Private Benefits Research Articles

Exploring Accounting for the Ocean: Utilisation of the Sociology of Worth to Assess Current Practice and Develop Propositions for Holistic Accounting

ABSTRACT The world’s oceans are vital for planetary health as well as food and energy security. Recently though, they have been increasingly considered as a solution to stagnating economic growth, with ocean resources and ocean spaces being used for both public and private benefit. This puts pressure on the sustainability of ocean ecosystems. These complex challenges have meant a need for an integrated understanding of and a more holistic approach to ocean accounting and governance. We adopt the Sociology of Worth to evaluate the application of the Ocean Accounts framework according to a range of competing and compromising perspectives on the concept of the common good within a contested case study. We find that Ocean Accounts fall short on key social and cultural aspects. However, there is scope to draw on alternative accounts to better inform the use of oceans. While the accounting literature presents a plethora of studies on environmental sustainability, studies on accounting for our ocean are limited. This is the first paper in accounting to focus on the Ocean Accounts framework.

The Distribution of Burden of Proof in Environmental Civil Public Interest Litigation

Environmental problems, in the current society, have attracted the attention and attention of the society and the public. Relevant laws are applied under the research of legislators and the reference of foreign legal experience. With the development of environmental civil public interest litigation, a series of problems have gradually emerged with judicial practice, and the allocation of the burden of proof is somewhat unreasonable. Through to our country and outside the environment of civil public interest litigation laws and regulations, understand the environment of the characteristics of the burden of proof and analysis its can perfect, points out that should distinguish the application of public welfare and private benefit, refining the causal relationship responsibility distribution, improve the system of proof obstruction, environmental damage appraisal system and environmental information disclosure system and other related measures.

Why do we argue about risk? The invisibility of worldviews in marine decision-making

The paper asks “why are we always arguing about risk?” It explores what drives risk perception in decision-making processes in Aotearoa New Zealand’s marine environment. The research’s holistic framing shows that the prevailing concern with risk and uncertainty (RU) issues in government and managerial settings deflects attention from and hides the background influences of worldviews. After introducing the invisibilities around RU and outlining worldview-based perceptions of risk, the paper turns to an empirical investigation focusing on deep-seabed mining investment in the context of Aotearoa’s Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf Act (Environmental Effects) 2012. Enacted as part of neoliberal reforms, the Act seeks to reduce environmental degradation in tandem with economic growth. A situated methodology examines a consenting process within this Act as a strategic site to establish expressions of RU and shaping invisibilities. Three key influences are revealed: the positionality of decision-makers, their disciplinary training, and the largely unknown filtering of environmental and economic options that come from 3 worldviews held in Aotearoa (dominant social paradigm, new environmental paradigm, Te Ao Māori). We contend hidden worldviews impact on economy–environment relations and ensuing economic and environmental practices and outcomes. This arises because they underpin and fuel debates around what RU are acceptable and how benefits should be distributed (public vs. private benefits investment decisions, and economy vs. environment). Unless we recognize and understand these hidden influences, we simply cannot work with them. This insight has major implications for how RU ideas might be framed and navigated in emerging policy settings.

The dark side of well-connected directors: Evidence from private firm acquisitions

We adopt a difference-in-difference approach to investigate the relationship between the board network and the acquirer's cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) by examining the influence of the directors' sudden death or retirement. We find that firms experiencing the departure of well-connected directors tend to obtain higher CAR when acquiring private targets. This suggests that well-connected directors may reduce the values of mergers and acquisitions (M&A). However, acquirers with greater external monitoring can reduce this negative effect. We also find that these directors with prior acquisition experience are more likely to secure board positions. In summary, these results support the agency problem that well-connected directors tend to make more M&A deals for their private benefits.

