British Withdrawal Research Articles

משק האנרגיה של היישוב היהודי בארץ ישראל בשלהי המנדט הבריטי

This article discusses the energy sector of the Jewish Yishuv in Palestine during the late British Mandate period, from late 1947 to the Declaration of Independence in mid-May 1948. The article examines how the Yishuv’s leaders and those in charge of its energy supply prepared for the British withdrawal from Palestine and the measures taken to ensure the Yishuv's energy needs during this period. Until then, the Mandate authorities had seen to the Yishuv’s energy needs, a responsibility that would now be transferred to the institutions of the Jewish state upon its establishment. Were their actions solely focused on the preparations for war or also on preparations for the creation of the state? Archival and other primary sources were used by the author. In addition to analyzing technical information, the article seeks to highlight the individuals who were involved in preserving and securing the energy supply of the Jewish Yishuv. These were resourceful and visionary individuals who used creativity, initiative, and boldness to enable the Yishuv to solve its problems and to navigate between various political and economic interests and the needs of the economy and the military. They successfully steered the rickety ship of the energy sector during the intercommunal war in Palestine and prepared the infrastructure for the energy sector of a sovereign state after the Declaration of Independence.

An Empire of Influence? British Relations with the United Arab Emirates in the 1970s

ABSTRACT As historical debate has moved from an analysis of the end of empire to its aftermath and consequences, there has been growing emphasis on the retention by the colonial powers of a large measure of influence over their former dependencies. With respect to the British experience, some historians have even suggested that the demission of empire amounted to a shift from formal to informal empire, using the term ‘imperialism of decolonization’ to encapsulate this concept. Given the maintenance of British economic and military ties with the fledgling United Arab Emirates which emerged from the small Sheikhdoms of the Lower Gulf in 1971, the UAE provides an illuminating case study to test interpretations that suggest Britain preserved a degree of influence amounting to the perpetuation of empire. Despite the preservation of such ties, the example provided by the UAE indicates that in the aftermath of formal British withdrawal from the Gulf at the end of 1971, Britain’s political, economic, and military position was eroded by the encroachment of other powers, both regional and international. Equally, an analysis of the United Arab Emirates casts doubt on whether British decision-makers actually sought to establish an informal imperial relationship with the Gulf States after 1971, preferring instead to establish recognisably post-imperial relations which respected their independence. Consequently, the ‘imperialism of decolonization’ paradigm is not an appropriate one to apply to British policy towards, and relations with, the UAE.

Health and well-being of serving and ex-serving UK Armed Forces personnel: protocol for the fourth phase of a longitudinal cohort study

IntroductionThis is the fourth phase of a longitudinal cohort study (2022–2023) to investigate the health and well-being of UK serving (Regulars and Reservists) and ex-serving personnel (veterans) who served during...

Military Loyalty in Britain’s Withdrawal from Aden, 1960–1967

This article argues an understanding of the British withdrawal from Aden in 1967 requires greater attention to be paid to the loyalty of the local security forces who were supposed to help repress the insurgency in south Arabia, and then secure a friendly state when Britain left. The Federal Regular Army (FRA), the most important formation, proved to be consistently unreliable through behaviours ranging from the attempted murder of British personnel, to desertion and political activism. However, disbanding the FRA might have made matters even worse, so British officers sought to manipulate its loyalty through various mechanisms, including pay rises, ignoring disloyal incidents and directing propaganda at the soldiers. These endeavours succeeded in holding off a mutiny until June 1967, but only by creating a force which became infiltrated by the insurgent movements and lacked the capacity to play any meaningful role in defending the federation. This analysis suggests studies on British counter-insurgency should investigate further the role of local allies in strategy and operations.

New Agreement on Northern Ireland Simplifies Relations Between EU and UK

On 27 February, the European Commission and the United Kingdom reached a political agreement in principle on the so-called ‘Windsor Framework’, necessary to resolve several issues that had arisen between the parties, in particular with regard to the Northern Ireland issue, following the British withdrawal from the European Union. The joint solutions, found within the framework of the Withdrawal Agreement, are based on the following starting points: a comprehensive, cross-cutting and definitive solution, addressing practical difficulties in the operation of the Protocol; a balance between flexibilities for the movement of goods for end use in Northern Ireland and effective safeguards guaranteeing the protection of the EU’s Single Market; a clear distinction between goods at risk and goods not at risk of entering the EU’s Single Market. The European Commission and the Government of the United Kingdom will proceed, within the remit of their respective powers, with the necessary steps to translate the joint solutions into legally binding instruments. Windsor Framework, Northern Ireland, Brexit, withdrawal, Belfast Agreement, customs, market

