Bilateral Game Research Articles

Study on the Psychological Factor Within the Middle School Footbal Team

The psychological factor is one of the least exploited aspects of football. In sports, developing performance capacity is the primary objective of training. Maintaining motivation and achieving performance are the foundations of the educational-instructional process and have great value as outcomes both individually and for the team. Research hypotheses. (H1). It is assumed that the members of the national football team have average/above-average emotional intelligence (test score => 100), significantly different from the rest of the students in grades VII-VIII, because teamwork and the psychological training included in the preparation develop the mental qualities and properties of the students who play football. (H2). It is assumed that there is a significant correlation between emotional intelligence and the performance of students in the experimental group. Research methods. In the present research, the initial testing was carried out among students in grades VII-VIII and the national football team (February 2024 – May 2024). This research was conducted at “Sf. Ilie” General School in Toplița. The research subjects were 68 students, 35 females and 33 males. Quantitative and qualitative methods were used, and the following methods were chosen: observation, emotional intelligence test (Roco, 2001), performance test (ball sense, heading the ball, complex test, shooting at two goals, bilateral game), and statistical analysis (t-test). Results. The level of emotional intelligence of the students is 86 and 81 in the national football team, below average, which raises a red flag. At the level of the national football team, a strong self-awareness among the students is noted. This indicator has the highest score, 500, far ahead of empathy (-180) and very far ahead of social skills (-360). After applying to the middle school team's training program, we see a significant increase in the level of emotional intelligence. The correlation statistical test and the t-test show a correlation of r=0.86 and a significance of p=0.00 between the initial and final test results. The Pearson correlation shows a strong link between emotional intelligence and the bilateral game (r=0.76), but does not show a significant relationship between emotional intelligence and the other performance indicators. To confirm if the value of r is statistically significant, i.e., if the two variables are correlated, the t-value was calculated. Conclusions. This research confirms that the psychological factor cannot be absent from the preparation of school representative teams. It was confirmed that a high level of emotional intelligence improves the performance of football players, especially in team play, increasing group cohesion. Keywords: football, psychological factor, performance, athletes, school team

A Bilateral Game Approach for Task Outsourcing in Multi-Access Edge Computing

A Bilateral Game Approach for Task Outsourcing in Multi-Access Edge Computing

Research on the decision-making method of coal order price and coal purchase quantity based on prediction

The imbalance of coal supply and uncertainty of demand changes have brought great challenges to the stable supply of coal. In the actual trading process, there are problems such as variable demand and incomplete information on both, and the trading process lacks scientific and effective guidance. Therefore, game theory is introduced into the coal trading process, and a decision-making method based on predicted coal supply and demand order price and coal purchase quantity is proposed. Firstly, the prediction method is introduced, and the Long Short Term Memory (LSTM) and Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average Model (ARIMA) model are used to predict the coal purchase quantity and coal price of the supply and demand, which provides a basis for the formulation of the initial scheme of the bilateral game between supply and demand. Secondly, a bilateral game model of coal supply and demand based on prediction is established, and a bilateral order game-solving strategy of coal supply and demand based on a genetic algorithm is proposed. Finally, the proposed method was verified by setting up three different example scenarios for thermal coal trading, and the optimal coal price and coal purchase quantity under equilibrium are solved, and the results showed that the profit of supply and demand is increased by 4.65% and 2.97%, respectively, and the calculation time is reduced by 21.12%, which improves the speed of solving the game model, maximizes the benefits of both the coal supply and demand sides and provides a theoretical basis for the scientific and efficient order formation of coal mining enterprises.

METHODOLOGICAL CONTRIBUTIONS REGARDING THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOOTBALL GAME TECHNIQUE IN HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS

