Bill Prices Research Articles

At War with Corruption: A Biography of Bill Price, U.S. Attorney for the Western District of Oklahoma by Michael J. Hightower

Reviewed by: At War with Corruption: A Biography of Bill Price, U.S. Attorney for the Western District of Oklahoma by Michael J. Hightower Aaron Bachhofer At War with Corruption: A Biography of Bill Price, U.S. Attorney for the Western District of Oklahoma. By Michael J. Hightower. Foreword by Frank Keating. (Norman, Okla.: 2 Cities Press, 2021. Pp. xx, 466. $29.95, ISBN 978-0-9847056-3-4.) The idea that corruption and chicanery were both frequent and familiar to Oklahomans remains a widely accepted perception of the state’s political history. Proponents posit that residents tolerated this “Soonerism” out of a misplaced sense of prairie populism, general apathy, or genuine ignorance of modern protocol (p. xiii). In At War with Corruption: A Biography of Bill Price, U.S. Attorney for the Western District of Oklahoma, independent historian Michael J. Hightower challenges that perception, arguing that Oklahomans were not tolerant of corruption. Rather, he asserts, the structure of state and local governments made corruption much too easy to institute and terribly difficult to eliminate. To support this notion, Hightower introduces readers to the political life of his friend William S. “Bill” Price, who served as U.S. Attorney for the Western District of Oklahoma from 1975 to 1989 and who spent the vast majority of his public and private life seeking to end political malfeasance in Oklahoma. A native Oklahoman who saw corruption as a threat to the legitimacy of state and national institutions, Bill Price forged ahead in political circles with an enviable fortitude and a sense of fairness that governed his entire public career. Educated at Georgetown University and the University of Oklahoma, Price was a devout Catholic convert and a proud family man. After his tenure as a U.S. Attorney, he mounted unsuccessful campaigns for the governorship and a seat in the U.S. House of Representatives, built a successful law practice, and advocated for criminal justice reform in Oklahoma. His reputation for honesty, hard work, and sharp intellect led his campaign manager and fellow political animal, Tom Cole, to remark that Price was “the best governor Oklahoma never had” (p. x). Aside from Price’s formative years, Hightower details, in abbreviated strokes, the painful series of political cancers that have plagued the Sooner State since its birth: the dispossession and murder of Indigenous Americans; the 1923 impeachment of the anti-Klan governor Jack Walton; the Oklahoma Supreme Court payola scandal of 1964; State Treasurer Leo Winters’s financial issues; and Governor David Hall’s extortion conviction, events that made national news regularly throughout the twentieth century. A significant part of the narrative’s second half focuses on Price’s prosecution of the Oklahoma county commissioner scandal—often called “Okscam” in state and federal circles. Hightower relates that the pervasiveness and normalization of county corruption stunned Price. Powerful county commissioners took bribes—often in exchange for awarding contracts—and the costs of their corruption were passed on to taxpayers. The fact that Price became the lead prosecutor ferreting out these crimes from his federal post illustrated a central weakness in Oklahoma law—the lack of multicounty grand jury systems that gave state prosecutors more discretion in their pursuit of justice. The scandal made Oklahoma a national political joke, but it encouraged officials to pursue much needed reforms in government purchasing and accountability. Price spent the rest of his tenure as U.S. Attorney investigating [End Page 396] drug cartels, bank fraud, corruption at the Oklahoma Corporation Commission, and other odious situations. Readers will find firsthand information included in these pages from Oklahoma political legends like G. T. Blankenship, Henry Bellmon, Frank Keating, Gene Stipe, and Tom Cole—men who helped shape politics in the state for upwards of seventy-five years. Most of the key “good guys” are included here—those who helped Price pursue wrongdoing or provided him with invaluable guidance during his political career. But Hightower’s narrative is missing a wider engagement with sources who might have been critical of Price, or at least those who challenged his commitment to law and order, which would have offered more balance. Hightower should be commended for offering readers a powerful, raw look at politics...

At War with Corruption: A Biography of Bill Price, U.S. Attorney for the Western District of Oklahoma. By Michael J. Hightower

<i>At War with Corruption: A Biography of Bill Price, U.S. Attorney for the Western District of Oklahoma</i>. By Michael J. Hightower

Interest Rates and Inflation Revisited

Abstract The continuously compounded (CC) interest rate on a one-month Treasury bill observed at the end of month t–1 is the sum of a CC expected real return and a CC expected inflation rate, Rt–1 = Et–1(rt) + Et–1(It). Two approaches are used to split Rt–1 between its two components. In the first, models for rt produce estimates of Et–1(rt), which are used to infer Et–1(It) as Rt–1 – Et–1(rt). The second approach models It to produce estimates of Et–1(It) and infer Et–1(rt) as Rt–1 – Et–1(It). By design, the estimates of Et–1(rt) and Et–1(It) from both approaches have the properties implied by rational bill prices. Received October 10, 2018; Editorial decision December 31, 2018 By Editor Jeffrey Pontiff