«MEDITERRANEAN CARD» IN ITALY’S EUROPEAN POLICY

It has always been important for Italian foreign policy to have a political weight both in the EU and in the Mediterranean. The country is trying to play on several boards, building different configurations, and does not limit itself solely to the ideas of the Rome – Paris – Berlin triangle. Realizing their vulnerability and the danger of being in a subordinate position among France and Germany, Italy is relying on the «Mediterranean card», building an informal union of the countries of Southern Europe (Italy, Spain, Greece, Cyprus, Malta, Portugal). With G. Meloni becoming primeminister, the Mediterranean continues to be in the rank of priority areas of Italy’s foreign policy. Playing the «Mediterranean card» is now easier because countries are creating the image of a common enemy for Europe. Despite attempts to consolidate informal cooperation between the countries of Southern Europe around the Mediterranean, it is not quite successful due to the economic weakness of the countries and the lack of proper political authority. However, there is tactical cooperation in the context of inter-Mediterranean energy cooperation, where Italy is achieving a coordinating role. After the British withdrawal from the EU, Rome is keen to take over the British seat, which could also strengthen the country’s role in the Mediterranean. The main competitor, jealous of Italy’s claim to leadership in both the EU and the Mediterranean, is France; the sub-regional competitor in the Mediterranean is Spain, which does not currently have enough resources to pursue its political ambitions.

Learning from precedent: how the British Brexit experience shapes nationalist rhetoric outside the UK

ABSTRACT The liberal international order has recently come under increasing nationalist pressure, evidenced by a rise in nationalist demands to withdraw from international institutions. A growing literature examines the domestic economic, social, and political origins of this nationalist backlash against international institutions. However, less is known about the extent to which precedents of withdrawals of one country affect nationalist pressures for future withdrawals elsewhere. In this paper, we argue that initial withdrawal episodes provide new information about the feasibility and desirability of withdrawals to nationalist elites in other countries. Hence, we expect nationalists abroad to be either encouraged or deterred to follow a similar path – depending on the success of these precedents. We explore this argument in the context of the British withdrawal from the European Union (Brexit), which arguably marks the most significant withdrawal from an international institution to date. Based on a quantitative analyses of media reports in ten European countries, we show we show that nationalist parties in Europe increased or moderated the aggressiveness about their EU-related rhetoric as the ups and downs of the Brexit-drama unfolded. Our results suggest that precedents of nationalist withdrawals shape domestic politics well beyond the concerned countries themselves.

The Northern Ireland Conflict and Colonial Resonances

ABSTRACT Scholarly disagreements over the applicability of a colonial framework to Ireland’s relationship with Britain have neglected how political actors perceived or used ideas about colonialism and imperialism. This article argues that how such ideas resonated and were used in the Northern Ireland ‘Troubles’ is as worthy of consideration as their validity. It examines how militant republicans conceived of Northern Ireland as having a colonial status and identified it as fitting into a broader pattern of decolonisation, seeking links with other anti-colonial forces outside Europe. It considers how a section of British politicians used the colonial framework to argue that British withdrawal was inevitable, viewing unionists as a settler community beyond the boundaries of Britishness. The dominant British discourse that opposed this framed self-determination differently, rejecting the utility of colonialism as an explanation of the dynamic of the conflict. When faced with charges of colonialism abroad, however, the rebuttal offered by those articulating this discourse had to be tailored to a suspicious international audience; the arguments available to British diplomats were narrowed by Britain’s colonial past. To overcome this, the unionist cause was omitted and select Irish voices within constitutional nationalism were promoted. Colonial analogies and comparisons shaped overall thinking on Northern Ireland, whether they were valid or not.

