Budget Stabilization Fund Research Articles

The fiscal effects of U.S. State budget stabilization funds (BSFs): evidence from a meta-analysis

A budget stabilization fund (BSF) is an important fiscal instrument for states to stabilize their budgets, but studies have found varying results regarding its impact. We conduct a meta-analysis to determine whether and under what conditions BSFs can serve as an effective countercyclical tool. By synthesizing a total of 540 effect sizes from 23 original studies, we find that on average, BSFs have a moderate positive effect on government savings and a small negative effect on fiscal stress. Additionally, strict withdrawal rules seem to attenuate the positive relationship between BSFs and government savings, and compromise the negative relationship between BSFs and fiscal stress. The presence of budget balance requirements, party conflict and some other environmental factors may also moderate the BSF-savings and BSF-stress relationships. This research contributes to the BSF literature and provides useful policy recommendations for state governments to consider when designing or revising their BSF legislations.

Does the Stringency of State Tax and Expenditure Limitations Discourage Political Manipulation in Fiscal Reserves?

AbstractThis article examines how state tax and expenditure limitations (TELs) affect the size of fiscal reserves over election cycles. Using a panel data set of 47 U.S. states from 1986 to 2013, we find that the persistent pattern of electoral cycles in general fund balances (GFBs) disappears in states with stricter TELs. Regarding a budget stabilization fund balances (BSFs), the preelection and election downward effect diminishes and becomes statistically insignificant while the postelection upward effect increases and becomes significant in states with stricter TELs. Our findings reveal that the stringency of TELs not only eliminates electioneering's impact on GFBs but also coincides with increases in BSFs, particularly in postelection years. Consistent with the principal–agent theory, politicians tend to use a budget stabilization fund (BSF) as a secondary saving account to circumvent stronger TELs and save more BSFs after elections.

A Dynamic Scoring Simulation Analysis of How TEL Design Choices Impact Government Expansion

A dynamic scoring simulation analysis compares the size-of-government effects of four state-government-level Tax and Expenditure Limit (TEL) and Budget Stabilization Fund (BSF) combinations. Two of the four TEL-BSF combinations have population-plus-inflation as the basis for the spending growth limit. The other two TEL-BSF combinations have personal-income-growth as the basis for the spending growth cap. A sensitivity analysis, including a regression analysis of Monte-Carlo-generated ‘observations’, measures the significance of the model parameter choices. The personal-income-growth TELs don’t constrain spending growth at all in some states. In most states, a TEL based on a significant multiple of population plus inflation restrains fiscal expansion more than either version of our personal income growth TEL. The findings provide some important policy issues: there are significant differences in the fiscal and economic impacts of likely TEL design alternatives, and there is a likely trade-off between stringency and political durability.

A Comparative Analysis of Budget Stabilization Fund Effectiveness

BSFs seek to force state governments to gather surplus revenues during good times into a fund that can be drawn later during bad times, when revenues slacken and when it is most difficult to borrow the funds needed by the government for recovery. It has been deemed that “strict” funds whose deposit and withdrawal rules are mathematical formulas designed to limit discretion in their use, are effective in reducing expenditure, deficits, and expenditure volatility over time. I analyze the effectiveness of the “strictest” measures using the synthetic control method. The analysis indicates no significant effects on expenditures, deficits, nor expenditure volatility in the post-implementation period nor the 2000-2001 recession, when most states first activated their funds. I conclude that these funds, by design, do not effectively limit the discretion of political actors to deposit or withdraw funds. As such, Budget Stabilization Funds do not overcome the agency problems they need to for true effectiveness.

The Rube Goldberg Machine of Budget Implementation, or Is There a Structural Deficit in the New York City Budget?

This paper examines the case of continuous budgeting both preadoption and postadoption in New York City and considers matters of forecast bias, rebudgeting, and the belief that New York City remains in structural deficit which has been cited as a continuing source of concern since New York City's 1970s fiscal crisis. The asserted structural deficit is a rationale for reducing spending in the prebudget and postbudget adoption periods. Williams (), shows that New York City's revenue forecasts are biased to underestimation, exacerbating over longer horizons. This paper examines expenditure estimates, reductions and within‐year modifications over the first decade of the twenty‐first century. If there is a structural deficit, expenditures would exceed revenues in forecasts by more than offsetting forecast biases. However, there are other reasons expenditures may exceed revenues in forecasts. Late term increases in expenditure estimates suggest deliberate choices, which cannot be termed “structural.” Expenditure changes follow changing revenue particularly in the postadoption period. This rebudgeting practice does not reflect fiscal stress; it is part of a complex method of producing a surreptitious budget stabilization fund, reallocations favored by the mayor, and possibly shifting of the budget towards capital uses with little broad public discussion. These observed effects are somewhat consistent with effective financial management, but are nontransparent and inconsistent with democratic participation. Policy recommendations aim at restoring transparency and democratic oversight.

