Buddhist Ethics Research Articles

Virtuous bodies: the physical dimensions of morality in Buddhist ethics

Virtuous Bodies breaks new ground in the field of Buddhist ethics by investigating the diverse roles bodies play in ethical development. Traditionally, Buddhists assumed a close connection between body and morality. Thus Buddhist literature contains descriptions of living beings that stink with sin, are disfigured by vices, or are perfumed and adorned with virtues. Taking an influential early medieval Indian Mahayana Buddhist text-'Santideva's Compendium of Training ('Sik,sasamuccaya)-as a case study, Susanne Mrozik demonstrates that Buddhists regarded ethical development as a process of physical and moral transformation. Mrozik chooses The Compendium of Training because it quotes from over one hundred Buddhist scriptures, allowing her to reveal a broader Buddhist interest in the ethical significance of bodies. The text is a training manual for bodhisattvas, especially monastic bodhisattvas. In it, bodies function as markers of, and conditions for, one's own ethical development. Most strikingly, bodies also function as instruments for the ethical development of others. When living beings come into contact with the virtuous bodies of bodhisattvas, they are transformed physically and morally for the better. Virtuous Bodies explores both the centrality of bodies to the bodhisattva ideal and the corporeal specificity of that ideal. Arguing that the bodhisattva ideal is an embodied ethical ideal, Mrozik poses an array of fascinating questions: What does virtue look like? What kinds of physical features constitute virtuous bodies? What kinds of bodies have virtuous effects on others? Drawing on a range of contemporary theorists, this book engages in a feminist hermeneutics of recovery and suspicion in order to explore the ethical resources Buddhism offers to scholars and religious practitioners interested in the embodied nature of ethical ideals.

Just to Make Clear “Where the Roots Come From”: A Response to Mark Denil’s “Manifestos”

“Right MAP Making: Five Ways to Make Maps for a Future to be Possible” needs to be practiced to be better defined, and this is more than I alone can give to it. It needs your help and effort. That said, I willaddress the dirt, to make clear “where the roots came from.” The broadside draws its inspiration from Buddhist ethics, ecofeminist, and ecotheology theory, the deep ecology, conservation and wilderness movements, the beauty of the earth, water, blank spaces, the unconscious, the Beloved Other, Mozart, and a JOY and love both for and within the world it-Self. It follows from a personal practice of making maps, teaching art, observation, and cartography, and a love for the body of the earth. There are many pressing concerns in the world: sex, class, society, population, consumption, environment, water, and disaster, to name but a few. And it is important for the making of maps, responding to the spatial aspects of any one of these concerns, to address and to awaken, in the mapping itself, to ethical issues. The broadside, “Right MAP Making” derives its form directly, after much consideration and many drafts over several years, from the Five Buddhist Precepts for laypersons. These are not dissimilar to the Jewish and Christian Ten Commandments and similar ethical works. Labeled as a manifesto, it aspires “to make public” the responsibilities of making maps. I think of it as a more personal credo or set of principles addressing the intention of ethical conduct on the part of the mapmaker, saying; “I believe,” or “I aspire to map in this manner.” Less as credo, it “is intended to articulate the fundamental principles of ethical conduct in mapping and maps”; it is an effort to initiate a discussion about the ethics of making maps and to remind us that our making is not isolated and without consequences. The Five Buddhist Precepts are Not Killing, Not Stealing, Avoiding Sexual Misconduct, Not Lying, and Not Taking Drugs. The Vietnamese Zen

Review of Mark Siderits, Buddhism as Philosophy

Siderits’ book is a welcome contribution to the ongoing dialogue between Buddhism and Western analytic philosophy. It covers the three main areas of philosophical enquiry—metaphysics, ethics and epistemology. Although conceptually quite challenging in places, the information is always presented in a pedagogic, evolutionary and highly readable manner. There are occasional problems with Siderits’ approach of isolating Buddhism as philosophy from Buddhism as religion, particularly in his chapter on ethics, which cannot avoid being somewhat unbalanced, and possibly misrepresentational, as it skirts around the major role that the doctrines of karma and rebirth play in Buddhist ethics. Although Siderits’ approach inevitably leaves some gaps, it manages to fill another important gap left by other books on Buddhism aimed either at the lay practitioner or specialist scholar. For those looking for a serious yet concise presentation of Buddhist philosophy, unencumbered with religious baggage, this is a rewarding resource for both personal and classroom study.

