Bicameral Legislature Research Articles

Diplomacy among Nations: The Case Study of Malaysia and Nigeria

Nigeria and Malaysia have a shared historical background. Both countries were free of British authority. They have a federal style of government with a bicameral legislature, and the regions are home to people of many racial and ethnic backgrounds. Both economies had a lot of natural resources. Malaysia and Nigeria were the main exporters of primary products when they gained independence in 1957 and 1960, respectively, due to their tropical climates. Nigeria has the capacity to emerge as the largest economy in Sub-Saharan Africa as well as even the world and play a significant role in the world economy, according to experts (Okezie C. A, 2017) and (Amir Baharuddin, 2017). These potentials have remained untapped, and Nigeria faces the risk of failing to reach the globally agreed millennium development goals (MDGs) by 2015, or the vision 2020, if current trends continue. This study aims to examine the untapped opportunities in the diplomatic relationship between these nations and also to determine what went wrong and take lessons from Malaysia achievement and how it was implemented. Nigeria and Malaysia share a very identical historical background: both had sultans as spiritual and political leaders in their major areas, were colonized by the British, and gained independence in 1960 and 1957, respectively. Malaysia has progressed in terms of human development since 1980 and strives to be among the industrialized nations. Nigeria has seen a rise in poverty from 1980 to the present, and it is likely to be classified as an underdeveloped country.

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The article deals with the analysis of the views of constitutional state by the Ukrainian diaspora scientists in law in interwar period made basing on their scientific and theoretical heritage. The author reviews the diversity of these scientists� general and academic scientific outlook on constitutional state and shows the essence of legal organization, state making ideas and ways of their implementation in the future sovereign Ukraine build-up. The article also reveals the contents and characteristic features of their doctrines of the state build-up, in particular the views of the constitutional legislature�s role in it as well as such basic constitutional and legal institutions as the parliament, the government, courts and the body of constitutional control. A particular attention is paid to the constitutional and legal status of a man and a citizen, national minorities, the Ukrainian people as the only source of power in their state. Considering Ukraine�s state and legal reality it seems especially interesting and topical to have been traced the basic nature of unicameral and bicameral legislature, their distinctive features and political and legal efficacy as well as emphasizing the Prime Minister�s independence and the determination of the judges� specific status. Key words: constitutional state, Ukrainian diaspora, legal conceptions, branches of power, state system.

EVOLUTION OF FEDERALISM IN PAKISTAN: A CONSTITUTIONAL STUDY

The primary goal of this study is to critically evaluate the origin and growth of federalism in Pakistan since its inception in 1947. This historical analysis scrutinizes constitutional development in relation to the federal provisions of various constitutional proposals and amendments adopted by the Pakistani parliament. Historically, the federation has been centralist in its approach. Unlike its counterparts, it established a unicameral legislature under its constitutions of 1956 and 1962. However, Pakistan's 1973 constitution not only granted provinces considerable provincial autonomy but also established a bicameral legislature and granted parity representation to units in the federal chamber. This paper claims that the federation underwent a major transition in 2010 when the parliament passed the 18th constitutional amendment that reformed the federal structure substantially. It is argued that since the enactment of this amendment, self-rule and shared rule, which is the essence of federalism, is strengthened in Pakistan. In this context, this study examines how this amendment has led to legislative, administrative, and fiscal decentralization and enhanced the role of the Senate and Council of Common Interests in Pakistan. Keywords: Federalism; Pakistan; British India; Self-rule; Shared rule; 18th constitutional amendment

Challenges in designing Bicameral Parliament in Multiethnic Federations: The Pakistani Experience

This paper examines the challenges that the Pakistani federation encountered in creating a bicameral legislature. Despite the fact that the state agreed to adopt a federal system, disagreements over the nature and function of federal political institutions arose during the constitution-making process. In this respect, the major bone of contention between the federating units was the composition and role of federal second chamber in Pakistan. Several bicameral design proposals were turned down by the first constituent assembly of Pakistan. Subsequently, in the constitutions of 1956 and 1962, the federation established a unicameral parliament with equal representation for both provinces regardless of population size. Following the separation of East Pakistan in 1971, a bicameral parliament was established in the 1973 constitution. However, due to the parliamentary system of government, the second chamber was given a subordinate role to the popular house. In this context, the paper provides historical analysis to show how the federation faced challenges in designing a second chamber and assigning it a pivotal role in Pakistan.

