Bligh Reef Research Articles

Considering Cumulative Social Effects of Technological Hazards and Disasters

This article describes research designs utilized to study cumulative sociocultural and psychosocial effects of technological hazards and disasters. We apply these designs to two cases: (a) the Exxon Valdez disaster with a focus on Cordova, Alaska, and (b) the Enbridge Northern Gateway Pipeline project with a focus on the Gitga’at First Nation in Hartley Bay, British Columbia, Canada. The Exxon Valdez oil spill began in 1989 with the grounding of the supertanker on Bligh Reef in Prince William Sound, Alaska. Fisheries collapsed, key species failed to recover, and litigation languished for 19 years, creating an accumulation of impacts from the initial event. The Gitga’at First Nation serves as a case for examining cumulative effects of energy development, specifically the Enbridge Northern Gateway Pipeline project proposed in 2010. Hartley Bay’s sociocultural and psychosocial well-being are under threat from these and other ongoing development activities; they have also endured centuries of government-led subjugation. In studying each of these communities, we used mixed methods approaches that combined document review, observations, interviews, and surveys. Based on our experiences, we contend that the most effective way to examine cumulative social impacts is to employ concepts and theories drawn from existing research to support guidelines, frameworks, and methods.

Conditions of persistent oil on beaches in Prince William Sound 26 years after the Exxon Valdez spill

On March 24, 1989, the Exxon Valdez grounded on Bligh Reef in Prince William Sound, Alaska, spilling an estimated 10.8 million gallons of crude oil. Contrary to early projections, subsequent studies over several decades have shown subsurface oil persisting on impacted beaches. Here we present findings from a lingering oil survey conducted during the summer of 2015 at a small set of beaches in Prince William Sound known to have persistent subsurface Exxon Valdez oil. The objectives of the survey were to estimate how much oil remains at these sites, the oil composition, and oil retention rates compared to previous studies. Results from the survey found lingering oil was present at 8 of 9 sites that were revisited. Surveys revealed little evidence of change in oil area or mass over the last 14 years, nor has there been a change in the distribution of oiling intensities or their location on the beach. Detailed analysis of the oil indicated it has not weathered since 2001. Subsurface oils collected in 2015 have enriched concentrations of phenanthrenes and chrysenes relative to oil originating in the cargo hold indicating that buried oil has retained some toxic potential over the last two decades, but it is not currently bioavailable. Subsurface oil appears to be sequestered in sediments and protected from hydrological washing and low oxygen and nutrient levels inhibiting biodegradation. These findings are consistent with previous surveys and predictive geomorphic models suggesting the estimated 0.6% Exxon Valdez oil remaining is sequestered and not bioavailable unless disturbed and will likely persist in the environment on a decadal scale.

A Look at the Ohmsett Oil Spill Research and Test Facility

On 11 October 2011, the X Prize Foundation announced the winners of the USD 1.4 million Wendy Schmidt Oil Cleanup X CHALLENGE, launched during the summer of 2010 in the wake of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill disaster in the US Gulf of Mexico. According to a press release, “the competition inspired entrepreneurs, engineers, and scientists worldwide to develop innovative, rapidly deployable, and highly efficient methods of capturing crude oil from the ocean surface.” Emerging from an original field of more than 350 submissions from all over the world, Elastec/American Marine of Carmi, Illinois, captured the USD 1 million first prize, with Norway’s NOFI Tromsø awarded the USD 300,000 second prize; no contestant’s cleanup system qualified to receive third prize. Testing the 10 finalists’ technologies in order to determine the winner would have been impossible were it not for a facility called Ohmsett (Oil and Hazardous Materials Environmental Test Tank). What is Ohmsett, and why is it so critical to the development of oil spill prevention and mitigation technology? Omsett’s Origins The existence of Ohmsett arose from response to another oil spill disaster. On 24 March 1989, the Exxon Valdez oil tanker struck Bligh Reef in Prince William Sound, Alaska, spilling an estimated 260,000 bbl to 750,000 bbl of crude oil. Considered one of the most devastating human-caused environmental disasters, a number of preventative or cautionary measures ensued. One of these was the US Oil Pollution Act (OPA 90) of 1990, which among its many provisions established a program providing for “research, development, and demonstration of new or improved technologies which are effective in preventing or mitigating oil discharges and which protect the environment.” The disaster also provided the push needed to get the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (OSLTF), created in 1986 by the US Congress, off the ground. In August 1990, US President George H.W. Bush signed OPA 90 into law, and authorized both the use of the OSLTF as well as collection of revenue to maintain it. One of the primary purposes of OSLTF’s Principal Fund (exclusive of its Emergency Fund) is to carry out oil spill-related research and development (R&D).

