Burma Socialist Programme Party Research Articles

YOSHIHIRO NAKANISHI. Strong Soldiers, Failed Revolution: The State and Military in Burma, 1962–88. Singapore and Kyoto: NUS Press in association with Kyoto University Press, 2013, xxi+358 p.

Strong Soldiers, Failed Revolution: The State and Military in Burma, 1962-88 YOSHIHIRO NAKANISHI Singapore and Kyoto: NUS Press in association with Kyoto University Press, 2013, xxi+358 p.Millions of words have been written about politics in Myanmar since the collapse of General Ne Win's socialist revolution in 1988. However, works of genuine scholarship on the structure and underlying nature of Myanmar politics are as rare as snow in summer. Strong Soldiers, Failed Revolution is a welcome exception. Yoshihiro Nakanishi has made a significant addition to the meagre literature on the politics of modern Myanmar. My criticisms which follow, and there are several, in no one way detract from the fundamental contribution that this book makes in confirming how the political and administrative core structure of the post-1962 state in Myanmar, the army, was constructed and survived unto today. The stability, and continuity, of army rule in Myanmar since 1962 is, as Dr. Nakanishi makes clear, unusual and requires explanation. The central chapters of this volume provide an explanation of that stability and grounds it in detailed, empirical, and highly original research.Chapters four through seven are the most important parts of the argument of Strong Soldiers, Failed Revolution, but the earlier and later chapters are also important contributions to our understanding of modern Burmese politics, although at places one can take issue with some of the points the author advances. Chapter one provides an overview of the volume and takes the reader through some of the relevant, and sometimes irrelevant, largely American, political science literature on comparative politics. If words mean anything, some of this is just jargon, such as dictatorship democracies, which some seem to favor. However, this chapter is important in setting the scene, particularly as the author does not make the mistake of many commentators on Myanmar politics and dismiss General Ne Win's commitment to his socialist revolution. He was willing to deny his army resources for the sake of that revolution, and that sacrifice became part of its strength and the reason the army could continue to rule after the revolution had failed.The second chapter provides the historical background to the Ne Win revolution. The author's grasp of this material is rather weaker than of the more recent history, though perhaps some of the problems stem from the fact that the language he is using has been translated at least three times-from English into Japanese and back into English again. For example, colonial Burma never had a governor-general (p. 33). It was the British Government of Burma Act of 1935 which separated Burma from India in 1937, not 1936 (also p. 33), though later this author gives the dates accurately (p. 38). These are petty criticisms, though it is important to note that the so-called British divide and rule policy was an accusation made by Burmese nationalists, and perhaps a consequence of British rule. Whether it was intentional is highly debatable. Aung San did not go to London to negotiate independence with the colonial governor, Sir Hubert Rance, but with the British Prime Minister, Clement Attlee (p. 50), the Panrong agreement is presumably the Panglong agreement, though whether it is a document proposing federalism is debateable (also p. 50), and the Mujahids wanted to merge northern Arakan with East Pakistan, not form a separate Islamic state (p. 51). However, as no one will read this book for the sake of this background chapter, this criticism is by-the-by.Chapter three on how the ideology of the Burma Socialist Programme Party came to be written is informative, though the author's lack of reference to a third ideological tract, the Specific Characteristics, which was the last published as a corrective to earlier texts, is surprising, given how thorough is his research. The author's attempt to draw a distinction between ideology and philosophy, at least in terms of political practice, I find unconvincing. …

Myanmar's Foreign Policy Towards Its Near Neighbours

This article examines the evolution of Burma/Myanmar`s foreign policy in terms of its ideological orientations and evolution. The collapse of the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) government in 1988 that had previously pursued a policy of neutrality obtained through self-imposed isolationism has been replaced by a much more realist foreign policy that views international relations and power in competitive terms. Myanmar also maintains a set of competitive relations with its near neighbours to stabilize the immediate external environment and stave off the impact of international sanctions. These bilateral relations are also calibrated to provide a balance-of-power between the three sets of relations in order to avoid being overwhelmed by any of them. All three near neighbours have many important and sensitive issues that are brought to bear on the relationships as well.

The 1990 Elections in Myanmar: Broken Promises or a Failure of Communication?

