Bentham's View Research Articles

Liberal constitution, civic enlightenment, and colonies: Jeremy Bentham on the Spanish empire

ABSTRACT Between April 1820 and April 1822, stimulated by the restoration of the Cádiz Constitution, Bentham devoted himself to writing a number of works on the constitutional reform and colonial rule of Spain, which have been sources of a scholarly debate over Bentham's views on colony. By examining those works, this essay aims to supplement the scholarly debate by drawing attention to a thesis that Bentham developed in his criticism and evaluation of the Cádiz Constitution: a thesis concerning the irreconcilable incompatibilities of liberal constitution and colonisation. I focus on Bentham's critical analyses of the Constitution, and indicate that Spain's colonial rule of Ultramaria not only intensified the weaknesses of the Constitution, but also rendered its merits useless, if not harmful, to the public in both hemispheres. Moreover, I explore the tension that Bentham detected between liberal constitutionalism and colonialism. I maintain that, in Bentham's observation, the civil rights granted by the Cádiz Constitution to the Ultramarians stood to facilitate the enlightenment of citizens and the formation of civil society. As a consequence, the delusion of the Spanish ruling few would be exposed, and the Ultramarians’ discontent with exploitation by such foreign rulers would sow the seeds of disobedience and resistance.

The Virtues of Prudence and Self-Command, not Jeremy Bentham’s Max U or the Invisible Hand of the Market, is Adam Smith’s Foundation for the Wealth of Nations

The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759; 1790) is the foundation for the Wealth of Nations(1776).Smith recognized, like all other major spiritual and moral teachers, that Prudence is the most important virtue because nothing can be accomplished without it being applied successfully first. The virtue of Prudence applies in all facets of life. However, there were individual philosophers who rejected virtue ethics. One such individual was Jeremy Bentham (another was Karl Marx). Bentham sought to replace Smith’s Virtue Ethics with his Principle of Maximizing Utility. Bentham argued that only his principle of maximizing utility could support the study of ethics. Bentham attacked Smith’s Virtue Ethics approach in 1787 in the same fashion as J.Viner attacked Smith’s Virtue Ethics in 1927. Both Bentham and Viner argued that • Smith’s The Theory of Moral Sentiments (virtue ethics) is very flawed • Smith’s support of interest rate control laws and skewing of bank credit to the sober people and away from the prodigals,imprudent risk takers, and projectors (Bentham was a strong supporter and employee all his life of the major projector company, the British East India Company, which started the American Revolutionary War) was very ill advised • Smith’s analysis of the macroscopic impact that the prodigals, imprudent risk takers ,and projectors have on an economy,endangering the sober people, was incorrect because the prodigals, imprudent risk takers, and projectors were really just innovative entrepreneurs pursuing their own self interest • Smith never actually made a single advance in the field of economics (political economy) in his lifetime as all of the parts of his theory were already available from other, earlier sources, which he failed to acknowledge properly and cite Smith responded to Bentham’s two pronged attack in 1787 by rewriting major parts of the The Theory of Moral Sentiments so that its virtue ethics message would be fine tuned in order to target legislators and government officials, which would counter the utilitarian message of Bentham’s Defense of Usury and The Principles of Morals and Legislation. There was now a clear cut choice between two completely different ethical systems upon which to build capitalism. Smith envisaged a completely different approach to capitalism than Bentham. Like the inhabitants of Augustine’s Earthly City and Heavenly City,there were two opposing groups, the middle class sober people, who practiced virtue ethics, and the upper class projectors, imprudent risk takers, and projectors, who practiced utilitarian ethics. The proper role of government was to use legislation, law and sanction to prevent the upper class projectors, imprudent risk takers, and projectors from damaging the middle class, sober people. The Smith and Bentham views about the correct evolution of capitalism over time are as different as night and day. A major confusion among economists, except G.Kennedy, since Smith’s death in 1790,is to confuse the operation and impacts of the virtue of prudence with the Invisible Hand. It is simply impossible for any Invisible Hand of the market to conceivably operate unless the sober people completely dominate the political, economic, social and institutional levers of power. Smith’s comments about the Invisible Hand in Part IV of the Wealth of Nations are simply a repetition of his comments in The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759; 1790), about the racer in a running competition always doing his very best to win the race, being applied to those engaged in a comparable economic race doing the best they can to sell their particular products. This brings out a positive response from their competitors, who also run and train harder. This positive interactive feedback effect is referred to metaphorically as an invisible hand, although it is actually the result of all of the sober people simultaneously applying the virtue of prudence. None of this has anything to do with Bentham’s Max U utilitarian approach. Once the gain, profit, or savings has been won, it is now time to apply the Virtue of Self Command (the Virtues of Temperance and Courage) to invest to expand one’s business.The correct choice is not financial manipulation , stock market speculation or conspicuous consumption, but investment in physical durable capital goods, worker training,and inventories of intermediate parts and materials.Business success now allows one to apply the final virtues of justice (fairness, equity), magnanimity and benevolence as worker wages and benefits can be increased.The result is opulence for all.