Classes of Agent and the Moral Logic of the Pali Canon

This paper aims to lay bare the underlying logical structure of early Buddhist moral thinking. It argues that moral vocabulary in the Pali Suttas varies depending on the kind of agent under discussion and that this variance reflects an understanding that the phenomenology of moral experience also differs on the same basis. An attempt is made to spell this out in terms of attachment. The overall picture of Buddhist ethics that emerges is that of an agent-based moral contextualism. This account does not imply that the prescription for moral conduct differs according to class of agent, but rather that the correct description of moral experience does. Further it implies that the descriptions of the moral experiences of different classes of agent differ phenomenologically, rather than in terms of overt behavioral characteristics. While most of the discussion is centered on the distinction between ordinary persons and disciples in higher training, the paper concludes with a brief exploration of the problematic moral experience of the arahat.

Eye on Religion: Miracles in the Chinese Buddhist Tradition

Books on Buddhism for general readers rarely mention miracles. Instead, the emphasis is usually on the life of the Buddha, his teachings, and the monastic order, the so-called “Three Treasures.” This is a heritage left by the European scholars who first became interested in Buddhism in the 19 century. Take the example of T.W. Rhys Davids, who founded the Pali Text Society in 1886 in England, and his wife Caroline A.F. Rhys Davids, who was its president. Steeped in Enlightenment values, they favored the Theravada Buddhist tradition, which has been practiced in Sri Lanka and southeast Asia, and its canonical language is Pali. They presented Buddhism as primarily a rational and ethical teaching, sharing similarities with Protestant Christianity. In contrast, they gave short shrift to the Mahayana Buddhist tradition of Tibet and East Asia because of its emphasis on the buddhas and bodhisattvas, who act as saviors for the faithful. They put more emphasis on Buddhist ethics than its rich mythology. But this is contrary to what Buddhists themselves believe. The life of Buddha is full of miracles. Eight events isolated from his life are called “great” miracles. They are his birth, enlightenment, first sermon, passing away or nirvana, as well as four other events at which he showed his supernatural powers to demonstrate the truth of his teaching. The places where the eight events took place came to be celebrated as the eight pilgrimage sites. For instance, in Lumbini, it is said that he emerged from under his mother’s right side instead of the normal birth channel. The infant immediately took seven steps and declared, “I am born for enlightenment for the benefit of the world; this is my last birth in the world.” Two streams of water–one hot and one cold–poured forth from the sky and fell on his head. The earth trembled and from the cloudless sky a shower perfumed with sandalwood, along with blue and red lotuses, fell. At Bodhgaya, during the night before his enlightenment, there was the famous story of Buddha’s defeat of Mara, the Buddhist Satan. When Mara’s demonic army attacked the Buddha, the rocks, trees, and axes that were discharged rose into the sky and remained suspended in midair. When a blazing log as large as a mountain was hurled at the Buddha, as soon as it was thrown, it hung suspended in the sky and burst into a hundred fragments through his magical power. Another group of miracles performed by the Buddha concern his teaching career. In India, there was a long tradition of gauging someone’s spiritual level by the supernormal powers (siddhi) he possessed. To make the audience willing to listen to him and thus benefiting from the Dharma, the Buddha found it necessary to exhibit his powers. Famous disciples were often recruited as a result of the demonstration. For instance, at Śravasti, he defeated the leaders of six heretical sects in front of the king in debate. To celebrate his victory, he performed the Twin Miracle or the Miracle of the Pairs. He levitated into the air, producing alternating streams of water and fire from different parts of his body. He also created multiple images of himself and had them preach the Dharma. These miracles were frequently depicted in stupas or memorial mounds. Belief in miracles has similarly been an integral part of the lives of devotees in other parts of the Buddhist world. I would use examples from the Chinese Buddhist tradition. Here, instead of using miracles to demonstrate the extraordinary nature of the Buddha as we read above, writers of the miracle stories are more interested in testifying to the efficacy of Buddhist deities in saving humankind from suffering. I begin with a story recorded by a Buddhist writer about 1500 years ago. Fu Liang, 374–426, the compiler of this earliest collection of seven miracle stories about the Buddhist savior deity known as Guanyin or Kuangshiyin (as the name appears in the story below), came from the elite educated class. He served as a government official, reaching the position of president of the Department of the Affairs of State under Liu Song. (420– 479). He was a scholar of Confucian classics, but like many of his contemporaries, he was also attracted to Buddhism, which was introduced into China some three hundred years earlier from India:

