Battle Drill Research Articles

I thought we tested that!: Lessons learned from a team communications field study

This paper presents practical lessons learned for conducting field research based on challenges faced during a complex field study. Communication between soldiers was captured via audio recorders as Army squads conducted simulated battle drills. The communication data provided critical information regarding squad performance in a realistic context that would not have been obtainable in a lab environment. The field study, despite intensive preparation, presented unforeseen issues requiring both short-term and long-term solutions. Issues were encountered with the environment, data collection, and data handling, which were able to be dealt with in real-time because we were adequately prepared. Preparations, challenges with specific examples, and universal lessons learned that can be applied to other field studies are discussed.

We Don’t Do that Here: Using Role Playing and Character Battle Drills to Develop Upstander Behavior at West Point

Background: The Army is focused on the prevention of harmful interpersonal behaviors such as sexual harassment and sexual assault. Training soldiers who may witness these behaviors to intervene is considered paramount to the Army’s prevention efforts. Objective: To increase the propensity and efficacy of cadets (undergraduate college students) employing upstander behaviors when witnessing harmful interpersonal behaviors in less governed spaces, the United States Military Academy at West Point facilitated two scenario-based role-playing workshops to develop its cadets while piloting new methods of training intervention behaviors. Methods: Both workshops had cadets improvise roles as upstanders, perpetrators, victims, and witnesses. The first workshop focused on developing cadets’ propensity (courage) to intervene and intentionally provided cadets with little guidance on if and how they should intervene, allowing them to develop their own workable intervention strategies and skills. The second workshop focused on developing cadets’ effectiveness during an intervention by having them apply the new Character Battle Drill (CBD) concept, which is a specific sequence of action steps to follow, including specific scripts to say during an intervention. Results: In both workshops, cadets reported higher levels of engagement than traditional forms of bystander training. Conclusions: Improvisational role playing seems promising for future training. Lessons-learned, limitations, and areas of future research are discussed.

A Novel Scenario-Based, Mixed-Reality Platform for Training Nontechnical Skills of Battlefield First Aid: Prospective Interventional Study.

Although battlefield first aid (BFA) training shares many common features with civilian training, such as the need to address technical skills and nontechnical skills (NTSs), it is more highly scenario-dependent. Studies into extended reality show clear benefits in medical training; however, the training effects of extended reality on NTSs, including teamwork and decision-making in BFA, have not been fully proven. The current study aimed to create and test a scenario-based, mixed-reality platform suitable for training NTSs in BFA. First, using next-generation modeling technology and an animation synchronization system, a 10-person offensive battle drill was established. Decision-making training software addressing basic principles of tactical combat casualty care was constructed and integrated into the scenarios with Unreal Engine 4 (Epic Games). Large-space teamwork and virtual interaction systems that made sense in the proposed platform were developed. Unreal Engine 4 and software engineering technology were used to combine modules to establish a mixed-reality BFA training platform. A total of 20 Grade 4 medical students were recruited to accept BFA training with the platform. Pretraining and posttraining tests were carried out in 2 forms to evaluate the training effectiveness: one was knowledge acquisition regarding the NTS and the other was a real-world, scenario-based test. In addition, the students were asked to rate their agreement with a series of survey items on a 5-point Likert scale. A battlefield geographic environment, tactical scenarios, scenario-based decision software, large-space teamwork, and virtual interaction system modules were successfully developed and combined to establish the mixed-reality training platform for BFA. The posttraining score of the students' knowledge acquisition was significantly higher than that of pretraining (t=-12.114; P≤.001). Furthermore, the NTS score and the total score that the students obtained in the real-world test were significantly higher than those before training (t=-17.756 and t=-21.354, respectively; P≤.001). However, there was no significant difference between the scores of technical skills that the students obtained before and after training. A posttraining survey revealed that the students found the platform helpful in improving NTSs for BFA, and they were confident in applying BFA skills after training. However, most trainees thought that the platform was not helpful for improving the technical skills of BFA, and 45% (9/20) of the trainees were not satisfied with the simulation effect. A scenario-based, mixed-reality platform was constructed in this study. In this platform, interaction of the movement of multiple players in a large space and the interaction of decision-making by the trainees between the real world and the virtual world were accomplished. The platform could improve the NTSs of BFA. Future works, including improvement of the simulation effects and development of a training platform that could effectively improve both the technical skills and NTSs of BFA, will be carried out.

