Binding Borrowing Constraints Research Articles

Idiosyncratic Income Risk and Aggregate Fluctuations

We study how the presence of idiosyncratic income risk affects aggregate fluctuations in the absence of binding borrowing constraints and/or cyclical income risk. Its impact is shown to be captured by the response of a consumption-weighted average of individual consumption risk to aggregate shocks. We analyze two example economies—an endowment economy and a New Keynesian economy—and show that, under plausible calibrations, the impact of idiosyncratic income risk on aggregate fluctuations is quantitatively small since most of the changes in consumption risk are concentrated among poorer (low-consumption) households. (JEL E12, E21, E24, E32)

Housing Boom‐Bust Cycles and Asymmetric Macroprudential Policy

AbstractIn this paper, I argue that occasionally binding borrowing constraints are a source of nonlinearity that warrant an appropriate nonlinear macroprudential policy response. Nonlinear policy responses likely better capture the spirit of macroprudential policy. I show that an asymmetric macroprudential policy rule, which lowers the borrowing limit more aggressively during credit booms, obtains better economic outcomes compared to an optimized symmetric rule that is typically studied in the literature. An asymmetric policy response reduces output and inflation tail risks, generating not only better economic stabilization but also positive externalities to monetary policy.

Rational housing demand bubble

We provide a unified framework with demand for housing over the life cycle and financial frictions to analyze the existence and macroeconomic effects of rational housing bubbles. We distinguish a housing price bubble, defined as the difference between the housing market price and its fundamental value, from a housing demand bubble, which corresponds to a situation where a pure speculative housing demand exists. In an overlapping generation exchange economy, we show that no housing price bubble occurs. However, a housing demand bubble may occur, generating a boom in housing prices and a drop in the interest rate, when households face a binding borrowing constraint. The multiplicity of steady states and endogenous fluctuations can occur when credit market imperfections are moderate. These fluctuations involve transitions between equilibria with and without a housing demand bubble that generate large fluctuations in housing prices consistent with observed patterns. We finally extend the basic framework to a production economy and we show that a housing demand bubble increases housing prices, which can still be characterized by large fluctuations.

Monetary and Macroprudential Policies Under Dollar-Denominated Foreign Debt

This paper studies the optimal monetary and macroprudential policies in a small open economy that borrows from abroad in foreign currency. The model features a novel mechanism in which sudden stops due to an occasionally binding borrowing constraint trigger a sharp currency depreciation through balance of payments adjustments, thereby increase the domestic-currency value of foreign debt and cause severe economic downturns. A policy analysis shows that a contractionary monetary policy mitigates depreciation during a crisis, but the anticipation of policy interventions during the crisis induces larger borrowings ex ante and destabilizes the economy. A combination of an ex ante macroprudential tax on foreign borrowing and ex post monetary policy interventions can stabilize the economy and improve social welfare.

Fiscal spending multipliers over the household leverage cycle

This paper investigates household leverage-dependent fiscal policy effects in a two-agent New Keynesian DSGE model with occasionally binding borrowing constraints. Our model successfully replicates empirical evidence showing that fiscal policy’s effectiveness differs significantly across the household leverage cycle. Fiscal multipliers are persistently above unity when government spending rises at the peak of the household leverage cycle. In contrast, increases in government spending at the trough of the household leverage cycle imply fiscal multipliers below unity. We test the model’s predictions on post-WWII U.S. data.

Testing the presence of borrowing constraints from consumption responses to housing deposit changes

The literature on consumption recognizes the challenge of identifying the presence of borrowing constraints at the household level. In this study, we utilize a unique Korean housing contract, a chonsei contract, to characterize the consumption response to housing deposit changes when households are not limited by borrowing constraints. More specifically, we derive a lower bound for consumption changes, the violation of which indicates the presence of binding borrowing constraints. Applying the result to Korean household data, we identify a group of borrowing-constrained households and confirm the association between borrowing constraints and the excess sensitivity of consumption.

Monetary policy and household net worth

This paper investigates the interrelation between household balance sheets, collateral constraints, and monetary policy. Using data on the U.S. economy, we estimate a monetary DSGE model with financial frictions and occasionally binding borrowing constraints. The model implies stronger effects of monetary policy interventions when the borrowing constraint is binding compared to situations when it turns slack. In a prediction analysis we find that, out of a set of alternative plausible endogenous model variables, the level of household net worth is the single best predictor of the tightness of the borrowing constraint, which implies that monetary policy is more effective when household net worth is low. We test this model prediction in the data and provide robust empirical evidence on asymmetric effects of monetary policy across the household net worth cycle that validates the model predictions. A contractionary monetary policy shock leads to a large and significant fall in economic activity during periods of low household net worth. In contrast, monetary policy shocks have only small and mostly insignificant effects when net worth is high.

