British Military Intervention Research Articles

Using role theory to analyse British military intervention in the Syrian civil war during David Cameron’s premiership

This article uses role theory to study British military intervention in the Syrian Civil War during David Cameron’s premiership. It attempts to understand the Cameron government’s limited willingness to use force (or willingness to use limited force) in the conflict as a product of role contestation in parliament. By analysing three debates preceding votes on military action in August 2013, September 2014 and December 2015, it shows how MPs debated whether Britain should play three distinct roles—of ‘faithful ally’, ‘responsible great power’ and ‘rule of law state’—and discussed how far fulfilling each role meant being willing to intervene militarily. Their disagreements, the article argues, undermined the coherence of the government’s preferred strategy, but did so without fundamentally delegitimising the idea of using force—hence its constrained commitment to intervention. The article concludes that involving parliament in decisions about military action makes it an important site for domestic role contestation of this sort.

Narratives and the romantic genre in IR: dominant and marginalized stories of Arab Rebellion in Libya

The article shows how the rebellion against Gaddafi in Libya in 2011 was romanticized in the British newspaper media and among the political elite. Combining insights from literary studies and employing a method of narrative analysis which focuses on the elements of setting, characterization and emplotment, it illustrates the process of narrative romanticization by emphasizing story elements which constitute the rebellion in an emotional setting in which the rebel is characterized as a young and brave underdog fighting against a brutal and oppressive regime for an ideal such as democracy, freedom and a better future. While romantic narratives were dominant in the discourse on Libya at the time, other less positive narratives which for example emphasize human right violations by rebels were marginalized through a strategy of silencing, denial, ridicule and justification. While the dominance of romantic narratives of rebellion aided the legitimation of British military intervention, the marginalization of negative counter-narratives contributed to the ignorance of extremism and set a bad precedent for the role of human rights in post-conflict Libya.

The Design of the Allies’ Military Strategies and the Post-War Structure at the Cairo Conference of 1943

For many Asian countries including Korea, the Cairo Conference has significant implications. At the Conference, of the allied nations pledged to accede the occupied territory from Japan to China and grant the independence of Korea ‘in due course’. The Cairo was reconfirmed at the Potsdam of 1945 and accepted by the Japanese after the war. The previous studies have mainly focused on ‘the Declaration itself or its effects on the destiny of the East Asian countries. However, the allies’ motivations for holding the conference, which underlay much of the Declaration, have not been a frequent theme of research. Many researchers have engaged in ‘circular logic’; that is, they have emphasized the Declaration, assuming the Cairo Conference was held to discuss the destiny of several areas in East Asia. The ‘Foreign Relations of the United States documents concerning the process of Conference’s preparation offer a more comprehensive interpretation of its historical meaning, which the cannot fully demonstrate by itself. Firstly, heads of nations at Cairo in 1943 needed to establish a new international order in East Asia. There was a disagreement over the Chinese role in the post-war structure between the two Western leaders. The meaning of a passage in the Declaration, stating ‘all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese... shall be restored’, could be fully understood by considering these leaders political intentions. The passage was prepared after the allies reconciled their ideas over this international political issue. Moreover, due importance should be given to the military strategic aspects of the Cairo Conference. In late 1943, the allied forces were laying plans for the recapture of Burma, while they had diverse opinions about the day on which an operation commenced and the extent of British military intervention on the Burmese front. They also showed different views over the Soviets participation in future military operations against Japanese imperialism. Thus, the passage ‘The Three Great Allies expressed their resolve to bring unrelenting pressure against their brutal enemies by sea, land, and air’ expressed the greatest common factor among the three allied forces rather than a rhetorical comment. In this sense, through a thorough investigation of the three great powers motivations in terms of international-political and military purposes at the Conference, the historical meaning of the can be explained more comprehensively.

British Public Opinion and Military Intervention in Greece, December 1944–January 1945: Stories from Mass-Observation

British military intervention in Greece in December 1944, in support of the anti-communist forces in the country, elicited a significant reaction at home, from left-wing politicians and trade unions as well as by the press. Indeed, records of the Mass-Observation organization, which became known for its practice of ‘Anthropology from Below’, indicate that the issue continued to hold the public’s interest for several months. This article discusses the inquiry conducted by Mass-Observation during December 1944 and January 1945 and analyses the views and feelings of ‘ordinary British citizens’ about British policy in Greece.