Private benefit of β-lactamase dictates selection dynamics of combination antibiotic treatment

β-lactam antibiotics have been prescribed for most bacterial infections since their discovery. However, resistance to β-lactams, mediated by β-lactamase (Bla) enzymes such as extended spectrum β-lactamases (ESBLs), has become widespread. Bla inhibitors can restore the efficacy of β-lactams against resistant bacteria, an approach which preserves existing antibiotics despite declining industry investment. However, the effects of combination treatment on selection for β-lactam resistance are not well understood. Bla production confers both private benefits for resistant cells and public benefits which faster-growing sensitive cells can also exploit. These benefits may be differentially impacted by Bla inhibitors, leading to non-intuitive selection dynamics. In this study, we demonstrate strain-to-strain variation in effective combination doses, with complex growth dynamics in mixed populations. Using modeling, we derive a criterion for the selection outcome of combination treatment, dependent on the burden and effective private benefit of Bla production. We then use engineered strains and natural isolates to show that strong private benefits of Bla are associated with increased selection for resistance. Finally, we demonstrate that this parameter can be coarsely estimated using high-throughput phenotyping of clonal populations. Our analysis shows that quantifying the phenotypic responses of bacteria to combination treatment can facilitate resistance-minimizing optimization of treatment.

«Басня о пчелах» Бернарда Мандевиля, или Гимн экономической свободе

Institutions (norms and rules) play an important role in the development of any socio-economic system, and largely determine its direction and speed. Economic freedom is one of the most important ‘products’ generated by the institutional environment. Strictly speaking, there is no unambiguous understanding of this phenomenon, but there is an almost universally accepted opinion that without freedom it’s difficult to achieve success in economic development and thereby ensure the growth of public welfare. The degree of freedom determines the extent and forms in which the interests of economic agents, related to the desire to obtain private benefits, which ultimately benefits the whole society, can manifest themselves. Bernard Mandeville, who can be considered the “petrel of economic freedom” almost the first among scientists and philosophers of Modern times, addressed this issue long before the founders of classical political economy and presented his judgments in allegorical form in “The Fable of the Bees”. Mandeville’s understanding of economic freedom as an opportunity for the manifestation of socially useful ‘private vices’ differs markedly from the interpretations of economic freedom that currently prevail and on the basis of which the relevant international indices are built. Nevertheless, Mandeville’s views, which were frank and devoid of any hypocrisy, served as the ideological foundation of modern views on economic freedom as an extremely useful, but very contradictory phenomenon in people’s lives.

Altruism and self-interest in constitutional reform: the case of the British abolition of slavery and the slave trade

AbstractWas the British abolition of slavery and the slave trade a triumph of altruism over pecuniary self-interest? Analysis of qualitative data reveals the importance of self-interested motives underlying this ostensibly other-regarding reform. The abolitionists worked to alleviate the suffering of enslaved Africans, but their campaign faced a collective action problem that was solved by the supply of the private benefits of status, esteem, and possible religious salvation to the leading figures. Abolition was also consistent with the desire of many ordinary Britons to eradicate the remnants of feudal society and move to a more liberal order. The payment of compensation to slaveowners on abolition also made reform consistent with their interests, and the interests of the individuals and financial institutions that processed and invested the payments. This analysis coheres with aspects of Eric Williams’ thesis that abolition took place because it benefited Britain’s ruling elite, although more Britons gained from abolition than Williams supposed. It is concluded that constitutional reform to remove oppressive and exploitative institutions does not follow from a sudden outpouring of societal altruism but requires the supply of private benefits to constitutional entrepreneurs able to make change consistent with the interests of the wider population and powerful groups who would otherwise lose from liberalization.

Usury enforcement as an alternative to capital taxation in pre-modern states

AbstractAll governments have an obligation to protect their territory and the wealth within that territory from external predation. In fact, since war has historically resulted in the plunder and destruction of wealth, it seems straightforward to suggest that the cost of providing adequate defense of one’s territory is a function of the accumulated wealth within the territory. Suppose that all wealth in society is capital. The accumulation of capital conveys a private benefit to its owner, but imposes an external cost on society. As with any externality, the optimal tax policy would be to tax capital. The revenue from capital taxation could then be used to finance defense. Such a taxation scheme, however, requires the state has an appropriate level of bureaucratic capacity. During the Middle Ages and the early Renaissance, this sort of state infrastructure did not exist. Yet the rulers of those states faced the same constraint. In this paper, I argue that the enforcement of usury laws during this period replicate the outcome of the optimal capital tax. Lending at interest was prohibited. However, rulers often allowed certain groups to lend in society in exchange for a license fee. This granted monopoly status to lenders. At the same time, rulers imposed binding price ceilings on interest rates. The combination of these three characteristics of enforcement replicate the long-run restriction on capital accumulation of the optimal capital tax and generate revenue that is possibly equivalent to the tax as well. I then model ruler behavior given these incentives. Finally, I use historical evidence from England, Italy, and France to support my argument.

