Budget Makers Research Articles

Pengaruh Identitas Profesional, Locus of Commitment, Bystander Effect, dan Self Efficacy terhadap Niat Melakukan Whistleblowing

The aim of this research was to investigate how professional identity, locus of commitment, the bystander effect, and self-efficacy influence the intention to whistleblowing. This study builds on Taylor and Curtis (2010) application of the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) as its theoretical foundation. It employs a purposive sampling method, targeting respondents employed within regional working units (SKPD) in Sawahlunto City. Respondents consisted of employees who served as the Budget User Authorizations, Budget Makers, Budget Section Head, Commitment Making Officers, Pay Order Signing Officers, Head of Finance, Financial Administration Officers, Activity Technical Implementation Officers, Expenditures Treasurer, Treasurer of Goods, and Finance Staff. The data for this research was gathered through primary methods, using structured questionnaires distributed to 26 regional working units in Sawahlunto City. Hypothesis testing was conducted using IBM SPSS Statistics 25 software. The findings of the study reveal that: (1) Professional Identity not significant influence whistleblowing intention; (2) Locus of commitment positively significant influence whistleblowing intention; (3) Bystander effect not significant influence whistleblowing intention; (4) Self efficacy positively significant influence whistleblowing intention.

Pengaruh Sikap, Kontrol Perilaku dan Religiusitas terhadap Niat Melakukan Whistleblowing

The purpose of this research is to determine the influence of attitudes, behavior control and religiosity towards the whistleblowing intentions. This research using purposive sampling method with the respondents working at the Local Government Organization in Bukittinggi City. Respondent consists of 121 people, who served as a head of finance, treasurer expenditures, finance staff, budget makers, commitment making officers, Paying Order Signing Officers, Budget User Authorizations. The data collection technique used in this research is field research in the form of researchers distributing structured questionnaires to 26 Local Government Organizations in Bukittinggi City. This data was analyzed by using multiple regression analysis in SPSS. From the results of data processing, it can be seen that the first variable is the attitude of influence on the intention of whistleblowing with a calculated value of t count> t table that is 7.198> 1.661 it can be said that the first hypothesis received. The results of testing the second variable, namely behavioral control has no affection the intention to do whistleblowing with t count < t table ie -0.359 < 1.661 . The religiosity variable is known that as a positive effect with t count> t table that is 1.967> 1.661 So it can be said that third hypothesis accepted.

Development of Budgetary Slack Research in Indonesia

This study aimed to provide an overview of the development of budgetary slack research in Indonesia. The research method was charting the field developed by Hesford et al. (2007). In this study, articles were classified based on topics, research methods, samples, and theories. The research samples were 161 articles published in 35 journals accredited by Sinta 1, 2, and 3 with 23 years of observation from 1999-2021. The results showed that for the research topic, the budget participation variable was the most widely used antecedent in research. Then as many as 157 articles used quantitative research methods, the most widely used samples were Local government work unit (SKPD) budget makers, and the most widely used theory in budgetary slack research was agency theory. Suggestions for further budgetary slack research are to use an experimental research design with research participants from professional accountants, managers, or employees who are directly involved in the budgeting process. In addition, it can examine several internal influence variables (moral reasoning, locus of control, religiosity, honesty, ethics, managerial trust, and motivation) and external influence variables (compensation scheme (clawback) and compliance pressure).

Pengaruh: PAD, DAK, DBH, ,SiLPA dan flypaper effect terhadap perilaku oportunistik penyusun anggaran

The implementation of the regional autonomy policy has brought changes to the regional government system, which has implications for the increasing role of the executive in making public policies, especially those related to regional budgeting. The regional autonomy policy is a gap for budget makers to act opportunistically. Opportunistic behavior is an act of seeking self-interest by using deception. This study aims to determine the effect of regional original revenue, special allocation funds, revenue sharing funds, SiLPA, and flypaper effects on opportunistic behavior in budgeting. The sample was taken from the provincial government in Indonesia by purposive sampling method. The test tool uses multiple linear regression. The study results found that the special allocation fund, SiLPA, and flypaper effect affected opportunistic behavior in budgeting. In contrast, regional original revenue and revenue sharing funds did not affect opportunistic behavior in budgeting.

Pengaruh Pendapatan Asli Daerah dan Flypaper Effect Terhadap Perilaku Oportunistik Penyusun Anggaran

This study aims to test and analyze the effect of local revenue and flypaper effect on the opportunistic behavior of budget makers. The data used in this research is panel data from eleven districts/cities in Maluku province from 2014 to 2020. The analysis method used is panel data regression analysis. The results showed that: (1) Local Own Revenue has a positive and significant effect on the Opportunistic Behavior of Regency/City Budget Formers in Maluku. This means that the higher the District/City Original Revenue, the higher the Opportunistic Behavior of Budget Compilers; (2) The Flypaper Effect has a positive and significant effect on the Opportunistic Behavior of Regency/City Budget Formers in Maluku. This means that the higher the occurrence of flypaper effect in regencies/cities in Maluku, the higher the opportunistic behavior of budget makers; and (3) Simultaneously the Regional Original Income and the Flypaper Effect influence the Opportunistic Behavior of Regency/City Budget Formers in Maluku.

