Bharatiya Janata Party Government Research Articles

Key Aspects of India’s Arms Export Policy amid Military-Industrial Complex Reform

The study examines the key features and areas of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government’s policy aimed at boosting the export of weapons, military and special equipment (WMSE) within the broader strategy of reforming the Indian military-industrial complex (MIC). The long-term goal of the Indian government is to achieve “strategic autonomy” in the defence sector. In the short term, Indian arms exports serve as the driving force behind the “Make in India” and “Self-reliant India” programmes - pivotal components of Prime Minister Modi’s political agenda. The significant amplification factor for India’s export ambitions has been conditioned in part by the escalating border tensions with China since 2017. The export of WMSE is emerging as a crucial tool to strengthen India’s bilateral relations with countries in the Asia-Pacific region to counterbalance China. Nonetheless, to propel India into the group of the world’s leading arms exporters, as well as to gain full “strategic independence,” may be hard to achieve even in the long run. Despite systemic reforms in the military-industrial complex, efforts to engage private businesses and attract foreign capital, a number of challenges impede the growth of the defence industry and the export potential of the Indian military-industrial complex. These include the inadequate development of India’s manufacturing sector, dependency on foreign technologies, and insufficient funding for military-technical advancements. At the same time, the policy of supporting defence exports and reforming the MIC has been a stable trend in the strategy of the BJP government, playing a crucial role in the fulfillment of its short, medium and long term goals.

Major Factors that Impede Reforms in India’s Military-Industrial Complex in 2014–2023

This article intends to assess the negative impact of a number of factors on the reforming process of the Indian military-industrial complex (MIC) under the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government during 2014–2023. The authors distinguish three groups of factors that mostly affect the whole structure of India’s defence industry at present. Conceptual and institutional factors include the contradictions of the basic laws and regulations of the Indian MIC, absence of the common strategy of the Indian armed forces development, politicising of the protectionist measures, offset policy implementation, bureaucracy’s impact and inter-agency contradictions. Economic factors include the problems with FDI attraction, governmental efforts to change the structure of defence expenditures by reducing the pensions to military personnel and attracting the private sector. The group of technological factors focuses on the problems with the quality and delivery delays of the defence production in India. An applied policy analysis, a retrospective analysis of data and content of the main documents allow the authors to conclude that the considered set of factors bears systemic nature and exerts a substantial negative impact on the Indian defence industry. These factors hinder the implementation of ambitious goals of the BJP government, aimed at achieving the “strategic autonomy” in the crucial fields for its national security. Moreover, the current problems of the Indian MIC are exacerbated by the impact of the domestic political situation. Consequently, resolving these problems in the short and medium term seems unlikely. However, in the longterm the reforms being carried out by the Indian government would largely offset the negative effect of the considered factors.

The doublespeak of ‘leave no one behind’: Implications for religious inequality in Hindu and Muslim pastoralist communities in India

The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development pledged to ‘leave no one behind’ (LNOB). This article suggests that LNOB can be a form of ‘doublespeak’, susceptible to being used to mask ideologies and policies that worsen social, political and religious divisions. Despite stated commitments to LNOB, both Agenda 2030 and the Modi-led Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government of India adhere to narrow models of development that fail to address and exacerbate the growing problem of religious and other inequalities. This article argues for reclaiming LNOB’s radical potential by conceptualising it as an empty signifier that takes on meaning through the hegemonic struggle to articulate what ‘left behind’ means. It develops this argument through a case study of Hindu Nationalist developmental normativity and two mobile pastoralist communities in Gujarat: Hindu Rabaris and Sufi Muslim Fakirani Jats. The empirical data show that in Gujarat’s marketised neo-liberal land regime, mobile pastoralism as a livelihood is increasingly stressed and liable to be constructed as ‘left behind’. Simultaneously, the Hindu and Sufi religious practices that shaped pastoralists’ relationships with land and animals are being transformed and, framed by the BJP government’s promotion of a Hindu nationalist religious identity, are shifting towards adoption of communal Hindu and Muslim identities that exacerbate social and religious inequalities, with particular effects on women. The paper concludes that LNOB has potential to tackle religious and other inequalities and generate a more radical and democratic politics of development if the range of demands that are met by this ‘empty signifier’ is broadened to challenge the hegemonic representations that dominate, and religion’s centrality in this struggle is recognised.