Whoever is elected will first have to draw up a constitution that will have to be adopted before the transfer of power. They haven't said how the constitution will be adopted. It could be through a referendum, but that could be months and months, if not years. --Daw Aung San Suu Kyi interview with Dominic Faulder, AsiaWeek, 21 July 1989 Burma, redesignated Myanmar in 1989, was a somewhat fractious, though vibrant democracy from independence in 1948 until 1962 when General Ne Win, the head of the Armed Forces, seized power and ruled through a Revolutionary Council, which proclaimed the Burmese Way to Socialism. In 1974 a new constitution, similar to the People's Democracies of Eastern Europe, was approved in a national referendum and a new Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma established under the guidance of the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP). However, popular dissatisfaction with one-party rule, with the socialist regime, and with growing economic problems resulted in some rioting in mid-1987, anti-government demonstrations in March 1988 led primarily by students, culminating in the bloody suppression by the military of widespread but peaceful protests on 8 August 1988. On 18 September 1988, fearful of still mounting chaos, the military seized power again, cracked down hard on rioters and dissidents, but nonetheless promised that multiparty democratic elections could be held and political parties set up. In the ensuing general elections held in Myanmar (Burma) on 27 May 1990, the National League for Democracy (NLD), whose founding Secretary-General Nobel Peace Prize laureate Daw Aung San Suu Kyi (1) had been placed under house arrest on 20 July 1989 along with other leading members of the NLD, won a resounding victory, fielding 447 candidates and securing 392 of the 485 seats to the Pyithu Hluttaw or National Assembly. The NLD secured 80.82 per cent of the seats with 59.87 per cent of valid votes cast, 52.44 per cent of all votes cast (valid and invalid) and 38.11 per cent of all eligible votes that could have been cast. The NLD's nearest rivals in terms of valid votes cast were the National Unity Party (NUP), the successor to the BSPP, which had dominated political life in the one-party state. The NUP, which most observers expected to do well, polled only 21.16 per cent of valid votes cast and secured only ten seats although fielding 413 candidates. They failed to capture a single seat in the capital Rangoon, even in districts with military cantonments. The remaining seats were won by other parties and independent candidates who were either in electoral alliance with the NLD or generally supported their aims. If anything, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi's enforced absence from the electoral campaign enhanced the success of the NLD. She had become the national symbol of democratic opposition to military rule. The statistical record (2) was as shown on the next page. No. of constituencies 492 No. of elections held 485 (7 constituencies suspended for security reasons) No. of eligible voters 20,818,313 No. of votes cast 15,112,524 (3) No. of valid votes cast 13,253,606 No. of party candidates 2,209, of whom 479 were elected No. of independent candidates 87, of whom 6 were elected No. of registered political parties 235 No. of parties presenting candidates 93 % of No. of Valid No. of % of 485 Valid Votes Seats Contested Votes Cast National League for Democracy 392 80.82 7,934,622 59.87 Shan Nationalities League for 23 4.74 222,821 1.68 Democracy Arakan League for Democracy 11 2. …

The Formation of <i>THE SYSTEM OF CORRELATION OF MAN AND HIS ENVIRONMENT</i>

This article examines the state ideology formation of the Ne Win regime (1962-1988) in Burma. Drawing on military documents and interviews with key figures, it depicts the interaction between the faction fighting within the military in the 1950s and early 1960s and the development of the future state ideology. I argue that understanding the military institution and the dynamics of military politics is essential to understanding the process and nature of the regime fromation.After March 2nd coup d'etat in 1962, the Revolutionary Council announced the organization of the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) as the only political party for guiding the revolution. BSPP's official ideology was The System of Correlation of Man and His Environment (SCME). SCME had been the state ideology until the fall of Ne Win's regime in 1988.SCME was written by U Chit Hlaing who belonged to the Directorate of Psychological Warfare, the Ministry of Defence. He received the order from General Ne Win in November 1962 and wrote the draft based on his articles, a series of “nama rupa wada”, published in Myawaddy Magazin in 1957 and 1958. Chit Hlaing wrote those articles as anti-communism and pro-constitutionalism propaganda under the intra-military leadership of Brigadier Aung Gyi and Colonel Maung Maung. They launched a number of initiatives to reform the military in the 1950s. One of them was to forge the military doctrine to ensure anti-communism and pro-constitutionalism.However, the political structure of the military changed in the early 1960s. Colonel Maung Maung was removed in 1961 and Lt-General Aung Gyi lost his leadership in the military. General Ne Win formed an alliance with the hard-liners. It enabled the military took over the state on March 2nd, 1962. General Ne Win rejected pro-constitutionalism. But they were unclear as to the guiding ideology which would be taken to achieve “Burmese Way to Socialism”. Therefore General Ne Win ordered Chit Hlaing to make out a draft of the BSPP's offical ideology. It is ironic that the articles written under the principle of anti-communism and pro-constitutionalism became the document to legitimate one-party rule and political intervention by the military for 26 years.