Leveraging Quasi-Experimental Methods to Estimate Model Structure: Understanding School Funding Changes in Response to Court Orders

We discuss an approach to using the event study, a common experimental design in the social sciences, to parameterize delays and develop other insights into system structure. We show a step-by-step process for undertaking a delay event study, discuss some of the conceptual reasons that this provides information about the delay, and illustrate the process for a typical example. We find evidence that school funding changes following court orders do not adjust quickly, and likely follow a higher-order, as opposed to a first-order, delay process. Our tests also suggest that school district budget makers appear to forecast revenue pessimistically, contributing an additional source of delay to the system.

Determinants of employees’ psychological ownership on budgetary slack

The existence of budgetary slack permeates every level of private sector organisations. Employees (i.e., budget makers) usually request excessive budgetary resources in the budgeting process. Due to its dysfunctional nature, existing researchers had extensively examined the relationship between budgetary slack and employees’ performance. This study adopted a survey questionnaire approach to examine the relationship between determinants of psychological ownership and employees’ intention to create slack in budgeting. There were 475 budget makers from private sector organisations in the Klang Valley, Malaysia who participated in this study through a questionnaire survey. Preliminary data analysis was performed using normality, multi-collinearity, variance inflation index (VIF), common method variance, and reliability analysis. Multiple regression analysis was also applied to investigate the relationships of each dimension of employees’ psychological ownership on budgetary slack. This paper is considered a pioneer empirical study that investigates the determinants of psychological ownership on budgetary slack among budget makers from the psychological perspective in the context of private sector organisations in Malaysia, where slack activities in budgeting existed.

Personal reflection (RNA journal 20th anniversary).

Personal reflection (RNA journal 20th anniversary).

Conceptual Model of Budgetary Activity on Firms Performance: Malaysian SMEs Case Study

This study examines the relationship of management accounting budgetary activities impacting on firm’s performance. The purpose of this paper is to provide evidence on how budgetary goals influencing a firm’s performance outcomes, whether positively or negatively. The result also demonstrated that the improvement of the budgetary control system would be essential for obtaining an accurate budget. Therefore, it is possible that budget makers in firms are likely to provide decision-makers with a basis for measuring efficiency, identifying problems, and controlling costs. It also serves as a control tool for evaluating the performance of the members of an organization.

Dealing with a Surplus: Budgeting, Taxing, and Spending in Arizona

DOI 10.1515/cjpp-2013-0020 Calif. J. Politics Policy 2013; 5(3): 343–359 David R. Berman* Dealing with a Surplus: Budgeting, Taxing, and Spending in Arizona Abstract: Arizona’s 50th regular legislative session ended in May, 2012, after 116 days. It will be remembered for headlines, sometimes national ones, involving the ethical behavior of lawmakers (or the lack thereof), an attempt to remove the chair of the independent redistricting commission and various eye-catching legis- lative proposals or laws. This report examines the broader context in which deci- sions were made, the nature of the budgeting system, the making of the budget, and concludes with an overview of financial issues facing budget makers. Keywords: Arizona; budget; FY 2012–13; governor; legislature. *Corresponding author: David R. Berman, Morrison Institute for Public Policy, Arizona State University, USA 1 Introduction Arizona’s 50th regular legislative session ended in May, 2012, after 116 days. It will be remembered for headlines, sometimes national ones, involving the ethical behavior of lawmakers (or the lack thereof) an attempt to remove the chair of the independent redistricting commission and various eye-catching legislative pro- posals or laws. Along the way, lawmakers came up with a General Fund budget for fiscal year 2013. The budget itself accounts for only 31% of what the state government spends. The remainder comes from federal funds (34%) and other state funds for specific programs, some of which are appropriated by the legislature and some of which are not (35%) (see Table 1). Still, while the general fund budget does not tell us all we need to know about how the state raises and allocates funds, its making has long been a central focus of state politics. The year 2012 was no exception through the exercise was far less dramatic than in the previous 2 years. In 2010 and 2011 budget making in Arizona – a place where the Great Recession had a particularly strong impact – was driven by revenue short- ages. Governor and legislative leaders of a conservative bent dealt with the situation through spending cuts, fund transfers, borrowing, and accounting

KAJIAN ETIKA BUDGETARY SLACK DI ORGANISASI SEKTOR PUBLIK MENURUT PERSPEKTIF GENDER

This study aims to examine the effect of education, training, and experience of budgetary slack through ethics in public sector organizations according to the gender perspective. Populations in this study is government agencies or offices city of Padang, Pariaman, and Bukittinggi. Sample used in this study is an official budget makers amount is 88 respondents. Hypothesis inthis study were tested using LISREL 8.80 program. This study found that ethics has positive and significant effect on budgetary slack. It was also found that men and women have different ethical behavior in budgetary slack.