Pre-IPO dividend puzzle: Reaction to IPO underpricing or post-IPO lockup? Evidence from China

It remains a puzzle as to why firms pay cash dividends to initial investors prior to their initial public offerings (IPOs) while at the same time raising capital through the IPOs. Leveraging mandatory disclosure from three years of pre-IPO data in China, we examine two possible explanations for this puzzle: strategic reactions to IPO underpricing and post-IPO lockup. Our findings suggest that (1) when an IPO firm expects a large IPO underpricing, it pays more cash dividends pre-IPO, suggesting that initial shareholders view large IPO underpricing as undervaluing the market value of the firm's cash pre-IPO. (2) When an IPO firm pays more cash dividends pre-IPO, its initial shareholders unload fewer shares post-IPO after lockup expiration, suggesting that the initial shareholders receive “compensation” via cash dividends to ease their liquidity concern from post-IPO lockup. Both results support the proposed explanations. Additional analyses show that high cash dividend payouts pre-IPO are associated with fewer fixed assets, less investment in research and development, and poor performance post-IPO. These results indicate that cash dividends pre-IPO are not consistent with shareholder value maximization. Overall, pre-IPO cash dividends reflect a type II agency conflict in which initial shareholders seek private benefits at the expense of future shareholders.

Information acquisition and tax avoidance: Evidence from a natural experiment

AbstractAnalyzing the launch of high‐speed rail (HSR) services in China as a natural experiment, we identify a positive externality stemming from lower information acquisition costs: the reduction in firms’ overinvestment in tax avoidance. Specifically, we find that outsiders undertake more corporate site visits and firms engage in less tax avoidance after the opening of HSR lines in the cities where these firms are located, leading to enhanced firm value. In another result consistent with expectations, we document that the impact of the introduction of HSR lines on tax avoidance is concentrated in firms in which insiders exhibit a high propensity to extract rents through aggressive tax strategies. Our results imply that more efficient transportation facilitates site visits and the acquisition of firm‐specific information, particularly soft information. This improvement strengthens external monitoring, thereby limiting the ability of insiders to accumulate private benefits under the guise of tax avoidance that benefits all shareholders as the residual claimants.

Examining the Influential Role of Family CEO and Investment on Tunneling: A BoundTest Approach

Tunneling is one of the ferocious corporate frauds mostly practiced in concentrated firms. This creates principal-principal agency conflict which influences the entire company operation and discourages investors. This study examined whether growth opportunities and family chief executive officer (CEO) smooth the way for tunneling practices in concentrated firms. The study analyzed panel quantitative data through a fixed effect model and autoregressive distributed lagged (ARDL) to forecast the short and long-run nexus. The finding shows that an increase in investment for expansion purposes creates a way for outward tunneling, which means that controlling shareholders secure their private benefits while availing growth opportunities. In addition, the study forecasts that these positive nexuses will be sustained significantly in the short and long run. Further, the current study also found that family CEOs tackle and minimize expropriation due to sustaining business, getting growth, and having a good reputation in the market. The study helped the regulatory body design policy, providing thorough information to investors strengthening governance mechanisms, and protecting shareholder's rights. The findings contribute to understanding governance dynamics in concentrated firms and highlight the need for regulatory measures to curb tunneling.