The State and the City: 1988 and the Transformation of Rangoon

modern Southeast and East Asia, cities are most often initial point of impact between forces of state and society. Rangoon (Yangon) , capital of Union of Burma (Myanmar) and its largest city, is a place with many coexisting and conflicting identities. As such, it offers a subject of study with rich opportunities for understanding interaction between military regime and Burmese society in period since State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) junta seized power in September 1988. Although in terms of design modern city (especially Central Business District and townships lying between it and Inya Lake) was creation of British colonial rule, it was not simply a colonial metropolis, like Jakarta (Batavia), Manila or Ho Chi Minh City (Saigon). Rather, Shwe Dagon Pagoda, where relics of Historical Buddha and three earlier Buddhas are said to be interred, gives city status as a ritual and devotional centre, a place with cosmological as well as political, administrative and economic significance. Rangoon was also site of independence movements during British colonial period that vested it with a tradition of revolutionary nationalism, a durable legacy that post-1988 military regime has found difficult to neutralize. The massive popular demonstrations of 1988, which caused collapse of Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) regime of General Ne Win, came exactly half a century after demonstrations of 1938-39 against British, led by students, nationalist Thakin Party, and politicized workers (the so-called 1300 Revolution, since that was Burmese Era year in which movement took place). During both periods, Shwe Dagon functioned not only as a Buddhist holy site, but also as a public space for political activism. University students established strike centres around Shwe Dagon during colonial period. Aung San Suu Kyi, independence leader Aung San's daughter, made an important speech on west slope of pagoda hill on 26 August 1988, in which she described upheavals of that year as the second struggle for national independence.1

Myanmar: Reconciliation — Progress in the Process?

year's end. These two events were the release from house-arrest of one important figure and the effective imposition of such arrest on another, and his later death from natural causes. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, leader of the opposition National League for Democracy (NLD), was freed, and former General (also former President and Chairman of the Burma Socialist Programme Party until 1988) Ne Win and his influential daughter Sanda Win were placed under effective house-arrest.2 General Ne Win died on 5 December 2002. In a sense his death

Reconsidering the Failure of the Burma Socialist Programme Party Government to Eradicate Internal Economic Impediments

Adopting the ‘Burmese Way to Socialism’ as a guiding principle, the military-led Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) government tried to restructure, among other things, the country's economic system and business community. However, due to its limited technical, financial and human resources – the resources needed to meet the needs of the public and to allow local state organs to function – the BSPP government failed to expand the state's share of the economy and to prevent the emergence of private business people, especially illegal ones, as dominant economic actors. This situation was compounded by the way party-state officials were elected, the domination of the party-state apparatus by corrupt opportunistic cadres, and the emergence of the three ma principles as the guidelines by which party-state officials carried out their duties. All these factors led local state officials to set aside the anti-business policies and regulations laid down by the central state, and to maintain the legal and illegal business people who had taken advantage of the state's failure to meet the public's needs as alternative providers of those basic needs, and as sources of additional income and finance for the state-sponsored ceremonies in their area. In the late 1980s, the BSPP government tried to reassert its control over the economy by opting for a head-on confrontation aimed at emasculating hmaung-kho (illegal) traders through demonetization. Taking tough action against the hmaung-kho sector, without the necessary political, social and economic power, was a disaster for the state. The party-state was then nearly bankrupt and politically very unpopular. Not surprisingly, the party-state's demonetization measures against hmaung-kho activities backfired, and the economy was plunged into even greater difficulty. Eventually, public disorder born from popular grievance paralysed the state, and the implementation of the ‘Burmese Way to Socialism’ ended in disarray.

