Belief Bias In Syllogistic Reasoning Research Articles

Repeated Retrieval Practice to Foster Students’ Critical Thinking Skills

There is a need for effective methods to teach critical thinking. Many studies on other skills have demonstrated beneficial effects of practice that repeatedly induces retrieval processes (repeated retrieval practice). The present experiment investigated whether repeated retrieval practice is effective for fostering critical thinking skills, focusing on avoiding biased reasoning. Seventy-five students first took a pre-test. Subsequently, they were instructed on critical thinking and avoiding belief-bias in syllogistic reasoning and engaged in retrieval practice with syllogisms. Afterwards, depending on the assigned condition, they (1) did not engage in extra retrieval practice; (2) engaged in retrieval practiced a second time (week later); or (3) engaged in retrieval practiced a second (week later) and a third time (two weeks later). Two/three days after the last practice session, all participants took a post-test consisting of practiced tasks (to measure learning relative to the pre-test) and non-practiced (transfer) tasks. Results revealed no significant difference between the pretest and the posttest learning performance as judged by the mean total performance (MC-answers + justification), although participants were, on average, faster on the post-test than on the pre-test. Exploring performance on MC-answers-only suggested that participants did benefit from instruction/practice but may have been unable to justify their answers. Unfortunately, we were unable to test effects on transfer due to a floor effect, which highlights the difficulty of establishing transfer of critical thinking skills. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that addresses repeated retrieval practice effects in the critical thinking domain. Further research should focus on determining the preconditions of repeated retrieval practice effects for this type of tasks.

Individual differences in epistemically suspect beliefs: the role of analytic thinking and susceptibility to cognitive biases

The endorsement of epistemically suspect (i.e., paranormal, conspiracy, and pseudoscientific) beliefs is widespread and has negative consequences. Therefore, it is important to understand the reasoning processes – such as lower analytic thinking and susceptibility to cognitive biases – that might lead to the adoption of such beliefs. In two studies, I constructed and tested a novel questionnaire on epistemically suspect beliefs (Study 1, N = 263), and used it to examine probabilistic reasoning biases and belief bias in syllogistic reasoning as predictors of the endorsement of those beliefs, while accounting for analytic thinking and worldview variables (Study 2, N = 397). Probabilistic reasoning biases, analytic thinking, religious faith, and political liberalism consistently predicted various epistemically suspect beliefs, whereas the effect of syllogistic belief bias was largely restricted to pseudoscientific beliefs. Further research will be needed to examine the role the biased evaluation of evidence plays in the endorsement of epistemically suspect beliefs.

Characterizing belief bias in syllogistic reasoning: A hierarchical Bayesian meta-analysis of ROC data

The belief-bias effect is one of the most-studied biases in reasoning. A recent study of the phenomenon using the signal detection theory (SDT) model called into question all theoretical accounts of belief bias by demonstrating that belief-based differences in the ability to discriminate between valid and invalid syllogisms may be an artifact stemming from the use of inappropriate linear measurement models such as analysis of variance (Dube et al., Psychological Review, 117(3), 831–863, 2010). The discrepancy between Dube et al.’s, Psychological Review, 117(3), 831–863 (2010) results and the previous three decades of work, together with former’s methodological criticisms suggests the need to revisit earlier results, this time collecting confidence-rating responses. Using a hierarchical Bayesian meta-analysis, we reanalyzed a corpus of 22 confidence-rating studies (N = 993). The results indicated that extensive replications using confidence-rating data are unnecessary as the observed receiver operating characteristic functions are not systematically asymmetric. These results were subsequently corroborated by a novel experimental design based on SDT’s generalized area theorem. Although the meta-analysis confirms that believability does not influence discriminability unconditionally, it also confirmed previous results that factors such as individual differences mediate the effect. The main point is that data from previous and future studies can be safely analyzed using appropriate hierarchical methods that do not require confidence ratings. More generally, our results set a new standard for analyzing data and evaluating theories in reasoning. Important methodological and theoretical considerations for future work on belief bias and related domains are discussed.

Individual differences in working memory capacity and resistance to belief bias in syllogistic reasoning.

