Block's Argument Research Articles

Knowledge of universals

ABSTRACT The Indian realists argue for the unique claim that universals are perceptible. The possibility of allowing perceptual access to universals puts pressure on the Nyāya theory of perception. The Nyāya philosophers introduced the notion of nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa (non-conceptual perception) to accommodate the perceptibility of universals. Since there is no direct introspective evidence for non-conceptual perception, it is difficult, if not impossible, to specify the content of nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa or non-conceptual perception. This paper addresses this concern by turning to Ned Block's work in contemporary philosophy of perception. Using Block's arguments, I propose that we have an independent empirical route to specify the content of a non-conceptual perception which is not subject to the ‘myth of the given’ objection.

Attention and Mental Primer

AbstractDrawing on the empirical premise that attention makes objects look more intense (bigger, faster, higher in contrast), Ned Block has argued for mental paint, a phenomenal residue that cannot be reduced to what is perceived or represented. If sound, Block's argument would undermine direct realism and representationism, two widely held views about the nature of conscious perception. We argue that Block's argument fails because the empirical premise it is based upon is false. Attending to an object alters its salience, but not its perceived intensity. We also argue that salience should be equated with mental primer, a close cousin of mental paint that reintroduces difficulties for direct realism and representationism. The upshot is that direct realism and representationism are still in trouble, but not for the reason that Block thinks.

In Defense of Counterfeiting Illegitimate Money

AbstractCounterfeiting legitimate money is, and ought to be, a crime, not only under the libertarian law code but under the rules and regulations of all civilized orders. But what about counterfeiting money that is per se illegitimate; that is, is itself counterfeit? Is that a licit human action? The present article argues, somewhat paradoxically, that it is. It offers a counterpart to two authors—Murphy (2006) and Machaj (2007)—who take the opposite point of view.

Expecting phenomenology

AbstractBlock's argument against correlationism depends in part on a view about what subjects in certain experiments can be aware of phenomenally. Block's main source of evidence for this view is introspection. I argue that introspection should not be trusted in this respect. This weakens Block's argument and undermines correlationism at the same time.

Access to phenomenality: A necessary condition of phenomenality?

AbstractBlock argues that relevant data in psychology and neuroscience show that access consciousness is not constitutively necessary for phenomenality. However, a phenomenal state can be access conscious in two radically different ways. Its content can be access conscious, or its phenomenality can be access conscious. I argue that while Block's thesis is right when it is formulated in terms of the first notion of access consciousness, there is an alternative hypothesis about the relationship between phenomenality and access in terms of the second notion that is not touched by Block's argument.

Behaviorism and psychologism: Why block's argument against behaviorism is unsound

Ned Block ((1981). Psychologism and behaviorism. Philosophical Review, 90, 5–43.) argued that a behaviorist conception of intelligence is mistaken, and that the nature of an agent's internal processes is relevant for determining whether the agent has intelligence. He did that by describing a machine which lacks intelligence, yet can answer questions put to it as an intelligent person would. The nature of his machine's internal processes, he concluded, is relevant for determining that it lacks intelligence. I argue against Block that it is not the nature of its processes but of its linguistic behavior which is responsible for his machine's lack of intelligence. As I show, not only has Block failed to establish that the nature of internal processes is conceptually relevant for psychology, in fact his machine example actually supports some version of behaviorism. As Wittgenstein has maintained, as far as psychology is concerned, there may be chaos inside.

Sidestepping the semantics of “consciousness”

Block explains the conflation of phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness by appeal to the ambiguity of the term "consciousness." However, the nature of ambiguity is not at all clear, and the thesis that "consciousness" is ambiguous between phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness is far from obvious. Moreover, the conflation can be explained without supposing that the term is ambiguous. Block's argument can thus be strengthened by avoiding controversial issues in the semantics of "consciousness."

