Behavior Of Prosecutors Research Articles

Nudging law enforcement: evidence from low priority initiatives

AbstractThe effect of non-binding guidelines (nudges) on citizens’ compliance with law has been studied theoretically and empirically in behavioral law and economics. Less is known about the impact of non-binding guidelines on the behavior of law enforcement agents and prosecution. Our work fills this gap. We study whether non-binding guidelines affect law enforcement and prosecution practices when the guidelines are not necessarily aligned with legal actors’ preferences. Our empirical analysis focuses on the impact of the adoption of a low priority initiative (LPI) on police and prosecutor behavior in Los Angeles County. Our results suggest that following the introduction of an LPI there is a rise in the number of misdemeanor arrests, but not in the rate that misdemeanor marijuana offenses are dismissed. We conclude that law enforcement preferences have a counterbalancing effect given that police officers may have strong punitive preferences. Prosecutors do not appear to respond to non-binding guidelines as evidenced by no change in the rate of dismissing cases.

Disciplinary responsibility of prosecutors of Ukraine: grounds, procedure and features of disciplinary proceedings

The paper is devoted to issues related to bringing prosecutors to disciplinary responsibility in Ukraine. Disciplinary responsibility is a type of legal responsibility that, compared to others, is the most common and often applied to prosecutors. It is worth noting that the existence and consolidation of the disciplinary responsibility of prosecutors at the legislative level does not contradict European standards and is justified, since this type of responsibility acts not only as a guarantor of the prosecutors' performance of their duties, ensuring the rights of citizens, society and the state, but also contributes to the prevention of offenses with by the prosecutors themselves. From a doctrinal point of view, the disciplinary responsibility of prosecutors is considered as a special, independent type of legal responsibility, which is applied in a specific sphere of human life and is related to the professional activity of special subjects - prosecutors. Disciplinary responsibility of prosecutors as a type of legal responsibility consists in the infliction by the violator of prosecutorial discipline of adverse moral, material and organizational deprivations for him and is one of the means of ensuring compliance of the activity and behavior of prosecutors with professional standards. It cannot be claimed that today the practice of bringing prosecutors to disciplinary responsibility is clearly developed and unambiguous. Both the theory and the practice of holding prosecutors to account require serious consideration and the introduction of new approaches in order to increase their effectiveness. In general, the disciplinary responsibility of prosecutors is aimed at forming a responsible professional approach and stopping offenses in the legal sphere, in particular the corruption component.

Prosecutor and court: strategic balance

The article deals with the discussion issue of the role of the prosecutor in judicial proceedings through the prism of the principle of adversarial parties and the main powers of the prosecutor’s office in the legal state. The conclusion is made about the inconsistency of the regulatory regulation of the supervisory powers of the prosecutor in relation to the preliminary investigation and inquiry bodies, which entails a different format of the behavior of prosecutors in forensic proceedings. The dual situation is critically assessed, when the prosecutor does not support the petition of the preliminary investigation authorities in court. The author analyzes the ways out of this situation, proposes to reformat the relationship of the prosecutor with the investigator, transferring the authority for procedural management of the inquiry from the prosecutor - the head of the inquiry unit. It will allow prosecutors to concentrate all the efforts on supervision of respecting the rule of law in pre-judicial criminal cases production, to change a role of the prosecutor in judicial and control procedures.

ANALYSIS OF THE FUNCTION OF THE PROSPERITY'S COMMISSION IN SUPERVISING THE BEHAVIOR OF PROSPECTORS IN INDONESIA

With the power possessed by the Attorney General of the Republic of Indonesia, this institution has considerable powers in the field of prosecution and in administering state power. To minimize the occurrence of the Authority of State Power that exceeds the limit, usually, every State Institution must have limits through the Internal and External Oversight Board. It becomes a problem/issue when the external oversight agency, in this case, is the KKRI, where the results of the oversight carried out by the agency are in the form of recommendations, not followed up by the Attorney General or the President. The purpose of this study is to know the Authority of the Prosecutor's Commission and the legal consequences that arise in carrying out its duties and functions. The research method used is normative juridical. The results of this study are that the Prosecutor's Commission in Supervision has the authority to provide recommendations on alleged violations of ethics or the Prosecutor's behavior, but these recommendations do not have coercive power to be carried out like the form of supervision carried out by the Ombudsman which has juridical consequences if not implemented in the form of administrative to criminal sanctions, so it is necessary to strengthen normatively by providing legal consequences if the recommendation is not implemented by the Attorney General or the President.