Reformuvannia instytutsiinoi systemy Yevropeiskoho Soiuzu za Lisabonskym dohovorom

The article examines the process of reforming the institutional system of the European Union from the creation of the first Communities to the modern European Union. The main constituent acts of the European Coal and Steel Community, the European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community have been studied and established. It is stated that in 1965, when the Merger Treaty was signed, the governing bodies of all the Communities were merged into joint institutions: The Commission, the Council, the Assembly and the Court of Justice. This common structure for the three different Communities is considered to be one of the main institutional changes of the European Union. The Maastricht, Amsterdam, Nice and Lisbon treaties are considered. Particular attention is paid to the analysis of the Lisbon Treaty of 2007, which introduced significant changes to the institutional system of the European Union. The EU Treaty identifies seven main institutions: The European Council, the Council of the European Union, the European Commission, the European Parliament, the Court of Justice of the European Union, the European Central Bank and the Accounting Chamber. It has been established that in the special institutional structure of the European Union, the European Council, which brings together leaders at national and EU level, sets broad EU priorities. Elected Members of the European Parliament represent European citizens in the European Parliament. The interests of the EU as a whole are defended by the European Commission, which is an executive body. The members of the European Commission are appointed by national governments. Governments defend their country’s national interests in the Council of the European Union. It is determined that within the European Union the bicameral legislature is the Council of the European Union and the European Parliament. The EU Court of Justice, which is the EU’s highest court, regulates differences between EU Member States and the EU itself, between institutions and upholds the rule of European law. It is established that the process of reforming the EU institutional system will continue.

ЎЗБЕКИСТОН РЕСПУБЛИКАСИ КОНСТИТУЦИЯСИНИНГ ЎЗИГА ХОС ЖИҲАТЛАРИ, ҚИЁСИЙ ТАҲЛИЛ

The world community will turn into a common international system. States, which are a separate independent part of this universal system, develop in all spheres in interaction, interdependence and interdependence. Each individual state can benefit from the best practices of another state in the field of political, legal, legislative and state building.Naturally, the study of the experience of foreign parliamentarism is of great importance for Uzbekistan, which democratically restructures its political and legal system and moves towards the formation of a bicameral legislature through parliamentary reforms. Over the past two hundred years of the historical development of parliamentarism, an incredibly rich and meaningful experience has been accumulated. No matter how diverse the diversity in this regard, comparing the activities of existing parliaments on the planet, it will be possible to identify all important aspects, common features and features of this state-legal phenomenon. The essence, traditions and general laws of parliamentarism can be understood by comparing the legislative practice that has developed in advanced countries with the procedures formed in them. At the same time, it should be noted that a number of rare works have been published based on a comparison of the experience of different parliaments

Constitutional Guardianship in Kenya’s Bicameral Legislature

The Constitution of Kenya of 2010 adopts a bicameral legislative structure, within a devolved system of governance, consisting of the National Assembly and the Senate. In keeping with the devolved structure of government, the Senate’s legislative mandate is to a large extent confined to considering, debating and approving Bills concerning counties as well as determining the allocation of national revenue among counties and providing oversight over the national revenue allocated to the 47 county governments. Over the last ten years, Kenya has witnessed a great consolidation of power by the National Assembly at the expense of the Senate especially with regards to the roles of the chambers over the process of enacting the Division of Revenue Bill. Such consolidation of power attempts to relegate the Senate to a peripheral role within the bicameral legislative institutional structure. Consequently, the Supreme Court has asserted its advisory power and the High Court its judicial review power to mete out this inter-institutional conflict between the National Assembly and the Senate. This paper interrogates the manner Kenyan courts have discharged the contested role of serving as guardians of a legislative institution in a conflict within the bicameral legislative system. It makes the point that while courts have the authority to intervene in inter-cameral conflicts, judicial intervention should be exercised as an option of last resort, only utilised after exhaustion of the constitutionally ordained intra-parliament mediation process.