Like day and night: Comparing squad level communications and shooting performance under differing battle drill conditions

An indicator of squad lethality is the ability to execute battle drills proficiently in a range of real-world situations and environments. While it is a common understanding that military night operations are vastly different from day operations, there is limited research comparing how squad communications and shooting performance differ from day to night in the field. Communication and shooting data were collected from 18 squads that executed a battle drill in the day, and again at night. In the night drills, there were illumination aids of muzzle flashes, chemlights, and Soldier worn night vision devices. The present field study focused on the support-by-fire team, whose central role was to generate suppressive fire which requires substantial teamwork. Findings revealed day-night differences in Soldier communications, firing activity, and the roles of various weapons in generating suppressive fire. Implications for day and night training are also discussed.

Sleep and Infantry Battle Drill Performance in Special Operations Soldiers.

BACKGROUND: Although multiple studies have documented the impact of insufficient sleep on soldier performance, most studies have done so using artificial measures of performance (e.g., tablet or simulator tests). The current study sought to test the relationship between sleep and soldier performance during infantry battle drill training, a more naturalistic measure of performance.METHODS: Subjects in the study were 15 junior Special Operations infantry soldiers. Soldiers wore an actigraph and reported their subjective sleep duration and quality prior to close quarter battle (CQB) drills. Experienced leaders monitored each iteration of the CQB exercise and recorded the number of errors committed.RESULTS: The number of errors committed during the live ammunition iterations was negatively correlated with subjective number of hours slept and subjective sleep efficiency/quality during the month prior. Soldiers with subjective sleep duration ≥7 h had a significantly lower number of errors than soldiers with subjective sleep duration <7 h (1.71 vs. 0.63 errors), and soldiers with sleep quality <85% committed more errors than those with sleep quality ≥85% (1.50 vs. 0.40 errors).DISCUSSION: These data preliminarily suggest that sleep quality and duration may influence subsequent performance on infantry battle drill training, particularly for soldiers with limited experience in battle drill conduction who have not yet perfected battle drill techniques. Future studies should enact sleep augmentation to determine the causal influence of sleep on performance in this setting.Mantua J, Shevchik JD, Chaudhury S, Eldringhoff HP, Mickelson CA, McKeon AB. Sleep and infantry battle drill performance in Special Operations soldiers. Aerosp Med Hum Perform. 2022; 93(7):557-561.

0014 Insufficient sleep is related to poor infantry battle drill performance in special operations Soldiers

Abstract Introduction Although multiple studies have documented the impact of insufficient sleep on Soldier performance, most studies have done so using artificial measures of performance (e.g., tablet or simulator tests). The current study sought to test the relationship between sleep and Soldier performance during infantry battle drill training, a more naturalistic measure of performance. Methods Fifteen junior special operations infantry Soldiers participated in the study. Soldiers wore Phillips Actiwatch Spectrum and reported their subjective sleep duration and quality during the week prior to Close Quarters Battle (CQB) drills. CQB training emphasizes close quarter combat tactics and requires a diverse range of cognitive skills (e.g., memory, decision-making, scanning). Each team of Soldiers performed six iterations of CQB – three using Ultimate Training Munitions (UTM; non-lethal rounds of munition) and three with live ammunition. Experienced leaders monitored each iteration and recorded errors on scorecards that are regularly used by the unit during CQB trainings. Results Participating Soldiers were all male and were 24.3 ± 3.82 years old. Soldiers slept an average of 6.6 hours per night leading up to the exercise and had an average sleep efficiency of 82/100%. The average number of errors committed during the UTM trials was 2.5 ± 1.9, and the average number of errors during the live ammunition trials was 1.1 ± 1.1. The number of errors committed during the live ammunition iterations was negatively correlated with subjective number of hours slept (r = -.67, p = .006) and subjective sleep efficiency/quality (r = -.55, p = .03). A t-test showed those with subjective sleep duration ≥ 7 hours had a significantly lower number of errors than Soldiers with subjective sleep duration &amp;lt; 7 hours (t(14) = 2.26, p = .04). Conclusion Enhancing infantry battle drill performance during training may directly translate to greater success in combat scenarios. These data preliminarily suggest that sleep quality and duration may influence subsequent performance on infantry battle drill training, particularly for Soldiers with limited experience in battle drill conduction who have not yet perfected battle drill techniques. Future studies should enact sleep augmentation to determine the causal influence of sleep on performance in this setting. Support (If Any) Support for this study came from the Military Operational Medicine Research Program (MOMRP) of the United States Army Medical Research and Development Command (USAMRDC). Material has been reviewed by the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research. There is no objection to its presentation and/or publication. The opinions or assertions contained herein are the private views of the authors, and are not to be construed as official, or as reflecting true views of the Department of the Army or the Department of Defense. The investigators have adhered to the policies for protection of human subjects as prescribed in AR 70–25. The authors have no conflicts of interest to disclose.