The Illiberal turn in Indian democracy: shifting the trajectory of India’s foreign policy

ABSTRACT Long-standing democracies such as India were not exempt from the global trend of democratic retreat. India has come under increasing international attention due to certain domestic policies such as the revocation of Article 370 of the Indian Constitution, the National Register of Citizens and Citizenship (Amendment) Act passed under the Bharatiya Janata Party government. In addition to India’s democratic decline being reflected in global democratic rankings, this has induced strains on India’s foreign relations. In its pursuit of becoming a leading power, India’s perceived democratic backsliding is likely to influence the direction of its foreign policy. To discern the impact of its perceived illiberal turn on its foreign engagement, the role of democracy in India’s foreign policy needs to be explored. While attempts have been made to understand democratic backsliding through a theoretical lens, the impact of a nation’s democratic status on its foreign relations and policy remains a largely unexplored area.

Reflections on the Second Administrative Reforms Commission: An Analysis of the Implementation of e-Governance Initiatives

Administrative Reforms Commission (ARC) was established by the Union Government of India to offer suggestions for the improvement of administrative machinery in India. This article focuses on the Second ARC’s Eleventh Report, which consists of recommendations on promoting e-Governance in India. The article emphasises the initiatives introduced by the Government of India to promote e-Governance and enhance civic engagement in the process of governance. These initiatives have been implemented, and some of them are in the process of implementation to promote good governance through the mechanism of e-Governance. It also highlights the implementation of the recommendations made by the ARC and the achievements and advancements made by the Bharatiya Janata Party Government under Prime Minister Narendra Modi in promoting e-Governance. The article analyses the various initiatives and offers suggestions for their improvement.

The BJP Government and the Kashmiri Pandits: Managing the Politics of Displacement in India

ABSTRACT After the Kashmiri Pandits were driven from their homes by a violent insurgency in the 1990s, the issue of their displacement and potential rehabilitation has featured prominently in mainstream Indian political discourse, and particularly in the messaging of the Hindu-nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). The BJP subsequently became the leading political force in India and as the governing party has had ample opportunity to respond to the Pandits’ plight. The displacement and possible rehabilitation of the Pandits is thus an appropriate case study to consider how the BJP in government has managed a grievance-based issue that served the party well while it was building its political base. In this article, I apply a critical discourse analysis methodology to the BJP’s handling of the plight of the Kashmiri Pandits. I argue that the government has used the plight of the Pandits for electoral advantage while doing little to resolve the issue and failing to create favourable conditions for the community’s rehabilitation. The BJP’s approach, and the consequent exacerbation of regional and religious polarisation, has instead led to further insecurity for the displaced Pandits.

Economics and politics under Modi government: A synoptic view

In 2019, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) won the general elections in India with a thumping majority for the second consecutive term. The BJP government has undertaken controversial policies which have been interpreted as flowing from its ideology of Hindutva, an ideology of aggressive Hindu nationalism. As a result of pursuing these policies, there has been a hollowing out of democracy in India according to scholars and reputed international organizations. On the other hand, in the last 8 years, the Indian economy has gone through major slowdowns and policy-induced crises, which the pandemic has further intensified. The paper tries to look at these political and economic processes under the Modi government simultaneously. It shows that the conditions of the Indian people have deteriorated during BJP rule. However, this has not affected the political fortunes of the government. The paper tries to answer how one can view the economic stagnation witnessed during the last 8 years together with the rise of Hindu nationalism in India. We argue that BJP wants to redefine the Indian nation in its Hindutva image. Such a re-imagination backed by state power has postponed the political blowback resulting from the economic crisis. Additionally, the BJP has articulated a new politics for the poor (without redistribution) and a new politics of caste to sustain its hegemony. The enduring dominance of BJP in the political domain of India even after a below-average economic performance during the last 8 years is therefore a result of multiple factors pertaining to Hindutva, nationalism and a new politics of caste and the poor.