Ethical standards of conduct of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court.

The article examines normative documents that establish standards and requirements for ethical and professional behavior of prosecutors of the International Criminal Court. The history of the formation of the International Criminal Court is considered. The analysis of the procedural position of the prosecutor in the system of international justice is carried out. The requirements that persons recommended for appointment to the post of Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court should have are considered. The main ethical standards of behavior of the staff of the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court have been identified. The main normative document of the International Criminal Court - the Rome Statute is considered. The main tasks and fundamental role of the Prosecutor's office in the investigation or prosecution of international crimes are investigated. The relevance of this work lies in the need to create a unified code regulating the ethical behavior of international prosecutors, as well as a strict selection of candidates appointed to the positions of international prosecutors. The rapidly changing situation in the world and in the system of international justice needs to update the previously existing requirements put forward to persons exercising international justice. The regulatory framework governing the activities of prosecutors is not so extensive. There are many areas of activity of persons exercising international justice where there are no normative standards of behavior, professionalism and independence. In the system of international justice, there is currently no specialized body regulating the activities and giving a legal assessment of the actions (inactions) of the Office of the Prosecutor.

Organizational governance and prosecutorial attitudes: Regulating Chinese prosecutors through the performance evaluation mechanism

Abstracts Performance evaluations shape the behavior of prosecutors in China, yet scholarship on the implementation of such evaluations is scarce. Based on documentary analysis and in-depth interviews with criminal justice officers in China, we show that the Chinese procuratorial evaluation system has been enforced from the top down, incentivizing upper-level prosecutors to pressure their subordinates to be more zealous in carrying out their functions. Highly quantitative parameters are used in the organizational governance of the procuratorial system, drawing different reactions from upper-level prosecutors versus front-line prosecutors and causing reciprocal relationship between prosecutors and other criminal justice actors. This study not only uses the latest empirical data to broaden our understanding of the details and logics of the Chinese procuratorial performance evaluation mechanism, but also stimulates the debate on organizational governance in comparative law and justice studies.

Realizing Indonesia Prosecutors Commission Professional and Trustworthy

Law enforcement in Indonesia is run by one of its institutions, namely prosecutors. Prosecutors have an essential role to be able to create and provide a sense of justice for the community. The performance and behavior of prosecutors run by the prosecutor are very often concern by the community, especially on the performance and behavior of the prosecutor. Prosecutors commission as one of the institutions that run the role as a supervisor of the behavior of the Prosecutor often also get attention because of the many cases involving the officials of the Prosecutor, especially the prosecutors. Concerning the role carried out by the Commission of the Prosecutor, then it can be withdrawn several problems such as the role of the Attorney's Commission in conducting performance supervision from the antics and what are the constraints of the Prosecutors Commission in conducting the performance supervision of the prosecutor. The role of the Prosecutor's Commission is related to the three main points of supervision, assessment, and monitoring, as well as the role of this Commission also publishes a report or recommendation which will later be released to the attorney general and passed back to the internal supervisor of prosecutors and the role of prosecutors the most critical commission is if the examination that has been processed by the internal Supervisor prosecutor does not show.