Individual Sacrifice and the Greatest Happiness: Bentham on Utility and Rights

This article considers Bentham's response to the criticism of utilitarianism that it allows for and may even require the sacrifice of some members of society in order to increase overall happiness. It begins with the contrast between the principle of utility and the contrasting principle of sympathy and antipathy to show that Bentham regarded the main achievement of his principle as overcoming the subjectivity he found in all other philosophical theories. This subjectivism, especially prevalent in theories of rights, might well lead to the sacrifice of the individual. The principle of utility was presented as an ‘objective’ theory that avoided the difficulties of other moral and political theories. The article also considers the importance of universally applicable ends, such as security and equality, as part of the principle of utility, and especially Bentham's view of maximizing pleasure as being a distributive rather than an aggregative idea. The article concludes by criticizing H. L. A. Hart's interpretation of the role of equality and rights in Bentham and John Stuart Mill, and argues that Mill's doctrine of moral rights builds on foundations originally established by Bentham, foundations which would preclude the sacrifice of individuals.

Graham Wallas Today

Author(s): Bevir, Mark | Abstract: Graham Wallas (1858-1932) was a leading political scientist of his generation. The context of his work was the Great Society created by the industrial revolution and its ramifications. Early on, he recognised the inadequacy of Bentham's view of human nature as one of rational self-interest. His alternative psychology drew on a Darwinian account of instincts to describe democratic politics as a system based on organised mental suggestion. The complexity of modern societies meant individualism had to be modified by collectivism as a principle of organisation. Collectivism, together with education of the individual mind, would lead to the Good Society understood in terms indebted to Aristotle. Although Wallas provides as a useful corrective to rationalist utilitarianism, he surely over-emphasises instincts at the expense of social traditions, and thus underestimates the need for institutional change as well as reform of the individual mind.

Bentham's Political Radicalism Reexamined

It was Elie Halevy's view that the term "radical" was first used adjectivally in a political sense in the year 1797, possibly 1798, and that between 1810 and 1819 it came increasingly to be prefixed to the substantive "reformer" to refer, in the main, to the supporters of annual parliaments and universal suffrage.' Jeremy Bentham is a central figure in Halevy's account of this transitional phase in the usage of the term and the form of politics it signified, but a complete account of the "radical" nature of Bentham's thought would have to begin far earlier, starting when he first developed the philosophical principles of his system in the 1770s.2 It would also include aspects of his work on ethics, legal and penal reform, political economy, poor law reform, education, and religious institutions, which cannot be adequately treated in this essay. Naturally, Bentham's views on political institutions cannot be omitted. Yet it is here that we encounter a fundamental problem of

Bentham's View of the Right to Silence

Bentham's View of the Right to Silence

Bentham on Peace and War

One of the most neglected aspects of Bentham's thought is his opposition to war. His views on this subject have been sketched out in a number of studies, but they have never been examined in any detail. Interested scholars have tended to base their assessments on a narrow range of sources. Most have relied on the four brief essays, collectively entitled ‘Principles of International Law’, which were published in John Bowring's edition of Bentham's Works. More particularly, they have leaned heavily on just one of these essays, ‘A Plan for an Universal and Perpetual Peace’. The aim of this paper is to present a much fuller picture of Bentham's views by supplementing relevant material in the international law essays with ideas drawn from Bentham's other works and unpublished papers.

