Behavior Of Non-human Species Research Articles

Whisper‐like behavior in a non‐human primate

In humans, whispering has evolved as a counteractive strategy against eavesdropping. Some evidence for whisper-like behavior exists in a few other species, but has not been reported in non-human primates. We discovered the first evidence of whisper-like behavior in a non-human primate, the cotton-top tamarin (Saguinus oedipus), in the course of investigating their use of human-directed mobbing calls. We exposed a family of captive cotton-top tamarins to a supervisor who previously elicited a strong mobbing response. Simultaneous audio-video recordings documented the animals' behavioral and vocal responses in the supervisor's presence and absence. Rather than exhibiting a mobbing response and producing loud human-directed mobbing calls, the tamarins exhibited other anti-predator behaviors and produced low amplitude vocalizations that initially eluded our detection. A post-hoc analysis of the data was conducted to test a new hypothesis-the tamarins were reducing the amplitude of their vocalizations in the context of exposure to a potential threat. Consistent with whisper-like behavior, the amplitude of the tamarins' vocalizations was significantly reduced only in the presence of the supervisor. Due to its subtle properties, this phenomenon may have eluded detection in this species. Increasing evidence of whisper-like behavior in non-human species suggests that such low amplitude signaling may represent a convergence in a communication strategy amongst highly social and cooperative species.

ALTRUISM IN SUICIDE TERROR ORGANIZATIONS

Abstract.In recent years, much has been learned about the strategic and organizational contexts of suicide attacks. However, motivations of the agents who commit them remain difficult to explain. In part this is because standard models of social learning as well as Durkheimian notions of sacrificial behavior are inadequate in the face of the actions of human bombers. In addition, the importance of organizational structures and practices in reinforcing commitment on the part of suicide recruits is an under‐explored factor in many analyses. This essay examines the potential applicability of evolutionary models of altruism to the understanding of commitment to suicide on the part of terrorist organizational recruits. Three evolutionary models of sacrificial behavior in nonhuman species and many categories of human behavior are explored cross‐organizationally: reciprocity, inclusive fitness theory, and induced altruism. Reciprocal altruism is unlikely to be a major motivator in suicide attacks because the costs exhibited by attackers are too high to be adequately compensated. However, the role of evolved self‐deception in perceptions of personal death, and thus of rewards in the afterlife, is potentially illuminating. Inclusive fitness theory can help explain the motivations of attackers because rewards to kin often are offered by organizations to suicide recruits. However, suicide bombers also often act out of revenge for the loss of or injury to relatives, and inclusive fitness theory generally, as well as more specific theoretical models of retaliatory aggression, may not adequately account for the bombers' actions. Predictions from induced altruism theory appear to be well supported because suicide terror organizations tend to be tightly structured around practices intended to maintain and reinforce commitment though the manipulation of kinship‐recognition cues.

Zero-Knowledge Cooperation in Dilemma Games

We consider a very simple adaptive rule that induces cooperative behavior in a large class of dilemma games. The rule has a Pavlovian flavor and can be described as win–continue, lose–reverse. It assumes no knowledge about the underlying structure of the environment (the “rules of the game”) and requires very little cognitive effort. Both features make it an appealing candidate for explaining the emergence of cooperative behavior in non-human species.

A quantitative behavioral model of developmental stage based upon the model of hierarchical complexity.