Evaluation of Two Training Programs Designed to Enhance Performance on the Army Combat Fitness Test Among ROTC Cadets.

Physical fitness is foundational to the U.S. Army as a component of combat readiness, and accurate assessment of readiness is imperative for mission success and soldiers' health and safety. To this end, the Army has developed the Army Combat Fitness Test (ACFT), which more accurately assesses these abilities and may aid development of a more combat-ready force. Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) programs nationwide are often challenged by limited structured training time, as well as access to equipment and training space. Development and/or adaptation of a training program that addresses these limitations would benefit ROTC programs nationally. Therefore, the purpose of this study was to compare a standard military fitness training program to High-Intensity Functional Training (HIFT) in ROTC cadets. We hypothesized that a HIFT program would be more effective than the standard military program developed by the DoD on both ACFT performance and assessment of common Warrior Tasks and Battle Drills (WTBDs). This study was approved by the Institutional Review Board at Colorado State University (CSU). Participants were recruited from CSU's Army ROTC program. Before and upon completion of the training intervention, participants completed a battery of testing, conducted over three visits. The first visit consisted of body composition assessment and measurement of aerobic capacity (VO2max). Visit 2 was the ACFT, and Visit 3 was a "benchmark test" to assess WTBD performance. Participants then completed 10 weeks of group training. Once weekly, participants completed the Daily Analysis of Life Demands for Athletes (DALDA) survey to monitor the risk of overtraining. Responses to training and survey responses were examined using two-way analysis of variance (time × group) with repeated measures. Baseline characteristics were compared using Student's t-test to assess pre-intervention differences between groups. Pearson product correlations were used to test relationships between ACFT performance, body composition, and performance on the benchmark assessment. The significance level alpha was set at P < .05. Twenty-five men and 10 women competed the study (n = 35). Mean age was 19.8 ± 1.3 years, range 18-23. There were no significant changes in absolute or relative VO2max within or between groups. We found no difference in body mass, but did find a small but statistically significant favorable change in body composition, with no difference between groups. Overall ACFT scores and scores in five of the six events increased significantly across both groups, with no significant differences between groups. For the benchmark test, there was no significant difference between pre- and post-intervention benchmark scores, time to completion, 1,600-m ruck time, or accuracy. DALDA survey results indicate no apparent risk for overtraining. Three 60-minute sessions per week of moderate-high-intensity training elicited improvements in ACFT scores, with no statistically significant differences between training programs. For this population of ROTC cadets, implementing a structured training program with expert oversight appears to be effective. Based on the successes and unanticipated challenges encountered in this study, training programs that emphasize intensity, train a wide variety of movements, maximize adherence, and are adaptable to a variety of situations are likely to be successful at improving ACFT scores.

Unit Collective Medical Training in the 75th Ranger Regiment.