Programme de recherche benthamien et économie politique britannique. Deux rendez-vous manqués

Bentham in research program and british political economy : two misunderstandings The topic of this research is to investigate the relationship between the utilitarian program imagined by J. Bentham and the british Political Economy during two important moments of its history, the classical age and the beginning of marginalism. Starting from a study of Bentham's works, the paper compares Bentham's views with J. Mil!'s and D. Ricardo's economic contributions on one hand, Jevons' and J. Y. Edgeworth's writtings on the other. The discussion leads to the conclusion of the independance of the Political Economy vis a vis Bentham's System. But in both cases the justificative given for this independance are different. Bentham's investi­gation has not the same aim as classical Political Economy. As for utilitarian calculus, it does not accept the postulate of egoistic individualism which is the basis of the marginalistic economie calculation. Whatever the two view points both express the will of economies not to get involved with ethics.

Communication machines and the panopticon

SUMMARY A discussion on Jeremy Bentham's views on the construction of prisons and other public buildings such as hospitals, alms houses and barracks. His views were essentially concerned with how, in these buildings, there is always the constant and omnipresent vigilante guarding the occupants. Bentham's ideas of the Panopticon were originally applied to the construction of a transparent circular prison with the vigilante situated in the middle constantly inspecting ther prisoners. In this article it is discussed how such a philosophy can be applied to a society which consists of the ever visual and omnipresence of guards, where everyone is inspected by everyone. Bentham's ideas are prophetic and directly linked to communicology in that he shows how communication can be manipulated by sight.

An Argument for Utilitarianism

Many utilitarians accept Bentham's view that to argue for the principle of utility is as ‘impossible as it is needless'. They take utilitarianism as a first principle which one either accepts or does not. They do, of course, defend utilitarianism against objections, and make objections to other ethical positions; but the principle of utility itself, they hold, must stand on its own merits. In this article we use a different approach. We introduce a principle, which we call ‘Weak Majority Preference', which we believe likely to be accepted by many who do not consider themselves utilitarians. We then show that from this principle it is possible to derive the general principle of utility.

Lectures on the Philosophy of World History. Introduction: Reason in History (review)

122 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY we must side reverentially with Macaulay in declaring that Bentham is a writer "from whose opinions on a question of jurisprudence it is rarely safe to dissent," or, indeed, that "on most parts of the philosophy of jurisprudence, it is not easy to add to what has been said by Mr. Bentham." It is rather to try to rescue him from his image as a lightweight in all branches of philosophy. To a large extent, that image is a result of students' concentrating too heavily on some parts of Bentham's output and neglectingothers. Of Laws in General has been a particular victim of this habit. For far too long, Bentham was known chiefly for his Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, where many of his greatest faults as a thinker are openly displayed, not least in in the first six chapters, which, as Plamenatz noted many years ago, contain many ambiguities and downright fallacies. Even where he is not ambiguous or fallacious in the IPML, Bentham propounds a vulgar and, in any case, impractical principle of utility. Moreover, his criticism of other principles is unthinking, almost flippant. These are not the chapters of a profound, contemplative thinker, but of a conjurer. But Bentham himself saw many of the conceptual (if not argumentative) weaknesses of the IPML while writing its last chapter. He realized that what was requred was, as Lyons puts it in his recent provocative work, "the study.., of the nature of law, as distinct from principles for rationalizing and reforming legislation." The result was Of Laws in General, which lay undiscovered in Gower Street until 1939. Even since its publication, however, it has not always been granted the full measure of esteem that is its due. Too often it has been taken to be of the same stripe as, and inferior to, Austin's Province of Jurisprudence Determined (1832); and it may be conceded that there are some cursory resemblances between the two. Both writers propound an imperative legal philosophy: inasmuch as Bentham does so, it is hardly surprising that Austin should, given the latter's often proclaimed allegiance to Bentham's views. But there are two areas of difference between them, and they are crucial; for we must understand the nature of Bentham's philosophy of law if we are properly to appreciate its very great merit and significance. Austin's legal theory--which in many respects has come to be viewed as the utilitarian legal theory and is therefore of no little significance itself--is considerably more rigid, less fastidious , and less alert to philosophical intricacies than is Bentham's and is thus considerably easier to demolish. The second difference is this. Austin's (the utilitarian) philosophy of law always rests on a particular notion--or notions--of utility. A great deal of Benthain's philosophy of law does not ineluctably rest on any notion of utility (although it is not therefore without a blemish). It is true that Bentham's notion of law as customary fidelity to the sovereign's commands has been the object of many telling attacks. Nonetheless, our fresh evaluation of Bentham with the aid of renewed curiosity and more information may, for a start, grant him a more substantial intellectual endowment and inventiveness than he has frequently been condeded. D. C. BAND Australian National University Lectures on the Philosophy of World History. Introduction: Reason in History. By G. W. F. Hegel. Translated by H. B. Nisbet, with an introduction by Duncan Forbes. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975. Pp. xxxviii + 252. $23.50) It is widely believed that one of Hegel's most influentialcontributionsto philosophy was his demonstration of the relevance of" history" to theoretical and, especially, political reflection. It is as a philosopher of history that Hegel is most often initiallypresented, whether in terms of his remarkable characterizations of the historical nature of human spirit in his Phenomenology , or by means of the published version of his lectures on history. Even though Hegel himself BOOK REVIEWS 123 continually insisted on the foundational status of the Logic for all his system, the "externalization " of the "Absolute" in the historical progression of Geist has become one...