The traditional practice of playing football in school, means going through the technical-tactical elements of the game according to the analytical method. Each process is practiced, in order to learn, isolated, broken by the conditions of the game. No matter how adequate the methods and means used are, the exercises will not succeed in ensuring the complete, multilateral employment of the student, so that through the immediate and subsequent effects the major objectives will be achieved, which motivated the introduction of football in school. The practice of the integral game, with some simplified rules, ensures a much greater contribution and a special contribution to the involvement of football in the tasks of physical education. In the game, students are engaged multilaterally in the bio-psycho-motor plane, and the phenomena of addiction, teacher-student is diminished. During the game, the teacher intervenes in correcting some fundamental mistakes in the technical-tactical executions, or in interpreting the game rules. Integral play, however, cannot be practiced without the students having acquired a minimum of specific motor knowledge and skills. The teacher's mastery consists in knowing how much of the physical education lesson is given to learning the technical procedures separately, how much in conditions analogous to the game and how much time is allocated to the whole game. In addition to this time planning in the lesson, the teacher must also schedule new technical-tactical actions subject to the learning process and the consolidation of the technical procedures underlying the development of the game of football. Starting from the optimal, technical-tactical model of the graduate, the content of the training must be in accordance with this model and staggered on the requirements of their periodization and staging. This need is imposed by the practice of the game of football both in school - as a means of physical education, but also by the participation of students in school competitions reserved for them and which includes the entire mass of students. So, in the physical education lesson, the isolated learning of the technical-tactical elements and procedures will be short, insisting on their repetition and consolidation within the technical-tactical actions of the game, by practicing the bilateral game. The system of physical education and sports has a dynamic character, being subjected over time to changes and adaptations dictated by the social order, respectively by the state of society and its members, by technological progress and cultural level, by their aspirations. In the spirit of this dynamic, the steps of elaboration and revision of the school curricula in a curricular vision are revealed. This vision presupposes “a design in their interaction of objectives, contents, learning activities and evaluation principles and methods. The curriculum for physical education in secondary education reflects a new conception regarding the formation and complex development of the autonomous and creative personality of the students ”. The curricular area underlying the new curricula is a first step in decentralizing education, offering increased opportunities for choice, increasing the chances of an individualized teaching / learning process and increasing school autonomy in developing one's own curriculum. The methodical steps imposed by the new orientation of the physical education and sports activities in the school represent a challenge for all those involved in this process, "but the teacher will always remain the main creator of his lesson".

Theory and Practical Application Based on Game Theory

Game theory refers to the method in which one of the interacting parties obtains the decision-making information of the other party and uses it to influence the other party in turn. Therefore, game theory is also called "game theory". Game theory can be divided into cooperative game and non-cooperative game. In recent decades, the theory of game theory has developed rapidly with the establishment of John Nash and has been applied to many fields such as medical, engineering, military, and business. In this paper, the author starts from the basic definition of game theory and analyze the prisoner's dilemma, concordance fallacy, median voter theorem, Gounod model, Bertrand model, iterative deletion of dominated strategy, etc. through specific cases. The research results show that game theory has been widely used in the economy. For bilateral games, the results of Nash equilibrium are unstable. The research in this paper broadens the theory of game theory and has important practical significance for the application research of game theory.

Dual Carbon Goal-Based Quadrilateral Evolutionary Game: Study on the New Energy Vehicle Industry in China.

In an effort to tackle climate change, the "Dual Carbon" target raised by the Chinese government aims to reach peak carbon dioxide emissions by 2030 and to achieve carbon neutrality by 2060. Accordingly, policy incentives have accelerated the new energy vehicle (NEV) sector. Whilst previous studies have focused on the bilateral game between governments and manufacturers, NEV development has witnessed interaction among multiple players. In this paper, we construct a quadrilateral evolutionary game model, considering the impact of government policies, manufacturers' R&D investments, dealers' support, and consumer choice on the evolutionary stabilization strategy (ESS) in the context of China. The results show that: (1) in the absence of government incentives, there is no motivation for manufacturers, dealers and consumers to consider the development of NEVs; (2) government incentives affect manufacturers and consumers on the evolutionary paths in the short term. In the long term, benefit- and utility-based limited rationality has a dominant role in the ESS. This study contributes to the understanding of the multilateral dynamics of NEV innovation and provides important implications to practitioners and policy makers.

Quid Pro Quo CSR and Trade Liberalization in a Bilateral Monopoly

We construct a dynamic bilateral monopoly game to analyze the bargaining between a foreign manufacturer and a domestic retailer regarding the wholesale price and explain the foreign upstream firm’s corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiative and its economic impacts on the domestic market. Under free trade, the foreign upstream firm’s CSR initiative realizes improvements in consumer surplus and social welfare in the home country. A “win–win–win” strategy exists, as the foreign manufacturer has more of an incentive to implement CSR when the government implements a strategic trade policy. The consumer-friendly action implemented by the foreign upstream firm leads to adequate consumer welfare and social welfare, which mitigates the government’s political hostility. With the high bargaining power of the foreign upstream firm and the low weight of the consumer-friendly upstream firm, the government should set a higher tariff rate for the foreign upstream firm to extract rent and enhance social welfare.

