Biological Weapons Convention Research Articles

APPLYING BAYES REASONING ON DISCRIMINATIONDETECTION

This research highlights the crucial role of discrimination detection in effectively implementing anti-discrimination laws. Our main goal is to advocate for the use of Bayesian reasoning as a powerful method for detection, providing a clear mathematical definition for lawyers. We emphasize the benefits of employing Bayesian reasoning in a legal context, such as addressing the Prosecutor’s Fallacy, considering evidence dependencies, and accounting for hidden assumptions like “common sense.” To apply Bayesian principles, we carefully examine variables aligned with anti-discrimination laws like the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Americans with Disabilities Act. These laws encompass important areas such as race, gender, religion, and disability. Following the guidance of the Community Relations Service’s resource guide, we collect variables related to protected characteristics, plausible discrimination scenarios, and indicators of reasonable accommodations. Our approach aims to present a well-rounded framework for discrimination detection rooted in Bayesian reasoning, meeting legal requirements and acknowledging the complex nature of discrimination in society.This research highlights the crucial role of discrimination detection in effectively implementing anti-discrimination laws. Our main goal is to advocate for the use of Bayesian reasoning as a powerful method for detection, providing a clear mathematical definition for lawyers. We emphasize the benefits of employing Bayesian reasoning in a legal context, such as addressing the Prosecutor’s Fallacy, considering evidence dependencies, and accounting for hidden assumptions like “common sense.” To apply Bayesian principles, we carefully examine variables aligned with anti-discrimination laws like the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Americans with Disabilities Act. These laws encompass important areas such as race, gender, religion, and disability. Following the guidance of the Community Relations Service’s resource guide, we collect variables related to protected characteristics, plausible discrimination scenarios, and indicators of reasonable accommodations. Our approach aims to present a well-rounded framework for discrimination detection rooted in Bayesian reasoning, meeting legal requirements and acknowledging the complex nature of discrimination in society.

Synthetic Biology and International Regulatory Law

For the purpose of constructing or generating new life forms, synthetic biology is a multidisciplinary field that blends biology with engineering, physics, mathematics, chemistry, and computer science. Making Biobricks, designing metabolic pathways, whole-genome synthesis, protocell engineering, and Xenobiology are the primary synthetic biology techniques. Synthetic biology spans a variety of industries, including pharmaceuticals, energy, chemicals, biosensors, and environmental protection. Although it has various uses, there are risk issues with biosafety, biosecurity, and bioethics. Strong regulatory rules must be developed in order to increase the risks associated with sedentary behavior. The Cartagena protocol recognizes some synthetic biology applications and outcomes as living modified organisms. The protocol's advance informed agreement governs the trans-boundary transfer of living, synthetically modified organisms. Dual-use technologies are governed by laws agreed under the Biological Weapons Convention and relate to synthetic biology products. Synthetic biology also makes use of the Nagoya Protocol, trade-relevant IP rights, and other legislative frameworks. However, because synthetic biology is a young field of study, there are no explicit regulations governing it in any way under international law. The purpose of this review is to evaluate the regulatory regulations governing synthetic biology and to describe the applications and hazards of synthetic biology.

Control over the circulation of dual-use goods and technologies within the international regimes of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction

International legal cooperation in the field of control over the export, transfer, transit of dual-use goods and technologies is based on a number of mechanisms of general competence (for example, the UN, WTO) and specific regimes, the core of which constitute international treaties on the non­proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Chemical Weapons Convention, Biological Weapons Convention) and related multilateral export control groups (Zanger Committee, Nuclear Suppliers Group, Australian Group).
 While the mentioned international treaties define the goals and basic principles of cooperation of their parties to prevent the spread of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, the critical task of intergovernmental export groups, capable of responding more promptly to security challenges in the light of technological progress and market dynamics, is to ensure the development and regular updating of lists of controlled goods, dissemination and exchange of best practices in this area, articulation of instructions for participating states regarding the strengthening of national export control systems.
 Such a structure, promoting transparency and responsible behaviour of states, objectively increases the level of international security, ensures more profound and comprehensive cooperation and interaction of participating states, regular exchange of information on sensitive dual-use goods and technologies, which leads to a consensus on the specifics of the implementation of export control systems and harmonisation of national policies and regulatory mechanisms. At the same time, taking into account the "softness” of obligations arising from the activities of specialised export groups, the effectiveness of the control mechanism depends on the goodwill of the participating states and their commitment to the values and goals of these regimes and is also complicated by the limited participation of individual actors (for instance, India, Pakistan, North Korea, etc.).