The Burmese ways to socialism

The death knell for Burmese socialism tolled an entire year before Tiananmen Square burned and the Berlin Wall crumbled, but few outside Burma heard it. Television news teams were not present to record the extraordinary events surrounding Burma's democracy movement in summer 1988. A year after the massive demonstrations against their government, the Burmese electorate rejected socialism and military rule. Candidates who even appeared to be connected to the discredited Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) were routed. Twenty-one million voters gave an overwhelming mandate to the political party led by Aung San Suu Kyi, 46, although the nervous junta had placed her under solitary house arrest. That did not stop the Nobel Committee from conferring its prestigious Peace Prize for 1991 on her, and by doing so remind the world of the unfinished struggle for democracy in Burma. Nevertheless, the Nobel laureate, who is the daughter of Burma's revered national hero, General Aung San, remains under house arrest and the military firmly in control. Burma's failure to achieve a viable post-independent socialist state has as much to do with the ideological and structural constraints inherent in the system as with Burmese history, culture and personality of the head of government. This paper examines socialism as espoused by two dissimilar post-independent leaders-U Nu and General Ne Win-and the means through which each chose to implement his particular version of utopia. Discarding colonial rule for socialism was for Burma more than just a reaction to a foreign exploitative system. Burmese nationalism was deeply rooted in socialism, as British journalist Martin Smith states in his excellent book: 'Burma since independence, is, after all, that rarity, a country in which successive governments have been regarded as left wing, but in which the principal political opposition has come from the left'.' Many have noted the natural affinity of Buddhist notions of egalitarianism, redemption through social action and a healthy ambivalence to capital accumulation with such socialist ideals as equitable distribution of wealth in a classless society. Socialism and Burmese Buddhism further enjoyed the illusion of being closely linked, for only Buddhist terminology was available to explain Marxist philosophy to the general populace. Years before socialism was officially sanctioned, however, Burmese society had already evolved in a significantly 'socialist' manner. Colonial Britain's Commissioner Charles Crosthwaite, with only some exaggeration, complained of the challenge of colonising a country '. . . where one man is as good as another, where there are no landlords, no hereditary aristocracy and no tribal chiefs . . .2

Burma in 1983: The Dilemmas of Neutralism and Succession

Research Article| February 01 1984 Burma in 1983: The Dilemmas of Neutralism and Succession David I. Steinberg David I. Steinberg Search for other works by this author on: This Site PubMed Google Scholar Far Eastern Survey (1955) 24 (2): 195–200. https://doi.org/10.2307/2644438 Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Share Icon Share Twitter LinkedIn Tools Icon Tools Get Permissions Cite Icon Cite Search Site Citation David I. Steinberg; Burma in 1983: The Dilemmas of Neutralism and Succession. Far Eastern Survey 1 February 1955; 24 (2): 195–200. doi: https://doi.org/10.2307/2644438 Download citation file: Ris (Zotero) Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search All ContentAsian Survey Search This content is only available via PDF. Copyright 1984 The Regents of the University of California Article PDF first page preview Close Modal You do not currently have access to this content.

Burma´s Third Four‑Year Plan: Half‑way to Socialism and Industrialization?

current moderate flurry of interest in Burma on the part of the West is a product of both greater Burmese involvement in foreign eco nomic relations and the growing international understanding of advances in the Burmese economy over the past half decade. Although this titillation is still muted compared with the interest in many other nations of the region, it varies markedly from the relative neglect of that country since the military coup of 2 March 1962. This isolation was fostered by the military Revolutionary Council, which engaged in a massive programme of nationalization in the 1960s to speed Burma along The Burmese Way to Socialism.1 Two important and interrelated events, that were largely ignored in the West, brought about structural changes in both the Burmese political and economic spheres. first was the Congress of the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) in June-July 1971, which was the culmination of the transformation of the party from a cadre to a mass organization. second was the promulgation of the Con stitution of 1974. This document transformed the administrative structure of the state, if not the underlying traditional nature of Burmese society. It reformulated administrative control, establishing a Pyithu Hluttaw (People's Assembly) in which sovereignty titularly resides, designated administrative means by which a successor to Ne Win as Head of State could be chosen, declared Burma to be a unitary state in which the minorities would effectively play a less prominent role than in the civilian period, and enfeoffed the BSPP as the single legal political entity that was to lead the nation.2 It did all this while still ensuring military control through the party process. In economic terms, however, the critical event was not the Con stitution, but the Party Congress. It ratified important economic policies that were designed to rescue the stagnant, centralized Burmese economy from the rigidity of Marxist orthodoxy, as tempered with Buddhism, if not from Marxist rhetoric.3 It did this through the 1