The Origins and Functions of Demonisation Discourses in Britain–Zimbabwe Relations (2000–)

Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe and his ZANU(PF) government's violent seizure of white-owned commercial farms in 2000 heralded the nadir of diplomatic relations with British Prime Minister Tony Blair's New Labour government. Britain objected to the ZANU(PF) government's human rights violations and state-orchestrated violence, and, through the European Union, subsequently imposed sanctions. This article maintains that, from 2000, mutual demonisation discourses became a distinct feature of the Britain–Zimbabwe diplomatic conflict. Yet the nature and drivers of these demonisation discourses, and their influence, have not received systematic treatment in the literature on Britain–Zimbabwe relations. Drawing on constructivist interpretations of international relations, I argue that New Labour engaged in demonisation for normative reasons, while ZANU(PF) demonised New Labour for more instrumental purposes. Demonisation discourses promoted non-engagement between the British and Zimbabwean governments. This non-engagement partly circumscribed foreign policy options to aggressive measures, as evinced in Blair's covert canvassing for British military intervention in Zimbabwe. Lastly, it is demonstrated that demonisation discourses affected the third-party mediation efforts of South African President Thabo Mbeki.

Anglo-American Relations and the Labour Government's ‘Scuttle’ from Abadan: a ‘Declaration of Dependence’?

The 1956 Suez Crisis has attracted enormous attention and been widely seen as marking a sea change in Britain's position in the Middle East and within the Anglo-American special relationship. Yet in September 1951 the Attlee government had already signalled waning British power in pulling back from major unilateral military action to defend Britain's single most important overseas asset: the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and its huge operations in Iran. What this crisis revealed of British aspirations in the Middle East and within the special relationship has not received the attention it deserves. This article examines the Attlee government's decision to ‘scuttle’ from Abadan in September 1951. It first places the decision in the context of Anglo-American relations and great cumulative pressure in favour of British military action. It then weighs various considerations claimed in the extant literature to explain the British decision. In doing so it disagrees with suggestions that British military intervention was precluded by an understanding between Truman and Attlee that such action was acceptable only in a narrow range of circumstances for fear of retaliatory Soviet intervention in Iran. It also argues that accounts that correctly emphasise US opposition to the use of force as the key restraint on the Attlee government could and should have gone further. Specifically, it needs to be better appreciated just how the Truman administration actively undermined potential British recourse to military intervention, infused other potential constraints with extra weight and helped delay a Cabinet decision until a point when armed intervention was least likely to achieve British ends.

New Babylonians: A History of Jews in Modern Iraq by Orit Bashkin (review)