Agroterrorism involving biological agents and related threats in Poland and Europe in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine

With the growing threat of agroterrorism and the highest level of risk in Poland and the European region since the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (1972) and the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions (1977) came into force, it is important to analyse the challenges in the area of biosecurity and food security and make recommendations. The analysis carried out by the author of this article indicates that the COVID-19 pandemic has contributed to the dissemination of knowledge of the basics of microbiology and epidemiology and to the increased availability of low-cost, portable microbiological diagnostics, which may also have negative effects. The analysis took into account the possibility of foreign intelligence influencing food production in Poland, e.g. through disinformation via social media. Conclusions of the analysis include: expanding monitoring of the expert community and social media, strengthening the vigilance of food producers and agricultural experts, simulating introduction scenarios, studying radicalisation processes and using epidemiological assessment tools in case of alarming events.

A key role for scientists in strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention

It is not easy to be optimistic about international security at the present time, but 9th Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention in December 2022 agreed a renewed effort to strengthen the Convention after decades of stagnation. In March 2023 an agreement was also reached on an agenda and timetable for this effort over the next 2 years. Scientists have a long history of providing valuable input to such meetings, in this paper, we discuss how such input might best be provided with complicated challenges now facing the BWC and concluded that there is much that could be done, but greater coordination amongst scientists is needed.

Rethinking biosecurity in the 21st century: An enhanced role for civil society

In this paper, we briefly discuss the historical issues concerning the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) and analyse the current situation after the COVID-19 pandemic with emphasis on the new developments at 9th Review Conference of the BTWC. In particular, we discuss the mission of the new working group agreed at the review conference to identify, examine, and develop specific and effective measures, including possible legally binding measures and to make recommendations to strengthen and institutionalise the Convention in all its aspects, and compare it with productive activities associated with the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the World Health Organisation (WHO). The enhanced role for civil society in support of the BTWC is then proposed with some solid examples from our own recent projects. We hope this analysis will help to facilitate new thinking about strengthening BTWC in coming years.

A Modular-Incremental Approach to Improving Compliance Verification With the Biological Weapons Convention.

A Modular-Incremental Approach to Improving Compliance Verification With the Biological Weapons Convention.

Recent Developments in the National Implementation of Biological Weapons Convention: What Happened Since Resolution 1540?

Abstract The national implementation of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) has long been a point of discussion. One aspect of this national implementation concerns the enactment of penal legislation addressing the prohibitions of the BWC. There has been a clear increase in the past 18 years of penal legislation addressing biological weapons. This coincides with the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1540. Through a comprehensive assessment of the adopted national legislation it is possible to see trends and consider the extent to which such legislation seeks to address the BWC or Resolution 1540. The assessment clearly indicates that there is a divergence between the legislation addressing biological weapons in a general manner and legislation specifically seeking to address biological weapons in a terrorism context. This analysis will recognize potential avenues to increase national implementation of the BWC by looking at the progress made in the context of Resolution 1540.

Guarding Against Catastrophic Biological Risks: Preventing State Biological Weapon Development and Use by Shaping Intentions.

Guarding Against Catastrophic Biological Risks: Preventing State Biological Weapon Development and Use by Shaping Intentions.

A Model Compliance Regime for the Biological Weapons Convention

A Model Compliance Regime for the Biological Weapons Convention

International legal issues on biosafety: general overview

Objective: The legal concept and content of biosafety is discussed in the context of International Law. Biosafety issues are enumerated as part of a definition of concrete aspects related to responsibility of the states for using biological weapons. The latest trends in international law on ensuring the international biosafety are analysed. Legal issues concerning the definition of a just war are discussed in terms of international humanitarian law, the issues of fundamental principles in current international law (the principle of necessity governing the use of force, the right of states to self-defence in case of a bioattack, the principle of the peaceful settlement of international disputes, the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of states, arms control, and responsibility). The article presents an overview of new types of sovereignty such as biosovereignty, cyber sovereignty, and genomic sovereignty of states, along with the legal concept of international biocrime (genomocide), as well as classifications of bioterrorism, bioaggression, biopolitics and bioeconomics. Under current conditions, the importance of facilitating a broad interpretation of the concept of biosafety is emphasized.Methodology: The research uses general scientific and special cognitive techniques wherein legal analysis and synthesis, systemic, formal-legal, comparative-legal, historical-legal and dialectical methods are applied.Results: Despite the prohibition of biological weapons, urgent issues, such as establishing an international control mechanism for monitoring the non-proliferation of biological weapons, remain. Moreover, the Protocol to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), which entered into force in 1975, is yet to be fully adopted and / or ratified by all member states. Identifying certain types of biomedical research that should be banned according to generally accepted principles, the study concludes that the problem of banning these research activities has yet to be solved by some states. The concept of biosafety is interpreted broadly in terms of issues arising in relevant industrial processes. Biosecurity and biosafety are directly related to ensuring environmental security, marine security, food security and the security of outer space. Principles governing effective legal regulation for ensuring environmental, biological, and food safety are presented.