Reference‐dependent preferences, time inconsistency, and pay‐as‐you‐go pensions

AbstractThe classic Aaron–Samuelson result argues that pay‐as‐you‐go (PAYG) pension schemes cannot coexist with higher‐return, private, retirement‐saving schemes. The ensuing literature shows if agents voluntarily undersave for retirement due to myopia or time‐inconsistency, then a paternalistic, rationale for PAYG pensions arises only if voluntary retirement saving is fully crowded out because of a binding borrowing constraint. This paper generalizes the discussion to the reference‐dependent utility setup of Kőszegi and Rabin (2009) where undersaving happens naturally. No borrowing constraint is imposed. We show it is possible to offer a non‐paternalistic, welfare rationale for return‐dominated, PAYG pensions to coexist with private, retirement saving.

A model of state-dependent monetary policy

In the presence of occasionally binding borrowing constraints, the responses of output to monetary policy shocks depend on the Euler equation of unconstrained households. Conversely, the set of unconstrained households depends on the responses of output. I show analytically that this equilibrium interaction creates state-dependent and asymmetric output responses. When stockholders’ incomes are more pro-cyclical than non-stockholders’, output responds less to monetary policy in recessions, and contractionary monetary policy is more powerful than expansionary policy. These results are consistent with the empirical evidence.

Estimating Macroeconomic Models of Financial Crises: An Endogenous Regime-Switching Approach

We develop a new approach to estimating DSGE models with occasionally binding borrowing constraints and apply it to Mexico's business cycle and financial crisis history. We propose a new endogenous regime-switching specification of the borrowing constraint, develop a general perturbation method to solve the model, and estimate it using Bayesian methods. The estimated model fits the data with well-behaved shocks, identifying three crisis episodes of varying duration and intensity: the early-1980s Debt Crisis, the mid-1990s Tequila Crisis, and the late-2000s Global Financial Crisis. The estimated crisis episodes are much more persistent and in line with the data than traditional models.

Reference-Dependent Preferences, Time Inconsistency, and Unfunded Pensions

In the real world, public pay-as-you-go pension (PAYG) schemes are popular and co-exist with private, retirement-saving schemes. This is true even in dynamically efficient economies where such pensions offer a lower return. The classic Aaron-Samuelson result argues that, in theory, this is impossible. Later work has shown that it may be possible if agents, left on their own, undersave due to myopia or time-inconsistency. In that case, if the government is paternalistic, a welfare rationale for PAYG pensions arises but only if voluntary retirement saving is fully crowded out because of a binding borrowing constraint. This paper generalizes the Aaron-Samuelson discussion to the reference-dependent utility setup of Kőszegi and Rabin (2009) where undersaving happens naturally. No borrowing constraint is imposed. In this case, it is possible to offer a non-paternalistic, welfare rationale for return-dominated, PAYG pensions to coexist with private retirement saving.

Estimating Macroeconomic Models of Financial Crises: An Endogenous Regime-Switching Approach

We estimate a workhorse DSGE model with an occasionally binding borrowing constraint. First, we propose a new specification of the occasionally binding constraint, where the transition between the unconstrained and constrained states is a stochastic function of the leverage level and the constraint multiplier. This specification maps into an endogenous regime-switching model. Second, we develop a general perturbation method for the solution of such a model. Third, we estimate the model with Bayesian methods to fit Mexico's business cycle and financial crisis history since 1981. The estimated model fits the data well, identifying three crisis episodes of varying duration and intensity: the Debt Crisis in the early-1980s, the Peso Crisis in the mid-1990s, and the Global Financial Crisis in the late-2000s. The crisis episodes generated by the estimated model display sluggish and long-lasting build-up and stagnation phases driven by plausible combinations of shocks. Different sets of shocks explain different variables over the business cycle and the three historical episodes of sudden stops identified.

Estimating Macroeconomic Models of Financial Crises: An Endogenous Regime Switching Approach

We estimate a workhorse DSGE model with an occasionally binding borrowing constraint. First, we propose a new specification of the occasionally binding constraint, where the transition between the unconstrained and constrained states is a stochastic function of the leverage level and the constraint multiplier. This specification maps into an endogenous regime-switching model. Second, we develop a general perturbation method for the solution of such a model. Third, we estimate the model with Bayesian methods to fit Mexico's business cycle and financial crisis history since 1981. The estimated model fits the data well, identifying three crisis episodes of varying duration and intensity: the Debt Crisis in the early-1980s, the Peso Crisis in the mid-1990s, and the Global Financial Crisis in the late-2000s. These crisis episodes display sluggish and long-lasting build-up and recovery phases driven by plausible combinations of shocks.