The crime and punishment of theExxon Valdez

In June 2008, in Exxon Shipping Inc v Baker, the US Supreme Court substantially reduced the punitive damages previously awarded against Exxon-Mobil for the Exxon Valdez disaster, bringing to an end almost 20 years of controversy and legal actions arising from one of the largest maritime oil spills in US history. On March 24, 1989, the tanker Exxon Valdez, captained by Joseph Hazelwood, was transporting crude oil from Valdez, Alaska, to the lower 48 states. Through a combination of blunders and dereliction of duty, the vessel hit Prince William Sound's Bligh Reef, spilling an estimated 10.8 million gallons of crude oil into the sound, and causing enormous ecological and economic damage. The Valdez had departed from standard shipping lanes to avoid sea ice, and a failure to correct the course was later attributed to lack of communication among the crew and poor supervision by Captain Hazelwood, who was not at the helm at the time of the incident. The spill spread almost 500 miles, coating 1300 miles of shoreline with crude oil. After four summers, and at a cost of over $2 billion, the cleanup was finally called off, though some areas still show signs of contamination. Ratios between punitive and compensatory damages have run from 1:1 to 500:1. Since 1989, courts have, depending on the reprehensibility of the plaintiff's actions, decided that a ratio of punitive to compensatory damages must be reasonable; the rule of thumb is 3:1, with a limit of 10:1 considered excessive. In the Exxon case, in 1994, a jury found that Exxon and Hazelwood were reckless, and thus liable, and awarded punitive damages of $4 billion (along with an award of $5000 against Hazelwood). After reconsidering the Supreme Court precedents, a second decision increased the punitive award to $5 billion. However, in early 2007, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals decided to lower the punitive award against Exxon-Mobil to $2.5 billion, reasoning that, because there was about $500 million in economic damage caused by the spill, a ratio of 10:1 – which the $5 billion in punitive damages represented – was too close to the limit required by Supreme Court opinions. In the most recent case, in a 5–3 decision authored by Justice Souter, the Court further lowered the punitive amount to a 1:1 ratio. Although the Court unanimously disagreed with Exxon by ruling that the CWA clearly allows punitive damages and that Exxon was liable for the reckless acts of the ship's captain, the Court also decided that punitive damages are unpredictable, that a hard-dollar cap for punitive damages was unfair, and that a punitive damage award for maritime cases seemed more fairly adjusted to a 1:1 ratio – in this case, about $500 million. The Court examined, among other things, state statutes that punish for environmental harms by imposing multiple damages, but found a mishmash that offered little guidance. Justice Souter noted that the CWA penalty rationale involves doubling damages for “knowing” versus “negligent” criminal penalties and reasoned that this “compares [with] discretion to double the civil liability on conduct going beyond negligence and meriting punitive treatment”. Thus, Justice Souter reasoned that a 1:1 ratio (for maritime cases, at least) was important “to protect against the possibility (and the disruptive cost to the legal system) of awards that are unpredictable and unnecessary” and to establish a “fair upper limit”. In dissent, Justice Stevens wrote that he would have upheld the $2.5 billion in punitive damages awarded by the lower court, whereas Justice Breyer believed that Exxon's conduct warranted “an exception from strict application of the majority's numerical rule”. So the long, sad tale of the Exxon Valdez may finally be at an end. The ship, renamed the Mediterranean, now sails under the flag of the Marshall Islands and is still doing its thing – hopefully under better direction.