Reviewed by: New Babylonians: A History of Jews in Modern Iraq by Orit Bashkin Kathrin Haurand Orit Bashkin , New Babylonians: A History of Jews in Modern Iraq. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2012. 310 pages. Paperback, $24.95. ISBN-10: 0-8047-7875-2. Looking at Jewish lives in Iraq during the first half of the twentieth century provides seminal insights into how European and Middle Eastern societies have historically influenced each other. Orit Bashkin's New Babylonians: The History of Jews in Modern Iraq focuses on the crossroads of Jewish, Iraqi, and European cultures. Bashkin, a historian at the University of Chicago, investigates the role of secular Jewish intellectuals in the Nahda (renaissance), the Arab nationalistic literary and cultural renewal movement, starting in the second half of the nineteenth century in Iraq. Her study sheds new light on how the secular Arab national movement influenced the self-understanding and identity of Jewish intellectuals in Iraq under Hashemite rule between 1921 and 1958. Like The Other Iraq: Pluralism and Culture in Hashemite Iraq (Syracuse University Press, 2009), Bashkin's earlier book on Iraq's political culture under Hashemite rule, New Babylonians challenges orientalist approaches to Middle Eastern and European history which often treat them as two discrete fields [End Page 102] of historical study. Bashkin sees herself as avoiding two traditional pitfalls of narrating Middle East Jewish history: presenting it either as a tale of peaceful, harmonious coexistence or as a story of perpetual persecution. Nonetheless New Babylonians does sketch a vision of peaceful coexistence between Muslims and Jews in Arab lands, even as it also details how that harmonious relationship was destroyed in the maelstrom of a modern Iraqi history ineludibly impacted by the political vicissitudes, sociocultural displacements, and violence of twentieth-century European history. Baskin tells how Jews were in the vanguard of modernization under the British-installed monarchy after World War I. By focusing on the experience of the Iraqi Jewish intellectual elite, she portrays a complex and vibrant "ethno-religious composition of Iraqi society that created a unique Jewish Iraqi experience, which was nonetheless intertwined with global and Western discourses." Arab language became the vernacular of social transformation, and "the educational system was key to the reconceptualization of Arab and secular identity." Transcending social barriers came at the price of disowning one's cultural and religious distinctiveness, such as abandoning certain Judeo-Arab dialects or religious observances. The "new effendia," as Bashkin terms the secular Iraqi Jewish intellectuals, moved into Baghdad's formerly Muslim, middle-class neighborhoods and became prominent in trade, politics, and Arabic literature. Less fortunate Muslims and Christians looked for answers to socio-economic inequalities in the emerging communist movement of the 1930s. The Iraqi Communist Party became a platform for poor Jewish students to raise their voices against social inequality by claiming a share in a national future and "employing the term Arab Jew." Despite the newfound status of secular Iraqi Jewish intellectuals and the vocal anti-Zionism of some prominent Jewish members in Baghdad's literary and political scene, Iraqi nationalists began to attack Jews as traitors in the 1930s. Nazi Germany's shortwave Arabic broadcasting Voice of Free Arabism began in October 1939 and continued broadcasting in Iraq daily until March 1945. The propaganda contributed significantly to a spread of anti-Semitic ideas by consolidating anti-Jewish and anti-Zionist resentment with Arab nationalism. Upon being exiled from Palestine by the British in 1937, Hajj Ammin al-Husseini, the pro-Nazi leader of the Palestinian national movement, found refuge in Baghdad, where he helped German and Arab nationalists to foment anti-Semitic violence. In the months leading up to the Farhud, the pogrom in Baghdad on June 1 and 2, 1941, most Jews placed their hope in British military intervention. Bashkin reveals that Baghdadi Jews were not just forsaken by leading Arab nationalists but also by the British, who stood by and watched the violence unfold. Bashkin contends that historians have overemphasized the larger significance of the 1941 riots. This has contributed, she asserts, to a "Farhudization" of Jewish Iraqi history, in which the Farhud is cast as typifying the overall experience of the otherwise harmonious relationship between Jews and...

Book Review: James Heartfield, British Workers & the US Civil War: How Karl Marx and the Lancashire Weavers Joined Abraham Lincoln’s Fight against Slavery 150 Years Ago

Book Review: James Heartfield, British Workers & the US Civil War: How Karl Marx and the Lancashire Weavers Joined Abraham Lincoln's Fight against Slavery 150 Years Ago. London: Reverspective, Ltd., 2012. ISBN: 978-0956806123 (Paperback). 40 Pages. £5[Article copies available for fee from The Transformative Studies Institute. E-mail address: journal@transformativestudies.org Website: http://www.transformativestudies.org ©2013 by The Transformative Studies Institute. All rights reserved.]You may have caught late night classics-in-the-making such as Abraham Lincoln: Vampire Hunter or Abraham Lincoln vs. Zombies. Well, I have one for you that happens to be true according to historian James Heartfield. What do Abraham Lincoln, weavers in Lancashire, Britain, Karl Marx, and the US Republican Party have in common? They all collaborated in the fight against the Confederacy and the regime of slavery that it represented.In his fascinating albeit abbreviated work, Heartfield, British journalist and former member of the Revolutionary Communist Party, weaves story of cross-Atlantic solidarity and social movement building while laying bare uncomfortable truths. He shows us that Britain was in position to determine the balance of the US Civil War for number of years until 1963. However, the British government and elites displayed contradiction that uncovered the dark nature of power in the classical manner that Chomsky lays bare as the nature of American Imperialism. Britain publically disdained slavery, going so far as to search its merchant ships on the high seas under suspicion of slave activity. Logically, then, one would expect that had Britain intervened in the Civil War, it would be on the side of the Union lead by Lincoln. According to the established myth, British workers would side with the Confederacy knowing they would be hurt by the famine through lost jobs and reduced work hours. This is because significant portion of Britain's industrial activity depended on stable supply of raw cotton from the South. When the North blockaded Southern ports it resulted in drop of cotton exports, thus the cotton famine.History proved otherwise, as Heartfield demonstrates in his work. British politicians and elites actively agitated their workers to enter the war on the side of the South for couple of reasons. One, Lincoln represented then radical Republican ideals opposed by British elites. Rather, it was the elite's natural instinct to oppose notions of freedom should those expand into greater demands by white workers. Second, British industrialists needed the South' s raw cotton for their mills and economic activity. The Northern blockade of Southern ports interfered with the free cotton trade. Third, Britain was resentful if not fearful of former colony becoming stronger competitor under consolidated Union.Marx, who was living in Britain at the time, and many other intellectuals, activists, journalists, etc., recognizing the specter of sanctioned slavery across the globe, agitated against support for the Confederacy. Marx himself corresponded with Lincoln, the first Republican President, in genuine show of support and solidarity. More importantly, as Heartfield underscores here, British workers demonstrated instinctive solidarity with the plight of the US slaves even though it was against their own immediate economic self-interest. As important, the North sent shipments of supplies to striking British workers in show of solidarity.Southern elites, in collaboration with most British elites, newspapers, and pseudo-pro-labor, and anti-slavery organizations, engaged in fierce propaganda to persuade British workers to support the Confederacy and accept British military intervention on their behalf. For example, the leader of the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society (BFASS), with official government ties, stated Lincoln's Proclamation was a measure of hostility to the whites, and designed to produce slave insurrection (p. …