Burma in 1982: Incomplete Transitions

BURMA IS IN the midst of a series of transitions, whose ultimate resolutions will in large part shape the nature of the political, economic, and internal structure of the nation over the next two decades. These changes, no matter how slow their movement may seem to outside observers, are profound in their implications, for they concern the future leadership of the state, its economic progress and direction, and the nature of its internal ethnic problems. When in August 1981 President Ne Win announced his plans to retire from that largely ceremonial position in the following November, he explicitly did so to ensure the measured movement toward a peaceful succession. Yet by retaining the chairmanship of the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP), Ne Win has begun, but not completed, the stillunfinished transition to new national leadership. The party controls the political process and, by virtue of its status as the only legal political entity, relegates the Pyithu Hluttaw (Peoples' Assembly) to a mere expression of BSPP's will. Burma's Third Four-Year Plan came to an end on March 31, 1982. Its close marks the virtual midpoint between the economic liberalization mandated at the First BSPP Congress in 1971, approved by the party's Central Committee in 1972, and the close of the Twenty-Year Plan in 1993/94, when Burma is projected to achieve the status of an industrialized, socialist state. The Third Four-Year Plan, although impressive in its aggregate accomplishments and the most successful of Burma's eco-

Burma in 1977: Cautious Changes and a Careful Watch

WHEN EDWIN W. MARTIN titled last year's article in 1976: The Beginnings of Change?, he referred the new possibility of liberalized economic policies replacing the previous rigidities of the doctrinaire socialism instituted and maintained by the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) since the Ne Win coup in 1962. An answer the question mark in his title would, he wrote, be found in the outcomes of the Third Party BSPP Congress scheduled for early 1977.1 The Third Congress met in Rangoon from February 21 March 1, 1977. The reports, discussions, and final resolutions concurred in recognizing the failure of past economic plans; saved face by blaming this more on men than on principles; and forthwith reversed previous policy by establishing new Guidelines now seeking foreign assistance promote the people's welfare and for giving positive assurance the (Burmese) private sector . . . so that they may begin participate in national production. A new Council of Ministers (the operational Cabinet) was chosen and the senior political Council of State was slightly altered. A Ministerial Committee of Nine, headed by the new Prime Minister, U Maung Maung Kha, was announced in June to carry out the purposes of the shift in the economy . . . implement the new guidelines . . . (and) coordinate economic matters between various Ministries.2

The Third Congress of the Burma Socialist Programme Party: "The Need to Create Continuity and Dynamism of Leadership"

DESCRIPTIVE SUMMARY comment on Burma for 1976 generally and correctly indicates that domestically it was more turbulent than past years. A group of junior Defense Services officers, allegedly assisted by several senior officers-among them Colonel Hla Pe, Northern Command Commander, and ex-General Tin Oo-carelessly plotted and were found guilty of planning the assassination of President U Ne Win, Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) General Secretary General San Yu, and National Intelligence Bureau Chief Colonel Tin Oo. These junior officers, led by Captain Ohn Kyaw Myint of the Rangoon Command HQs, were determined-so it was later charged-to destroy the socialist economic system as well as restore to power the previously sacked Chief of Staff and Defense Minister General Tin Oo (no relation of the Colonel). The junior officers were arrested in July, tried and convicted during the latter part of the year, and sentenced on January 11, 1977.2 The country's two universities, seven colleges, and nine professional and technical training institutes, having been reopened in January 1976, were again closed in March following a planned public student demonstration and an unplanned student take-over of the Convocation Hall at Rangoon University. The various educational institutions were again reopened in October. Corruption in high places,

The Third Congress of the Burma Socialist Programme Party: "The Need to Create Continuity and Dynamism of Leadership"

The Third Congress of the Burma Socialist Programme Party: "The Need to Create Continuity and Dynamism of Leadership"

Burma in 1976: The Beginnings of Change?