Interest Rates and Inflation Revisited

The continuously compounded (CC) interest rate on a one-month Treasury bill observed at the end of month t-1 is the sum of a CC expected real return and a CC expected inflation rate, Rt-1 = Et-1(rt) + Et-1(It). Two approaches are used to split Rt-1 between its two components. In the first, models for rt produce estimates of Et-1(rt) which are used to infer Et-1(It) as Rt-1- Et-1(rt). The second approach models It to produce estimates of Et-1(It) and infer Et-1(rt) as Rt-1- Et-1(It). By design, the estimates of Et-1(rt) and Et-1(It) from both approaches have the properties implied by rational bill prices.

Never Mind the Bollocks: A Tech-Processual Analysis

Never Mind the Bollocks, Here's the Sex Pistols was a record made under highly unorthodox circumstances. In this article, four contextual cornerstones of record production study are considered: the recording workplace (studio); recordist(s); the sound recording and production technology; and production processes and techniques. The tech-processual context of Never Mind the Bollocks is considered in full, before a detailed production analysis of the track “Sub Mission.” The analysis reveals the extent of the contribution made by recordists Chris Thomas and Bill Price to the overall sonic character and shape of the record. This is not an example of “auteurism,” but an illumination of how Never Mind the Bollocks has come to be understood as a quintessentially rock—as opposed to punk—record.

The impact of the UK governments spending review into the Feed in Tariff (FIT) on the installation on photovoltaic panels in the residential sector

Purpose – In October 2011 the Government brought in measures to reduce the revenue provided by the Feed in Tariff (FIT) system. This change came under a lot of opposition due to the potential affects that it would have upon the industry. The purpose of this paper is to explore the potential benefits of the FIT and the impact that the Governments Comprehensive Spending Review had upon the industry and its uptake by the householders. Design/methodology/approach – For the study and to calculate the benefits of the FIT, a predictive modelling tool was built that could calculate the potential income and savings for a household. A photovoltaic (PV) installation was then monitored for over a year and the results of the predictive modelling tool were compared to actual results produced from the system to show how accurate the modelling tool was. The impacts of the Governments comprehensive spending review and the potential impacts in the industry were then calculated and discussed. Findings – The FIT is still a good incentive for people investing in PV. However, the reduction in the FIT may impact the “Rent a Roof” system and this in turn will impact most heavily on lower income families. The research also concluded that the changes in the political agenda have had a major impact on the FIT for both the industry and the community. Thus, the solar FITs will continue to be an attractive incentive in place to pay for heating through renewable means and thus ensuring reducing the own carbon footprint. Concomitantly, well-developed ownership schemes need to be put in place. Originality/value – The reduction in the FIT was the right move by the Government as it should prevent the increase in energy bill prices which will affect the people without PV at this point in time. It also has been set so that it is still generous enough to encourage the industry and stimulate installation as there is still profit but not in a way that should put people off. The UK may just have to take time to realise that the FITs are still a good deal after the very generous tariff that preceded them.

Investor mood and financial markets

Numerous studies in recent decades have linked investor mood and financial market behavior, but most works have been empirical investigations. This paper bridges the gap between empirical findings and financial theory. By slightly modifying the Lucas (Lucas, R.E., 1978. Asset prices in an exchange economy. Econometrica 46, 1429–1445.) model, this study shows how investor mood variations affect equilibrium asset prices and expected returns. Analysis results indicate that both equity and bill prices correlate positively with investor mood, with higher asset prices associated with better mood. Conversely, expected asset returns correlate negatively with investor mood. Further, the mood effect on asset prices increases when investors are in a good mood, and mood variations exhibit a greater influence on equity markets than on bill markets. Results of this study suggest that investor mood is a vital factor in equilibrium asset prices and returns, and integrating investor mood into asset-pricing models helps to interpret the growing body of seemingly anomalous evidence regarding investor behavior.

The Best service...

≫The avoidance of calls is the central aim of every Call Center.≪ A thesis discussed at a forum, brought controversial views to light and became an exploratory expedition between call avoidance and no service. A subject that Call Center pioneer, author and CallCenterWorld keynote speaker Bill Price has explored further in a discussion at the CallCenterWorld in Berlin.