Parliamentary scrutiny of the quality of legislation in Spain. The role of parliamentary clerks

ABSTRACT This article examines the case of Spain as part of a broader comparative study on parliamentary scrutiny of the quality of legislation, looking in particular at the role played by the Letrados de las Cortes Generales, the corps of high-ranking parliamentary civil servants, or clerks, of the Spanish bicameral legislature. As in many other countries, the Spanish political landscape has witnessed an increasing polarisation in the last decade which has led to the fragmentation of the Congreso de los Diputados, or Lower House, once dominated by a two-party system. This has severely affected the parliament´s legislative function. Fewer laws are passed, and there has been a shift in the origin of legislative initiative. Government bills are no longer so easily passed, whereas non-governmental bills have more chances now of becoming laws than before. Against this background, and given the lack of specific parliamentary bodies or guidelines for the scrutiny of the quality of legislation, the Letrados de las Cortes Generales seem essential in contributing to improving the quality of bills, whichever its origin, throughout the legislative procedure, until their passing into laws. This article explores at length their role and the different steps and ways in which they do this. It also analyses the progress in setting standards and bodies for Legislative Drafting by the Spanish Government since, in the absence of specific ones for parliament, Government’s Guidelines are usually applied by the Letrados in their work. To illustrate the current debate on the quality of legislation, the evolution of the Spanish Constitutional Court’s rulings on the matter is also briefly outlined. In conclusion, and though limited to legal and technical aspects, the Letrados de las Cortes Generaleś scrutiny of bills does contribute, to a large albeit imperfect extent, to improving the quality of legislation in Spain.

Balancing Accountability and Effectiveness: A Case for Moderated Parliamentarism

In this article, I bring two key issues in constitutional studies — institutional regime type and electoral system choice — in conversation with each other, and examine their interaction through a normative framework concerning the role that constitutions ought to play in shaping their party systems. The main goal is to offer a theoretical defense (ceteris paribus) of moderated parliamentarism — as superior to its alternatives such as presidentialism, semi-presidentialism, and other forms of parliamentarism. Moderated parliamentarism entails a strong bicameral legislature in which the two chambers are symmetric (i.e. they have equal legislative powers) and incongruent (i.e. they are likely to have different partisan compositions). It has a centrist chamber whose main function is to supply confidence to the government, and a diversified chamber whose main function is to check this government. The confidence and opposition chamber is elected on a moderated majoritarian electoral system (such as approval vote or ranked-choice/preferential vote system, but not first-past-the-post); the diversified chamber — a fully independent checking and appointing chamber — is constituted on a proportional representation model (moderated by a reasonably high threshold requirement for translating votes into seats). The confidence and opposition chamber is elected wholesale for shorter terms. It alone has the power to appoint and fire a unified political executive headed by a prime minister. The checking and appointing chamber is independent of the confidence and opposition chamber as well as of the political executive; its members have longer and staggered terms. Moderated parliamentarism combines the benefits of different regime types and electoral systems in a way that optimizes four key constitutional principles in relation to political parties: it protects the purposive autonomy of parties and enables their ability to keep the four democratic costs low; it serves the party system optimality principle by making it more likely that every salient voter type will have a party to represent it, but also distinguishes between governance parties (which are likely to dominate the confidence and opposition chamber) and influence parties (which will have a space in the checking and appointing chamber); it aids the party-state separation principle by giving significant (and over-weighted) checking powers to smaller parties in the checking chamber; and it promotes the anti-faction principle by distinguishing between smaller influence parties that are polarizing factions from those that are not factional (and punishing the latter a lot less severely than the former). The traditional debates between presidentialism and parliamentarism, and between majoritarian and proportional electoral systems have endured for as long as they have because each system brings something attractive to the table. Moderated parliamentarism seeks to combine the most attractive elements of each — checks and balance from presidentialism, continuous precarity of the political executive from parliamentarism, anti-factionalism of majoritarian electoral systems, and political pluralism of proportional representation systems. Because these virtues are in tension, no system can maximize each of them without incurring a cost for another. Moderated parliamentarism is one way to optimize the virtues of each system and yet yield a stable and effective regime type.