Indian ethics: classical traditions and contemporary challenges

Contents: Preface General introduction: Thinking ethics, the West and India. Introduction to Part A Early Indian Ethics - Vedas to the Gita dharma, rites to 'Right': Dharma, imperatives, and tradition: toward an Indian theory of moral action, J.N. Mohanty Dharma and rationality, Bimal Krishna Matilal The myth of the ethics of Purusartha or humanity's life-goals, Daya Krishna The fires of strangers: a Levinasian approach to Vedic ethics, Laurie L. Patton Samkhya-Yoga ethics, Roy W. Perrett Ethics of liberation in Patanjali's yoga, Ian Whicher Karma's suffering: a Mimamsa solution to the problem of evil, Purushottama Bilimoria Dana as a moral category, Maria Heim. Introduction to Part B: Buddhist and Jain Approaches to Ethical Decision Making: Purgation and virtue in Jainism: toward an ecological ethic, Christopher Key Chapple Buddhist ethical theory, Padmasiri de Silva Are there 'human rights' in Buddhism?, Damien Keown Buddhism and democracy, Jay L. Garfield Buddhist reductionism and the structure of Buddhist ethics, Mark Siderits Animal ethics and ecology in classical India - reflections on a moral tradition, M.K. Sridhar and Purushottama Bilimoria. Introduction to Part C: Reflections on Moral Ideals and Modernity Ghandi and Nonviolence: Hindu theory of tolerance, Bhikhu Parekh Action oriented morality in Hinduism, Christopher Key Chapple The ethical irrationality of the world: Weber and Hindu ethics, Pratap Bhanu Mehta Social injustice, retribution and revenge: a normative analysis of the contemporary social scene, Rajendra Prasad Gandhi, empire and a culture of peace, Joseph Prabhu Ethical skepticism in the philosophy of Sri Aurobindo, Stephen Philips. Index.

The Killing (Off) of Animals in Some Southern African Fiction, or "Why Does Every Animal Story Have to be Sad?"*

Summary The paper begins with cameos of my personal experience of killing animals and a discussion of the media debate in January 2007 about the ritual slaughtering of a "ceremonial bull" by Tony Yengeni. It then investigates representations of non-human animal deaths in some recent southern African fiction in relation to the thinking of Jacques Derrida, Martha Nussbaum, J.M. Coetzee's Elizabeth Costello, as well as Buddhist ethics and utilitarianism. All the fictional animals are sacrificed to human ideas of "the animal" even though some of the deaths could be classified as euthanasia: the dogs in J.M. Coetzee's Disgrace [1999]2000; Sharisha, the whale, in Zakes Mda's The Whale Caller (2005); Piet, the baboon, in Justin Cartwright's White Lightning (2002); and Mangy-Dog in Luis Bernardo Honwana's short story "We Killed Mangy-Dog" ([1969]1977). Ethics relating to animal deaths recur in these fictions: the animals' putative awareness of impending death, the denial of embodied dignity in contrast to the possibilities of human violence and sadism. The animals killed also lose the potential for a flourishing life, even if their suffering has been brought to a close. Some of the writers deploy the sympathetic imagination in their representations of the particular condemned subjects, so that the reader may enter the experience of the othered animal; all portray how the animals are situated, tragically, within a carnophallo-gocentric order which rarely acknowledges their subjectivities or individualises their deaths.

Good and Evil in Indian Buddhism: The five Sins of Immediate Retribution

Indian Buddhist sources speak of five sins of immediate retribution: murder of mother, father, an arhat, drawing the blood of a buddha, and creating a schism in the monastic community. This category provides the paradigm for sinfulness in Buddhism. Yet even these sins can and will, be expiated in the long run, demonstrating the overwhelmingly positive nature of Buddhist ethics