The 75th Ranger Regiment's success with eliminating preventable death on the battlefield is innate to the execution of a continuous operational readiness training cycle that integrates individual and unit collective medical training. This is a tactical solution to a tactical problem that is solved by the entire unit, not just by medics. When a casualty occurs, the unit must immediately respond as a team to extract, treat, and evacuate the casualty while simultaneously completing the tactical mission. All in the unit must maintain first responder medical skills and medics must be highly proficient. Leaders must be prepared to integrate casualty management into any phase of the mission. Leaders must understand that (1) the first casualty can be anyone; (2) the first responder to a casualty can be anyone; (3) medical personnel manage casualty care; and (4) leaders have ownership and responsibility for all aspects of the mission. Foundational to training is a command-directed casualty response system which serves as a forcing function to ensure proficiency and mastery of the basics. Four programs have been developed to train individual and collective tasks that sustain the Ranger casualty response system: (1) Ranger First Responder, (2) Advanced Ranger First Responder, (3) Ranger Medic Assessment and Validation, and (4) Casualty Response Training for Ranger Leaders. Unit collective medical training incorporates tactical leader actions to facilitate the principles of casualty care. Tactical leader actions are paramount to execute a casualty response battle drill efficiently and effectively. Successful execution of this battle drill relies on a command-directed casualty response system and mastery of the basics through rehearsals, repetition, and conditioning.

Ranger O Low Titer (ROLO): Whole Blood Transfusion for Forward Deployed Units.

First-time use of Ranger O Low Titer (ROLO) blood and implementation of a forward-walking blood bank using predetermined donors proved essential in the survival of a 33-year-old active duty soldier following a complex blast injury during combat operations. The patient sustained significant bone, soft tissue, and vascular damage and continued to deteriorate despite resuscitation with cold-stored whole blood (WB). Only after utilizing the ROLO battle drill and transfusing with fresh WB was the patient able to be stabilized and evacuated. In this case report, we discuss how ROLO walking blood bank takes the next step in aiding resuscitation, providing smaller, forward-deployed units with blood resupply without the administrative burden of storage, particularly in resource-scarce environments. We provide an overview of WB and contrast its use to that of component therapy. In conjunction with the Golden Hour, ROLO can be incorporated as the standard damage control resuscitation to reduce the risks of noncompressible hemorrhage. By taking precautionary steps in the pre-deployment setting, ROLO offers an invaluable alternative to conventional resuscitation.

Prediction Equation For Estimating Total Daily Energy Requirements Of Special Operations Personnel

Special Operations Forces (SOF) engage in a variety of military tasks with many producing high energy expenditures, resulting in undesired energy deficits and loss of body mass. Therefore, the ability to accurately estimate daily energy requirements would be useful to generate adequate feeding regimens to support maintenance of energy balance during military operations. PURPOSE: Generate a predictive equation estimating energy requirements of SOF. METHODS: Retrospective analysis of data collected from SOF personnel engaged in 12 different SOF training scenarios. Energy expenditure and total body water were determined using the doubly-labeled water (DLW) technique. Physical activity level was determined as daily energy expenditure divided by resting metabolic rate. Physical activity level was broken into quartiles (0 = mission prep, 1 = common warrior tasks, 2 = battle drills, 3 = specialized intense activity) to generate a physical activity factor (PAF). Regression analysis was used to construct two predictive equations (Model A; body mass and PAF, Model B; fat-free mass and PAF) estimating daily energy expenditures. RESULTS: Average measured energy expenditure during SOF training was 4468 (range: 3700 to 6300) Kcal·d-1. Regression analysis revealed that physical activity level (r = 0.91; P < 0.05) and body mass (r = 0.28; P < 0.05; Model A), or fat-free mass (FFM; r = 0.32; P < 0.05; Model B) were the factors that most highly predicted energy expenditures. Predictive equations coupling PAF with body mass (Model A) and FFM (Model B), were correlated (r = 0.74 and r = 0.76, respectively) and did not differ (mean ± SEM: Model A; 4463 ± 65 Kcal·d-1, Model B; 4462 ± 61 Kcal·d-1) from DLW measured energy expenditures. CONCLUSION: By quantifying and grouping SOF training exercises into activity factors, SOF energy requirements can be predicted with reasonable accuracy and these equations can be used by dietetic/logistical personnel to plan appropriate feeding regimens to meet SOF nutritional requirements across their various mission profile. Disclaimer: The views expressed in this abstract are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy of the Department of Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