Optimal Policy for Macro-Financial Stability

In this paper we study whether policy makers should wait to intervene until a financial crisis strikes or rather act in a preemptive manner. We study this question in a relatively simple dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model in which crises are endogenous events induced by the presence of an occasionally binding borrowing constraint as in Mendoza (2010). First, we show that the same set of taxes that replicates the constrained social planner allocation could be used optimally by a Ramsey planner to achieve the first best unconstrained equilibrium: in both cases without any precautionary intervention. Second, we show that the extent to which policymakers should intervene in a preemptive manner depends critically on the set of policy tools available and what these instruments can achieve when a crisis strikes. For example, in the context of our model, we find that, if the policy tools is constrained so that the first best cannot be achieved and the policy maker has access to only one tax instrument, it is always desirable to intervene before the crisis regardless of the instrument used. If however the policy maker has access to two instruments, it is optimal to act only during crisis times. Third and finally, we propose a computational algorithm to solve Markov-Perfect optimal policy for problems in which the policy function is not differentiable.

Bubble on real estate: the role of altruism and fiscal policy

Abstract In this paper, we are interested in the interplay between real estate bubble, aggregate capital accumulation and taxation in an overlapping generations economy with altruistic households. We consider a three-period overlapping generations model with three key elements: altruism, portfolio choice, and financial market imperfections. Households realise different investment decisions in terms of asset at different periods of life, face a binding borrowing constraint and leave bequests to their children. We show that altruism plays a key role on the existence of a productive real estate bubble, i.e. a bubble in real estate raising physical capital stock and aggregate output. The key mechanism relies on the fact that a real estate bubble raises income of retired households. Because of higher bequests, there children are able to invest more in productive capital. Introducing fiscal policy, we show that raising real estate taxation dampens capital accumulation.

Risk Aversion and Precautionary Savings in Dynamic Settings

We study the saving behavior of infinitely long-lived agents who face income uncertainty and deterministic interest rates. Using monotone recursive preferences, we prove that risk aversion unambiguously increases savings. The result accounts for possibly binding borrowing constraints and holds for very general specification of income uncertainty, which can follow any kind of stochastically monotone process. Codes are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2017.2959 . This paper was accepted by Han Bleichrodt, decision analysis.

Credit Crunches from Occasionally Binding Bank Borrowing Constraints

AbstractWe present a model in which banks and other financial intermediaries face both occasionally binding borrowing constraints, and costs of equity issuance. Near the steady state, these intermediaries can raise equity finance at no cost through retained earnings. However, even moderately large shocks cause their borrowing constraints to bind, leading to contractions in credit offered to firms, and requiring the intermediaries to raise further funds by paying the cost to issue equity. This leads to the occasional sharp increases in interest spreads and the countercyclical, positively skewed equity issuance that are characteristics of the credit crunches observed in the data.

Optimal Policy for Macro-Financial Stability

This paper studies whether policymakers should wait to intervene until a financial crisis strikes or rather act in a preemptive manner. This question is examined in a relatively simple dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model in which crises are endogenous events induced by the presence of an occasionally binding borrowing constraint as in Mendoza (2010). First, the paper shows that the same set of taxes that replicates the constrained social planner allocation could be used optimally by a Ramsey planner to achieve the first best unconstrained equilibrium: in both cases without any precautionary intervention. Second, the paper shows that the extent to which policymakers should intervene in a preemptive manner depends critically on the set of policy tools available and what these instruments can achieve when a crisis strikes. For example, in the context of the model, it is found that, if the policy tools are constrained so that the first best cannot be achieved and the policymaker has access to only one tax instrument, it is always desirable to intervene before the crisis regardless of the instrument used. If, however, the policymaker has access to two instruments, it is optimal to act only during crisis times. Third and finally, the paper proposes a computational algorithm to solve Markov-perfect optimal policy for problems in which the policy function is not differentiable.

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Bubble on Real Estate: The Role of Altruism and Fiscal Policy

In this paper, we are interested in the interplay between real estate bubble, aggregate capital accumulation and taxation in an overlapping generations economy with altruistic households. We consider a three-period overlapping generations model with three key elements: altruism, portfolio choice, and financial market imperfections. Households realise different investment decisions in terms of asset at different periods of life, face a binding borrowing constraint and leave bequests to their children. We show that altruism plays a key role on the existence of a productive real estate bubble, i.e. a bubble in real estate raising physical capital stock and aggregate output. The key mechanism relies on the fact that a real estate bubble raises income of retired households. Because of higher bequests, there children are able to invest more in productive capital. Introducing fiscal policy, we show that raising real estate taxation dampens capital accumulation.