Seeing the Forest and the Trees: Visual Culture in American Conservation History

On the night of March 23-24, 1989, the Exxon Valdez veered out of its shipping lane and ran aground on Bligh Reef in Alaska's Prince William Sound. Eleven million gallons of oil contaminated the sound and coated twelve hundred miles of shoreline, killing birds, mammals, fish, and shellfish. More than fifteen years later, Exxon Valdez and images of oil-soaked seals, birds, and fish dead or gasping for life remain ingrained in the American collective memory and serve as a signal reminder of nature's fragility and the human capacity to devastate the physical environment at a point when further advances on the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge and Alaskan oil reserves have become a key point of controversy in American politics. Another, less universally remembered oil spill afflicted the Pacific coast of Oregon, when the New Carissa ran aground near Coos Bay on February 4, 1999. The spill was far less severe--only seventy thousand gallons-but newspapers up and down the coast printed photographs of the beached Japanese tanker emitting flames and plumes of black smoke as rescue crews desperately tried to burn as much oil as possible before it seeped into the sea. In all, before the ocean ripped the New Carissa in two, two hundred thousand gallons of bunker and diesel oil had been burned, considerably reducing the potential extent of the damage to the sea and sea life. Ironically, in 1989, in the hours immediately following the Valdez's grounding and before the oil began to disperse, the suggestion of burning the oil was dismissed; Exxon could not afford to be seen to be acknowledging their responsibility for the spill and feared that images of the tanker engulfed in fire would constitute a public relations nightmare. The nightmare came anyway, as news reports showed countless images of nature in jeopardy, prompting public outrage and Congress's swift passage of the 1990 Oil Pollution Act.1 Exxon's reluctance to ignite the tanker stemmed from a visual idea of politics, public relations, and memory. Their public relations experts mistakenly

Ice Detection and Avoidance

ABSTRACT An extensive risk assessment of oil transportation in Prince William Sound, Alaska was finalized in 1996 that identified drifting icebergs, from Columbia Glacier, as one of the most significant oil spill risks remaining to be addressed. The Prince William Sound Regional Citizens’ Advisory Council (PWS RCAC) was a major participant in this risk analysis. As part of the groundwork for the ice detection project, PWS RCAC has also sponsered extensive studies of Columbia Glacier calving and drift patterns, iceberg size and distribution. A collaborative project, called the ice detection project, was developed by a multi stakeholder working group and provides an opportunity for an immediate and long-term solution using existing technology. One objective of the project is to verify the efficiency, effectiveness and reliability of existing radar technologies to provide mariners and the United States Coast Guard with real time information regarding ice conditions. A secondary objective is to promote the research and development through field testing of new and emerging technologies to determine the possible enhancement of conventional radar. In addition to PWS RCAC, stakeholders responsible for spearheading this project are: Alyeska Pipeline Service Company, Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation, Oil Spill Recovery Institute, United States Coast Guard, Prince William Sound Community College and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. Each of the seven participants brings expertise and backing from the stakeholder they represent. The site chosen for the ice detection radar project is Reef Island (illustration 1), located adjacent to Bligh Reef, Prince William Sound. This location is ideal because of its proximity to Columbia Glacier, the source of the icebergs, as well as providing an unobstructed view of the shipping lanes. A fifty foot tower was installed at the site during the fall of 2001 and a conventional radar system is currently being configured for installation. The expectation is that the system will be up and running by July of 2002, giving real time information on ice in the tanker lanes to mariners in Prince William Sound. A second field test of an UHF radar prototype is planned for the summer of 2002. Field testing and ground truthing of the radar system is scheduled for the next five years.

Mapping the Environment: Contested Physical and Cultural Terrain in the “Far North”