THE GOVERNMENT OF Burma has long been accustomed to the onslaughts of a large variety of insurgent forces, but in 1976 ominous signs of opposition to President Ne Win's leadership appeared within the Burmese army itself. There were also indications of strain within the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP), the country's sole legal political party. Economic issues appeared to be at the root of the tensions within the army and the party. In the case of the army, officers who attempted a coup in July are said to have denounced the economic system,' while in the case of the BSPP, doctrinaire socialist elements may prevent implementation, if not the adoption, of measures essential to the revival of the seriously ailing Burmese economy. On September 10 began the trial of a group of young Burmese army officers accused of plotting to assassinate the President and stage a coup, allegedly the first such attempt by members of the army since Ne Win himself came to power by a military coup in March 1962. General San Yu, Secretary of the BSPP and of the State Council, and Colonel Tin Oo, Director General of the National Intelligence Board, were also alleged to have been targets for assassination. Two officers were accused of high treason and five others of encouraging them to commit acts of treason. All were accused of having sought to ruin the BSPP, thus violating the Vanguard Party Safeguarding Law. What gave this assassination and coup trial particular importance was the alleged role of former Defense Minister and Army Chief of Staff, General Tin U. who appeared in the dock along with the accused coup plotters. He was charged with misprision of treason, i.e., of knowing about the plotters' acts of treason but failing to report

Burma: A Political and Economic Background

Nineteen seventy-four was a significant year for Burma as the government, after more than a decade of political reconstruction, adopted a new constitution purportedly made by the people and for their interests. Paradoxically, the year witnessed the most serious expression of popular discontent against the government in the form of serious riots by workers and students in June and December. Since it came to power in a military coup in 1962, the Ne Win Government has been preoccupied with developing political accoutrements to legitimize its rule and to create a political system to justify its socialist ideology. In July 1962, the government formed the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) as a cadre party, after having abolished all other political parties in the state. Later, in an attempt to mobilize peasants and workers, the People's Workers' Councils and People's Peasants' Councils were formed as sub-organizations of the BSPP. The BSPP enlarged its membership in 1970 and soon transformed itself from a cadre to a people's party. In 1972, the administrative and judicial systems were reorganized. The colonial secretariat was abolished, regional administration was simplified, and the old criminal courts in the townships and village-tracts gave way to People's Courts. In the same year, Ne Win and twenty of his senior commanders retired from the army to become civilian members of government. The military Revolutionary Council was reorganized as a cabinet with Ne Win as Prime Minister and fourteen others as members (eleven civilians and three military personnel). Though it was merely a change of garb, the transition from military to civilian government sym bolized another stage in the process of transferring power to the people. The climax in this process was reached in January 1974, when a new constitution was adopted and Burma became a socialist republic. Work on the new constitution had begun more than two years earlier in September 1971, when a ninety-seven member commission (thirty-four military personnel and sixty-three civilians) was organized to formulate a draft constitution. Fifteen field teams were formed to enlist suggestions and opinions from the people on the new constitution. These teams toured the country and were reported to have met over 105,000 people and heard suggestions from 3,458 representatives before the first draft of the constitution was completed. The ritual of tours throughout the country and meetings with peasants, workers, and members of the armed forces continued throughout the second and third drafts of the constitution. In April 1973, a nation-wide census, the first since 1931, was begun in preparation for a referendum on the constitution and subsequent elections. The referendum which was held between 15 and 31 December 1973 was a marked success. More than 12-5 million people out of an electorate of about 14-5 million

Burma: Loosening up on the Tiger's Tail

t the first general meeting of the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) in 1965, Bogyoke Ne Win addressed the new party cadre on the many obstacles blocking the Burmese Way to Socialism. The military government's goal of transforming Burma into a socialist society was far from realization. Ne Win admitted that the Revolutionary Council continued to experience considerable difficulty in its new role as manager of the state economy. Despite the problems, the military was not yet prepared to relinquish control over the government nor was it willing to expand popular participation in the affairs of state. Characterizing the situation of the Revolutionary Council since it seized state power, Ne Win observed that, It was like having caught hold of the tiger's tail. Once we caught hold of the tiger's tail we could not let go. We had to go ahead to the attack.' On March 2, 1972, the Revolutionary Council marked the tenth anniversary of the coup d'etat which overthrew the government of U Nu and terminated Burma's often turbulent post-Independence experiment in parliamentary democracy.2 As the first decade of the Burmese Way to Socialism ended, the Ne Win government introduced a series of sweeping institutional changes designed to accelerate the revolutionary transformation of Burma and reduce the gap which continued to exist between the military rulers and the Burmese polity. While there is still question as to how substantive some of these changes are in fact, one is nevertheless led to the conclusion that the military is still holding the tiger's tail, but is beginning to loosen its grip.