The author attempts to substantiate the hypothesis that Singapore, during the years of Lee Kuan Yew’s tenure as Prime Minister (1965-1990), pursued a pragmatic foreign policy course that was innovative for a small power. It was based on a hedging strategy in interaction with the United States, Singapore’s major partner, and maintaining equidistant relations with others important states in the region and around the globe. This politics also allowed Singapore to enter the XXI century with notable diplomatic achievements, the most important of which was an ability to maintain very close relations with both Washington and Beijing. As the geopolitical situation in the Asia-Pacific region becomes more complex, the Singaporean leadership, despite continuing attempts to preserve foreign policy balance between its main partners, appears to be gradually moving towards alignment with Washington contrary to the principles of multi-vector foreign policy laid down by its Founding Father. Thus, Singapore, which at one time set a trend towards greater independence in foreign policy in spite of physical limitations, in the current realities, on the contrary, prefers a more traditional behavioral model for a smaller power in dealing with bigger counterparts.
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