In two experiments, we investigated the possibility that individual differences in working memory capacity (WMC) would provide resistance to belief bias in syllogistic reasoning. In Experiment 1 (N = 157), participants showed a belief bias effect in that they had longer response times and decreased accuracy on syllogisms with conflict between the validity and believability of the conclusion than on syllogisms with no such conflict. However, this effect did not differ as a function of individual differences in WMC. Experiment 2 (N = 122) replicated this effect with the addition of decontextualized (i.e., nonsense) syllogisms as a different means of measuring the magnitude of the belief bias effect. Although individual differences in WMC and fluid intelligence were related to better reasoning overall, the magnitude of the belief bias effect was not smaller for participants with greater WMC. The present study offers two novel findings: (a) The belief bias effect is independent of individual differences in WMC and fluid intelligence, and (b) resolving conflict in verbal reasoning is not a type of conflict resolution that correlates with individual differences in WMC, further establishing boundary conditions for the role of WMC in human cognitive processes.

Real‐World Correlates of Performance on Heuristics and Biases Tasks in a Community Sample

AbstractIn the current study, we sought to examine whether performance on several heuristics and biases tasks and thinking dispositions was associated with real‐life correlates in a community sample of adults. We examined performance on five heuristics and biases tasks (ratio bias, belief bias in syllogistic reasoning, cognitive reflection, probabilistic and statistical reasoning, and rational temporal discounting), three thinking dispositions (actively open‐minded thinking, future orientation, and avoidance of superstitious thinking), and a questionnaire assessing real‐world correlates in several domains (substance use, driving behavior, financial behavior, gambling behavior, electronic media use, and secure computing). Our heuristics and biases tasks and thinking disposition measures were modestly associated with several real‐world outcomes, including the domains of secure computing, financial behaviors, and the total scores. That is, better performance on the heuristics and biases measures was associated with fewer negative outcomes. We found that the associations were generally higher in males than in females. Heuristics and biases performance and thinking dispositions were unique predictors of real‐world outcomes after statistically controlling for educational attainment and sex differences. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Using forced choice to test belief bias in syllogistic reasoning

In deductive reasoning, believable conclusions are more likely to be accepted regardless of their validity. Although many theories argue that this belief bias reflects a change in the quality of reasoning, distinguishing qualitative changes from simple response biases can be difficult (Dube, Rotello, & Heit, 2010). We introduced a novel procedure that controls for response bias. In Experiments 1 and 2, the task required judging which of two simultaneously presented syllogisms was valid. Surprisingly, there was no evidence for belief bias with this forced choice procedure. In Experiment 3, the procedure was modified so that only one set of premises was viewable at a time. An effect of beliefs emerged: unbelievable conclusions were judged more accurately, supporting the claim that beliefs affect the quality of reasoning. Experiments 4 and 5 replicated and extended this finding, showing that the effect was mediated by individual differences in cognitive ability and analytic cognitive style. Although the positive findings of Experiments 3–5 are most relevant to the debate about the mechanisms underlying belief bias, the null findings of Experiments 1 and 2 offer insight into how the presentation of an argument influences the manner in which people reason.

Modeling causal conditional reasoning data using SDT: caveats and new insights

Modeling causal conditional reasoning data using SDT: caveats and new insights

Rapid recollection of foresight judgments increases hindsight bias in a memory design.

One component of hindsight bias is memory distortion. This component is measured with a memory design, in which individuals answer questions, learn the correct answers, and recall their original answers. Hindsight bias occurs when participants' recollections are closer to the correct answers than their original judgments actually were. The present study used a memory design to examine the relationship between response time in recalling original answers and the magnitude of hindsight bias. In Experiment 1, participants' response times were negatively correlated with a hindsight bias index. In Experiment 2, half of the participants were instructed to recall their original judgments quickly and the other participants were instructed to take time to recall their judgments. The hindsight bias index was greater among rapidly responding participants than among delayed responding participants. These results, in conjunction with other findings, support a separate components view of hindsight bias. The memory distortion component of hindsight bias appears to occur quickly, and unbiased responding requires time for processing. This finding relates the memory distortion component of hindsight bias to other cognitive biases, such as the belief bias in syllogistic reasoning. The relationship of this hindsight bias component to dual-process models of cognition is discussed, and several avenues for additional research are suggested.