Of all the groups negatively impacted by the Exxon Valdez oil spill, in many ways Alaska Natives were the most devastated. The oil spill.. shook the ... cultural foundations of Native life. Alaska Native subsistence culture is based on an intimate relationship with the environment. Not only does the environment have sacred qualities for Alaska Natives, but their survival depends on the well-being of the ecosystem and the maintenance of cultural norms of subsistence (Gill and Picou, 1997: 168), While Alaska's seven indigenous cultural groups are culturally distinct, its 85,000 Native residents do share a common reverence for the land and sea. Indeed, they see themselves as an integral part of nature. As the quote suggests, Alaska Natives also share cultural norms of subsistence. Since statehood in 1959, subsistence has been at the heart of a cultural divide with Alaska Natives on one side and non-Natives and the State on the other. This ongoing dispute has drawn in the federal government as the trustee for Native subsistence practices. David Case, the foremost expert on Alaska Native laws, maintains that Actions and events which interfere with subsistence inevitably cut across the whole cloth of Native culture. Understandably, Natives perceive threats to subsistence as threats to their cultural survival... (1984: 276). Federal legislation in the 1980s generally defined subsistence as encompassing three conceptual elements: (a) continued economic or physical reliance, (b) cultural or social value, and (c) custom or tradition (Case, 1984: 275). In dealing with subsistence issues, the State of Alaska has vacillated between recognizing Native cultural values and invoking values of individualism and common use. In 1989, the Alaska Supreme Court ruled that the rural subsistence preference discriminated against urban residents. This decision led to a federal takeover of hunting and fishing regulations on federal lands in Alaska (60 percent of the state) in order to protect Native subsistence rights (McBeath and Morehouse, 1994: 113). The subsistence issue and its rural/urban and Native/non-Native split is replicated on most development issues in Alaska, including those on federal lands. Consequently, when the supertanker Exxon Valdez ripped its hull open on Bligh Reef on March 24, 1989, and spilled nearly 11 million gallons of crude oil in the pristine waters of Prince William Sound, it became a potent symbol of these disparate ideological interests. The interests at stake included those of multinational oil companies, of a heavily oil-dependent Alaskan state government, of a federal government with military and energy interests in oil, of an American public in love with gas-guzzling automobiles, of environmentalists from conservationists to preservationists, and of culturally distinct Alaska Native groups. Given the centrality of land in these ideological differences, it is useful to think of the Far North as sites or places of sharp conflict between those desiring to extract valuable natural resources, those desiring to protect threatened species and land, and those striving to maintain the vitality and integrity of unique human cultures (see Young, 1992, 5). In their analysis of public opinion and media discourses, Gamson and Modigliani suggest that on any policy issue it is appropriate to think of multiple discourses interacting in complex ways (1989: 2-3). As they see it, journalists manage this complexity by producing internally structured packages with up to five framing devices that make sense of events and suggest what is at issue (1989: 2-3). Their framing devices include metaphors, exemplars from the past, catchphrases, depictions, and visual images (1989: 3). while all of these framing devices are of course pertinent to the journalistic packaging of the Exxon Valdez oil spill, I have dealt with most of them in previous research' and will here largely restrict my analysis to a particular form of visual imagery. …

Running Aground in a Sea of Complex Litigation: A Case Comment on the Exxon Valdez Litigation

I. INTRODUCTION Oil spills leave more than an environmental mess in their wake. They usually leave a mess of litigants and court dockets jammed with lawsuits filed by private and public parties, making claims for damages based upon a myriad of theories of liability.(1) On March 23, 1989, the supertanker Exxon Valdez slowly left Valdez, Alaska carrying 53 million gallons of crude oil. Its next planned stop was Long Beach, California.(2) The ship traveled at a speed of no more than six knots during the first leg of its journey because there were small islands, reefs and, most likely, ice ahead. Captain Joseph Hazelwood stood on the bridge of the ship with the third mate Gregory Cousins. As the ship began making its way toward Prince William Sound, Hazelwood left to go to his office to do paperwork after telling Cousins to call if he needed anything.(3) Exxon's manual dictated that the captain had to be on the bridge whenever conditions present a potential threat to the vessel such as passing in the vicinity of shoals, rocks or other hazards presenting any threat to safe navigation.(4) A short time later, Hazelwood received a call that there was ice ahead and that they would need to maneuver around it. Hazelwood returned to the bridge, studied the ice reports, and ordered the helmsman to change course. Hazelwood then gave instructions to Cousins regarding the next turn the Exxon Valdez would need to make. Hazelwood left the bridge again and returned to his office down below.(5) While Hazelwood did paperwork, Cousins went into the chart room to look at the map, leaving the helmsman alone on the bridge. Suddenly, the lookout sounded an alarm and cried that the flashing red buoy marking Bligh Reef could be seen off the starboard when it was supposed to be on the port side. Cousins quickly ordered a turn. However, the huge ship could not turn fast enough. Cousins called Hazelwood in his office and told the captain, We're in serious trouble.(6) Just after midnight, the Exxon Valdez ran aground on Bligh Reef tearing open the hull of the ship. Bligh Reef was a well-known navigational hazard in Prince William Sound and clearly marked on the ship's navigating charts. The damage caused the ship to gush oil into the Sound at a rate of 200,000 gallons a minute. At the time, Prince William Sound was regarded as of the most pristine and diverse ecological systems in the world.(7) Chief Warrant Officer Mark Delozier of the Coast Guard was called out to the Exxon Valdez. When he arrived, he spoke to Hazelwood. While talking to Hazelwood, Delozier could smell the odor of alcohol. He ordered Hazelwood and some of the crewmembers to be tested for alcohol. It would later be discovered that Hazelwood spent much of the previous afternoon in a bar. Due to numerous delays, however, Hazelwood's blood sample was taken nearly eleven hours after the grounding. Although the authenticity of the samples was later challenged in trial, the test revealed that Hazelwood's blood alcohol level was .061 eleven hours after the accident. Federal law prohibits a crewmember from operating a vessel if his blood alcohol level is over .04.(8) Exxon fired Captain Hazelwood immediately.(9) Eleven million gallons of oil from the damaged hull poured out and eventually spread over 2,592 miles of coastline.(10) It has been called the worst environmental disaster in United States history.(11) The oil spill caused the death of more wildlife than any other single human catastrophe. More than 250,000 seabirds, 3,500 otters and hundreds of bald eagles were killed.(12) Additionally, the spill had an extensive impact on almost all levels of life in Alaska. Nearly 60,000 Alaskans claimed the oil spill impacted their lives.(13) No one knows what the long-term effects of the oil spill will be. What is certain is that this spill sparked the beginning of one of America's largest and most complex litigation in history that would involve thousands of people, hundreds of lawyers and years of court battles. …