Multiple Streams, Open Windows, and yet No Solution

Abstract Article VII of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) requires states to provide emergency assistance in the case of a deliberate bioweapons attack on any state party to the convention. Since no operational mechanism defining how to request or provide such assistance has yet been established, the painful lessons of the 2014–2016 West African Ebola crisis returned this topic to the agenda of the BWC. This study uses multiple streams analysis to investigate the impact of the Ebola crisis on the considerations of Article VII. While it revived the three streams of the debate—problem, policy, and politics—and opened a policy window, nevertheless, no political entrepreneur was able to couple the streams to produce policy output. As this window of opportunity begins to close, the Covid-19 pandemic seems to be the next focusing event shaping the BWC discourse on emergency assistance.

BWC assurance: increasing certainty in BWC compliance

ABSTRACT Following the 2001 end to negotiations on a legally binding protocol, states parties to the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) developed entrenched positions about the necessity of treaty verification, hindering progress on treaty aims. The study described in this article was designed to facilitate dialogue on verification-related issues outside the context of those positions, using the term “assurance” to represent the degree of certainty that states parties are meeting their treaty obligations. From August 2020 to July 2021, the researchers conducted 36 interviews—16 with state-party delegations and 20 with independent experts, representing 20 countries. They performed mixed-methods analysis on the interviews, including quantitative metrics on qualitative interview content. Interviewees’ views on verification, compliance, and related concepts varied widely. Future efforts by states parties to achieve common understanding on these topics could facilitate concrete progress. While no single mechanism is sufficient to achieve verification or assess compliance, packages of mechanisms could increase assurance. Interviewees expressed general support for implementing assurance mechanisms, even in the absence of a comprehensive, legally binding protocol or verification regime, even among states parties for which that is the primary goal. Avenues to increase assurance among BWC stakeholders merit further discussion in the current intersessional program.

Assessing emerging technologies from an arms control perspective.

Developments in science and technology improve health and wellbeing of humankind, for example with better methods to detect and treat diseases. However, some advances have led to the development of weapons of mass destruction: chemical and biological weapons. Although banned by international treaties, chemical weapons have been used in recent years in assassinations and the Syrian civil war. Additionally, biological weapons became the subject of recent suspicions and allegations. While not limited to these fields, the so-called dual-use potential—the possibility to apply aspects both with benevolent or malevolent intentions—is especially pronounced in the life sciences. Here, we showcase some areas explored at the conference series Spiez CONVERGENCE that facilitates an exchange between science, arms control and international security. Together, these communities discuss the potential impact of life scientific advances on the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions. Enabled by digital technologies, DNA sequencing and synthesis provide the toolbox to (re)construct viruses and cells, which demonstrated invaluable during the COVID-19 pandemic but bear the misuse risk to allow intentionally triggering an outbreak. Open databases and algorithms could be used to generate new chemical weapons. We argue that preventing unintended consequences of life science research while promoting its benefits with responsible science, requires awareness and reflection about unexpected risks of everyone involved in the research process. The strength of the ban of chemical and biological weapons also depends on scientists interacting with policy makers in evaluating risks and implementing measures to reduce them.

Key issues in the implementation of the Tianjin Biosecurity Guidelines for Codes of Conduct for Scientists: A survey of biosecurity education projects

In order to effectively implement the Tianjin Biosecurity Guidelines for Codes of Conduct for Scientists, biosecurity awareness-raising and education are essential because if these are not in place scientists will not understand the need for biosecurity codes of conduct. In an effort to assist in the implementation of the guidelines, a small-scale survey was carried out in early 2022 of biosecurity awareness-raising and education projects that have been developed over the last two decades to discoverwhat resources and experience have been accumulated. It is argued that the survey demonstrates that much of what is needed to implement the guidelines effectively has been developed, but that there are specific deficiencies that need to be remedied quickly. In particular, an updated teaching resource covering the core issues related to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) and the problem of dual use in scientific research needs to be made widely available and translated into at least the six official United Nations (UN) languages. Additionally, more specialists from the Humanities with expertise in ethics need to become involved in biosecurity awareness-raising and education activities. While advantage should be taken now of the available national, regional and international networks of people involved in related activities, it is suggested that in the longer term cooperation in biosecurity awareness-raising and education will benefit from the development of an equivalent organisation to the International Nuclear Security Education Network (INSEN) organised through the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Inactivation of ricin by constituents present in a skin decontamination lotion

