This paper will explore two interwoven themes. Firstly, it will consider the political context that gave rise to the amnesties. In doing this, it will seek initially to evaluate the depth of the international community’s commitment to justice during the conflict by assessing the measures taken by international actors in the response to the violations and the importance given to justice in the various peace initiatives. It will argue that whilst the violence was ongoing, and contrary to the actual crimes being committed within Bosnia-Herzegovina, efforts were made by some international actors and local propagandists to construct a narrative of the violations in which the actions of all sides were described as morally equivalent. The objective of this narrative construction was to lessen demands for justice as it was felt that if the violence was acknowledged as genocide or at least it was widely recognised that Bosnian Serb forces were disproportionately responsible for the commission of war crimes, and the Bosniak civilians suffered disproportionately during the conflict, it would have been more difficult for international mediators to seek to broker a settlement that recognised the ‘facts on the ground’ that had been created by ethnic cleansing. As a result, the international mediators, eager to reach a negotiated settlement, repeatedly prioritised reaching a peace agreement over the pursuit of justice, and even after the ICTY was established, its work was hampered by a lack of funding and cooperation until 1997. The report will also argue that contrary to the behaviour of international actors in other contemporary conflicts, there was, however, a reluctance to agree to an amnesty for war crimes, due to the intense media coverage of the Balkans conflicts and the resultant public outrage. The resultant global awareness and debates on the mass atrocities perpetrated in Bosnia-Herzegovina provided the impetus for the creation by the United Nations of the Commission of Experts and the ICTY. Although the support of international actors for these mechanisms was initially reluctant, the institutions nonetheless gradually gained momentum and the ICTY grew into an effective body commanding significant resources and personnel, and its existence helped to shape the limits of Bosnia’s amnesties. Secondly, this paper will explore the scope and impact of the amnesty laws that were eventually adopted. The report will investigate the objectives of these laws and the extent to which these objectives were realised. In particular, as the exclusion of the most serious crimes from the amnesties was deliberately intended to facilitate prosecutions of these crimes, and provides an example of how amnesties that adhere to the evolving anti-impunity norm articulated in recent years by international human rights activists operate, the report will explore the extent to which excluding these crimes has contributed to truth and justice with Bosnia. Clearly, without the exclusion of the most serious crimes, few trials would have been possible. However, this paper will argue that in the 14 years since the Dayton peace accords, only a small fraction of the total number of offenders have been tried and progress towards improved interethnic relations and stable government within Bosnia-Herzegovina has been minimal. In addition, the report will explore the introduction of plea agreements at the ICTY and in the national legal system in order to consider the extent to which some forms of leniency following conflict and mass atrocity represent an efficient means to prioritise limited prosecutorial resources and incentivise perpetrator testimony. Furthermore, the report will consider whether the pursuit of more holistic forms of transitional justice encompassing both trials and more restorative strategies could help Bosnian society to achieve to peaceful coexistence under domestic democratic government, a status which, as will be explored in the following section, has not featured in Bosnia’s past.