The Mob, the State and Harassment of Journalists via Twitter in India

Media scholars exploring online harassment of journalists have described it as a form of ‘mob censorship,’ a type of citizen vigilantism aimed at delegitimizing and silencing journalists. Arguably, this trend is most pervasive in India, where online supporters of the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) troll and abuse journalists critical of the Narendra Modi government. Over the years, the BJP has harnessed the digital work of these online Hindu nationalists for agenda setting, spreading their political ideology, and influencing public discourse. Such a symbiotic relationship between the mob and the state has put to question the argument distinguishing mob censorship and state censorship of the press. Through a qualitative textual analysis of tweets posted by online Hindu nationalists, this article explores the discursive strategies employed by right-wing activists to influence the BJP government in its censorship of the press. This study finds that through tactics such as calls to ‘cancel’ journalists, intimidation of foreign correspondents, and digital surveillance of news reporters, online Hindu nationalists aid the BJP government in the suppression of dissident reporting in India.

The Apogee of India - Nepal relations under NDA First Modi Government

The last Indian parliamentary election held in 2014, proved to be the finest example of India’s age-old commitment towards the pinnacle of democratic norms. India had set a niche by conducting the largest democratic franchise in history. First time ever since the 1984, Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) achieved the majority in the Lok Sabha without clubbing with coalition partners. It also got the absolute mandate to rule India’s federal government by ending the Congress monopoly. Interestingly, the Prime Ministerial candidate Narendra Modi in his campaigns criticized Congress-led United Progressive Alliance II (UPA II) for its impotency towards establishing friendly and cooperative relations with India’s neighbors. He also gave assurance that if his party (BJP) got the mandate, his leadership would adopt appropriate measures to resuscitate convivial ties with neighbors. Since forming the government, Prime Minister Modi has been persistently trying to pursue those promises by proceeding towards friendly ties with India’s neighbors. In the light of above discussion, this paper seeks to critically analyze the progress in Indo-Nepal relations under BJP government led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi.

India–West Asia Relations Under the ‘Nationalist’ Modi Government

India’s West Asia policy discourse has traditionally revolved around its energy dependency, security and the welfare of the 7 million Indians living in the region. In recent years, particularly since the coming of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) to power in 2014, the issues of counterterrorism, security, defence cooperation and non-oil trade have gained in importance. This qualitative shift is partially guided and supported by both pragmatism and the ideological differences that the BJP and its predecessor, the Bharatiya Jana Sangh (BJS), had been maintaining against the West Asia policy of the earlier governments led by the Congress party. Through explaining the ideological perspectives of the Indian National Congress (INC) and the BJP, this article argues that the changing global and West Asian landscape, the consolidation of Chinese influence in and around India’s land and maritime boundaries, the instability in the energy market and the insecurity of the Arab uprising–hit West Asian monarchies have provided the BJP government an opportune time to rethink and reorient India’s relations with West Asia. While ideological determinants dominate the public discourse, as the BJP’s top leadership elaborates in the public domain, the policy choices made are not always in tune with these. Prime Minister Narendra Modi has often preferred the pragmatic to the ideological, and this he has done over the expectations of his party and supporters.

Killing a Constitution with a Thousand Cuts: Executive Aggrandizement and Party-state Fusion in India