Legislature by Lot : Focusing on Design of a Hybrid Bicameral Legislature

선거원과 추첨원의 양원으로 구성된 하이브리드 양원제를 옹호하는 사람들은 추첨원의 숙의적 문제해결과정과 선거원의 협상과정에 의해 하이브리드 양원제가 원만하게 추동될 수 있다고 믿는다. 그러나 추첨이 대의정치 영역에 점차 자리를 잡아감에 따라, 장차 구성될 수 있는 하이브리드 양원 사이에 서로 상충되는 정당성 문제를 해결하고 서로의 권한을 배분하는 문제가 순탄치 않을지도 모른다는 우려가 제기되고 있다. 선거제를 유지하는 것의 이점이라고 거론되는 것이 단지 허상일 뿐이고 선거원이 추첨원에 끼치는 나쁜 영향은 실재하는 것이라면, 애초의 의도와는 달리 하이브리드 양원제에서 선거원의 경쟁적 측면은 살아남고 추첨원의 잠재적 가치는 사라지게 될 것이다. 설령 하이브리드 양원제를 과도기적 제도로 여긴다고 할지라도, 근본적으로 과두제적 장치인 선거제가 민주주의 심화에 필수적인 것으로 간주되어서는 안 된다.Advocates for a hybrid bicameral legislature with the two chambers, one consisting of elected representatives and the other a sortition assembly of randomly selected citizens, believe that a bicameral legislative processes could be driven by a creative tension between deliberative problem-solving in the sortition body and adversarial negotiation in the elected chamber. But, in the period of transition toward a widely accepted use of sortition in political representation, it is very important to address the issue of conflicting legitimacies and to distribute power between the two chambers. If it is true that the supposed benefits of elections prove illusory but their harmful effects on a sortition body would be all too real, a hybrid bicameral system would maintain the aspects of competitive elections while sabotaging the potential benefits of sortition. Although a bicameral legislature can be regarded as a transitional system, but as a fundamentally oligarchic tool, elections should not be championed as necessary for deepening democracy.

Japan – U.S. Relations under the Abe Doctrine: Shifting Policy in East Asia Regional Stability

Reelection of Shinzo Abe as Prime Minister provides a favorable climate for both Donald Trump’s first presidential visit to Japan and an improvement of Chinese-Japanese-U.S. bilateral relations. In the 22 October 2017 ballot, Abe’s dominant Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and its coalition partner Komeito, secured a two-thirds majority in the House of Representatives, the lower house of Japan’s bicameral legislature. The coalition already holds a supermajority, required for amending the constitution, in the upper house. It justified Abe for calling the national elections a year earlier than needed to secure a public mandate for addressing the growing North Korean threat and to validate popular support for deepening national economic reforms, which have had recent success in boosting Japan’s growth rate and the stock market. Still the outcome gave Abe a mandate for his policies. However, his stewardship was unclear as several other factors contributed to LDP’s overwhelming victory. At the structural level, Japan’s first past the post-electoral system tends to amplify electoral wins in comparison to proportional representation systems. Abe’s foreign and security policies highly charged with ideological revisionism contain the potential to shift Japan onto a new international trajectory in East Asia. Its degree of articulation and energy makes for a doctrine capable of displacing the Yoshida Doctrine that has been Japan’s dominant grand strategy in the post-war period. Abe will remain pragmatic and not challenge the status quo. However, Abe has already begun to introduce radical policies that appear to transform national security, US-Japan alliance ties and relations with China and East Asia. The Abe Doctrine is dynamic but high risk. Abe’s revisionism contains fundamental contradictions that may ultimately limit national effectiveness.