Behavior analytic theories have focused on explaining the acquisition of relatively simple behavior (the behavior of nonhuman species, of infants, and of individuals who are mentally retarded or autistic) rather than complex behavior. For these reasons, such theories have tended to become marginalized as far as developmental psychology as a whole is concerned. Developmental psychology as a whole has been concerned with what develops and in what sequence. The major theory that dealt with the possible sequences in which behavior is acquired has been the mentalistic theory of Jean Piaget (e.g., Piaget, 1954; 1976). We propose here a quantitative behavior-analytic theory of development that deals both with the sequences of development and with why development takes place. The theory presented here is behavioral because it makes only behavioral assumptions and avoids mentalistic explanations. By rejecting mentalism and substituting task analyses, we show that more complex behaviors combine and sequence less complex behaviors. This fact of hierarchical organization may be used to define the nature of stage and stage transition. Commons ( Commons, Trudeau, et. al 1998) constructed the model of hierarchical complexity of tasks and their corresponding stages of performance using basically just three main axioms. As a consequence, there is only one possible stage sequence with gaps between the stages. The gaps cannot be filled with intermediate behaviors. The benefits for the field of psychology of having an analytic measure of stage are discussed. ********** A theory of development must be able to account for two aspects of behavior: a) what behaviors develop and in what order and b) why development takes place. It must be able to account for simple as well as complex behaviors. Behavior analytic theories of development have concentrated on explaining how development takes place (e.g., Bijou & Baer, 1961; Baer & Rosales, 1994). Development has been explained primarily in terms of contingencies of reinforcement. Such accounts have argued that the sequences in which behaviors develop are environmentally determined. Any particular behavior is viewed as being shapeable given the proper contingencies. As a result, sequences have been largely seen as arbitrary and easily changed. Behavior analytic theories have been better at explaining relatively simple behavior (the behavior of nonhuman species, of infants, and of individuals who are mentally retarded or autistic) rather than complex behavior. For these reasons, such theories have tended to become marginalized as far as developmental psychology as a whole is concerned. Developmental psychology as a whole has been concerned with what develops and in what sequence. The major theory that dealt with the possible sequences in which behavior is acquired has been the mentalistic theory of Jean Piaget (e.g., Piaget, 1954; 1976). Skinner (1953) criticizes these types of theories as follows: any mental event which is unconscious is necessarily inferential, and the explanation that makes use of it is therefore not based upon independent observations of a valid cause (p. 39). A behavioral explanation is based instead on the relationship among detectable events, as will be discussed below. We propose here a quantitative behavior-analytic theory of development that deals both with the sequences of development and with why development takes place. The theory presented here is behavioral because it makes only behavioral assumptions and avoids mentalistic explanations. The theory also uses principles derived from quantitative analysis of behavior (e.g., Commons & Nevin, 1981) in that the assumptions are explicit and the measures of performance are quantitatively describable; neither are they limited by the earlier forays into quantification such as those of Hull (1943; 1952) or Piaget ( Inhelder & Piaget, 1958; Piaget, 1954; Piaget, 1976; Piaget & Inhelder, with Sinclair-de Zwart, 1973). …

ON WHY THERE ARE SO FEW COMPARISONS IN COMPARATIVE PSYCHOLOGY

The comparative study of behavior requires close attention to the ecologi- cally unique details ofthe environmental challenges and adaptations (both behavioral and structural) of a systematically selected range of species. It offers an understanding of which aspects of behavior change and which remain constant across phylogenetic path- ways and evolutionary challenges. The General Process View of Learning (also known as the principle of the transsituationality of reinforcement, and by several other names), however, militates against study of the details ofbehavioral adaptations, by insisting that particular behaviors may be regarded as arbitrary instances of universal associative principles. The history of behaviorism, and of contingency theory, in particular, is largely the history of the gradual emergence and dominance of this General Process View, and of the working out of its profoundly anticomparative implications. The increasingly wide repudiation ofthe General Process View is providing the basis for a renewal ofcomparative studies of behavior. Comparative psychology, like psychology as a whole, has always attracted its share of commentators who are willing to pass judgment on its past record, its present health, and its future prospects. At the present time, and for quite a number ofyears in the past, the commen- tators have been split between thosewho find comparative psychology in robust health and those who find it in decline or worse. Those who find comparative psychology healthy point to the amount of research in progress on the behavior of nonhuman species, to new or greatly amended behavioral principles that have come from this research during the last two decades, to the build-up ofinformation about the adaptations of particular species, or to the use of animal data in developing general behavior theories (e.g., Dewsbury, 1984; Galef, 1987). The orientation of these positive commentators tends to be more behavioral than cognitive, more laboratory-based than field-based, and more operant than ethological. Theytend toview contingencytheoryon a continuum ranging from tolerance to enthusiastic approval. On the other hand, those who find comparative psychology less healthy, or altogether moribund, point to the limited number ofdifferent