Abstract Many concerned citizens, including judges, bureaucrats, politicians, activists, journalists, and academics, have been claiming that Indian democracy has been imperilled under the premiership of Narendra Modi, which began in 2014. To examine this claim, the Article sets up an analytic framework for accountability mechanisms liberal democratic constitutions put in place to provide a check on the political executive. The assumption is that only if this framework is dismantled in a systemic manner can we claim that democracy itself is in peril. This framework helps distinguish between actions that one may disagree with ideologically but are nonetheless permitted by an elected government, from actions that strike at the heart of liberal democratic constitutionalism. Liberal democratic constitutions typically adopt three ways of making accountability demands on the political executive: vertically, by demanding electoral accountability to the people; horizontally, by subjecting it to accountability demands of other state institutions like the judiciary and fourth branch institutions; and diagonally, by requiring discursive accountability by the media, the academy, and civil society. This framework assures democracy over time – i.e. it guarantees democratic governance not only to the people today, but to all future peoples of India. Each elected government has the mandate to implement its policies over a wide range of matters. However, seeking to entrench the ruling party’s stranglehold on power in ways that are inimical to the continued operation of democracy cannot be one of them. The Article finds that the first Modi government in power between 2014 and 2019 did indeed seek to undermine each of these three strands of executive accountability. Unlike the assault on democratic norms during India Gandhi’s Emergency in the 1970s, there is little evidence of a direct or full-frontal attack during this period. The Bharatiya Janata Party government’s mode of operation was subtle, indirect, and incremental, but also systemic. Hence, the Article characterizes the phenomenon as “killing a constitution by a thousand cuts.” The incremental assaults on democratic governance were typically justified by a combination of a managerial rhetoric of efficiency and good governance (made plausible by the undeniable imperfection of our institutions) and a divisive rhetoric of hyper-nationalism (which brands political opponents of the party as traitors of the state). Since its resounding victory in the 2019 general elections, the Modi government appears to have moved into consolidation mode. No longer constrained by the demands of coalition partners, early signs suggest that it may abandon the incrementalist approach for a more direct assault on democratic constitutionalism.

Modi Couldn't Change Indian Foreign Policy: The Question Is Why

Modi Couldn't Change Indian Foreign Policy:The Question Is Why Rajesh Rajagopalan (bio) Narendra Modi's success in foreign policy is credited as one of the reasons for his victory in the May 2019 Indian general election, where he led his Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) to an even larger majority in the parliament. This is more than a bit unusual because foreign policy is generally thought to have low electoral salience in India. Modi's foreign policy is also thought to have moved India away from some of the shibboleths of the past, such as nonalignment, toward greater realism and pragmatism. Though still shy of an alliance, Modi has moved India even closer to the United States and tentative strategic partnerships with countries such as Australia and Japan that appear designed to counter China's rise. He also appears to have shifted India's traditional reluctance to militarily escalate when dealing with Pakistan-sponsored terrorism. Does all this signify that there is now a "Modi doctrine" in Indian foreign policy, or that Indian foreign policy is now on a different trajectory? In his excellent new book Modi and the Reinvention of Indian Foreign Policy, Ian Hall takes a close look at Modi's first term as prime minister (2014–19) and contends that his attempt to transform Indian foreign policy was deeply ideological, motivated by a vision based on Hindu nationalism rather than realism or pragmatism. But Modi's transformational effort has not been successful: Hall argues that "Modi's government did less to change the direction of Indian foreign policy, its foundational assumptions and key practices, than might be suggested by all the drama and noise it generated" (p. 17). This fits with the traditional consensus about Indian foreign policy—that it has demonstrated great continuity despite changes in government. Changes in foreign policy direction have been gradual, and when such changes do happen, they are sustained by new governments comprising different political parties. Such stability is a cause either for comfort or, more often than not, for frustration. Scholars have suggested a couple of reasons why this is so: some have argued it is the lack of an ideational framework beyond that which India's first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, provided; others have suggested that India's insular [End Page 168] institutional framework and foreign policy's lack of electoral salience have discouraged change.1 Despite such continuity, there was an expectation that Modi's BJP government would be different and that it would shift the direction of India's foreign policy in a far more consequential manner than previous changes of government. For one, though the BJP had previously ruled the country, it had never held a majority in the parliament on its own and had depended instead on a coalition of smaller parties. In 2014, by contrast, although it was still in a coalition, the BJP by itself had enough seats for an outright majority in parliament's lower house. Moreover, Modi appeared to have far greater control over the party than previous BJP leaders such as former prime minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee. And as his term progressed, it was clear that Modi was using foreign policy in a determined and unprecedented way that went beyond the unusual level of energy and attention with which previous Indian leaders had practiced international diplomacy. Indeed, Hall argues that Modi was able to successfully garner domestic political dividends by creating the impression that India was now more internationally respected, with the domestic audience a significant target of this messaging. Why then was Modi unable to transform India's foreign policy? An important reason, according to Hall, was the limitations of Hindu nationalist ideology, which is the focus of a large part of the book. Hall traces the roots of this ideological vision of India's place in the world, discussing in some detail Hindu nationalist thought and concerns about international politics and security. This is an inconsistent and contradictory mix that included, most importantly, the conviction that Hinduism represents a superior spiritual path to solve the world's problems, with India as the vishwaguru—the teacher of the world. In this vision, rather than on its material power...