Blackmail as a career choice: A liberal assessment

Walter Block sets out a respectable libertarian critique of laws that criminalize blackmail. Although some may take offense at the behavior of those who earn or supplement their livelihoods in this despicable way, Block endorses the libertarian precept that would restrict the criminal sanction only to cases in which miscreants employ or threaten to employ force, fraud, or theft. Absent some element of this triad, the blackmailer's misdeeds should attract the attention of the law--the civil law, not the criminal law--only when one of the parties complains that the voluntary agreement between the two--the blackmail contract--has been breached. It is the purpose of this paper to focus attention on the nature of that peculiar agreement and to argue that it is, in one critically important way, unworthy of the respect that Block wants us and our judiciary to accord to it. The paradox of blackmail is familiar, emerging from two apparently uncontroversial premises. The first is that what the blackmailer threatens to do, characteristically, is merely to reveal or publicize what is true of, albeit highly damaging to, another. Even though this may be harmful, it is ordinarily not a criminal offense and journalistic muckrakers often prosper from the marketing of such stories. Likening the blackmailer's reputation-shattering disclosures to gossip, Block is at pains to show that force, fraud, and theft need not be involved and I shall not challenge him on that point. Indeed, it should be noted that there are cases in which such disclosure is admirable, as when public-spirited citizens identify wanted felons to the authorities or when whistleblowers alert the public to corporate and official misconduct. Now although it is no criminal offense to pass along such information, neither is it an offense to sit on it. Thus the second premise: that it is not generally a criminal offense to ask to be paid for a promise to forbear from doing what one is at liberty to do or not, as one wishes. If I am free both to do A and to forbear from doing A, I am at liberty to ask for and accept payment in return for a promise not to do A. Commercial transactions commonly have this feature. If, for example, you want to buy my car but will not have the full amount until next week, I may ask for a smaller sum in exchange for my promise not to sell to anyone else for seven days. Such agreements to forbear from action are simply garden-variety commercial transactions that routinely receive our judicial blessing. Now if we put the two of these innocent acts together--I will promise to keep your dark secret quiet if you pay me--we somehow get an agreement without legal validity: indeed one that makes the offeror into a criminal. This is puzzling. Much of the literature on this paradox has sought an ethical/jurisprudential justification for holding that blackmail belongs on the list of criminal offenses. I think it is right to say that there is no generally accepted account of why this should be so.(1) But after considering much of that inconclusive work, Block and his Libertarian comrades have urged that we eliminate the paradox by legalizing blackmail. That approach suggests that we pause and reflect on the place of contracts within the judicial system. Taking the blackmailer's agreement as an exemplar, this is what I propose to do. If Block's arguments were to prevail, then we would expect the offense of blackmail to be struck from the criminal codes. For the would-be blackmailer, decriminalization eliminates the costs and hazards of prosecution. Given the mean price of secrecy set out in his examples -- $5000 -- one would anticipate that blackmail would become an economically attractive career choice. It is a useful analytical approach to look carefully at the blackmailer's business, trying to conceive it as a lucrative opportunity in Block's libertarian utopia. Having made such a career choice, how might one prosper? …

P-Consciousness presentation/A-Consciousness representation

P-Consciousness (P) is to be understood in terms of an immediate fluctuating continuum that is a presentation of raw experiential matter against which A-consciousness (A) acts to objectify, impose form or make determinate “thinkable” contents. A representationalises P but P is not itself representational, at least in terms of some concepts of “representation.” Block's arguments fall short of establishing that P is representational and, given the sort of cognitive science assumptions he is working with, he is unable to account for the aspect of phenomenal content that he thinks goes beyond “representational” content. BBS discussion reveals the need for greater analysis and justification for a representationalist thesis of P.

On a Defense of the Hegemony of Representation

On the general ideological issue, I am on Bill Lycan's side: I would like to believe in the hegemony of representation. But I don't find it quite so easy to believe this (or even to understand it fully) as he apparently does. When it comes to the details of his defense of the general thesis against some specific objections and counterexamples, I am not very clear about how the argument is supposed to go. I have worries both about the response to Ned Block's inverted earth argument for a distinction between qualitative and intentional content of experience, and about the response to Christopher Peacocke's proposed counterexamples to his version of the hegemony of representation. First on Block's inverted earth: I will review Block's argument, as I understand it, and then consider Lycan's response. Block told his story in two versions. In both of them, inverted earth is a place much like earth, except that the actual physical colors of things are inverted -switched with the complementary colors. Further, the language spoken by inverted earthians is an inverted version of English: they use blue to refer to the color yellow, which is the color of the sky. In the intersubjective version of the story, our subject