Bentham's Concept of Pleasure: Its Relation to Fictitious Terms

Although much of Bentham's Utilitarianism has been dissected and explained, little or nothing has been recorded concerning the semantic status of Bentham's concept of pleasure, or of the relationship, for Bentham, between this concept and the concept of good. To my knowledge, only two books, John Wisdom's Interpretation and Analysis in Relation to Bentham's Theory of Definition, and C. K. Ogden's Bentham's Theory of Fictions, have dealt extensively with Bentham's theory of language. However, neither of these has included a study of the concept of pleasure. Contrariwise, those who have made some effort to interpret Bentham's concept of pleasure have failed either to notice or to discuss important implications to be drawn from his theory of language as it applies to the concept of pleasure.' Most observations in the philosophical literature about Bentham's view of pleasure and good give no indication whether or not Bentham believed that the concept of pleasure and the concept of good are identical. G. E. Moore, who, in his Principia Ethica, criticizes Benthanm for having committed the naturalistic fallacy, does not specifically claim that Bentham identified good with pleasure. Yet, I am inclined to believe that, since Moore, and perhaps because of Moore, philosophers have thought that Bentham did make this identification. One instance of this is to be found in the writings of Sidney Zink, who, in discussing Moore, observes: Moore's contention is that . . . 'good' cannot be just another symbol for 'pleasure' or for 'what we desire to desire', otherwise the statement 'Good is pleasure' would be equivalent to 'Pleasure is pleasure', and the question 'Is good pleasure?' would be equivalent to 'Is pleasure pleasure?' Now one might in reply claim, as Bentham surely would have claimed, that the statement

Bentham's Ideal Republic

Seldom read today, Bentham's Constitutional Code (1820-1832) nevertheless ranks among the most significant political treatises of the last century. It contains an extended statement of the ideas of Philosophic Radicalism on the eve of their partial victory in the Reform Bill of 1832. It must be nearly, it may be actually, the last work of any important figure of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment. At the same time it is one of the first works in which through the fog of doctrinaire radicalism there can be seen fairly clearly the characteristic features of the contemporary state with its extreme centralization, its myrmidonian corps of bureaucrats, its elaborate administrative apparatus, and its miscellaneous services to the public. There are few books of a century ago in which the contemporary political scientist, provided he can overcome initial hurdles of style and manner, ought to feel more at home, if only because he will find there the twentieth-century student's interest in institutions and the emphasis on administration that plays so large a part in the study of government today.The Constitutional Code may be regarded as Bentham's view of the best possible commonwealth—a Utilitarian Utopia. Like all Utopias it was the product of disappointment with the here and now. It is well known that Bentham turned to systematic consideration of constitutional questions only after repeated failure to persuade the rulers of England to accept his legal reforms and especially his Panopticon scheme for a model prison.