Oil, Seabirds, and Science

When an environmental accident creates a potential conflict between science and environmental advocacy, science may suffer. When the supertanker Exxon Valdez ran aground on Bligh Reef in Prince William Sound, Alaska, on the morning of 24 March 1989, it aroused widespread concern about possible environmental concern about possible environmental devastation. Within hours, some 41 million liters of crude oil were released into the marine ecosystem, making this spill the largest in US history. Eventually, oil was found more than 900 km from the spill site, and roughly 2100 km of shoreline were contaminated with oil (Neff et al. 1995). 46 refs., 8 figs.

The Fate of the Oil Spilled from the Exxon Valdez

Just after midnight on March 24, 1989, the 987-foot tank vessel Exxon Valdez grounded on Bligh Reef in Prince William Sound (PWS), Alaska, releasing approximately 10.8 million gallons of North Slope crude oil into the Sound. The energetic environmental conditions in PWS and the extensive cleanup activities led to wide dispersion of the Exxon Valdez oil, which simultaneously underwent biodegradation and photooxidation. Although some more refractory residuals of the petroleum (e.g., high molecular weight PAH, resins, and asphaltenes) persist, many of these constituents are not readily distinguishable from other petroleum sources and naturally occurring hydrocarbon residues. We estimate that approximately 20% of the spilled oil evaporated and underwent photolysis in the atmosphere; approximately 50% biodegraded either in-situ on beaches or in the water column; approximately 14% was recovered or disposed; < 1% remained in the water column (except as biodegradation products); approximately 2% remained on intertidal shorelines; and approximately 13% remained in subtidal sediments, mostly in the GOA and again mostly as highly weathered residuals. 60 refs., 3 figs., 2 tabs.

The Grounding of Exxon Valdez: An Examination of the Human and Organizational Factors

Just after midnight on March 24, 1989 the tankship Exxon Valdez ran aground on Bligh Reef inPrince William Sound, Alaska. The consequences of the accident were the loss of 258 000 barrels of crude oil resulting in substantial environmental and economic loss. The vessel possessed the best technologies available to the tanker industry and was the pride of the Exxon fleet. However, the complexity and the potential catastrophic consequences of using these new technologies is leading to the examination of a more critical element: the human factor. It has been determined that approximately 65% of catastrophic marine-related accidents have been the result of compounded human and organizational errors (HOE) during operations. Consequently, tanker operators and regulatory agencies have begun to realize the importance of examining the critical human factor element in tankship operations. Probabilistic risk analysis (PRA) procedures using influence diagramming are currently being developed to examine the effects of HOE in marine-related accidents. This paper examines (1) the human and organizational elements which led to the grounding of ExxonValdez, (2) structuring of the accident cause-effect relationships into an analytical framework, (3)methods for probabilistic risk analysis (PRA) of HOE in the accident, (4) changes in operational and regulatory policy in post-Exxon Valdez era, and (5) methods for determining HOE management alternatives for future tanker operations.