Working memory and the memory distortion component of hindsight bias

One component of hindsight bias is memory distortion: Individuals' recollections of their predictions are biased towards known outcomes. The present study examined the role of working memory in the memory distortion component of hindsight bias. Participants answered almanac-like questions, completed a measure of working memory capacity, were provided with the correct answers, and attempted to recollect their original judgements in two conditions: with and without a concurrent working memory load. Participants' recalled judgements were more biased by feedback when they recalled these judgements with a concurrent memory load and working memory capacity was negatively correlated with memory distortion. These findings are consistent with reconstruction accounts of the memory distortion component of hindsight bias and, more generally, with dual process theories of cognition. These results also relate the memory distortion component of hindsight bias with other cognitive errors, such as source monitoring errors, the belief bias in syllogistic reasoning and anchoring effects. Implications for the separate components view of hindsight bias are discussed.

Assessing the belief bias effect with ROCs: Reply to Dube, Rotello, and Heit (2010).

Dube, Rotello, and Heit (2010) argued (a) that the so-called receiver operating characteristic is nonlinear for data on belief bias in syllogistic reasoning; (b) that their data are inconsistent with Klauer, Musch, and Naumer's (see record 2000-02818-008) model of belief bias; (c) that their data are inconsistent with any of the existing accounts of belief bias and only consistent with a theory provided by signal detection theory; and (d) that in fact, belief bias is a response bias effect. In this reply, we present reanalyses of Dube et al.'s data and of old data suggesting (a) that the receiver operating characteristic is linear for binary "valid" versus "invalid" responses, as employed by the bulk of research in this field; (b) that Klauer et al.'s model describes the old data significantly better than does Dube et al.'s model and that it describes Dube et al.'s data somewhat better than does Dube et al.'s model; (c) that Dube et al.'s data are consistent with the account of belief bias by misinterpreted necessity, whereas Dube et al.'s signal detection model does not fit their data; and (d) that belief bias is more than a response bias effect.

Belief–logic conflict resolution in syllogistic reasoning: Inspection-time evidence for a parallel-process model

An experiment is reported examining dual-process models of belief bias in syllogistic reasoning using a problem complexity manipulation and an inspection-time method to monitor processing latencies for premises and conclusions. Endorsement rates indicated increased belief bias on complex problems, a finding that runs counter to the “belief-first” selective scrutiny model, but which is consistent with other theories, including “reasoning-first” and “parallel-process” models. Inspection-time data revealed a number of effects that, again, arbitrated against the selective scrutiny model. The most striking inspection-time result was an interaction between logic and belief on premise-processing times, whereby belief – logic conflict problems promoted increased latencies relative to non-conflict problems. This finding challenges belief-first and reasoning-first models, but is directly predicted by parallel-process models, which assume that the outputs of simultaneous heuristic and analytic processing streams lead to an awareness of belief – logic conflicts than then require time-consuming resolution.

Belief bias and figural bias in syllogistic reasoning.

Belief bias is the tendency to be influenced by the believability of the conclusion when attempting to solve a syllogistic reasoning problem. Figural bias is the tendency to be influenced by the order in which the information is presented in the premises when attempting to solve a syllogistic reasoning problem. When studied simultaneously they enable an investigation of whether participants' reasoning on the syllogistic reasoning task is guided by the conclusion (backward reasoning) or the premises (forward reasoning). Experiments 1 and 2 found evidence of belief bias but not figural bias on the syllogistic evaluation task paradigm. Experiments 3 and 4 found evidence of figural bias but not belief bias on the syllogistic production task paradigm. The findings highlight that different task characteristics influence performance dependent upon the nature of task presentation. These findings are discussed in the context of current theories of belief bias in syllogistic reasoning.

Working memory, metacognitive uncertainty, and belief bias in syllogistic reasoning

Working memory, metacognitive uncertainty, and belief bias in syllogistic reasoning

Working memory, metacognitive uncertainty, and belief bias in syllogistic reasoning.

