureaucracies of the executive branch; and an outer circle inclusive of the US Congress and the larger African affairs constituency. An important result of White House and Congressional neglect of Africa is that the Bush administration's foreign policy towards Africa, perhaps more so than that directed towards any other region of the world, essentially will be delegated to the high-level bureaucrats and political appointees within the executive branch, leading to an outcome best characterized as 'bureaucratic incrementalism' in which continuity rather than change will mark the administration's policies towards Africa. THE INAUGURATION IN JANUARY 2001 OF GEORGE W. BUSH as the 43rd President of the United States potentially heralds the beginning of a new era in US policy towards Africa. As was the case with two previous presidential transitions in which Republican Presidents took office after a period of Democratic Party control of the White House (Nixon's replacement of Johnson in January 1969 and Reagan's replacement of Carter in January 1981), the Bush foreign policy team has castigated its Democratic predecessor (the Clinton administration) as having pursued an overly idealistic and ultimately Peter J. Schraeder is associate professor in the Department of Political Science at Loyola University Chicago. His most recent books include African Politics and Society: A mosaic in transformation (2000) and Exporting Democracy: Rhetoric versus reality (forthcoming 2001).

Proposed Card, Intended to Facilitate Medical Billing, Record Keeping, Draws Mixed Reviews

ELECTRONIC SYSTEMS designed to cut health insurance red tape are, with caveats on confidentiality, generally thought to be a good way to reduce costs and hassles for patients and providers. However, a proposal this month by Department of Health and Human Services Secretary Louis Sullivan, MD, to give every insured person a credit card that would facilitate electronic billing and record keeping by containing the details of what the patient is and is not covered for, and to then call that a first step in health care reform, seems mostly to be fueling criticism of the Bush administration's approach to such reform. "Not that it is a bad idea," says Sidney Wolfe, MD, director of Public Citizen Health Research Group, Washington, DC, but the potential savings "are a drop in the bucket of administrative waste. This does not improve access, it improves cash flow," he says. The plan is "a

The Bush Administration and National Security Policy‐making: A Preliminary Assessment

The Bush administration's approach to national security policy–making, at least as judged by the early record, can be characterized accordingly: managerial, collegial, incremental and pragmatic. Each of these elements will be considered in turn as part of a preliminary assessment of whether the Bush administration's approach to American national security is adequate to deal with the challenges that the United States will face in world affairs during the “post–Cold War era” of the 1990s.