An oilspill, alcohol and the captain: A possible misapplication of forensic science

Good scientific principles, and the results of otherwise valid research, sometimes can be misused in forensic investigations. The case history of the EXXON VALDEZ tanker disaster illustrates this problem. In March 1989, the vessel left Alaska under the command of Captain Joseph Hazelwood; about 3 h later, it was aground on Bligh Reef and leaking oil. Emergency procedures were instituted but the spill was extensive; indeed, environmental cleanup is not yet complete. Attempts were made to identify those responsible for the accident. The ship's master was almost immediately charged with negligence and, later, intoxication. He was discharged and ultimately tried but acquitted (of intoxication) in an Alaska court. Independently, the U.S. National Transportation and Safety Board issued a report wherein three teams of specialists judged Captain Hazelwood to be intoxicated at the time of the accident. They did so by analyzing samples of his (transmitted) speech. Yet, individuals who were with him during that period testified that he was not intoxicated. Whether he was or was not, is not the primary issue here. Rather, the question to be asked relates to the possibility that the NTSB groups misapplied otherwise good scientific procedures in reaching their opinion.

EXPERIMENT IN DEMOCRACY: THE CITIZEN OVERSIGHT COUNCIL AS A MEANS OF MITIGATING ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS OF TERMINAL AND TANKER OPERATIONS

ABSTRACT In 1987, a handful of people from the small fishing community of Cordova, Alaska, coalesced around concern over the risks of oil-related pollution and oil spills in Prince William Sound posed by the trans-Alaska pipeline terminal and tanker operations in neighboring Valdez. The Cordova group sent an emissary to Alyeska Pipeline Service Company, which operates the Valdez Marine Terminal on behalf of its seven oil company owners. The emissary asked Alyeska to consider forming a citizen group to advise Alyeska on environmental issues of local or regional concern. Alyeska listened but rejected the idea. In March 1989, the Exxon Valdez ran aground on Bligh Reef. Alyeska's owners, acting principally at the behest of majority owner, British Petroleum, soon effected sweeping change in Alyeska's management. The change in management, with Jim Hermiller as president, produced a change in Alyeska's attitude toward the citizen advisory group proposal, and not long afterward Alyeska formed the Alyeska Citizen Advisory Committee. Over the next year that group evolved into what is now called the Prince William Sound Regional Citizens' Advisory Council, or RCAC. The Prince William Sound Regional Citizens' Advisory Council is a national experiment in providing citizens a voice in corporate decisions that affect them and their communities. This paper recounts the story of RCAC's formation and evolution, the group's mission under both federal law and its contract with Alyeska, and the hallmarks of its achievements and challenges to date.

DOUBLE HULL OIL TANKERS—HOW EFFECTIVE ARE THEY?

ABSTRACT The groundings of the Exxon Valdez on Bligh Reef in Prince William Sound, spilling more than 10 million gallons of Alaska North Slope crude, and the American Trader off Huntington Beach, spilling almost 400,000 gallons of Alaska North Slope crude, suggest that the construction of oil tankers be re-examined with respect to a design which could reduce both the number and magnitude of oil spills. This paper discusses state-of-the-art tanker technology with respect to spill prevention, effectiveness, and cost. The design features include double hulls, centralized bunker tankers, vacuum-retaining valves, cargo control systems, auxiliary thrusters, electronic charting, and the retransmission of the ship's position. Double hulls provide the highest probability of surviving damage, either from a collision or grounding, with no loss of cargo. Use of double hulls can reduce oil spill incidence by 90 percent in grounding situations and by 75 percent in collisions. The oil spill from the American Trader could have been completely avoided by double hull construction. The arrangement provides spaces below the cargo tanks and on the vessel's sides solely for the carriage of ballast water when the tanker is in ballast condition. These tanks are empty when the tanker is loaded and then also act as the first line of defense in the event of structural damage to the cargo tanks. Tanker design is integrated with port safety measures, including vessel monitoring systems, in this total spill prevention analysis. All aspects of the tanker transportation system are considered.

Possible connection between two Alaskan catastrophes occurring 25 yr apart (1964 and 1989)

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Community impacts resulting from the Exxon Valdez oil spill

On 24 March 1989, the supertanker Exxon Valdez grounded on Bligh Reef spilling approximately 11 million gallons of crude oil into Alaska's Prince Wil liam Sound. The environmental damage has been well publicized. Less well known are the disastrous social effects produced both by the spill and by the cleanup efforts that followed it. The purpose of this paper is to illustrate the social impact from the oil spill and cleanup through a discussion of three influ encing factors—the environmental damage itself, the influx of extraordinary sums of money, and the operational style of the cleanup entities.