Power index rankings in bicameral legislatures and the US legislative system

In this paper we study rankings induced by power indices of players in simple game models of bicameral legislatures. For a bicameral legislature where bills are passed with a simple majority vote in each house we give a condition involving the size of each chamber which guarantees that a member of the smaller house has more power than a member of the larger house, regardless of the power index used. The only case for which this does not apply is when the smaller house has an odd number of players, the larger house has an even number of players, and the larger house is less than twice the size of the smaller house. We explore what can happen in this exceptional case. These results generalize to multi-cameral legislatures. Using a standard model of the US legislative system as a simple game, we use our results to study power index rankings of the four types of players -- the president, the vice president, senators, and representatives. We prove that a senator is always ranked above a representative and ranked the same as or above the vice president. We also show that the president is always ranked above the other players. We show that for most power index rankings, including the Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik power indices, the vice president is ranked above a representative, however, there exist power indices ranking a representative above the vice president.

The Failed Diffusion of the Unicameral State Legislature, 1934–1944

The early twentieth-century witnessed numerous efforts to reform state government institutions, resulting in the widespread adoption of such reforms as the direct primary and citizen initiative. By contrast, efforts to establish unicameral state legislatures experienced success in just one state: Nebraska. In this article, I examine why movements to adopt one-house legislatures in other states failed in the wake of the Nebraska breakthrough of 1934. Using a most-similar case study research design, I compare the successful Nebraska effort to unsuccessful subsequent efforts in Ohio and Missouri, and I point to rural opposition as being the decisive factor explaining divergent outcomes across the three states. In Nebraska, the lack of malapportionment in the bicameral legislature meant that rural communities did not fear that unicameralism would lead to their diminished influence in state government, but in Ohio and Missouri (where malapportionment was high) rural communities used their structural advantages in state politics to shut down unicameralism efforts. The article's findings suggest that the bicameral state legislature is an important institutional legacy of the bygone era of rural dominance in American politics.

Still the Century of Intergovernmentalism? Partisan Ideology, Two‐level Bargains and Technocratic Governance in the post‐Maastricht Era

AbstractThis study compares the explanatory power of intergovernmentalism and national partyism for European integration in the post‐Maastricht era. Using data on the issue‐specific positions of all heads of state and government at the Amsterdam, Nice and Lisbon conferences, I identify a common policy space with latent preferences and outcomes on two integration dimensions, the design of governance and the pooling of policy competences. The findings show that partisan ideology characterizes leaders’ preferences for the pooling of policy competences, which helps to find compromise among the leaders from large/rich and small/poor countries on governance design. Due to their credible referendum threat, leaders from smaller countries dominate interstate bargains in the post‐Maastricht era. This implies institutional choices for a separation of powers with a bicameral legislature, which promotes functionalist responsibility at the expense of responsiveness to the concerns of the voters.

Bicameralism in a Federation: An Historical Analysis of Role of Senate in Promoting Federalism in Pakistan

Bicameralism is an essential feature of federalism. It is indispensable for a federation to safeguard the rights of smaller units and to accommodate the diversity in the legislature. For this purpose, the upper house of the bicameral legislature, known variously including the Senate, provides a feasible platform to the units for representation on the principle of equality. Therefore, it is almost evitable for all federations, to have the upper house. Pakistan adopted bicameralism in 1973, though it became a federation in 1947 but remained under a unicameral legislature according to early two constitutions (of 1956 and 1962) which severely compromised the basic essentials of federalism. However, the Constitution of 1973 finally provided a bicameral legislature for the development of federalism. Even then the country could not flourish as a true federation and the Senate could not perform its basic functions well. What actually have been the lacunas in the working of the Senate and what can be the possible remedies for them, this study aims to investigate the answers to such questions.