The decision to provide discovery: an examination of policies and guilty pleas

Prosecutors’ decisions to provide discovery can have vast implications for defendants. When prosecutors do not provide exculpatory information in the context of trials, they place innocent defendants at risk for wrongful convictions (Brady v. Maryland, 1963). Open-file discovery policy, in which prosecutors broadly share evidence with the defense, is the leading reform to address the withholding of exculpatory evidence. A US Supreme Court decision, however, ruled prosecutors do not have to turn over one form of exculpatory evidence (i.e., impeachment evidence) in the context of guilty pleas (U.S. v. Ruiz, 2002). The present study investigated the impact of two discovery policies (open-file (OF) and the Ruiz Supreme Court decision (SC)) on mock prosecutor behaviors and decisions. Participants playing the role of prosecutor were randomly assigned to one of four conditions (neither OF or SC, only OF, only SC, both OF and SC) and assembled a case against a defendant. In assembling the case, participants turned over discovery to the defense and had the opportunity to withhold four potentially exculpatory items. Results revealed both discovery policies impacted mock prosecutor behavior: Participants in the OF conditions turned over significantly more discovery and significantly more exculpatory items than those not in the OF conditions. Conversely, participants in the SC conditions turned over significantly less discovery and significantly fewer exculpatory items than those not in the SC conditions, regardless of their decision to offer a plea or go to trial. Our findings provide important empirical data for two prominent but nonetheless controversial, discovery policies.

SUPERVISION MODEL TO THE PROSECUTORS AND EMPLOYEES OF PROSECUTORS BY DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR SUPERVISION

Supervision of the performance and behavior of prosecutors and prosecutors' offices both inside and outside the office is the authority of 2 (two) supervisory body, namely the internal supervisorybody and the external supervisorybody. The supervisory model implemented by the Deputy Attorney General for Supervision is repressive that have weaknesses. The formulations of the problem in this research are How is the prosecutor and prosecutor’s employee supervision model by the Deputy Attorney General for Supervision ? How is the new construction of the supervision model for prosecutors and prosecutors' employee by the Attorney General's Office of the Republic of Indonesia. This type of research is a sociological legal research, with a qualitative research approach. Qualitative data in the form of primary data obtained through observation and interviews, while secondary data obtained through literature study, especially Law No. 16 of 2004 concerning the Indonesian Attorney General's Office and Presidential Regulation No. 18 of 2011 concerning the Attorney Commission of Republic of Indonesia. The results showed that there was a dualism of supervision of prosecutors and prosecutors' employees, therefore internal supervisors and prosecutors' external supervisors need to work together to improve the quality of the performance and behavior of Prosecutors and Prosecutors' Employee.

Comment on “‘A Million Dollars in Free Advertising’: Politics and Sex Offense Prosecution in the Wake of Duke Lacrosse”

Comment on “‘A Million Dollars in Free Advertising’: Politics and Sex Offense Prosecution in the Wake of Duke Lacrosse”

Individual Speech Behavior of Russian-Speaking Prosecutors in the 19-20th Centuries: A Case Study in Implicit Pragmatics

Abstract The article focuses on individual speech behavior of Russian-speaking prosecutors in implicit pragmalinguistics in the 19th-20th centuries. Speech signals of corresponding implicit strategies (“Participation/Nonparticipation of members of communication in a speech event”, “Sure/Unsure speech behavior of an author”, “The sender’s formation of addressee’s attitude to a speech event by evaluation”) actualizing the senders’ speech behavior in Russian are established. We count the frequency of the planes’ actualisation, form and interpret the senders’ speech portraits, diagnose individual features of speech behavior of prosecutors of Russian-speaking linguocultures.

Perceptions of Coercion in Plea Bargaining

This paper contains five new psychological studies analyzing lay perceptions of what constitutes coercion in the plea bargaining process. We investigate what an average citizen without particular legal or moral training thinks is appropriate, in contrast to plea bargaining laws and practices as they currently exist. We find that there is a base perception of coercion by prosecutors negotiating plea bargains. We also find specific factors in the prosecutor's behavior and the defendant's situation that make the plea bargaining process seem more coercive.

Prosecutorial Retention: Signaling by Trial

AbstractWe examine how retention motives affect prosecutor behavior under different evaluation criteria. In particular, we analyze how prosecutors of differing capabilities respond in choosing which cases to take to trial and which to plea bargain. We show how different criteria distort the mix of cases chosen for trial and that the direction of the distortion depends crucially on the evaluation tool used. Optimal evaluation metrics are derived that combine multiple signals of performance and are shown to achieve the first‐best outcome.