Forecasting General Fund Revenue: An Analysis of Idaho FY 1998 to FY 2011

Forecasting state general fund revenue (GFR) though business cycles means possibly confusing a cycle with an underlying long-run trend. Relative to the actual revenue, the mean squared error of the academic, legislative, governor's, the growth path (GP), and Holt-Winters (HW) forecasts for Idaho GFR was not significantly different than the naïve forecast's; the Combined GP-HW forecast has significantly smaller mean square error. The GP model (ARIMA 1, 2, 1) produced a short-run elasticity of revenue with respect to income of 1.05 (±0.05). The best GFR forecasts combined a HW two-step-ahead level with a GP one-step-ahead trend that provided a forecast of GFR with the smallest root mean square error between FY 1998 and FY 2009. A budget stabilization fund needs to be 34–40 percent of GFR for GFR to sustain growth at the state's long-run expansion rate during a contraction.

State budget stabilization fund adoption: Preparing for the next recession or circumventing fiscal constraints?

The high rate of budget stabilization fund adoption during the 1980s is often attributed to the 1980–1982 recession. In this view, states adopted funds to prevent a recurrence of the fiscal crises experienced during that recession. An alternative hypothesis is that some funds adopted during this period were intended to circumvent tax and expenditure limit laws. We find that states with TELs in place were significantly more likely to adopt statutory funds, but were significantly less likely to adopt funds with stringent deposit and withdrawal rules, suggesting that some funds were adopted to circumvent existing fiscal constraints.

The Role of Budget Stabilization Funds in Smoothing Government Expenditures over the Business Cycle

The economic downturn that began in 2001 resulted in sizable budget shortfalls and arguably the worst fiscal conditions for state governments in decades. The use of savings to stabilize cyclical fluctuations in the budget has been institutionalized in most states in the form of budget stabilization funds. In this article, the authors explore how state expenditure volatility is affected by the existence, size, and structure of stabilization funds using multiple measures of expenditure cyclicality over the period from 1969 to 1999. The results indicate that while most states have not witnessed a reduction in expenditure volatility over the business cycle, states with rule-bound stabilization funds experience significantly less expenditure volatility from utilizing a budget stabilization fund. In fact, the authors find that state expenditures are approximately 20 percent less volatile following the adoption of a rule-bound budget stabilization fund.

Budget Stabilization Fund: Structural Features of the Enabling Legislation and Balance Levels

This article examines what leads to high balances of the budget stabilization fund (BSF) to make it a countercyclical fiscal tool. Checking state BSF laws, this article classifies BSF structural features into purposes, funding sources, balance caps, and use approval procedures. Using panel data (1979–1999) and controlling for related variables, this article tests the features' effects on BSF levels over the sample period and different phases of the economy to identify specific effects of the features in boom and lean years. The article also forwards policy recommendations for state governments to consider in designing or revising their BSF legislation.

What Stabilizes State General Fund Expenditures in Downturn Years—Budget Stabilization Fund or General Fund Unreserved Undesignated Balance?

This article strictly defines the budget stabilization fund (BSF) as a counter‐cyclical reserve, and with a panel data set examines the effects of BSF and general fund unreserved undesignated balances (UUB) on stabilizing state general fund expenditure during downturns. The article finds that BSFs bolster spending in lean years: each percentage point increase of BSF balance as a percent of general fund expenditure can minimize negative expenditure gap by a quarter percentage point. But the article does not find evidence that UUB is a counter‐cyclical fiscal tool, indicating that wide adoption of BSF may have changed the nature and use of UUB.

The Optimal Size of Countercyclical Budget Stabilization Funds: A Case Study of Ohio

Ohio is one of several states that has instituted a Budget Stabilization Fund to serve as a tool to fight the impacts of economic fluctuations on state finances. The optimal size and rate of contribution to the fund are explored in this study. A widely accepted target of 5 percent of general fund revenue for the budget stabilization fund is found inadequate to provide any degree of normalization of state general fund revenue when Ohio's recent fiscal experiences are examined. An optimal size of close to 13 percent emerges as a more likely target for Ohio along with an annual contribution rate approaching 4 percent of revenues in average non‐contractionary years.