“One nation,” BJP, and the future of Indian federalism

ABSTRACTOn August 5th 2019, the newly elected Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government in New Delhi moved the Indian Parliament to abrogate Article 370 and bifurcate the state of Jammu and Kashmir into two Union Territories. Months later, as the year came to a close, the Indian parliament passed a controversial amendment to India’s Citizenship Law. Several state governments came out in vocal opposition to the amendment, and some challenged the amendment in the Supreme Court. These events provided confirmation that the reelection of a majority BJP government has heralded far-reaching changes for India’s federal order, compounding shifts in the institutions and practice of federalism during Narendra Modi’s first term (2014–19). In this article, we assess the implications of the 2019 Lok Sabha elections for the future dynamics of federalism in the constitutional, administrative, and fiscal spheres under the second term Modi government.

Disempowering Trade Unions by Law: A Death Blow to Workers' Rights

14 | International Union Rights | 27/4 FOCUS | TITLE OF FOCUS Disempowering Trade Unions by Law: A Death Blow to Workers’ Rights “Lend me a magnifying glass, please…I am searching for an Indian Trade Union!” If the ongoing labour scenario persists, will this be the India’s future predicament? This situation may sound unimaginable for a country like India, with 468 million working population, 16,154 registered trade unions and countless unregistered ones because 93 per cent of the workforce belongs to the unorganised sector. A major grievance of the central trade unions, and independent federations and associations of various sectors against the Bharatiya Janata Party government is that it has failed to respond to the unions, and has refused to dialogue with any of them, thus far. According to the unions, the government undermines tripartism. This becomes quite obvious in the government’s lassitude in holding the Indian Labour Conference (ILC). No ILC has been held in the last four years. Instead, the government continues its aggressive attack on the lives and livelihoods of the working people. The unions are convinced that the government will go to any extent to amend the labour laws and make them pro-employer. And not without cause. The attitude of the government is reflected in the haste with which 44 Central laws were codified into four, disregarding all suggestions by the trade unions. These amendments have been made in such a way that regular employment and job security becomes a Utopian concept. An overview of the policies, rules, regulations, the new labour codes and amended labour legislations (abetted by an unsympathetic bureaucratic attitude of the Government of India) will reveal the current condition of the working class in India. New Legislations— What Benefit to Workers? The Ministry of Labour and Employment, in line with the recommendations of the Second National Commission on Labour, brought in four Labour Codes—the Code on Wages; the Code on Industrial Relations, the Code on Occupational Safety, Health and Working Conditions, and the Code on Social Security—by simplifying, amalgamating and rationalising the relevant provisions of the existing Central Labour Laws. Both the houses—the Lok Sabha and the Rajya Sabha—passed the Codes; these then got the Presidential nod to become laws. According to Mr. Santhosh Kumar Gangwar, the Minister of State for Labour and Employment, the Labour Codes have been enacted with a view to balance the interests, rights and obligations of employees and the employers in the country and it will prove to be an important milestone for the welfare of the workers, and a historic game-changer that will harmonise the needs of workers, industries and other related parties. Prime Minister Narendra Modi tweeted and spoke on many occasions that the labour reforms will ensure ease of doing business and that these futuristic legislations will empower enterprises by reducing compliance, red-tapism and ‘Inspector Raj’. According to him, this long-overdue and muchawaited -for labour reforms will harness the power of technology for the betterment of the workers and industry, ensure the well-being of industrial workers and boost India’s economic growth. Why then did the working class rise up as one and protest against these four legislations? Subsuming 44 labour legislations into four is what the government did by introducing the new Labour Codes. Let us take a closer look at what these Codes entail. The Code on Wages 2019 was notified in the Gazette of India on 8 August 2019. It was formulated by integrating four existing legislations—Payment of Wages Act 1936, Minimum Wages Act 1948, Payment of Bonus Act 1965, and Equal Remuneration Act 1976. Contrary to the earlier Acts, which cover only 40 per cent of the employees, the new code on wages is expected to cover all sections of the workforce, that is, around 50 million workers. One among the unique feature, as claimed by the government is, a national floor level wage to be fixed by the central government and the state government, while deciding on the minimum wages, cannot go beyond it, but can increase it as it to suit the specific state government requirement. The trade unions say the wage code has been formulated...