Strategic Advice Provision in Repeated Human-Agent Interactions

This paper addresses the problem of automated advice provision in settings that involve repeated interactions between people and computer agents. This problem arises in many real world applications such as route selection systems and office assistants. To succeed in such settings agents must reason about how their actions in the present influence people's future actions. This work models such settings as a family of repeated bilateral games of incomplete information called ``choice selection processes'', in which players may share certain goals, but are essentially self-interested. The paper describes several possible models of human behavior that were inspired by behavioral economic theories of people's play in repeated interactions. These models were incorporated into several agent designs to repeatedly generate offers to people playing the game. These agents were evaluated in extensive empirical investigations including hundreds of subjects that interacted with computers in different choice selections processes. The results revealed that an agent that combined a hyperbolic discounting model of human behavior with a social utility function was able to outperform alternative agent designs, including an agent that approximated the optimal strategy using continuous MDPs and an agent using epsilon-greedy strategies to describe people's behavior. We show that this approach was able to generalize to new people as well as choice selection processes that were not used for training. Our results demonstrate that combining computational approaches with behavioral economics models of people in repeated interactions facilitates the design of advice provision strategies for a large class of real-world settings.

Bilateral associated game: Gain and loss in revaluation

Hamiache introduces associated game to revalue each coalition’s worth, in which every coalition redefines his worth based on his own ability and the possible surpluses cooperating with other players. However, as every coin has two sides, revaluation may also bring some possible losses. In this paper, bilateral associated game will be presented by taking into account the possible surpluses and losses when revaluing the worth of a coalition. Based on different bilateral associated games, associated consistency is applied to characterize the equal allocation of non-separable costs value (EANS value) and the center-of-gravity of imputation-set value (CIS value). The Jordan normal form approach is the pivotal technique to accomplish the most important proof.

NEGOTIATION ON NATURAL RESOURCES

The host government (HG) of resource-rich countries (RRC) dealing with multiple International Oil Companies (IOCs) faces a choice between making a simultaneous multilateral offer and a sequential bilateral offer on equity shares from resource value. Provided that the HG treats all its foreign partners in a simultaneous negotiation as a single entity, it is argued that the HG is predicted to gain a higher equity share from a simultaneous multilateral bargaining deal than from a sequential bilateral one with each player. Furthermore, we argue that in case of positive weak externality from a sequential bilateral game, HG would still prefer a simultaneous multilateral game due to superadditivity and efficiency properties of grand coalition.

Hybrid time-scale energy optimal scheduling strategy for integrated energy system with bilateral interaction with supply and demand

In view of the complex energy coupling and multiple market entities competition in integrated energy system, a hybrid time-scale energy optimal scheduling model based on game interaction with supply and demand is presented. Considering the initiative of market players in the day-ahead scale, a bilateral game interaction framework for the operator of integrated energy system and a calibration model considering differences in energy distinguishing feature in the intraday scale are presented. At the intraday scale, the cold and thermal energy related equipment and controllable resources with low time resolution were modified combined with the day-ahead plan in slow layer, while the power related’s with high time resolution were modified combined with the slow layer plan in fast layer. Aim at the above-mentioned complex model, such as multi-objective, nonconvex, strong constraint, large-scale decision variables and irregular Pareto front shape, an adaptive reference point based large scale multi-objective whale optimization algorithm is proposed. Finally, the bilateral interactivity and sensitivity for scheduling results were quantitatively analyzed, under the influence of power generation and consumption uncertainty. The results show that the strategy can balance the economy and robustness, improve the profit benefit of IES by 61.5% with the traditional robustness. Balance the benefits of market entities, bilateral game can increase the benefit of IES by 57.6%. The model based on different energy characteristics is more in line with the actual scheduling situation.

Fictitious play in networks

This paper studies fictitious play in networks of noncooperative two-person games. We show that continuous-time fictitious play converges to the set of Nash equilibria if the overall n-person game is zero-sum. Moreover, the rate of convergence is 1/τ, regardless of the size of the network. In contrast, arbitrary n-person zero-sum games with bilinear payoff functions do not possess the continuous-time fictitious-play property. As extensions, we consider networks in which each bilateral game is either strategically zero-sum, a weighted potential game, or a two-by-two game. In those cases, convergence requires a condition on bilateral payoffs or, alternatively, that the network is acyclic. Our results hold also for the discrete-time variant of fictitious play, which implies, in particular, a generalization of Robinson's theorem to arbitrary zero-sum networks. Applications include security games, conflict networks, and decentralized wireless channel selection.

Fairness Preferences in a Bilateral Trade Experiment

Is the willingness to make trades influenced by how the total gains from trade are split between the trading partners? We present results from a bilateral trade game (n = 128) where all participants were price-takers and trading pairs faced one of three exogenously imposed trading prices. The fixed prices divided the gains either symmetrically in the reference treatment or asymmetrically in treatments favoring either the buyer or seller. Price treatments generating asymmetric gains from trade reduced desired transaction levels on both sides of the market, but more strongly by the disfavored party. The data weakly indicated a larger reduction when the disfavored party was a seller.