Ricin is a proteinaceous toxin, listed on the schedules of both the chemical and biological weapons conventions. The ease of accessibility to the Ricinus communis plant and toxin extraction makes ricin a viable concern for use of intentional release and causal effects. The adverse effects following exposure to the toxin are caused by the bipartite molecular structure of ricin which allows binding to the mammalian cell surface, enter via endocytic uptake, and deliver the catalytically active polypeptide into the cell cytosol where it irreversibly inhibits protein synthesis, causing cell death. In the present study, the inactivation effectiveness of RSDL® (Reactive Skin Decontamination Lotion) and its individual inactivating constituents (Potassium 2,3-butanedione monoximate (KBDO) and 2,3-butanedione (DAM)) was evaluated for ricin using a number of read out systems including a cytotoxicity assay, quantitative sandwich ELISA test, and a mass spectrometry-based assay. The results demonstrate that RSDL is able to abolish ricin activity after an incubation time of 30 min as determined in the cytotoxicity assay, and after 2 min as determined in the ELISA assay. Mass spectrometric analysis provided evidence that RSDL is able to induce cleavage of the disulfide linkage between the A- and B- polypeptide chain of ricin which is crucial to the inactivation of the toxin, but this seems not the only mechanism of inactivation. Follow on studies would assist to elucidate the details of the toxin inactivation because it is possible that additional generic mechanisms are in place for denaturation with the RSDL lotion components. This may also provide a promise for testing and inactivation with RSDL of other protein toxins.

Plague, Pestilence and the Peninsula: International Humanitarian Law Concerns of North Korea’s Biological Weapons Program

Abstract Suspected development of advanced biological weapons by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea), despite its status as a party to both the Biological Weapons Convention and other nonproliferation agreements, bears significant implications for both public health and security around the globe. A steady decrease in resources and attention devoted to preparedness for biological attacks or outbreaks since 2001 has exacerbated the vulnerability of the USA and its allies to outbreaks of such pathogens, both from North Korean biological weapons and natural sources. This article assesses several International Humanitarian Law (IHL) issues raised by the prospect of an international armed conflict in which North Korea deploys biological weapons. Historical context is discussed to contextualize the various IHL issues raised by a potential armed conflict, which include United Nations Enforcement actions, anticipatory self-defense, protection of civilians, targeting and proportionality. Preparing for and responding to a potential biological weapons attack by North Korea presents a host of unique challenges for the USA and its allies. An international armed conflict involving the use of such weapons by North Korea against the USA or its allies would be devastating for civilians and military personnel alike. It is thus imperative to understand the IHL issues raised by such a conflict, including circumstances that would warrant pre-emptive use of force by the USA and its allies, the scale and scope of any military response, and the need to protect civilians throughout the Korean peninsula.