Constitutional Erosion and the Challenge to Secular Democracy in India

This chapter analyzes how the ongoing drift toward increasing religiosity in elections and governance poses a challenge to secular constitutional democracy in India. In drafting India’s Constitution, the Constituent Assembly entrenched a particular conception of secularism informed by the need to inhibit and prevent religious and communal conflict and violence. The essay traces the rise of the Hindu-Right Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and its electoral victories in the 1990s and early 2000s, and analyzes how the Supreme Court of India and Election Commission have failed to check the ongoing process of “constitutional erosion” of secularism. It then traces how the recent of deployment of religion and religious rhetoric in elections, and the enactment of symbolic legislation and other actions aimed at inflaming religious tensions by the current BJP government threatens other core constitutional values, and poses a long-term threat to the integrity and stability of India’s democracy.

Whither Democracy, Secularism, and Minority Rights in India?

Indian democracy, which was once considered remarkable in scale and duration, has been weakened by the rise of xenophobic nationalism and threats to religious minorities. Although these trends were evident in the past, they have dramatically increased amidst the growth of Hindu nationalism. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which was elected to power in 2014, has promoted or tolerated attacks on women, Dalits, Christians, and Muslims, by members of its party, government, and civil society organizations. The BJP government has also centralized state power and curtailed civil rights and liberties. Clearly, the protection of democracy and religious freedoms are closely inter-twined.

Maoist insurgency in India: grievances, security threats and counter-strategies

ABSTRACTThe adivasi insurgency, an offshoot of the colonial period, continued in independent India. Post-independence, government assurances to redress the forest and land rights remained mostly unimplemented. As an alternative, the adivasis joined the Communist Party of India (Marxist Leninist, CPIML). However, after neutralisation of the CPIML and failure to regain forest and land rights, the adivasis joined the Communist Party of India (Maoist). Witnessing the expanding threat from the Maoists, the government adopted a dual strategy. This involved first amending the Forest Act to woo the adivasis and second placing the Maoists on the terrorist list. However, not getting the expected results, the current Bharatiya Janata Party government adopted an integrated and holistic approach to rooting out the insurgency by further amending the Forest Act, offering attractive surrender-cum-rehabilitation incentives and launching an offensive against the Maoist leadership. Although the insurgency is contained, the operational fault lines still remain. This paper attempts to trace the antecedents of the adivasi grievances, the challenges posed to India’s internal security and counter-strategies adopted by different governments to contain the Maoist insurgency.