Baseline soldier physical readiness requirements study

Introduction: The Baseline Soldier Physical Readiness Study was conducted in order to determine the physical requirements for Soldiers in a combat environment. The study used physically demanding, commonly occurring and critical Warrior Tasks and Battle Drills (WTBD) and Common Soldier Tasks (CST) as a proxy for a wartime environment. There were three objectives: (1) determine the baseline physical requirements of WTBD/CST; (2) determine the WTBD/CST variability explained by the current Army Physical Fitness Test (APFT); and (3) determine if other common physical fitness test events were more predictive of Soldier success on WTBD/CSTs.

Body mass index predicts selected physical fitness attributes but is not associated with performance on military relevant tasks in U.S. Army Soldiers

ObjectivesArmy body composition standards are based upon validated criteria; however, certain field-expedient methodologies (e.g., weight-for-height, body mass index [BMI]) may disqualify individuals from service who may otherwise excel on physical performance and military-relevant tasks. The purpose was to assess soldier physical performance and military-specific task/fitness performance stratified by BMI. DesignCross-sectional observational study. MethodsMale (n=275) and female (n=46) soldiers performed a wide-array of physical fitness tests and military-specific tasks, including the Army physical fitness test (APFT). Within-sex performance data were analyzed by BMI tertile stratification or by Army Body Composition Program (ABCP) weight-for-height (calculated BMI) screening standards using ANOVA/Tukey post-hoc or independent t-tests, respectively. ResultsBMI stratification (higher vs. lower BMI) was associated with significant improvements in muscular strength and power, but also with decrements in speed/agility in male and female soldiers. Within the military specific tasks, a higher BMI was associated with an increased APFT 2-Mile Run time; however, performance on a 1600-m Loaded March or a Warrior Task and Battle Drill obstacle course was not related to BMI in either sex. Male and Female soldiers who did not meet ABCP screening standards demonstrated a slower 2-Mile Run time; however, not meeting the ABCP BMI standard only affected a minimal number (∼6%) of soldiers’ ability to pass the APFT. ConclusionsMilitary body composition standards require a careful balance between physical performance, health, and military readiness. Allowances should be considered where tradeoffs exist between body composition classifications and performance on physical tasks with high military relevance.

Psychiatry, Hate Training, and the Second World War

During the Second World War, the role of psychiatrists in military training was crucial. The part played by psychiatrists in training young men for combat was of intense interest to the family and friends of service personnel, as well as to men preparing for combat. Fearing that British men would be unable to cope with the rigors of the modern battlefield and heeding the advice of behaviorist psychologists, the military established battle schools. These “schools” or training camps would focus on “battle inoculation” and “hate training.” The first battle school was established by the British army in early 1942, and a psychiatrist was appointed to it. The school had two aims: first, to establish a new battle drill to replace older methods of training that had proven unworkable; second, to “condition students to the noise and fog of war” by using live ammunition and high explosives. However, this “hate training” came under sustained attack by psychiatrists and the general public. This article uses the lens of military training to reflect on the uses and abuses of psychiatry in times of national emergency.

On Combat Effectiveness in the Infantry Platoon: Beyond the Primary Group Thesis

ABSTRACTSince 2001, Western troops have been heavily engaged in combat in Iraq and Afghanistan raising once again the long-standing question of why small groups of soldiers are willing and able to fight together. Drawing on evidence from recent campaigns, and specifically focusing on American and British forces, this paper examines why small Western units have generally been effective in combat. Against the primary group thesis, originally proposed by Morris Janowitz and Edward Shils in 1948, the article claims that training and battle drills, not interpersonal relations, are the primary factor in generating performance on the battlefield. Moreover, high levels of training alters the relations between soldiers, giving rise to a core group which generates distinctive patterns of motivation.