THE FORMATION OF KAZAKHSTAN'S MODEL OF PARLIAMENTARISM

Ponte Academic JournalOct 2017, Volume 73, Issue 10 THE FORMATION OF KAZAKHSTAN'S MODEL OF PARLIAMENTARISMAuthor(s): Otarbayeva Asel ,Kozhakhmetov GalimJ. Ponte - Oct 2017 - Volume 73 - Issue 10 doi: 10.21506/j.ponte.2017.10.6 Abstract:In this article the authors have made an attempt to show the\\nhistory of development and periodization of Kazakhstan\\\'s model of\\nparliamentarism on the basis of objectivity and use of previous researchers�\\nworks. The article cites the opinion of various scholars engaged in this issue, as\\nwell as presents authors� arguments based on actual events occurring in modern\\nKazakhstan. The article justifies that the bicameral legislature is a legislative\\nparamilitary body that solves economic, social and political issues in the history\\nof the country. The specificity of the Majilis and the Senate formation is\\nformulated as reflecting the democratic legitimacy and the effective combination\\nof regional interests and needs. It is stated that the constitutional reforms being\\nimplemented in recent years have been promoting the political image and\\nreputation of the Parliament in the trio structure of the state. Theoretical\\njustification for the notion of parliamentary models and classification of\\nparliamentary models are given. On the basis of the material studied, the model of\\nparliamentarism in the Republic of Kazakhstan is characterized as developing,\\nauthors� view of the peculiarities of development of parliamentarism in the\\ncountry is given. It is asserted that Kazakhstan as a sovereign state incorporating\\nthe positive experience of foreign countries and not forgetting its traditions and\\nlegal culture creates new levers and self-organizing bodies. Download full text:Check if you have access through your login credentials or your institution Username Password

The Women of the Pennsylvania General Assembly: Explaining Women’s Representation in Pennsylvania State Politics

The Pennsylvania General Assembly is ranked 40th among the 50 state legislatures for its proportion of female legislators. Women constitute 18.6% of the bicameral legislature, including nine of 50 senators and 38 of 203 representatives. Various characteristics of the Pennsylvania General Assembly, including its professionalization, appear to provide numerous challenges to women’s entry. As such, the presence of 47 women in the legislature is noteworthy. This exploratory case study examines the experiences of women in the Pennsylvania General Assembly, presenting a qualitative analysis of several interviews with female legislators. The findings indicate that these women were encouraged to run for their current seats primarily by having the support of their families and political parties, by the availability of open seats, and by developing confidence in their qualifications through a politicized upbringing.

The imperfect agenda-setter: Why do legislative proposals fail in the EU decision-making process?

This article analyzes how uncertainty about the location of the pivotal actor influences the outcome of Commission proposals. We argue that the Commission is an imperfect agenda-setter and expect that Commission proposals are more likely to fail when uncertainty increases in the bicameral legislature of the Council and the European Parliament. Considering all legislative acts decided under the co-decision procedure proposed in the period from November 1993 until December 2009, we focus on withdrawal of Commission proposals as failures. In the empirical analysis we distinguish between electoral and procedural uncertainty and provide evidence that both types of uncertainty explain withdrawal of Commission proposals.

States, Countries and Peoples: Who Should the Second Chamber Speak For?

States, Countries and Peoples: Who Should the Second Chamber Speak For?

The Political Segregation of the United States

The federal bicameral legislature of the United States of America (U.S.) is currently dysfunctional, in that it is unable to pass legislation to address important issues such as immigration reform and economic development. I show that dysfunctional government in the U.S. is largely a byproduct of segregation: a phenomenon in which liberals tend to relocate to live in areas where liberal voters are in the majority, and conservatives tend to relocate to live in areas where conservative voters are in the majority. I analyze U.S. presidential election data by state from 1976-2012, and show that a shift occurred in voting behavior for key American states after 1976. I explore some of the reasons for these political trends and I review and discuss the psychological literature related to voting behavior.