Dephasing India's Look East/Act East Policy

India's policy was launched in the early 1990s as part of a concerted effort to elevate the strategic importance of Southeast Asia in the country's foreign policy agenda. The policy has been described as going through various with accelerated pace and process of interaction in moving from one to the next, marked by a broadening and deepening of India's interaction with the region. This has culminated in the most recent phase under the government of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, which has rebranded the policy as to signify a more pro-active and action-oriented approach towards the region. However, has there been any real and substantive change in India's engagement with Southeast Asia in moving from one phase to the next? Does this narrative of phases in India's post-Cold War engagement with Southeast Asia hold any substance? This article deconstructs the narrative of phases in India's Look East and now Act East policy and argues that India's eastward engagement has not been a process of simple linear progression. As such, while the concept of phases in India's Look East policy serves as a useful narrative device, it does not capture the nuances of India's post-Cold War re-engagement with Southeast Asia, which has been far more complex than this narrative suggests. Keywords: Indian foreign policy, Look East, Act East, Southeast Asia, ASEAN. The year 2017 marks twenty-five years of dialogue partnership, fifteen years of summit-level relations and five years of strategic partnership between India and ASEAN. The relationship between India and Southeast Asia has come a long way from the days of mutual mistrust rooted in concerns over India's naval ambitions in the 1980s; (1) New Delhi's support for Vietnam following its invasion of Kampuchea (Cambodia) in 1978 and recognition of the Heng Samrin regime in 1980; (2) and Indian perceptions of ASEAN as an instrument of neo-colonialism and a reincarnation of SEATO [South-East Asia Treaty Organization] following its creation in 1967. (3) Undoubtedly, India's economic interactions, institutional linkages and security cooperation with Southeast Asian countries have grown in leaps and bounds in the post-Cold War period. The policy, which was launched in the early 1990s as part of effort to re-engage with Southeast Asia, has been characterized by Indian scholars and policymakers as evolving through various phases, with accelerated pace and process of interaction in moving from one to the next. (4) This has been marked by a broadening and deepening of India's engagement with the region: broadening as the policy has expanded beyond its initial geographic focus on Southeast Asia to encapsulate the broader East Asia and now Indo-Pacific region; and deepening to expand beyond its initial focus on economic integration towards greater political interaction and security cooperation. This has culminated in the most recent phase under Prime Minister Narendra Modi who assumed power in 2014 and rebranded the policy as to signify a shift towards a more pro-active and action-oriented approach to the region. (5) However, is the recently rebranded Act East policy real? In other words, has there been any real and substantive change in India's engagement with Southeast Asia under its most recent phase? More broadly, does the narrative of phases in India's post-Cold War engagement with Southeast Asia hold any credence? One could argue that the various phases of the Look East policy are rooted in domestic political rhetoric rather than foreign policy shifts as new governments have sought to differentiate their policymaking approach from previous administrations. Notably, the first corresponds with the Congress (Indian National Congress) government of Prime Minister Narasimha Rao that came to power in 1991, while the second was unveiled by the Atal Bihari Vajpayee-led BJP (Bharatiya Janata Party) government in the early 2000s after it assumed power in 1998-99 and continued under the Congress government of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in 2004. …

Broadening the security paradigm: Indian women, anti-nuclear activism, and visions of a sustainable future

This article uses the anti-nuclear activism of Indian women as a case study to question the relevance of statist discourses of security in Indian politics. By highlighting their activism against the Indian state (under its recent Hindu Right Bharatiya Janata Party government), this article deconstructs how (in)security imaginaries have been utilized by the Indian state to legitimize India's nuclear policies; how the Indian state's perceptions of (in)security has collided with ‘people-centric’ visions of security; and finally, how activism has enabled these women to de-center a militaristic and communal vision of (in)security that undergirds India's nuclear policy. I also highlight the ways in which women's activism has differed from that of men's including how women activists have used distinctive rationales and strategies to oppose Indian nuclearization. The contribution of this article lies in stitching together the spirit of inclusiveness that brings these women's leadership qualities, capabilities, and preferences to broaden India's security paradigm.

Modi and the Camera: The Politics of Television in the 2002 Gujarat Riots

The Gujarat Hindu–Muslim clashes of 2002 were the first major Indian riots of the 24-hour television age—and television became central to the politics of the violence. This paper examines the role of television in the shaping of the riots and its impact on the subsequent election campaign in Gujarat. It seeks, thereby, to demonstrate the change in Indian politics brought about by the advent of satellite television. It will show how the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) skilfully used television coverage of the riots and mediated the message of this coverage for its own political purposes. Secondly, as an analytical aid, it compares the Gujarat case with the television coverage of the civil rights disturbances in the American South in the 1950s and 1960s, and British television coverage of the inner-city disturbances in 1981. It will be seen that in all three countries, the reportage was remarkably similar, and that many of the same issues were raised. In each case television clearly introduced a new factor into the political matrix. Nevertheless, Gujarat was different because of the nature of the round-the-clock live coverage television provided of that event. Generally that coverage was hostile to the Hindu Right forces affiliated with the Gujarat BJP government. But the ruling BJP managed to portray the media coverage of the violence as an attack on Gujarati regional honour, successfully converting it into an emotive election issue.