A Team Cognitive Readiness Framework for Small-Unit Training

The modern battlefield is characterized by a need to mitigate the effects of creative tactics by insurgent enemies. At the small-unit level, this need requires coordination by team members highly proficient in battle drills and immediate actions. Furthermore, these teams must demonstrate a facility in adaptive decision making and flexible action execution to effectively respond to threats. At issue is whether current training theory can appropriately support this need to enable teams that are not only procedurally ready but also cognitively ready. In this article, the authors provide a theoretical framework meant to guide the development of training for team cognitive readiness (TCR). Beginning with perceptual processing and cue recognition, elevating to problem solving and decision making, and scaling up to complex coordinative processes, TCR requires a comprehensive theoretical framework capable of addressing the varied processes and performance demands at the small-unit level. In service of this need, the authors provide a framework to improve the understanding of, and to improve adaptive coordination in, teamwork in dynamic environments.

Rustic warriors: warfare and the provincial soldier on the New England frontier, 1689-1748

List of Maps Preface and Acknowledgments Introduction: The New England Provincial Soldier: A Problem of PerceptionPart I: Warfare on the New Engl and Frontier 1 The Initiation of War and the New England Military System 2 Garrisons: The First Line of Defense 3 Provincial Forts: The Magnet 4 Scouts: Patrols, Probes, and Raids 5 Expeditions: The Anglo-American Partnership 6 Stores of War: The Logistical Nightmare Part II: The Provincial Soldier 7 Recruiting: Gone for a Soldier 8 Officers: Chosen to Lead 9 Battle Drill and Fighting Spirit 10 Battle Experience: Facing the Enemy 11 The Wounds of War Afterword Notes Index About the Author

The Struggles for Zimbabwe, South Africa and SADC

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes 1. The Rhodesia Front government unilaterally declared independence from Britain in November 1965. 2. This Rhodesian claim was based on the fact that sixteen of the sixty-six seats in the Rhodesian Parliament were reserved for Africans, and Africans could vote if they fulfilled stringent literacy and property requirements. But the system actually ensured that few could vote. 3. Anti-colonial resistance leaders and traditional leaders from the first Chimurenga of 1896-7 are particularly revered. 4. See Griff Foley, ‘Learning in the Struggle: the Development of Political Consciousness Among Zimbabweans in the 1930s’, Zimbabwean History (Vol. 12, 1980), pp. 47–60. 5. The MDC have been particularly vulnerable to this claim. 6. See Terence Ranger, ‘Nationalist Historiography, Patriotic History and the History of the Nation: the Struggle over the Past in Zimbabwe’, Journal of South African Studies (Vol. 30, No. 2, June 2004), pp. 215–234. 7. As quoted by war veteran leader Lucas Gwara, interview in The Herald, 12 November 2006. 8. In 2005, Operation Marambatsvina resulted in the forced displacement of an estimated 600,000 people from the cities in Zimbabwe. 9. ZUM was led by Edgar Tekere, a ZANU-PF heavyweight and former minister in the post-1980 government. After falling out with Mugabe, Tekere became a long-standing critic of Mugabe, and a ‘political warlord’ in Manicaland province. 10. South Africa's ‘total strategy’ was adapted from French General Andre Beaufre's 1950s thesis that the West had to develop a ‘total strategy’ to counter the Communist ‘total onslaught’. 11. Live ammunition instead of blanks was used at the ZNA's mock battle drill at the Marondera Agricultural Show in September 2004; this resulted in fourteen people being seriously injured. It also led to a parliamentary enquiry, and Parliamentary Defence Committee Report (2004) which highlighted serious morale and training problems in the ZNA. 12. Doubts about Mbeki's suitability intensified in the wake of his ‘no crisis’ comment following the March 2008 elections in Zimbabwe. 13. For more details on the ANC's post-1994 internal ideological struggles, see William Gumede,Thabo Mbeki and the Battle for the Soul of the ANC (London: Zed Books, 2007). 14. Naison Ngoma, Prospects for a Security Community in Southern Africa (Pretoria: ISS, 2005), pp. 230–231. 15. Professor Laurie Nathan headed the Military Research Group which worked with the ANC and SADF to produce the 1993 South African White Paper on Defence. This document was crucial in promoting a non-militarist, human security driven conception of national security. 16. Although Rwanda's participatory justice process has been groundbreaking, there have been concerns about the extent to which it has ended the culture of impunity, and whether it institutionalises ‘victor's justice’. On the other hand, it has provided a crucial template for local ownership of the justice and restitution process in Africa. Additional informationNotes on contributorsKnox ChitiyoDr Knox Chitiyo is Headof the Africa Programme at RUSI