Prosecutor Elections, Mistakes, and Appeals

Prosecutors under common‐law tradition exercise a significant amount of discretion in the criminal justice system. In the United States, the dominant form of accountability is that prosecutors must be reelected by the voters. Recent empirical work illustrates that election concerns open up the potential for distortion in the decision making of prosecutors. Specifically, it has been shown that prosecutors take more cases to trial and plea bargain less when running for reelection. Does this hawkish behavior of prosecutors lead to inaccuracies in the criminal justice system? A panel data set of appellate decisions in western New York is analyzed. It is shown that if the initial felony conviction takes place in the six months prior to a reelection and is appealed, the probability that the appellate court upholds the lower court's decision decreases by 5.1–7.1 percentage points. Additional investigation into the types of mistakes made is done. Thus, the popular election of prosecutors results in inaccurate sentences, wrongful convictions, and, consequently, successful appeals.

Prosecutor Elections, Mistakes, and Appeals

Prosecutors under common‐law tradition exercise a significant amount of discretion in the criminal justice system. In the United States, the dominant form of accountability is that prosecutors must be reelected by the voters. Recent empirical work illustrates that election concerns open up the potential for distortion in the decision making of prosecutors. Specifically, it has been shown that prosecutors take more cases to trial and plea bargain less when running for reelection. Does this hawkish behavior of prosecutors lead to inaccuracies in the criminal justice system? A panel data set of appellate decisions in western New York is analyzed. It is shown that if the initial felony conviction takes place in the six months prior to a reelection and is appealed, the probability that the appellate court upholds the lower court's decision decreases by 5.1–7.1 percentage points. Additional investigation into the types of mistakes made is done. Thus, the popular election of prosecutors results in inaccurate sentences, wrongful convictions, and, consequently, successful appeals.

Prosecutorial Retention: Signaling by Trial

We examine how retention motives affect prosecutor behavior under different evaluation criteria. In particular, we analyze how prosecutors of differing capabilities respond in choosing which cases to take to trial and which to plea bargain. We show how different criteria distort the mix of cases chosen for trial and that the direction of the distortion depends crucially on the evaluation tool used. Optimal evaluation metrics are derived that combine multiple signals of performance and are shown to achieve the first-best outcome.

Race, Prosecution, and Juries: The Death Penalty in Tennessee

The behavior of prosecutors and juries with respect to the decision to impose the death penalty is examined. Using data on 968 first-degree murder convictions in Tennessee from 1977 to 2006, models of prosecutorial and jury behavior are constructed with a focus on the role of the defendant's race and the victim's race. Once significant controls are introduced, neither the race of the defendant nor that of the victim is a significant predictor of prosecutors' decisions to seek the death penalty. Nor is the race of the victim a significant predictor of the jury's decision to impose the death penalty. The defendant's race is a significant, albeit weak, predictor of jury behavior, but only because white defendants are more likely to be sentenced to death. While a number of other variables are significantly related to both prosecutorial and jury behavior, much of the variance in these decisions remains unexplained.

Guilt Shall Not Escape or Innocence Suffer? The Limits of Plea Bargaining When Defendant Guilt is Uncertain

This article examines optimal prosecutor behavior with respect to plea bargaining when defendant guilt is uncertain. I show that when jury beliefs and behavior are determined endogenously in equilibrium along with defendant and prosecutor behavior, plea bargaining can play only a limited role in managing society's conflicting desires to maximize punishment of the guilty and minimize punishment of the falsely accused. In particular, while it can be optimal for prosecutors to use plea bargaining to induce a large fraction of guilty defendants to voluntarily sort themselves from the innocent, such sorting must come at the cost of imposing relatively short sentences on such guilty defendants who accept plea bargains.

Citizen Oversight and the Electoral Incentives of Criminal Prosecutors

cases and prosecutor behavior. We model voter oversight of prosecutors in light of these difficulties. Voters use the promise of reelection given ob? served outputs to induce prosecutors to reduce uncertainty through investi? gation and subsequently to punish the guilty and free the innocent. The model demonstrates that an optimal voter strategy is always to reelect prosecutors who obtain convictions. Most importantly, even voters who most fear wrongful convictions should reward success at trial. Voter atti? tudes and beliefs instead influence rewards for cases concluded out of