Estimating the Term Structure of Volatility in Futures Yield - A Maximum Likelihood Approach

The volatility structure of 90-day bill futures traded on the the Sydney Futures Exchange is analysed within the framework of the Heath-Jarrow-Morton model. The method involves characterisation of the transition probability density function for the forward rate process represented by the stochastic differential equation in the arbitrage-free economy. Maximisation of the likelihood function then results in the estimates of the parameters of the volatility function. The volatility function is also used in a simulation of the preference-free stochastic differential equation for bill prices.

William Charles Price. 1 April 1909—10 March 1993

William Charles Price, known as Bill Price to his friends and colleagues, was a spectroscopist whose work spanned the disciplines of physics and of chemistry. He made important contributions to our understanding of the electronic structure of molecules through his pioneering developments in vacuum ultraviolet spectroscopy and photoelectron spectroscopy. He was a superb experimentalist, a formidable theorist and an extraordinary innovator. Perhaps more than any other physical scientist of the age he symbolized the approach of the great 19th-century physical scientists who constructed their own apparatus, made their own measurements and developed the theories for interpreting their own results. He and his research group were constantly at the forefront of new instrumental developments and the interpretation of the novel data that could then be produced. The greater part of his career was spent at King's College, London, where he was the Wheatstone Professor of Physics.

A test of the cost of carry relationship for the Australian 90 day bank accepted bill futures market

In competitive markets participants in the markets rapidly drive out arbitrage profits. Thus, assuming markets are competitive, cointegration provides one test of arbitrage based pricing models as this test identifies ‘longer-term’ deviations from an equilibrium relationship. In this paper the equilibrium is described by the cost of carry model, an arbitrage relationship between the bank accepted bill price, the bank accepted bill futures price and the interest rate to futures contract maturity. Time series observations are available for 90 day bank accepted bill futures contracts starting with the contract maturing in June 1980 extending through to the contract maturing in March 1990. Unit root tests are conducted on the times series and these identify the underlying variables in the cost of carry relationship as I(1) processes. Cointegration tests are then applied to test for longer-term deviations from the cost of carry relationship. The level of cointegration identified in these series increases in th...

Synchrotron spectroscopy of molecules at high resolution

Abstract We present a review of high-resolution spectroscopic studies performed using the electron synchrotrons in Bonn in a joint collaborative programme between Imperial College and the Physikalisches Institut: the spectra of many molecules have been investigated in the vacuum ultraviolet, and the results represent a continuation and extension of the pioneering studies by Bill Price.

A mean reverting process for pricing treasury bills and futures contracts

AbstractAn analytically tractable, discrete‐time single‐factor model is developed for valuing treasury bills and futures contracts. It uses a multiplicative binomial foward process that creates neither negative nor implausibly large positive interest factors, and which can incorporate different possible degrees of mean reversion. The paper derives explicit formulae for bill prices, futures prices, their conditional variances and risk premia in a setting that relates the evolution of the term structure more closely to both model and data than do other similar works. In contrast to other term‐structure constrained models, this paper emphasizes that in a one‐factor model the martingale probabilities cannot be treated independently of the perturbation functions. The paper's empirical methods also differ from the customary approaches. Instead of comparing differences between model‐predicted and observed prices, the paper applies ARCH methodology to test model‐predicted ratios of conditional variances to risk premia. Our tests find influences exogenous to the model, but these factors do not seem capable of being explained with two‐factor models using only interest rates.

A discrete time model for pricing treasury bills, forward, and futures contracts.

This paper develops a discrete time model for valuing treasury bills and either forward or futures contracts written against them. It provides formulae for bill prices, forward prices, futures prices, and their conditional variances and risk premiums. The interest rate process is described by a multlphcatwe binomial random walk whose features conform to some principal characteristics of observed processes. Initial forward rates are constrained to match mltmlly observed term structure data. This paper uses a discrete time multlplicatlve binomial model of the spot interest rate process to derive pricing formulae for treasury bills, and forward and futures contracts written against them. All results are developed under assumptions of zero arbitrage profits. The model ~s constrained to match the initial term structure of interest rates, and uses an empirically plausible interest rate process. The model explicitly states the theoretical and empirical Importance of initially estimated forward rates, bond maturity dates, and forward and futures contract delivery dates. We find pricing formulae and time dependent expressions for the condltlonal variance and conditional risk premiums of bill prices, forward prices and futures prices. Finally, we use a property of binomial processes to relate conditional variances and risk premiums, and hence provide theoretical support for relations used m the empirical literature (ENGLE [1982], ENGLE, LILIEN and ROBINS [1987])

A Discrete Time Model for Pricing Treasury Bills, Forward, and Futures Contracts

AbstractThis paper develops a discrete time model for valuing treasury bills and either forward or futures contracts written against them. It provides formulae for bill prices, forward prices, futures prices, and their conditional variances and risk premiums. The interest rate process is described by a multiplicative binomial random walk whose features conform to some principal characteristics of observed processes. Initial forward rates are constrained to match initially observed term structure data.