涅槃與安樂——從佛教的立場看“安樂死”問題

LANGUAGE NOTE | Document text in Chinese; abstract also in English.安樂死問題是當代生命倫理學中一個重要的問題，對於這一問題各界爭論不休。但是，就理論資源的角度來說，大多只是集中於醫學、哲學以及倫理學等領域，宗教倫理尤其是佛教倫理中蘊藏著豐富的理論資源，為我們認識安樂死問題提供了一個全新的視角，可以對安樂死問題的解決給出全新的答案。The problem of euthanasia (or mercy killing) is quite important in contemporary ethics. There have been a large amount of arguments among many circles. However, most contemporary discussions are limited to the theoretical resources of medicine, philosophy and ethics. In religious ethics, especially Buddhist ethics, there exists abundance of intellectual resources that could be drawn on.This essay analyses several general representative value judgments which support euthanasia. It is not difficult to find that both extreme utilitarian views and extreme human rights views on euthanasia can be taken as originating from either the classical Greek thinking or the modern Enlightenment thinking. Contemporary moralists are unable to take advantage of such views to get out of the difficulty around the issue of euthanasia. Such views often consist of some general principles, such as autonomy, beneficence, justice and etc. Interestingly, both the supporters and opponents of euthanasia can use the same set of such principles to make their arguments, and cannot persuade the other side. This situation indicates the impoverishment of such views for solving bioethical problems. It is then necessary to introduce some other traditional resources, especially Eastern religious perspectives, to reconsider the problem of euthanasia from a wider background.From the Buddhist view, all sides of the contemporary debate over the problem of euthanasia - no matter whether it is from the background of Christianity or from modern humanist thinking, actually share the same theoretical presuppositions and originate from the same cultural traditional background, although they seem to be dramatically and severely different. Both Christian theologians and modern Western Humanist intellectuals cut death from daily human life, viewing death as an enemy which people should challenge and overcome. As Buddhists see it, this attitude will surely bring the problem of euthanasia to a mess. Buddhism understands that death and life cannot be entirely separated from each other. This does not mean that Buddhism must support active euthanasia. Rather, to introduce Buddhist thinking resources into consideration over this problem could provide us a brand new perspective of understanding this problem, and may give us some new resolutions of euthanasia.DOWNLOAD HISTORY | This article has been downloaded 135 times in Digital Commons before migrating into this platform.

Improving ‘Consumer Protection’ with Buddhist Ethics: Necessity, Possibility and Challenge

This article primarily aims to draw attention to the concept of consumer protection in health care and the drug regulatory system. Consumer protection originated in the Western tradition and later it became a consumer protection model adopted by countries all over the world. However, it has been challenged when consumers have encountered the various unethical drug marketing strategies of the pharmaceutical industry. Modern advertising and aggressive drug marketing have considerably contributed to and stimulated mixed feelings of greed, fear and delusion so that consumers’ minds have become weak and vulnerable. Meanwhile, the minds of physicians and the drug regulators have been more or less influenced. National drug regulatory systems have been inevitably undermined. Consequently, this concept needs to be reexamined and improved. Overall, the article provides a theoretical investigation of two fundamental moral principles of consumer protection, one based on Western ethics as the foundation of the original concept and the other a new approach applied from the principles of Buddhism. This article is designed to discuss the advantages and limitations of a moral foundation to the concept for consumer protection and to propose possible Buddhist ways of improvement, particularly in strengthening the mind in order to prevent patients, consumers, physicians, regulators, producers and others related to the drug regulatory system from mind manipulation by consumerism in a consumer society.

Being Benevolence: The Social Ethics of Engaged Buddhism (review)

