British Nuclear Policy Research Articles

Dissenting Scientists in Early Cold War Britain: The “Fallout” Controversy and the Origins of Pugwash, 1954–1957

British nuclear policy faced a major challenge in 1954 when the radiological dangers of the new hydrogen bomb were highlighted by an accident resulting from a U.S. thermonuclear test in the Pacific that underscored how nuclear fallout could travel across national borders. Echoing the response from the United States, the British government downplayed the fallout problem and argued that weapons testing was safe. Some influential scientists rallied behind the government position on fallout and weapons tests, but others disagreed and were regarded within government circles as troublesome dissidents. This article focuses on two of the dissident scientists, Joseph Rotblat and Bertrand Russell, showing how they challenged government policy and sought to make public their view that fallout was dangerous and that weapons testing should stop. Their objections ensured that the fallout debate became a part of public life in Cold War Britain, imbuing the hydrogen bomb and the arms race with new meaning. The article casts new light on the process by which the fallout/testing issue came to be the most publicly controversial area of nuclear weapons policy, serving as a rallying point for scientists beyond the nation-state, at once a national and transnational problem.

On Case's <em>Calling Dr. Strangelove: The Anatomy and Influence of the Kubrick Masterpiece</em>

On Case's Calling Dr. Strangelove: The Anatomy and Influence of the Kubrick Masterpiece Calling Dr. Strangelove: The Anatomy and Influence of the Kubrick Masterpiece. By George Case. Jefferson, NC: McFarland and Company, 2014. 212 pp., ISBN 978-0-7864-9449-1 (pb); ISBN 978-1-4766-1848-7 (e-book); US $40 (both editions).In Calling Dr. Strangelove George Case offers a useful and entertaining tour through the iconic 1964 film directed by Stanley Kubrick. Case explores thoroughly the making of the film, from its initial origins as a pulp novel authored by Peter George (under the pen name Peter Bryant), through its legacies in contemporary American culture. As Case does so, he provides the reader with valuable connections between the black comedy and the equally absurd reality it parodied.The book looks closely at the novel's plot, highlighting its foundation in the real structures of American and British nuclear policy in the 1950s and early 1960s. Case describes the British, Soviet, and American bomber forces charged with constantly patrolling the air so that they could retaliate at any moment if any of those nations came under attack. Of course these plans for retaliation were only defensive and could be put into action only under the command of the nations' leaders-until President Dwight Eisenhower introduced a loophole allowing junior staff to launch missiles in case communication was disrupted. It was this precarious structure that animated the George novel, as well as the Kubrick film's satire, although by the time of the film's release, that loophole had been closed.After tracing the book's origins to this frightening reality, Case describes Stanley Kubrick's gradual decision to bring out the absurd humor in the political situation. Although Kubrick initially intended to play the novel straight, within the first few weeks ofwriting the screenplay, the outrageous and ridiculous nature of the subject matter indicated to him the direction the film needed to take. According to Kubrick, I found that in trying to put meat on the bones and to imagine the scenes more fully . . . one had to keep leaving things out which were either absurd or paradoxical in order to keep it from being funny, and these things seemed to be close to the heart of the scenes in question (23). Case describes Kubrick's intense research into the subject of nuclear warfare, and his close work with George and writer Terry Southern to transform that subject into comedy.Case then moves into a discussion of the production, researching the experiences of the film's bit actors as well as major stars. One of the strengths of this book is that it addresses Kubrick's reputation as a dictatorial auteur but also highlights the experiences, input, and participation of a host of other people involved in the film. He describes the challenges of working with Peter Sellers, for example, as well as the competition between the release of this film and the very similar, very non-funny Sidney Lumet film Fail Safe (USA, 1964). …

British nuclear weapons and NATO in the Cold War and beyond

NATO has been a source of influence on British nuclear policy and strategy since the 1950s. The nature and extent of its influence has, however, been kept limited by successive British governments. This article considers how and why this has happened. It discusses evolving British attitudes towards NATO command and planning, and shows how these were reflected with regard to strategic nuclear issues from the late 1950s. The evolution of the key notion that the United Kingdom is a second centre of nuclear decision within NATO is traced, and both its utility and contradictions are examined. Overall it is argued that, both during and since the Cold War, NATO has neither been a central factor in shaping British nuclear strategy and policy, nor have British nuclear weapons been other than of limited importance and relevance for most NATO members.