Adapting Budgetmaking to Inflation, Icelandic Municipalities in a Volatile Economic

Inflation was a growing problem during the 1960’s and the 1970’s in Iceland. Inflation represents a problem for any entity that tries to write up a budget, whether an individual, a company or a governmental entity. Many governmental entities do not have right to spend money unless what has been prescribed in the budget. The purpose of this paper is to map out how inflation affected different parts of municipality budgets in Iceland during the 1960’s and the 1970’s. Furthermore, to look at how well budget makers in the Icelandic municipality sector managed the task of forecasting inflation during the high inflation period of the 1970s.

Mental health policy and psychotropic drugs.

The pace of innovation in psychotropic drugs has been rapid over the past 15 years. There also have been unprecedented increases in spending on prescription drugs generally and psychotropic medications specifically. Psychotropic medications are playing a more central role in treatment. They also are receiving close scrutiny from health insurers, state budget makers, and ordinary citizens. Public policy actions regarding prescription drugs have the potential to significantly affect clinical care for mental disorders, the costs of this care to individuals and society at large, and the prospects for future scientific advances. This article outlines the policy issues related to psychotropic drugs with respect to their role in determining access to mental health treatment and the cost and quality of mental health care.

Municipal Budgets in Poland and the Czech Republic in the Third Year of Reform

Municipal budgets in Poland and the Czech Republic are compared in the context of the institutional settings adopted for local government in each country. Wildavsky's model of budgetary behaviour for ‘poor and uncertain’ budget makers is applied to explain the financial decisions of local authorities in the circumstances of postcommunist transition. The scope of independence of local budgeting is examined in both countries with regard to legal restrictions on municipal revenues and expenditures and also in regard to the relationship between local government and the intermediary level of state administration. Two hypotheses are tested concerning the capital expenditures of the municipal governments under study. The first seeks to explain the impact of state grants on the level of municipal investments, depending on the way they are distributed—directly from the centre or through the district offices. The second hypothesis concerns the consequences of electoral rules on budgetary decisions of the respective councils. At the end, a map of municipal incomes is produced for each country, both reflecting the west—cast gradient of modernization.

Budget makers as agents: A preliminar investigation of discretionary behavior under state-contingent rewards

Two classes of hypotheses purport to explain government spending. The conventional explanation is that spending outcomes are somehow determined by the supply of and the demand for publicly provided goods and services. Under the conventional explanation, competition either for office or through some kind of Tiebout mechanism constrains elected officials to serve the tastes and preferences of the electorate perhaps those of the median voter. Presumably, budget makers are merely loyal puchasing agents, perfectly responsive to the interests of their political masters.1 The alternative explanation is largely due to John Crecine and his students. 2 It derives from the behavioral approach of Herbert Simon, Richard Cyert, James March, and others and relies on a distinctive methodology computer simulation, based on models developed from carefully constructed decisionmaking protocols. But its most important distinguishing attribute is the explanatory role it assigns to the budget maker. As Crecine (1969: 20) explains:

Pay versus jobs: The choices facing local authorities

The Secretary of State wants local authorities to cut both manpower and spending. But it is local authority budget makers who face the harsh choices posed by cash limits on the one hand and national wage settlements on the other. That they have come much closer in respect of manpower than spending to what the Secretary of State wants, reflects the trade‐offs facing them in the labour market. New information reveals how brutally these bear on some sections of the workforce rather than others, and how they affect costs both to authorities and to ratepayers.

Medicine and Public Affairs. Carter and science: medals and a message.

If your fiscal lifelines run to Washington, it is useful to be in harmony with the agencies that send you money. What is also useful is a public expression of support from the President, the reason being that your friends in the bureaucracy are not sovereign when it comes to looking after your interests. In pursuit of their own goals and those of their clients, they must contend with the White House budget makers, adjacent bureaucracies and a swirl of often conflicting interests. Still, it is the President who appoints the chiefs, sets the budgets and prescribes the territories. Which . . .

The German Municipal Budget and its Relation To the General Government

To a proper understanding of our subject it seems necessary to reverse the order suggested by the title and first explain the relation of the local to the general government. No attempt will be made to explain in detail the complicated relations of the German municipality to the various governmental units of administrative areas within the German Empire, though a complete study of the municipal budget would require it; for every taxpayer living within a rural or urban commune contributes directly or indirectly to several governmental organizations above the municipality. Obviously many of the sources of revenue of both the state and the imperial governments lie within the city. The income tax, for example, is a source of both state and municipal revenue, while the unearned increment tax, introduced into Frankfort in 1904, was adopted by the Imperial Government in 1911. It is now provided by law that this tax shall be collected and administered by the various states and the proceeds are to be divided between the imperial, state, and municipal treasuries. In practice, however, this tax is collected by the municipal authorities who may, by sanction of the state, levy a supplemental unearned increment tax not to exceed 100 per cent of the imperial tax. I mention these facts here merely to show the complicated financial relations between the local and general governments that we may better appreciate the problems presented to the budget makers. Before entering upon details, other facts of a general nature should also be kept in mind. In considering German municipal practices it should be remembered that the German Empire is composed of twenty-six more or less independent states, that each of these states has its own legislative body, its own administrative officials, its own political subdivisions and its own system of local government. A mere glance at the history of Germany-its former 192