Using Virtual Environments for Conducting Small Unit Mission Rehearsals

This research examined the use of virtual environments as a viable dismounted infantry mission rehearsal tool. Four squads of soldiers individually conducted two missions that involved clearing a two-story building located at an urban operations training site. Two squads rehearsed the mission in a virtual representation of the exact building they would clear at the urban training site. The remaining squads rehearsed in an actual two-story building that was similar to the one they would clear at the urban training site. Squads executed both missions in each environment. Performance differences between the rehearsal groups across the two “real-world” missions were small to negligible. Group performance differences for fratricides and personnel flagging were negatively affected by simulator constraints. The research showed that while virtual environments show promise for this type of training, a number of interface and technology problems must be overcome. Currently, virtual environments do not appear to be as effective as real-world tactical training for improving skills underlying specific small unit tasks or battle drills. However, these environments may be used effectively at selected stages of training to enhance cognitive skills development.

Lionel Wigram, Battle Drill and the British Army in the Second World War

Like many thousands of his contemporaries, Lionel Wigram (1907-44), a London-based solicitor and property developer, joined the British army at the outbreak of the Second World War. Already commissioned in the Territorial Army, he joined the Colours as a captain. Battle drill, invented during the First World War and revived by the then Lieutenant-General Harold Alexander in I Corps after Dunkirk, was a method of teaching infantry minor tactics. Wigram played the leading part in spreading this training technique to the whole of the Home Army. Having founded and run 47th Division's School of Battle Drill in 1941, he was appointed chief instructor at the new GHQ Home Forces Battle School at Barnard Castle early in 1942. It was from here that battle drill swept through Home Forces. Later that year, the Barnard Castle school became a wing of the new War Office School of Infantry established on the same site, and battle drill gained War Office blessing. Battle drill was, however, a controversial training technique. Many officers, particularly those of the regular army, did not trust it. The War Office withheld its approval until battle drill's popularity with the troops threatened to make a mockery of official reservations. Although there were respectable pedagogical objections to battle drill, there were also other less honourable motives for the hostility battle drill aroused in some quarters. That Wigram was not a regular officer yet nonetheless presumed to teach the army its business was chief among them. Wigram reciprocated with a large measure of contempt for the regular army, which in his view had failed to maintain elementary infantry fighting skills. Dissenting from previous interpretations, this article contends that battle drill was a highly promising development that both rescued infantry morale and improved military efficiency. However, it proved not to be the panacea that many had hoped, although not for the pedagogical reasons that had prompted regular army doubts. The author explores the reasons for this situation, arguing that ultimately the regular army's failure to take Wigram into its confidence robbed British troops of their best chance of thorough training for the problems they would face in battle.

The Canadian Army and the Normandy campaign: a study of failure in high command

Foreword by Gunther E. Rothenberg Preface Prologue: Of Ignorant Armies Long Forgotten Winters The Canadian Corps and the British Mold The Bellows of Peace Shaping an Expeditionary Force The Staff Caste Battle Drill Die The Montgomery Measurement Epilogue: Final Tempering Half-Forgotten Summer The Imprint of Doctrine Cast of Commanders Throes Beyond the Beach Cold Eye on Death The Amiens Alchemy Case Hardening Conclusion: Final Casting Appendix A: Some General Notes on What to Look for When Visiting a Regiment by Lt.-Col. B. L. Montgomery Appendix B: Tank and Gun Comparisons Select Bibliography Index