Reviewed by: Being Benevolence: The Social Ethics of Engaged Buddhism Rita M. Gross Being Benevolence: The Social Ethics of Engaged Buddhism. By Sallie B. King. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2005. 291 pp. This discussion of the social ethics of Engaged Buddhism is organized into chapters on four basic issues: the relationship between individual and society, human rights, nonviolence and its limits, and justice/reconciliation. Setting the context for these issues are an introduction, a chapter on how Engaged Buddhist social ethics is built from Buddhist tradition, and another surveying Engaged Buddhist [End Page 174] ethical theory. The author's conclusions and evaluations of the movement, for the most part, are found in the last chapter, the book's eighth. In her preface, King explains a crucial decision she made regarding the extent of her analysis of Engaged Buddhism. She realized that an important question about Engaged Buddhism concerns its relationship with Western thought and decided that she could better focus on that question and "avoid muddying the waters" (p. xii) by not including Western Engaged Buddhist thinking in her survey. She further justifies this decision by claiming that Western Buddhists are still largely students of Asian Buddhists who need to overcome familiar cultural habits "to clearly perceive the otherness of Buddhism and what it has to offer" (p. xii). This decision makes sense in its own context, and I agree that many Western Buddhists seem to not understand that the spiritual and philosophical foundations of Buddhism are quite different from those of Western religions. Unfortunately, the decision to not include Western Engaged Buddhists also furthers a view that Buddhism is "foreign," and, therefore, not directly relevant to Westerners or to the issues that most occupy Westerners in our day. Many Western Buddhists are at pains to undercut precisely that view of Buddhism. However, I do concede that including Western Engaged Buddhists in her analysis would have complicated her task enormously. King's concerns about the relationship between Engaged Buddhist thinking and Western thinking have more to do with refuting the claim made by "traditional" Buddhists, both Asian and Western, that the Engaged Buddhist movement is merely the product of Western influences and, therefore, not truly Buddhist. She refutes this claim by demonstrating that the most influential Asian Engaged Buddhist leaders are intelligent, well-educated people who are unlikely to meekly adopt foreign ideas. Cogently, she argues that Western influences on Engaged Buddhism do not make Engaged Buddhism "the product of Western influences" and that the claim that Engaged Buddhism is the result of Western cultural imperialism denies what it is trying to protect: "the subjectivity and agency of the Engaged Buddhist leaders themselves" (p. 3). She demonstrates that Asian Engaged Buddhist leaders are selective about which Western concepts they include in their discussions of social ethics and that their thinking about social ethics has deep consonance with utterly basic Buddhist concerns, such as interdependence, the Four Noble Truths, anatman (lack of independent abiding self), the enlightenability of human beings, the importance of compassion, the importance of varied self-transformative practices, and nonviolence. Before delving into Engaged Buddhism's major concerns in depth, King provides a lengthy chapter in which she outlines Engaged Buddhist ethical theory. She does not claim that Engaged Buddhists have worked out a systematic ethical philosophy, but rather that certain ideas and claims underlie their recommendations and actions, although not all of them are used by every Engaged Buddhist or in every situation. Natural law ethics, which claims that ethical requirements are not culturally relative because they stem from the nature of reality itself, not human invention, is an important element in Engaged Buddhist thinking, she [End Page 175] claims. (King, however, does not discuss the difficulty that the different religions have very different analyses of the nature of reality.) Engaged Buddhists also use a developmental perspective, recognizing that, as individuals develop, ethical understanding also develops. That developmental perspective implies that ethics is more about principles than about rules. Engaged Buddhist ethics are holistic, in that intellect and emotion are not thought of as at odds with each other in ethical decision making, but are well integrated with each other. A nonadversarial stance is critical...

The Essence of Buddhist Ethics Its Value in Tradition and in Modern Time

The Essence of Buddhist Ethics Its Value in Tradition and in Modern Time

Toward a “Wider and Juster Initiative”: Recent Comparative Work in Buddhist Ethics

AbstractThis essay considers some of the important trends in comparative approaches to Buddhist moral thinking, including early reflections on how and where to place Buddhist thought. It argues that some of the formative gestures shaping the field of Buddhist ethics sprang from contested efforts by historians of religion and philosophical formalists to chart a comparative methodology. The essay describes the methodological holism that characterizes important work in the field and argues against it, pointing instead to more diffuse lines of inquiry that do not efface Buddhism's historical diversity and the distinctiveness of its moral discourses. The essay begins to develop a different orientation in ethics that centers on the ethical study of human nature. To this end, it offers a small exercise in comparative moral psychology to explore the moral sentiment “sympathetic joy.”

Gross National Happiness and Environmental Status in Bhutan

The Himalayan Kingdom of Bhutan is in the midst of transformation as it moves from an isolated past to a modern nation‐state and participant in the global community. Its development path embraces the concept of “Gross National Happiness,” a philosophy and policy instrument that seeks to promote human development and manage environmental conservation within a sustainable strategy guided by Buddhist ethics. After examining Bhutan's approach to development and the governance and environmental policies stemming from it, this essay assesses its impacts on environmental conditions in the country.