Oil on the rocks—the 1989 Alaskan oil spill

Outline details are given of how, in March 1989, the oil tanker Exxon Valdez went aground on Bligh Reef in the Gulf of Alaska spilling about 4 x 104 m3 of crude oil. Contingency operations failed to come into action as swiftly as planned and the spill was not contained for 36 hours. The oil slick spread over a vast area of water and beaches threatening marine life in a fragile environment. Although great efforts were made to disperse the oil and to skim it off the surface, the bulk of the spillage was dealt with by natural processes. As a result of the spill, improvements in tanker design and better contingency plans in the event of a spill seem likely. The oil spill is an ideal topic for a student project, and details are given of background resources available.

CAMEO—Valdez: Charting the Progress of the Spill Cleanup1

ABSTRACT On the morning of March 24, 1989, the tanker Exxon Valdez ran aground on Bligh Reef in Alaska's Prince William Sound. The vessel was carrying more than 53 million gallons of North Slope crude oil of which almost 11 million gallons were spilled into the water. The immediately impacted area included most of the western part of the sound, but as the time went by the impacted area expanded to include parts of Seward, Homer, and Kodiak. This event became the worst oil spill in the history of this country—identified as a “spill of national significance.” Exxon's major cleanup response was closely monitored by federal, state, and various interest groups. Early in the response it was obvious to the federal on-scene coordinator (FOSC) that a computer-aided management system was necessary to monitor the progress of the spill cleanup operations. CAMEO (computer-aided management of emergency operations)—Valdez then was developed for the FOSC by the scientific support coordinator (SSC) through the efforts of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and immediately put to use.

The Federal On-Scene Coordinator's Role in the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill1

ABSTRACT On March 24, 1989, the role of the federal on-scene coordinator took on its greatest challenge when the tank vessel Exxon Valdez grounded on Bligh Reef. The vessel discharged 11 million gallons of crude oil into Prince William Sound. The oil eventually spread over a 600-mile area, fouling the shorelines and waters of some of the most pristine and unforgiving coastal areas of the United States. The Exxon Valdez spill quickly developed into a spill of national significance. Its overwhelming size required the mobilization of hundreds of vessels, aircraft, and a large variety of oil spill response equipment operated, managed, and monitored by more than 12,000 industry and agency personnel. The duration of the response (which is still proceeding) required the federal on-scene coordinator (FOSC) to develop an organization to address the operational challenges; the concerns of federal agencies, the state, native Alakans, communities, and private land owners; and the challenges created by the intense political and media interest. The OSC organization which evolved over the course of the response was based on federal authority and incorporated a decision-making process that ensured that “environmental due process” was provided.

Catastrophes and Conservation: Lessons from Sea Otters and the Exxon Valdez

In this commentary, the author considers the effort to save sea otters after the Exxon Valdez oil spill. Despite immense expenditures, the emerging facts lead to two conclusions: population losses were poorly documented, and few animals were saved. These findings cast doubt on our ability to protect sea otters from future spills and lead to troubling questions about how to recognize and document the effects of catastrophic events, and, ultimately, the utility of highly visible and expensive efforts to save wildlife from perceived environmental catastrophes. On 24 March 1989, the Exxon Valdez ran aground on Bligh Reef in northeastern Prince William Sound, spilling more than 10 million gallons of crude oil. Catastrophic losses were expected and a monumental effort was made to save sea otters. The Exxon Valdez spill spread over a linear distance of more than 700 kilometers and soiled an estimated 5,300 kilometers of shoreline. While cleaning up and capturing oiled wildlife for rehabilitation, 878 sea otter carcasses were recovered - a minimal estimate of loss. However, many animals killed by the spill undoubtedly were not found. Losses have been estimated from pre- and post-spill surveys, although these surveys shed little light on the population-level effect, mainly becausemore » the size and distribution of the population just prior to the spill is poorly known. This is because a comprehensive survey of Prince William Sound and adjacent waters was not done immediately after the spill but before oil dispersed into southwestern Prince William Sound and the northern Gulf of Alaska. Thus, although the Exxon Valdez spill undoubtedly killed many sea otters and may have reduced populations substantially, available data lack the power to demonstrate population changes.« less