Armies of Arabia: Military Politics and Effectiveness in the Gulf

Armies of Arabia: Military Politics and Effectiveness in the Gulf

The position of the Arab Gulf states on the British withdrawal from the area east of the Suez Canal for the period 1968-1971

بعد انحسار النفوذ البريطاني في منطقة الخليج العربي والمشرق بشكل عام الامبروطورية البريطانية التي لا تغيب عن مستعمراتها الشمس وظهور حركات وطنية تتزعمها القبائل العربية بدا التناغم الأمريكي الإيراني يظهر إلى العلن وخاصة في زمن شاه إيران محمد رضا بهلوي(1941 -1978 ) لأهمية المنطقة من حيث موقعها الجغرافي الذي يربط الشرق بالغرب فسارعت إيران باحتلال الجزر العربية الثلاث (طنب الكبرى وطنب الصغرى وأبو موسى) في 30 تشرين الثاني 1971 أي قبل يوم واحد منذ انهيار الحماية البريطانية لملأ الفراغ الذي يحصل نتيجة انسحاب البريطانيين من المنطقة والسيطرة على هذا المنفذ الحيوي الرابط والمحيط الهندي وجميع الشواطئ والجزر فيه فعملت على توطيد علاقاتها بدول الخليج العربي وخاصة الكويت والسعودية لمواقفه القومية الرافضة للهيمنة على القرار العربي وللمشاكل المستمرة بين إيران والعراق بسبب ترسيم الحدود واعتبار الخليج فارسيا وليس عربيا .

Negotiating secession: Brexit lessons for Scottish independence

Brexit has contributed to increased discussion of a second independence referendum in Scotland, so-called IndyRef2. A successful Yes vote would require negotiations between Scotland and the rest of the UK to settle distributional questions and coordinate on cross-border policies, but there are few precedents for this and little scholarly discussion as a result. This article argues that the lessons from Brexit can help us understand what negotiating secession might look like, insofar as British withdrawal from the European Union illustrates the specific dynamics associated with exiting a pluri-national and institutionally dense union under conditions of asymmetric interdependence. Drawing on recent research on the politics of exit, this article suggests the period following a successful independence referendum will be characterised by efforts to reinterpret the referendum mandate, political change within and between parties and institutions, altered preferences in London, and a highly asymmetric bargaining environment. Understanding the lessons of Brexit can aid our understanding of the dynamics of independence and help policymakers prepare in advance for the eventuality of a Yes vote.

The British withdrawal from the Persian Gulf 1968-1971 and its impact on British-Saudi relations

The British decision to withdraw from the Arabian Gulf after more than a century of presence in that vital region of the world did not come arbitrarily or abruptly. Among the countries most affected by the decision to withdraw because of the presence of key issues and concerns related to the British presence in the Gulf, so this withdrawal is double-edged for Saudi Arabia; On the other hand, he raised the concerns of Riyadh because of the dangers and regional and international threats that will emerge after the British withdrawal.

Imperialism after empire? Britain and Qatar in the aftermath of the withdrawal from East of Suez

The existing historiography on relations between Britain and the states of Lower Gulf after British withdrawal from ‘East of Suez’ in 1971 suggests that the former imperial power successfully established an informal role in the 1970s and beyond which amounted to empire in all but name. While Britain certainly sought to retain as much of its influence and as many of its interests in the economically important Lower Gulf as possible, an analysis of Anglo-Qatari relations after 1971 demonstrates that Britain’s former exclusive position was substantially eroded. British economic weakness, fierce competition from Britain’s industrial rivals, and the encroachment of the Arab world into the affairs of Qatar all militated still further against the preservation of British influence and interests, let alone the establishment of an informal imperial relationship with Qatar.

(Still) Supporting the Indispensable Power: Singapore's Relations with the United States from Trump to Biden