TOWARD A DESCRIPTION OF DOGEN'S MORAL VIRTUES

Revitalized interest in “the virtues” has affected the study of Buddhism in recent years, and in this regard we may benefit by focusing on the Zen Master Dōgen (1200–1253). Seeking to describe Dōgen's moral virtues, we might begin by a study of his primer, the Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki; a particularly efficacious template for this project would appear to be one provided by Edmund L. Pincoffs in his book Quandaries and Virtues: Against Reductivism in Ethics. This modus operandi reveals Dōgen's exhortation of a broad array of mandatory and nonmandatory virtues, partially depending on whether or not the intended recipient is a layperson or one leading the religious life. If valid, this description may benefit Dōgen Studies as well as contribute to, and encourage, other “Western” efforts to articulate Buddhist ethics.

Buddhism and the Ethics of Species Conservation

Efforts to conserve endangered species of animal are, in some important respects, at odds with Buddhist ethics. On the one hand, being abstract entities, species cannot suffer, and so cannot be proper objects of compassion or similar moral virtues. On the other, Buddhist commitments to equanimity tend to militate against the idea that the individual members of endangered species have greater value than those of less-threatened ones. This paper suggests that the contribution of Buddhism to the issue of species conservation should not, however, be discounted. It argues, on the contrary, that Buddhist traditions, in reminding us of the moral significance of the suffering of individual animals, add an important dimension to debates concerning the ethical justification of efforts to conserve endangered species.

Buddhism and the Ethics of Species Conservation

Efforts to conserve endangered species of animal are, in some important respects, at odds with Buddhist ethics. On the one hand, being abstract entities, species cannot suffer, and so cannot be proper objects of compassion or similar moral virtues. On the other, Buddhist commitments to equanimity tend to militate against the idea that the individual members of endangered species have greater value than those of less-threatened ones. This paper suggests that the contribution of Buddhism to the issue of species conservation should not, however, be discounted. It argues, on the contrary, that Buddhist traditions, in reminding us of the moral significance of the suffering of individual animals, add an important dimension to debates concerning the ethical justification of efforts to conserve endangered species.

The "Nature" of Buddhism: A Survey of Relevant Literature and Themes

AbstractThis paper is a review of the scholarly conversation relating Buddhism to environmental issues, primarily in the United States. Topics of particular concern include important scholarly benchmarks in the field, and the nature of Buddhist ethics. Also considered are the relationships between Buddhism and other schools of thought that have been important in thinking about nature and the environment. In particular I focus on Deep Ecology and related philosophies, Buddhism and Christianity in Process thought, and the relationship between Buddhism and the natural sciences. I outline current practices performed worldwide by people who self-identify as Buddhists that clearly demonstrate environmental consciousness, sometimes actively participating in environmental movements in efforts to resist globalization and, often, Westernization. In the end, this survey perspective illustrates that there is no monolithic Buddhist tradition, but rather a substantial number of adapted (and adapting) Buddhisms.

Empty Words: Buddhist Philosophy and Cross-Cultural Interpretation (review)