Studies of syllogistic reasoning have shown that the size of the belief bias effect varies with manipulations of logical validity and problem form. This paper presents a mental models-based account, which explains these findings in terms of variations in the working-memory demands of different problem types. We propose that belief bias may reflect the use of a heuristic that is applied when a threshold of uncertainty in one's processing--attributable to working-memory overload--is exceeded during reasoning. Three experiments are reported, which tested predictions deriving from this account. In Experiment 1, conclusions of neutral believability were presented for evaluation, and a predicted dissociation was observed in confidence ratings for responses to valid and invalid arguments, with participants being more confident in the former. In Experiment 2, an attempt to manipulate working-memory loads indirectly by varying syllogistic figure failed to produce predicted effects upon the size of the belief bias effect. It is argued that the employment of a conclusion evaluation methodology minimized the effect of the figural manipulation in this experiment. In Experiment 3, participants' articulatory and spatial recall capacities were calibrated as a direct test of working-memory involvement in belief bias. Predicted differences in the pattern of belief bias observed between high and low spatial recall groups supported the view that limited working memory plays a key role in belief bias.

On belief bias in syllogistic reasoning.

On belief bias in syllogistic reasoning.

On belief bias in syllogistic reasoning.

A multinomial model is used to disentangle the respective contributions of reasoning processes and response bias in conclusion-acceptance data that exhibit belief bias. A model-based meta-analysis of 22 studies reveals that such data are structurally too sparse to allow discrimination of different accounts of belief bias. Four experiments are conducted to obtain richer data, allowing deeper tests through the use of the multinomial model. None of the current accounts of belief bias is consistent with the complex pattern of results. A new theory of belief bias is proposed that assumes that most reasoners construct only one mental model representing the premises as well as the conclusion or, in the case of an unbelievable conclusion, its logical negation. New predictions derived from the theory are confirmed in 4 additional studies.

Can any ostrich fly?: some new data on belief bias in syllogistic reasoning

According to one version of the mental models theory (Oakhill, J.V., Johnson-Laird, P.N., Garnham, A., 1989. Believability and syllogistic reasoning. Cognition 31, 117–140) beliefs exert their influence on reasoning in three ways. First they can affect the interpretation of the premises, for example by conversion. Second, they can curtail the search for alternative models of the premises, if an initial model supports a believable conclusion. Third, they can act as a filter on any conclusion that is eventually generated. This last influence is important in explaining the effects of belief bias in one-model syllogisms with no convertible premises, since such syllogisms, by definition, have no alternative models. However, the most natural interpretation of such a filter is that it filters out conclusions and leads to the response `no valid conclusion'. The present study, which was conducted with groups of both British and Italian subjects, looked at the effect of prior knowledge on syllogistic reasoning, and showed that: (1) invalid conclusions for such one model syllogisms, either thematic or abstract, are typically not of the type `no valid conclusion', but state invalid relations between the end terms; (2) belief-bias is completely suppressed when previous knowledge is incompatible with the premises, and therefore the premises themselves are always considered. The results are compatible with a version of the mental models theory in which a representation of prior knowledge precedes modelling of the premises, which are then incorporated into the representation of this knowledge. The relation between this theory and other accounts of belief bias in syllogistic reasoning, and the implications of these findings for reasoning more generally, are considered.

Individual differences in rational thought.

Much research in the last 2 decades has demonstrated that humans deviate from normative models of decision making and rational judgment. In 4 studies involving 954 participants, the authors explored the extent to which measures of cognitive ability and thinking dispositions can predict discrepancies from normative responding on a variety of tasks from the heuristics and biases literature including the selection task, belief bias in syllogistic reasoning, argument evaluation, base-rate use, covariation detection, hypothesis testing, outcome bias, if-only thinking, knowledge calibration, hindsight bias, and the false consensus paradigm. Significant relationships involving cognitive ability were interpreted as indicating algorithmic-level limitations on the computation of the normative response. Relationships with thinking dispositions were interpreted as indicating that styles of epistemic regulation can predict

On theories of belief bias in syllogistic reasoning

On theories of belief bias in syllogistic reasoning