Политэкономическая оценка продвижения системы образования в России в условиях становления цифровой экономики

The article reviews a political-economic analysis of the growing dynamics of the education system in Russia, using the example of higher education in the creative solutions of the digital economy. The author examines the economics of education from the political economy view. The evolution of targets in higher education is presented. When comparing definitions of higher education targets, they provide two mutually related, but competing functions of higher school: the role of higher education in the teaching workforce for all economic sectors and the general intellectual growing of a creative, socialized personality. The nature of economic interests in the higher education system is determined. Market economy and democratic society principles imply models of competitive harmony in economic interests of higher education. The educational product is analyzed from the principle of diglossia as a public and private benefit. In the near future, a combination of fee and free higher education in Russia is inevitable. However, the share of fee-paying educational services of universities will dramatically increase. The analysis confirms academic steps to create a scientific product in the digital economy. Competition of universities in the market of scientific products for receiving profitable contracts with firms and corporations stimulates universities to increase their rankings. The conclusion shows the inconsistency of the dynamics of the development of the education system of Russia in the digital economy. An important contradiction is in the prevalence of political decisions free from long-term socio-economic consequences.

Research on Risk Management of Equity Pledge in Listed Companies: A Case Study of Guirenniao

In the present financial market, the financial needs of listed companies are expanding rapidly. Equity pledge, as a commonly used means of financing for listed companies, is becoming increasingly significant. As an emerging form of guarantee, equity pledge allows listed companies to pledge their own equity as collateral to obtain financing from external financial institutions. Equity pledge has many advantages, such as universality, fast financing speed, strong security, and effective risk diversification. However, equity pledge not only meets the financing needs of listed companies, but also brings corresponding risks to them. this paper selects the classic case of Guirenniao Co., Ltd. as the research object and adopts the literature analysis method to review relevant research on equity pledge both domestically and internationally. Based on the leverage cycle theory, PBC (Private Benefits of Control) theory, and asymmetric information theory, the article analyzes the risks associated with equity pledge and identifies excessive pledge by Guirenniao as an important factor contributing to the failure of company operation. Finally, based on the research findings, risk response measures are proposed from the main aspects of external information disclosure, internal supervision and control, enhancement of enterprise value, and dynamic monitoring of business operations. It aims to raise awareness among other listed companies and their stakeholders, prevent risks, effectively supervise the equity pledge behavior of listed companies, and ensure the sustainable development of equity pledge.

The underwriter's conflict of interest and earnings forecast bias in prospectus: Evidence from Hong Kong

About 40% of the firms that go public on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange voluntarily include earnings forecasts in their prospectuses. These forecasts are on average biased downwards by 8% compared to the realized earnings. We hypothesize that the underwriter, in order to increase IPO underpricing and obtain private benefits, pressure managers to low-ball earnings forecasts in the prospectuses. We examine the effect of underwriting commission rate, reputation, and IPO trading commissions on the earnings forecast bias in the prospectuses. We find that underwriting commission rate is negatively associated with the forecast bias. Using the 90-day post-IPO trading volume as a proxy for future trading commissions and profits generated from institutional investors and aftermarket trading activities in general, we document that trading commissions are positively associated with the forecast bias. Further analysis shows that underpricing is positively associated with the forecast bias, but the effect of the forecast bias on underpricing disappears after controlling for the underwriter's trading commission. Overall, these results are consistent with predictions based on the agency theories of underwriter by Baron (1982) and Loughran and Ritter (2002).

Public Debt and the Political Economy of Reforms

How do electoral incentives influence the choice to experiment with a policy reform that generates uncertain future benefits? To answer this question, we examine a two-period model of redistributive politics with uncertain policy outcomes involving a mixture of private and public benefits. In equilibrium, we find that the intertemporal trade-off between current policy costs and future benefits creates an incentive for politicians to use public debt to smooth spending across periods. The higher the share of policy benefits that are in the form of a public good, the higher the level of available debt-related spending on targeted policies that is necessary. (JEL D63, D72, E23, H41, H63)

Acquihiring for Monopsony Power

It is often argued that startups are acquired for the sole purpose of hiring specialized talent. We show that the goal of such acquihires might be to shut down the most relevant labor market competitor. This grants the acquirer monopsony power over specialized talent. As a consequence, acquihiring may harm employees and be socially inefficient. We explore the robustness of these effects, allowing for private benefits associated with working at a startup, varying bargaining protocols, multiple employees with and without complementarities, and private information. This paper was accepted by Maria Guadalupe, strategy. Funding: H. Bar-Isaac thanks the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for financial support. V. Nocke gratefully acknowledges support from the German Research Foundation (DFG) through CRC TR 224 [Project B03].