Secular Aspirations and Political Islam in the Arab Middle East: The 1950s Reconsidered

The Maghreb Review, Vol. 37, 1, 2012 © The Maghreb Review 2012 This publication is printed on longlife paper SECULAR ASPIRATIONS AND POLITICAL ISLAM IN THE ARAB MIDDLE EAST: THE 1950S RECONSIDERED BY JAMES PISCATORI∗ Wm. Roger Louis ends his great study of the British empire in the Middle East by noting that, as the 1940s had witnessed British concern over the old regimes, the 1950s would turn to concern about a revolutionary Middle East.1 Those regimes were assumed to be revolutionary because they would be antiimperialist or nationalist. Military coups in Syria in 1949, 1951 and 1954, the Egyptian revolution of 1952, the revision of the Anglo-Egyptian treaty in 1954, the Suez war of 1956, and in 1958 the overthrow of the monarchy in Iraq, the Lebanese civil war, the British military intervention in Jordan and the formation of the United Arab Republic between Egypt and Syria were highlights of an eventful decade that induced anxiety in the West as bipolar geostrategic rivalry unfolded on the larger world stage. Mid-ranking military officers, nationalist and socialist ideologues and urban technocrats looked set to dominate the modern Middle Eastern political universe. While this view was common, it needs to be qualified in two ways. First, any implication that Islam was absent from the political equation of the time is offset by a defined view of the time that it was very much present. In this view, it was an unpredictable throwback to an earlier age but, with luck, it could be positively channelled given Islam’s even greater hatred of communism than of the West. The ascendancy of modernization theory in the 1960s somewhat obscured the extent to which Cold War imperatives had dictated an approving, utilitarian view of what was regarded as a traditional religious force. Second, some of the literature on political Islam has drawn misleading conclusions from the purportedly revolutionary Middle East of the 1950s. While explanations for political Islam, fundamentalism, Islamism, the Islamic revival or Islamic resurgence almost always prudently point to several causes, considerable emphasis has been placed on the reaction to this period’s perceived prevailing secularism, the belief that religion should be separated from the state and had little to contribute to political goals and programmes.2 * Durham University. An earlier version of this paper was presented at a conference on ‘The Middle East in the 1950s: Historical Perspectives: Israel, the Arab World, and the Great Powers’, co-sponsored by the Roberta Buffett Center for International and Comparative Studies and the Crown Family Center for Jewish Studies at Northwestern University, 25-27 April 2010. I am grateful to Professor Elie Rekhess for his kind invitation to participate and for suggesting this topic and to Ronald Nettler for his useful comments. 1 Wm. Roger Louis, The British Empire in the Middle East, 1945–1951: Arab Nationalism, the United States and Postwar Imperialism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), p. 747. 2 The new Egyptian revolutionary leader, ‘Abd al-Nasir, told the French journalist Jean Lacouture in 1954: ‘after eighteen months in power, I still don’t see how it would be possible 4 JAMES PISCATORI Even so perceptive an observer of the Arabs as Malcolm Kerr, who famously chronicled the Arab Cold War between the Arab nationalist revolutionaries and the conservative monarchies, argued that the struggle for secularization had been largely won in the 1950s, except among the diehard Muslim Brothers and in the cultural area. The remaining unspoken debate was between secularists who ‘would combat religious traditionalism by surgery and those who prefer medication’.3 In addition, a good deal of the literature on political Islam tends to date its emergence to a period of a decade or more after the end of the 1950s. Many would ascribe its rise as a formidable force in the Middle East to the mid- to late 1970s. For Gilles Kepel, this decade was neatly bracketed by the death of Egypt’s ‘Abd al-Nasir in 1970, heralding the decline of Arab nationalism, and the overthrow of the Shah in Iran in 1978–9, marking the rise of a revolutionary Islam. Some date it, at its earliest, to the loss of Jerusalem in the Arab–Israeli war...