Economic benefit analysis of green building based on fuzzy logic and bilateral game model

Economic benefit analysis of green building based on fuzzy logic and bilateral game model

Human-Robot Collaborative Manufacturing using Cooperative Game: Framework and Implementation

Human-robot collaborative manufacturing (HRC-Mfg) is an innovative production mode, however currently the theoretical explanation for the collaboration mechanisms is limited. Considering the dynamics and uncertainties in manufacturing environment, it is also crucial for both task allocation and decision-making. In the sight of cyber-physical production system, based on bilateral game and clan game, this paper presents the characteristics of HRC-Mfg and demonstrates the applicability of cooperative game in such system. Moreover, we also develop a framework and approach to describe how the mechanism works in detail. The case study shows it can dynamically arrange procedures and maximize the production benefit.

Development of a Kinect-based bilateral rehabilitation game for children with cerebral palsy

Development of a Kinect-based bilateral rehabilitation game for children with cerebral palsy

Political Economy of Cross-Strait Relations: is Beijing’s patronage policy on Taiwanese business sustainable?

Via quantitative analysis and interviews, this article examines the credibility and sustainability of Beijing’s patronage policy towards Taiwanese business. The new finding is that the rise of economic nationalism and local protectionism in China is undermining and constraining Beijing’s patronage policy. Consequently, China’s rising economy does not deepen cross-Strait integration but rather crowds out Taiwanese business. Moreover, considering the growing influence of Chinese domestic constraints, this article attempts to provide a bilateral two-level game to grasp the new dynamics on cross-Strait relations under the new normal.

Fictitious Play in Networks

This paper studies fictitious play in networks of noncooperative two-person games. We show that continuous-time fictitious play converges to the set of Nash equilibria if the overall n-person game is zero-sum. Moreover, the rate of convergence is 1/T, regardless of the size of the network. In contrast, arbitrary n-person zero-sum games with bilinear payoff functions do not possess the continuous-time fictitious-play property. As extensions, we consider networks in which each bilateral game is either strategically zero-sum, a weighted potential game, or a two-by-two game. In those cases, convergence requires a condition on bilateral payoffs or, alternatively, that the network is acyclic. Our results hold also for the discrete-time variant of fictitious play, which implies, in particular, a generalization of Robinson's theorem to arbitrary zero-sum networks. Applications include security games, conflict networks, and decentralized wireless channel selection.

Metastrategies in Large-Scale Bargaining Settings

This article presents novel methods for representing and analyzing a special class of multiagent bargaining settings that feature multiple players, large action spaces, and a relationship among players’ goals, tasks, and resources. We show how to reduce these interactions to a set of bilateral normal-form games in which the strategy space is significantly smaller than the original settings while still preserving much of their structural relationship. The method is demonstrated using the Colored Trails (CT) framework, which encompasses a broad family of games and has been used in many past studies. We define a set of heuristics (metastrategies) in multiplayer CT games that make varying assumptions about players’ strategies, such as boundedly rational play and social preferences. We show how these CT settings can be decomposed into canonical bilateral games such as the Prisoners’ Dilemma, Stag Hunt, and Ultimatum games in a way that significantly facilitates their analysis. We demonstrate the feasibility of this approach in separate CT settings involving one-shot and repeated bargaining scenarios, which are subsequently analyzed using evolutionary game-theoretic techniques. We provide a set of necessary conditions for CT games for allowing this decomposition. Our results have significance for multiagent systems researchers in mapping large multiplayer CT task settings to smaller, well-known bilateral normal-form games while preserving some of the structure of the original setting.

Advice Provision for Choice Selection Processes with Ranked Options

Choice selection processes are a family of bilateral games of incomplete information in which a computer agent generates advice for a human user while considering the effect of the advice on the user's behavior in future interactions. The human and the agent may share certain goals, but are essentially self-interested. This paper extends selection processes to settings in which the actions available to the human are ordered and thus the user may be influenced by the advice even though he doesn't necessarily follow it exactly. In this work we also consider the case in which the user obtains some observation on the sate of the world. We propose several approaches to model human decision making in such settings. We incorporate these models into two optimization techniques for the agent advice provision strategy. In the first one the agent used a social utility approach which considered the benefits and costs for both agent and person when making suggestions. In the second approach we simplified the human model in order to allow modeling and solving the agent strategy as an MDP. In an empirical evaluation involving human users on AMT, we showed that the social utility approach significantly outperformed the MDP approach.