Cross-border regulatory cooperation and cash holdings: Evidence from US-listed foreign firms

We investigate the effect of cross-border regulatory cooperation on the cash holdings of firms cross-listed on US stock exchanges. The staggered adoption of the Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding (MMoU) facilitates cooperation among securities regulators around the world and expands their enforcement capabilities against foreign firms. Using a difference-in-differences design, we find that US-listed foreign firms significantly reduce their cash holdings after their home countries sign the MMoU, suggesting that the threat of increased SEC enforcement induced by regulatory cooperation disciplines corporate insiders from stockpiling cash holdings to enjoy private benefits of control. Information opacity and the cost of capital are two of the channels through which the threat of increased SEC enforcement affects cash holdings. The reduction in cash holdings is more pronounced for foreign firms from countries with weaker governance. After the MMoU, foreign firms make faster cash adjustments toward target levels, they reduce cash by making payouts, and their cash is valued more by investors.

Legal Aspects of Using Blockchain Technologies in the Field of E-Commerce on SDG'S

Objective: The objective of this study is legal aspects of blockchain. Theoretical Framework: Blockchain is one of the most prominent technologies and it has become a driving factor in business transformation. Method: Methods of historical and logical analysis and comparison, expert opinions, system analysis and forecasting were used. The research materials included legal aspects, in particular, in the development of blockchain technology. Results and Discussion: Blockchain, like any electronic technology, can have different forms of social implementation. Their openness is manifested in the fact that anyone can become a network node participating in the consensus procedure. Information in public blockchains is actually and legally publicly available. The listed qualities ensure a high level of security of public blockchains and a high level of users’ trust toward them. Research Implications: The legal regulation of digital technologies is becoming an important tool for ensuring a balance between public and private interests, benefits and risks of the digital age. Originality/Value: The global blockchain market will grow significantly in the coming years. The new vector of blockchain technology will be aimed at accelerating the pace of digitalization, financial inclusion and enhancing security. There is no doubt that blockchain is a disruptive technology and will continue to dominate the business world in the coming years.

Vaccination equilibrium: Externality and efficiency

I study individual consumers’ choices of getting vaccinated. A vaccine reduces the severity of an infectious illness, but may produce side-effects and other disutilities at the time of administration. Such private benefits and disutilities vary across consumers in the population. The infection probability depends negatively on the total mass of vaccinated consumers. This is an externality. One consumer’s vaccination choice has negligible contribution to the total mass of vaccinated consumers. Consumers do not internalize the externality. I characterize a unique Vaccination Equilibrium, the sustainable vaccination mass resulting from individual decisions. I show how vaccine improvements in benefits, side-effects, and infection likelihood change the Vaccination Equilibrium. The first-best or efficient vaccination mass takes into account the externality and consumers’ benefits and costs. The unique Vaccination Equilibrium is never first best. Taxes, subsidies, and mandates may change the Vaccination Equilibrium.

Impact of Ownership Structure and Dividends on Firm Risk and Market Liquidity

This article examines the impact of ownership structure and dividend payouts on idiosyncratic risk and market liquidity using agency, signaling, and bankruptcy theories from an emerging market perspective. The evidence shows that family firms dominate and have concentrated ownership, and dividend payouts are lower among family firms than their counterparts. The idiosyncratic risk is high among firms with higher family ownership concentration. The family ownership concentration and control positively influence the (firm) risk, dividends positively affect the market liquidity, and risk relates negatively to the market liquidity, supporting the entrenchment of the minority shareholders’ proposition that a significant payout leads to a decrease in information asymmetry and a lower level of risk. The study further supports the proposition that information asymmetries are central to elucidating the dynamics of dividend payouts and their effects on firm risk and market liquidity. The evidence confirms that family ownership concentration affects policy decisions, especially ownership control. The paper’s originality lies in factoring ownership concentration when analyzing how payouts affect firm risk and market liquidity from an emerging markets perspective where controlling shareholders enjoy substantial private benefits, whereas minority shareholders have limited protection.