Andrew M. Dorman, 2009, Blair’s Successful War. British Military Intervention in Sierra Leone, Burlington, vt, Ashgate, 159 p.

Andrew M. Dorman, 2009, Blair’s Successful War. British Military Intervention in Sierra Leone, Burlington, vt, Ashgate, 159 p.. Un article de la revue Études internationales (Volume 42, numéro 1, 2011, p. 5-152) diffusée par la plateforme Érudit.

Development co-operation and conflict in Sierra Leone

This article examines the role of development co-operation in the 1991–2001 civil war in Sierra Leone. British military intervention, sanctions against Liberia for supporting the rebellion and the deployment of UN peacekeepers were key, albeit belated, initiatives that helped resolve the conflict. The lessons are that, first, domestic forces alone may be incapable of resolving large-scale violent conflicts in Africa. Second, conflict tends to spread from one country to another, calling for strong regional conflict resolution mechanisms and deeper regional integration to promote peace. Third, donor policies need to address the root causes of state fragility, especially the political and security dimensions, which they tend to ignore. Fourth, a critical analysis is required to determine circumstances in which elections could undermine peace: the conduct of donor-supported elections under an unpopular military government in Sierra Leone culminated in an escalation of the conflict. Finally, a united international community is crucial to resolve a complex conflict and it should be accompanied by strong and timely measures informed by a full understanding of local conditions.

Stephen Blackwell, British Military Intervention and the Struggle for Jordan: King Hussein, Nasser and the Middle East Crisis, 1955–1958

Stephen Blackwell, <i>British Military Intervention and the Struggle for Jordan: King Hussein, Nasser and the Middle East Crisis, 1955–1958</i>

Whitehall vs Old China Hands: The 1935–36 Leith-Ross Mission Revisited

The fabi reform of 1935–36 is widely recognised as an important milestone in the history of Republican China. It saw the Nationalist government in Nanjing break off China's age-old reliance on silv...