Are US treasury bills underpriced in the primary market?

Studies of securities markets have found that new issues of debt or equity tend to be underpriced in primary markets. We extend this research by examining the US Treasury bill market. The bill market provides an especially pure comparison of new and seasoned bill prices because when new bills are issued, identical securities are trading coincidentally in the secondary market. We find that it is cheaper to buy a bill in the primary market than to buy the same bill in the secondary market. We explain this ‘underpricing’ as a predictable consequence of auctiontheoretic and microstructural differences in the primary and secondary market mechanisms.

Failed delivery and daily Treasury bill returns

If the seller of a Treasury bill does not provide timely and correct delivery instructions to the clearing bank, the bank does not deliver the security. Furthermore, the seller is not paid until this “failed delivery” is rectified. Since the purchase price is not changed, these “fails” generate interest-free loans from the seller to the buyer. This article studies the effect of failed delivery on Treasury bill prices. We find that investors bid prices to a premium to reflect the possibility of obtaining the interest-free loans that fails represent. This premium is a function of the opportunity cost of the fail. We also find that the bid-ask spread varies directly with the length of the fail. We rule out that our results are due to liquidity premiums, or to a general weekly pattern in short-term interest rates or the bid-ask spread.

Forward rates as predictors of future spot rates

Abstract When adjusted for variation through time in expected premiums, the forward rates of interest that are implicit in Treasury Bill prices contain assessments of expected future spot rates of interest that are about as good as those that can be obtained from the information in past spot rates. Moreover, in setting bill prices and forward rates, the market reacts appropriately to the negative autocorrelation in monthly changes in the spot rate and to changes through time in the degree of this autocorrelation. This evidence is consistent with the market efficiency proposition that in setting bill prices, the market correctly uses the information in past spot rates.

Bidding Theory and the Treasury Bill Auction: Does Price Discrimination Increase Bill Prices?

R ECENT DISCUSSIONS by Milton Friedman [4] and Deane Carson [2] have independently suggested that the Treasury should abandon the policy of price discrimination in the weekly auction of 91-day and 182-day Treasury bills. They would substitute a simulated purely competitive auction in which all bids are filled at a uniform market-clearing price determined by the intersection of the offer quantity and the demand array of submitted bids. Andrew Brimmer [ 1, p. 181 ] challenged this view, arguing in favor of price discrimination on the ground that efficient resource allocation should be subordinated to the minimization of interest cost to the Treasury. . This conclusion requires the assumption, stated explicitly by Brimmer [1, p. 178] that, Through auctioning new bills (at discriminatory prices), the United States Treasury receives higher prices than it could get by selling these issues at a single This paper is not directed to the question of whether the Treasury should or should not practice in the public sector what the Clayton Act prohibits in the private sector. The paper is concerned exclusively with the theoretical question of whether the Treasury would necessarily receive higher prices by employing price discrimination than it could get by selling the issues at a single price. From a theory of bidding under uncertainty, which seems to apply naturally to the Treasury auction, it will be shown that buyers may be expected to enter lower bids under price discrimination than they would for a simulated competitive auction. If this analysis is accepted, it suggests that the Treasury may actually get less revenue from a given bill offering under price discrimination than under a competitive auction. Various approaches might be used in attemDting to build a model of bidding behavior in the bill auction. My approach will assume that bidders desire to maximize expected utility, where the expectation is over a subjective probability density function for the lowest accepted bid. That is, whether we are designing a discriminatory auction model or a purely competitive auction, each bidder is assumed to associate a subjective probability with each possible value for the minimum successful bid. Within this framework, three models will be discussed. Model I assumes each bidder has a fixed specified limit price at which he is willing to buy a specified quantity of bills. I intend this model to serve as an abstract representation of the behavior of non-dealer participants in the bill auction -banks, corporations and insurance companies -who act more or less as final holders of the bills. It is assumed in Model II that each bidder attaches a subjective probability density to the price at which he can resell new bills bought at auction from the Treasury. I think of this model as applying to the government security dealers who participate in the auction. Such dealers face not only the uncertainty, experienced by all bidders, as to where the low bid will fall, but also uncertainty as to the price that can be obtained by retailing the new bills in the secondary market for outstanding bills. In both Models I and II, the decision variable is the bid price. Model III is a generalization of II in which the decision variables are the bid price and the quantity of bills to be specified in the bid. From Models I and II, it is possible to show, unambiguously, that an individual will make at least as low a bid (and most probably lower) in a discriminatory auction as in a single-price competitive auction. From Model III, which seems to be less tractable, the case rests with an example in which an individual's bid price is less, and the quantity of bills specified in the bid is less, under discrimination.