(Still) Supporting the Indispensable Power:Singapore's Relations with the United States from Trump to Biden See Seng Tan (bio) Singapore regards the United States as an indispensable power whose global might, purpose, and reach Singaporeans have long viewed as invaluable to the stability, security, and prosperity of Asia. The United States has evolved from an unlikely collaborator and patron of Singapore following the 1971 British withdrawal east of the Suez Canal to being the city-state's invaluable partner today. As with other U.S. allies and partners, Singapore's relations with the United States were tested during the presidency of Donald Trump, who effectively recused his nation from the traditional role of global leadership it had played since the end of World War II. Yet Singapore chose to stay the course of its pragmatic encouragement and facilitation of the U.S. forward presence in Asia. The transition to the Biden administration, which presumably aims to walk back Trump's "America first" policy without easing up on China, has not changed Singapore's perspective on and policy toward the United States. It remains in Singapore's interest to continue welcoming, facilitating, and—in the face of growing Chinese objection to U.S. strategic dominance in the region—justifying the United States' place and role in Asia. That said, Singapore's view of U.S. indispensability does not mean it will take Washington's side on every international issue and dispute, especially where Singapore's interests and the general well-being of the Asian region are thought to be at risk. Singapore is a consummate hedger that has long sought "to be a friend to all, but an enemy of none."1 Its contemporary support of the United States has risked souring relations with China, [End Page 77] Singapore's top trading partner in 2021.2 Thus understood, Singapore's qualified belief in U.S. leadership presupposes a United States that accepts not only its long-standing role as a world leader but equally the obligation to be a force for Asia's peace, prosperity, and security—a responsibility that, in Singapore's view, is better shared than hogged at a time when Beijing's strategic ambitions have risen concomitantly with China's growing military power and global influence. How the United States and its partners can work with China while balancing Chinese power and influence without causing regional discord is the key challenge. It is on that basis that Singapore will do what it can to help the United States restore its post-Trump credibility in Asia while seeking to ensure that U.S.-China tensions do not irreparably damage the region. This essay contends that Singapore will continue to support the United States' forward presence in Asia while encouraging Washington and Beijing to accommodate one another and seek ways to cooperate amid their competitive relationship. Beginning with a short reflection on the city-state's propensity to hedge against the great powers, the essay then explores Singapore's ties with the United States from the Trump to the Biden administration. Incorrigible Hedger Historically, Southeast Asian states have relied on hedging and shifting limited alignments, and Singapore is no exception.3 Hedging is the inclination to adopt the via media between aligning with great powers and balancing them. States hedge to minimize risks and deny larger powers their ability to dominate without having to balance directly against them.4 Neither passive neutralists nor fence-sitters, hedgers seek to engage multiple powers without becoming reliant on any single power. Short of the U.S.-China rivalry intensifying to Thucydidean proportions, it is not unreasonable to assume that Singapore will persist in hedging to create [End Page 78] strategic space and flexibility for itself as long as there is no undue pressure to take sides.5 Singapore has been described as having pursued a "balanced" foreign policy that assiduously avoids the impression that it is seeking to balance others—a difficult act made more necessary at a time when the city-state is caught in the middle of the U.S.-China competition.6 Like the proverbial bird on a wire, Singapore's perceived vulnerability as a small state in a...

Constraints and Adjustments in the US–Yemeni Relations

This article analyzes the course of US–Yemeni relations from the 1940s to the present and aims to explain the reasons for the twists and turns in bilateral relations. It argues that the US government never developed a unique “Yemen policy” and that its attitude toward that country was determined largely by its ties with Saudi Arabia. Yemen began to loom large in US foreign policy in the early 1960s when Egyptian President Gamal Abd al-Nasser intervened on behalf of the Republicans who staged a coup against the Royal imamate regime, which relied on Saudi support. The article shows that President John Kennedy looked favorably on the new Republican regime in Yemen despite the robust relations that existed between the United Statesand Saudi Arabia. In addition, it argues that despite the war in Yemen, which lasted from 1962 to 1970 and caused instability in this region, this country did not loom large in US foreign policy. This was largely due to the British presence in south Yemen and especially in the port of Aden, which lasted until 1967. The article shows how the British withdrawal from Aden increased Yemen’s value in the eyes of US policymakers, but even then, no effort was made to fashion a unique policy toward this country. In addition, the article demonstrates how Washington’s attitude changed in 1969 when the country was divided into North Yemen, which tended to regard the Soviet Union as its protector and South Yemen, which continued to rely on US aid. And lastly, the article traces US–Yemeni relations from 1990, when the country reunited, until the present. It demonstrates how the bilateral relations were affected by the superpowers’ rivalry during the Cold War, the fight against terrorism, and disagreement between the Republican and the Democratic parties in the United States.

British naval assistance at the twilight of empire: The case of Abu Dhabi, 1966–1968

Britain long sought to establish, develop and utilise local military capabilities across its empire. In its informal empire among the Arab Gulf Sheikhdoms of Eastern Arabia, Britain increasingly encouraged – and often cajoled – its protégés to build up their own security forces as London's moment in the Middle East was coming to an end. The scholarly literature on imperial assistance to local forces is invariably army-centric; little attention is given to how powers such as Britain helped establish local naval forces. This article seeks to address this imbalance by describing how British naval institutions supported the establishment of the local naval force in Abu Dhabi in the years immediately before British withdrawal from the region in 1971. This case study expands the historiography of British military assistance to cover naval forces and describes the repertoire of support provided by the Royal Navy and Navy Department.