Idealism on Appeal: The Lord Advocate's Reference on British Nuclear Policy

Idealism on Appeal: The Lord Advocate's Reference on British Nuclear Policy

America and the British Labour Party: the 'special relationship' at work

Part 1 Introduction: defining the special relationship the academic debate about the Special Relationship Labour Party attitudes towards the Special Relationship. Part 2 Labour in power: the election campaign of 1945 Attlee, Bevin and the post-war world Anglo-American relations, 1945-7 the breakdown of Anglo-Soviet relations Labour Party reaction to the onset of the Cold War developing a framework for European security the atomic bomb the Labour party and the creation of the Atlantic Pact Labour and the movement for European unity the German question the Korean War personalities conclusions. Part 3 The opposition years, 1951-1964: German rearmament Labour and the crisis nuclear weapons the move towards Europe the Polaris decision personalities conclusions. Part 4: Labour dominance and decline, 1964-1979: Labour's victory in 1964 Wilson's priorities and style nuclear sharing British nuclear policy under Labour the war in Vietnam the non-proliferation treaty negotiations consequences of economic decline East of Suez Labour and Europe co-operation and conflict in Anglo-American relations personalities conclusions. Part 5 Labour's eclipse, 1979-1992: the 1979 general election the Labour left takes over Labour's 1983 general election defeat the early Kinnock years the 1987 general election Europe and changing trans-Atlantic relations the end of the Cold War the 1992 general election personalities conclusions. Part 6 Labour's regeneration and victory, 1992-1997: Labour under John Smith Tony takes over as Labour leader the Blair effect and the 1997 general election conclusions.

Military nuclear relations between the United States and Great Britain under the terms of the McMahon Act, 1946–1958

ABSTRACTThis article takes a fresh look at Anglo-American nuclear relations between 1946 and 1958. It concentrates on the relationship between the military establishments of the two countries in general and the ties between the United States air force and the Royal Air Force in particular. The article argues that an understanding of military relations is essential for an understanding of the high politics of the nuclear relationship. It is shown that senior officers in the armed services were the main ‘functional elite’ dealing with nuclear delivery systems and the planning for their use. Relations between these groups were personally and institutionally close and on the whole cordial. In Britain the link sustained optimism about the possibility of close nuclear co-operation in the 1940s and early 1950s and suppressed fears about the loss of nuclear independence in the late 1950s. In the United States it was recognized that military relations were an important channel through which to influence British nuclear policy. The article offers accounts, based on new archival research, of the nuclear aspect of the October 1947 Pentagon talks on the Middle East, Churchill's visit to the United States in January 1952 and the first Anglo-American joint nuclear targeting agreement – the Wilson/Alexander agreement of 12 March 1954. It reveals for the first time details of Plans E and X which equipped the RAF with American atomic and thermonuclear weapons between 1955 and 1958. The article concludes that the British nuclear force was becoming subordinated to the United States even before negotiations about Thor, Skybolt and Polaris missiles became central to the relationship.

British Nuclear Policy After the Cold War

During the Cold War, NATO's nuclear weapons played an essential part in ensuring that major conflict never occurred. The knowledge that NATO might use the immense power of its nuclear forces in response to aggression removed any rational basis for a potential adversary believing that a war could be fought in Europe and won. Having established such a stable and secure framework for maintaining peace, we should not think lightly of dismantling it. The artificial division of Europe has now gone but uncertainties and dangers remain.

DECOMMISSIONING COSTS AND BRITISH NUCLEAR POLICY

The topic of decommissioning ecommics is not an isolated activity. As Gordon MacKerron shows in this chapter, decommissioning economics are linked to other, often national considerations. The advanced age of the British reactors, plus the government's desire to privatize the entire electrical utility industry, brought decommissioning to the front of public debate unexpectedly early in Britain. As decommissioning estimates have come under closer attention, they have tended to rise from early estimates. Today, the estimated costs are much higher than in the U.S. So far, the funds for this activity are only paper provisions. It appears that one source of higher costs will be increased regulatory requirements. Thus, nonengineering factors are beginning to affect decommissioning costs, as they have other nuclear costs in Britain and elsewhere. MacKerron concludes that the final costs of decommissioning are likely to be higher than estimated originally.

The British Origins of Nuclear Strategy, 1945-1955.

Why did Britain decide in 1947 to build an atomic bomb? What military plans were there for using it? This neglected dimension of British nuclear policy is assessed in detail for the first time, using confidential records - including those of the Chiefs of Staff - which have become available for the entire post-war decade. The emergence and evolution of British strategic ideas about nuclear deterrence and targeting are documented and analysed by Ian Clark and Nicholas J. Wheeler, whoalso argue that British thinking was distinctive and made a much more substantial impact on nuclear strategy than American accounts would suggest. They reveal that, from a perspective unique to British circumstances and traditions, British officials made a significant contribution to early thinking about nuclear weapons. This study covers the early shift from a 'countervalue' to a damage limitation targeting posture, the assessment of the Soviet threat, the impact of the Korean War, the Global Strategy Paper of 1952, the decision to manufacture a hydrogen weapon in 1954, and the inter-service rivalries in the mid-1950s about the nature and size of the British strategic force. As well as providing a survey of British thinking, it is unusual in its focus on strategic comparisons between Britain and the United States.

Nuclear power in Britain: The case for a new approach

Recent criticisms point to the way British nuclear policy has been made up of a succession of poor decisions badly arrived at. But these criticisms do not go to the heart of the matter. A new approach is needed to decision‐taking in this area, and in energy policy as a whole.