Problems of Biosafety in Current International Law

INTRODUCTION. The presented article is devoted to an extremely curious and, without exaggeration, urgent topic. The authors seek to understand the content and legal concept of biosafety in International Law. The researchers seek to list the biosafety issues in order to define concrete aspects related to responsibility of the States for using biological weapons. The authors analyze new legal trends on ensuring the international biosafety. The article is focused on legal issues by raising many questions about what should be considered a just war in the view of international humanitarian law, the issues of fundamental principles in current international law (the principle use of force, the right of States to self-defense in case of a bioattack, the principle of the peaceful settlement of international disputes, the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of States, arms control, and responsibility). The writers give an overview of new types of sovereignty such as biosovereignty, cyber sovereignty, cyberbiosovereignty, and genomic sovereignty of States, the legal concept of international biocrimes (genomocide), the legal classification of bioterrorism, bioaggression, biopolitics, and bioeconomics. The authors consider the importance of facilitating the broad interpretation of the concept of biosafety.MATERIALS AND METHODS. The research uses general scientific and special cognitive techniques wherein legal analysis and synthesis, systemic, formal-legal, comparative-legal, historical-legal and dialectical methods are applied.RESEARCH RESULTS. The authors found out that despite the prohibition of biological weapon there are still other urgent issues such as an international control mechanism for monitoring the non-proliferation of biological weapons has not been established yet. The Protocol to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) has not been adopted yet. The study concludes with an idea that the problem of banning certain types of biomedical research has not been solved in some States and at the international level. The authors note such important problems as the lack of an international control mechanism for monitoring the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons, as well as the threat to the safety of genomic research and confidentiality of genetic data. In this paper, we interpret the concept of biosafety rather broadly, considering the issues typical of allied industries. Biosecurity and biosafety are directly related to ensuring environmental security, marine security, food security and outer space security. The researchers paid attention to the issue of legal regulation of ensuring environmental, biological, and food safety. Due to this fact, it is hard to do so with regard to the causal link between the acts (bioterrorism) of state agencies, the violation of the principles of international law, standards of human rights and the consequences that occurred. It is not clear from the text of the BTWC Convention which international organ/body can investigate such acts in international affairs and which norm of international law directly should be applied.DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS. Following a review of the content, the authors raise possible problems, strategies, suggestions and guidelines for ensuring biosafety in international law. The authors conclude that near future new categories of weapons of mass destruction appear in the world, moreover, genetic weapons should be classified as weapons of mass destruction, along with chemical, biological, bacteriological, and nuclear weapons. Technological developments will trigger the issues of fundamental principles in current international law. The authors came to the conclusion about extension of the universal jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court in case biological and genetic weapons are used. The authors encourage the complement to the international legal regulation the necessity to adopt a Protocol to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), establishing an international control mechanism for verifying prohibitions on the development, production, and stockpiling of biological weapons is obvious. The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction adopted in 1993, which contains a mechanism for verifying compliance with the prohibitions of the Convention, can be considered a precedent for the effective regulation of the circulation of hazardous substances all over the world.

Governance of Heritable Human Gene Editing World-Wide and Beyond.

To date, the controversy surrounding the unknown risks and consequences of heritable genome editing has grown, with such work raising biosafety and ethical concerns for future generations. However, the current guideline of global governance is limited. In the context of the new framework for the governance of human genome editing developed by the World Health Organization (WHO) committee, this paper presents further analysis by highlighting predicaments of governance on germline engineering that merit the most attention: (1) building a scientific culture informed by a broader set of values and considerations in the internal scientific community at large, such as codes of ethics, and education, in addition to awareness-raising measures; and (2) reflecting on and institutionalizing policies in grassroots practice according to local conditions in external governance, such as the experimentalist governance, which is a multi-layered model of governance that establishes an open-ended framework from the top and offers stakeholders the freedom of discussion. The key to achieving these goals is more democratic deliberation between the public and the inclusive engagement of the global scientific community, which has been extensively used in the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). On a global scale, we believe that practicing heritable human genome editing in accordance with the WHO and BTWC appears to be a good choice.

Complementarity of International Instruments in the Field of Biosecurity.

The COVID-19 pandemic has demonstrated the devastating impact of infectious disease outbreaks and the threat of emerging and re-emerging dangerous pathogens, independent of their origin. Natural, accidental, and deliberate disease outbreaks all need systems in place for an effective public health response. The best known international instrument in the field of public health is the WHO International Health Regulations (2005). Although the International Health Regulations are mainly focused on natural disease outbreaks, the actions to take to comply with them also contribute to biosecurity and non-proliferation. This paper examines in case of full implementation of the International Health Regulations, what other actions states should take to comply with international biosecurity instruments, including the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, to effectively prevent and defend against intentional biological threats. An overview of international instruments from different disciplines regarding biosecurity is presented. Furthermore, this paper clarifies the similarities between the international biosecurity instruments and addresses the additional requirements that instruments stipulate. From a detailed comparison between the instruments it can be concluded that, to adhere to all legally-binding international biosecurity instruments, specific non-proliferation and export control measures are necessary in addition to full implementation of the International Health Regulations. Additionally, an overview of non-legally binding instruments in the field of biosecurity is presented and practical implementation examples are highlighted. Compliance with legally binding instruments can be improved by precise guidance provided by non-legally binding instruments that are clear and attuned to the situation on the ground. To improve understanding of the existing international instruments, this paper aims to provide an overview of the international legal biosecurity framework to biosecurity experts, policymakers, civil servants, and practitioners. It offers possible practical applications for the politico-legal context and accommodates the enhancement of full employment of biosecurity resources for an improved multidisciplinary capacity to prevent, detect, and respond to infectious disease outbreaks.