The Last Hump: The Lahore Elementary Flying Training School, the Chinese Civil War, and the final days of the British Raj

AbstractThis article centres on the evacuation of the Lahore Elementary Flying Training School, which was built in 1943 to train Chinese pilots and mechanics. It details the British and Chinese authorities’ concerns over the school and how the chaotic situation in India during the final days of the British Raj influenced its evacuation back to China. This article locates the story within the broad context of the British withdrawal from India and the Chinese Civil War, and it uses this case to uncover the links between the two most significant events in the history of modern India and China. In so doing, it puts forward an integrated framework for studying modern Indian and Chinese history.

Keşmir Çatışmasının Tarihsel Kodları

İngilizlerin Hint Alt Kıtası’ndan çekilme süreciyle güç boşluğunun oluşması ve dini çatışmaların başlaması üzerine kurulan Hindistan ve Pakistan devletleri arasında Keşmir’in egemenliğine ilişkin anlaşmazlık ortaya çıkmıştır. Hindistan ve Pakistan arasında Kontrol Hattı olarak adlandırılan bir sınırla bölünmüş olan Keşmir, iki ülke arasındaki en büyük gerilim kaynağıdır; iki ülkenin üç savaşına, sayısız çatışmasına ve askeri kavgalarına ve her ikisinin de nükleer silah geliştirmesine yol açmıştır. 1947 itibarıyla doğan Keşmir çatışması Hindistan ve Pakistan tarafından düşük yoğunluklu çatışmalar, ateşkes ihlalleri, sınır ötesi terörizm ve insan hakları ihlalleriyle hala devam etmekte, dolayısıyla çözüme yakın görünmemektedir. 1947’ye kadar yaşanan süreci odak alan çalışma, Keşmir çatışmasının tarihsel kodlarını analiz etmektedir. Bununla birlikte bölgedeki iki devlet arasında öngörülebilir bir zamanda çözülemeyecek bir soruna İngilizlerin neden olduğunu ve Keşmir çatışmasının hiçbir zaman gerçek anlamda tamamlanamayan bölünme sürecinin doğrudan bir ürünü olduğunu öne sürmektedir.

“Great and Powerful Friends of Yesteryear”: Australia's Dilemma with “East of Suez”, 1967–71

Great Britain's decision to withdraw its forces from Southeast Asia by the mid‐1970s created uncertainty for those living in the region. The potential loss of British presence led Australia to attempt to discourage Britain from leaving, while also recsognising recognising the decision as an opportunity to re‐evaluate Australia's strategic outlook in Southeast Asia and the Pacific. Scholars have treated Asia and the Pacific as two regions with distinct experiences related to withdrawal. Some address changing Anglo‐Australian relations but include little, or no, mention of the Pacific territories. Others, writing about the Pacific, focused more the individual paths taken by each island than on connecting the larger process of decolonisation in the Pacific to the one in Asia. This article pairs Australia's Strategic Basis of Defence papers with documentary evidence across multiple departments in Canberra to understand how British withdrawal from east of Suez connected Australian concerns about security in Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands. By connecting the two areas through Australian interests, the withdrawal from east of Suez can be understood as a catalyst for Australia's pursuit of a distinctive role within its neighbourhood.

Unity over diversity? The politics of differentiated integration after Brexit

ABSTRACT There is now a significant literature on the effects of Brexit on the differentiated forms of integration that have become an increasingly familiar feature of the EU’s political landscape. While the significance of British withdrawal for questions of differentiation is not difficult to establish, there is little agreement in the literature on whether Brexit will lead to a more or less differentiated EU, which aspects of withdrawal are most relevant, and how the specified causal mechanisms operate. This article takes stock of the debate, discussing four distinct causal pathways: (1) the removal of the UK’s opt-outs; (2) the lessons of the British experience; (3) Brexit as a catalyst for reform; and (4) the future UK-EU relationship. The article suggests a more starkly differentiated EU post-Brexit is likely precluded by the political context of disintegration, which downplays negative lessons, reinforces EU unity, and disincentives a ‘British model’ of external differentiation.