Reviewed by: Empty Words: Buddhist Philosophy and Cross-Cultural Interpretation Edward R. Falls Empty Words: Buddhist Philosophy and Cross-Cultural Interpretation. By Jay L. Garfield. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2002. 306 + xi pp. Jay L. Garfield's Empty Words is a collection of (mostly) previously published essays bearing on the interpretation of Buddhist thought. Emphasizing the Indo-Tibetan tradition while indebted to Euro-American philosophy, Empty Words belongs in a class with books such as Tom Tillemans's Scripture, Logic and Language: Essays on Dharmakīrti and His Tibetan Successors (1999) and Matthew Kapstein's Reason's Traces: Identity and Interpretation in Indian and Tibetan Buddhist Thought (2001). Below is a précis of Empty Words, followed by remarks on some points that especially caught this reviewer's interest. The essays in Empty Words are gathered into three sections according to subject matter: (1) Madhyamaka, (2) Yogācāra, and (3) Ethics and Hermeneutics. There are five essays in section 1, clustered around three themes: Nāgārjuna's theory of causality (ch. 2, 4), parallels between Madhyamaka and the European skeptical tradition (ch. 1), and paradox in Madhyamaka (ch. 3, 5). Section 2 begins with an essay interpreting Vasubandhu on the three natures and three naturelessnesses, arguing that "Vasubandhu subordinates the naturelessnesses [End Page 196] to the natures pedagogically and describes them as characteristics of, but not (with the exception of the third) identical to the three natures" (p. 121). As for the other three essays in section 2, chapter 7 consists of a translation of and commentary on Vasubandhu's Trisvabhāvanirdes´a, chapter 8 presents an interesting experiment in cross-cultural interpretation in which the history of European idealism is viewed through a Buddhist idealist lens, and chapter 9 (one of the two previously unpublished essays in Empty Words—ch. 14 is the other) attempts to bring together Garfield's views on the limits of expressibility in Madhyamaka and his interpretation of the three natures in Yogācāra. Section 3 includes three essays concerning issues in ethics or political philosophy and two essays discussing the hermeneutical issues involved when Euro-American and Tibetan philosophers attempt to understand each other's traditions. The topics of the former essays are as follows. Is the Dalai Lama's advocacy of human rights (which are grounded in liberal moral theory) compatible with Buddhist ethics, which emphasizes a compassion-based morality (ch. 10)? Are Buddhist values and democracy incompatible (ch. 11)? How does Samdhong Rinpoche's approach to nonviolence relate to Gandhi's (ch. 12)? In the final two essays of the book, Garfield advocates a strategy of cross-cultural interpretation which would avoid the pitfall of orientalism, drawing heavily on Gadamerian-Heideggerian hermeneutics. The remarks that follow bear exclusively on points from essays in section 1 on Madhyamaka. In chapter 4, Garfield critiques the claim, attributed to Dharmakīrti (by rGyal tshab in his commentary on the pramānasiddhi chapter of Pramānavarttika) that belief in rebirth is necessary for the cultivation of bodhicitta. Garfield argues that if this claim is correct, then the "I" in the bodhisattva vow is doing real metaphysical work, functioning as the basis for a real causal relation, contra Nāgārjuna's analysis of causality (which is supposed to involve the rejection of real causal powers). Otherwise, a simpler account of bodhicitta would suffice, in which striving for personal enlightenment could be replaced by striving for someone's attaining enlightenment some time in the future. On this account, practitioners would resolve to contribute to the accumulation of causes of someone's eventually attaining enlightenment, where this accumulation of causes turns out to be something like "universal moral improvement." But what if practitioners just do not know how to bring about universal moral improvement? Garfield acknowledges that buddhas sometimes act counter to the "moral" good, and this suggests an important cognitive difference between buddhas and ordinary beings: ordinary beings can only (fallibly) infer what the best thing to do is, whereas buddhas simply know. Hence, the importance, from a practitioner's standpoint, of the Buddha's teaching, which is a path of personal attainment (and who knows whether it is incidentally a...

An Introduction to Buddhist Ethics: Foundations, Values and Issues

1. Shared foundations of Buddhist ethics: sources of guidance to Buddhists Rebirth and karma The four noble truths Philosophy of action 2. Key Buddhist values giving Keeping the lay precepts Monastic values Ethics of inter-personal relationships Loving kindness and compassion Social ethics 3. Mahayana emphases and adaptations: the path of the Bodhisattva The ethics of the Bodhisattva Skilful means and overriding precepts Specific strands of Mahayana thought and practice Mahayana reassessment of monasticism 4. Attitude to and treatment of the natural world Humanity's place in nature Non-harming of animals Positive regard, and help, for animals Plants, trees and forests Conservation and environmentalism 5. Economic ethics Lay economic ethics The monastic economy Buddhism and capitalism: Weber's 'Protestant Ethic' thesis 'Buddhist economics' Buddhism and economics in the modern world 6. War and peace Buddhist analyses of the causes of conflict Solutions to conflict Non-violent reflections on a violent world The position of the soldier Buddhist 'justifications' of and involvement in, violence Buddhist action for peace in the modern world 7. Suicide and euthanasia considerations and arguments against suicide Suicide and the precepts Euthanasia 8. Abortion and contraception Embryonic life Abortion and Buddhist principles Contraception Abortion in Buddhist cultures Anti-abortion but pro-choice?: the relationship between morality and law 9. The status of women: women in early Hinduism the effect of Buddhism The spiritual potential and achievement of women Gender, rebirth and the status of women Views on spiritual statuses unattainable by women Images of wise and wayward women Ascetic wariness of the opposite sex The ordination of women Nuns and other female religious roles in Buddhist cultures Lay women in Buddhist texts Lay women in Buddhist cultures 10. Homosexuality and other forms of 'Queerness' Sex change Hermaphrodites Pandakas Homosexual acts Homosexuality in Buddhist cultures.