Communications

Communications Rafe Blaufarb and Timothy M. Roberts To the Editor, In his review (JER, vol. 28, Fall 2008, 511–17) of my book, Bonapartists in the Borderlands (Tuscaloosa, AL, 2006), Dr. Timothy M. Roberts claims that I argue that the U.S. government supported the establishment of a small French settlement (the Vine and Olive colony) in the Alabama territory as “a front for covert military operations against the Spanish Empire” (514). He criticizes this view as both “unpersuasive” and “not plausible” (Roberts, 514). I agree that such an explanation is unconvincing. But it is not the one I advance in my book. What I actually argue is that, to the extent the colony served a military purpose at all, that purpose was defensive and dissuasive—“to act as a barrier against cross-border raids” mounted by Seminoles, escaped slaves, and others from the territory of Spanish Florida (Blaufarb, 53). But an even more important American aim in backing the colony was “to put additional pressure on Spain to resume negotiations for the sale of Florida” by demonstrating that “the prevailing demographic trends [in the Gulf Coast region] made it inevitable that the United States would eventually absorb Florida” (Blaufarb, 56). I elaborate at some length upon President Madison’s original idea “that Spanish Florida could be obtained through the weight of demography alone” and also upon his efforts to bring the bellicose General Andrew Jackson around to his point of view (Blaufarb, 56). None of this suggests that the U.S. government contemplated using the Vine and Olive colony for military action against Spanish Florida. Rather, I explicitly argue that the U.S. proceeded cautiously in this part of the world out of fear that too aggressive a policy toward Spain would provoke British military intervention—“renewed conflict with Great Britain was the last thing the United States needed” (Blaufarb, 71) Dr. Roberts also takes me to task for supposedly ignoring the fact that, after 1815, the U.S. government sought to “distance the country officially from assistance to Latin American independence and in particular to filibustering” (Roberts, 514). Roberts seems to have overlooked what I wrote on this matter. “Before 1815 first Jefferson and then Madison had come close to proffering recognition and even [End Page 187] sponsored filibustering expeditions against Spanish provinces. . . . But after the return of peace to Europe and the United States after 1815, a note of hesitation began to color American policy. President Madison signaled this shift with a proclamation delivered on 1 September 1815 prohibiting ‘illegal expeditions’ against the Spanish domains . . . Despite the difficulties experienced by the government in enforcing American neutrality, even within its own ranks, the fact that violations were increasingly exposed and sometimes prosecuted underlines the growing determination of the administration to proceed cautiously after 1815” (Blaufarb, 70–71). Dr. Roberts is right to question the notion that the Vine and Olive colony was founded as a filibustering base. But he is in error when he attributes such an interpretation to my book. Rafe Blaufarb To the Editor, I stand by my view that in his book, Bonapartists in the Borderlands, Rafe Blaufarb overemphasizes the purpose of the Society for the Cultivation of the Vine and Olive to solve Americans’ inability to intimidate Spain into conceding Florida. He writes, “By early 1817 the [U.S.-Spanish] negotiations had clearly reached a deadlock. . . . [I]n this ‘thickening atmosphere’ of diplomatic stalemate over Florida, Congress approved the Vine and Olive grant. . . . [T]he French settlement on the Tombigbee was intended to put additional pressure on Spain to resume negotiations for the sale of Florida. . . . [Andrew] Jackson approved wholeheartedly of these views” (56, 57). There was little sense in the Madison or Monroe administrations, however, that failure to achieve Spanish concessions represented a deadlock or stalemate soluble by taking land obtained from the Creek Indians out of the market for purchase by American citizens and giving it to French and Haitian Creole refugees. General Jackson supported the policy of President-elect Monroe of white settlement of this land, but merely reiterated his position at the time of the conclusion of the Treaty of Fort Jackson in 1814, that American security would be enhanced...

Killing Kith and Kin: The Viability of British Military Intervention in Rhodesia, 1964-5

Killing Kith and Kin: The Viability of British Military Intervention in Rhodesia, 1964-5

Fighting for freetown: British military intervention in Sierra Leone

(2001). Fighting for freetown: British military intervention in Sierra Leone. Contemporary Security Policy: Vol. 22, No. 3, pp. 140-168.

Britain's ‘Vietnam syndrome’? Public opinion and British military intervention from Palestine to Yugoslavia

There have been calls for policymakers to draw ‘lessons’ from Britain's experience of Empire and Northern Ireland to inform a new generation of post-Cold War interventions by the international community. This article emphasises the role that domestic public opinion, galvanized by the impact of casualties and the plight of military relatives, has played in shaping Britain's experience of ‘military intervention’ in the ‘civil wars’ of Palestine, Northern Ireland and the former Yugoslavia. Three principal arguments are put forward.

In Defence of oil: Britain's response to the Iraqi threat towards Kuwait, 1961

This article outlines the United Kingdom Government's response to the perceived Iraqi military threat towards Kuwait in June‐July 1961. It is argued that the decision to take the threat seriously was based on the perception of Kuwait's importance to British national interests coupled with the view that the Iraqis could launch a small‐scale surprise attack. While it has been argued elsewhere that the British military intervention in Kuwait was designed to bolster its prestige in the Middle East this article demonstrates that the policy of intervention was largely based on the fear of the risks entailed by any failure to ward of an Iraqi invasion off Kuwait.

Operation Vantage: British military intervention in Kuwait 1961

Operation Vantage: British military intervention in Kuwait 1961

The Influence of British Arms: An Analysis of British Military Intervention since 1956.

The Influence of British Arms: An Analysis of British Military Intervention since 1956.