Bargaining Behavior Research Articles

Test anxiety and the bargaining behavior of preadolescent males.

Summary The bargaining behavior and types of agreements reached on a competitive allocation problem by pairs of high and low test anxious preadolescent males (TASC) were examined. Dyads composed of same and opposite type test anxious boys were constituted and one randomly determined member in each pair passed an arithmetic test which made toys available for play. It was hypothesized that the dyads composed of two high test anxious boys would evidence equalitarian tendencies, while those composed of at least one low test anxious member would relatively quickly agree to an equity distribution. The former prediction received support. Unexpectedly, however, the dyads with a low test anxious failer more often agreed to nonequitable rather than equitable divisions and did so after prolonged, competitive negotiations. The findings were discussed in terms of differences between high and low test anxious boys in their response to evaluation.

THE INTERGROUP BARGAINING OF MIXED-SEX GROUPS.

This study investigated the intergroup bargaining behavior and outcomes of mixed-sex groups. A bargaining situation frequently observed in industrial settings--A male union representative bargaining on the behalf of a female union constituency negotiated with a female management representative representing male upper management--was simulated in the laboratory to determine if the results of the simulation were consistent with the predictions of bargaining theory and/or with the results observed in an industrial setting. It was found that the male union representative's behavior was consistent with bargaining theory; however, the outcomes of his bargaining with the management representative contradicted bargaining theory and were consistent with the field observation. Specifically, the union representative bargained cooperatively with the management, representative but deadlocked often.

The effects of information and aspiration level on bargaining behavior

This paper examines a crucial problem facing a bargainer in interpersonal negotiation; should he seek additional information about an opponent's reward structure. The “information is weakness” hypothesis and the “reality of aspiration” hypothesis give conflicting recommendations concerning this question. An “information-aspiration” model is presented as an explanation of why the findings which give support to both positions are not necessarily contradictory. This model is tested in a 2 × 2 factorial design where 80 buyers bargained having either complete or incomplete information and low or high aspiration levels, against 80 sellers with incomplete information. In general the model was supported in that bargainers with low aspirations tended to gain strength with additional information, while those with high aspirations tended to lose strength with additional information.

Cooperation, Competition, and the Effects of Time Pressure in Canada and India

The effects of time limitations on bargaining behavior were investigated in India and Canada. The findings indicated that Canadian males reacted to time limits imposed by one of the bargainers in a manner consistent with the way North American males typically react to threat-that is, by becoming very competitive and resisting yielding. When the time limits were imposed by the experimenter, however, this same group reacted cooperatively. Canadian females and Indians of both sexes were all relatively cooperative, regardless of the source of time limitation. Indian females, however, were more passive than the other groups.

Constituent's Bargaining Orientation and Intergroup Negotiations

The bargaining behavior of 80 pairs of female undergraduates on a competitive reward‐allocation task was examined. The participants either bargained for themselves or represented the interests of a constituent as well as themselves. Representatives were given information indicating that their constituent expected them to win or to behave cooperatively, or they were given no information concerning their constituent's bargaining orientation. Consistent with previous research, the present findings indicated that representational role obligations tend to increase competition between negotiators. However, the findings also revealed, that this tendency is reduced when pressure to cooperate is applied by constituents to at least one of the representatives. Procedures that aid in the resolution of intergroup conflict were discussed.

The influence of reward magnitude, opening bid and concession rate on profit earned in a managerial negotiation game

This paper examines the influence that reward magnitude, concession rate, and opening bid concession have on the payoffs earned in a managerial bargaining game. Twenty-four subjects participated as both buyers and sellers in 18 separate bargaining sessions. The data indicate that the opening bid concession and the concession rate of the bargainer are crucial in reaching mutually rewarding agreements over a period of time regardless of the magnitude of the potential earnings. The implications of the results for managerial bargaining behavior in organizations are discussed.

Effects of the opponent's initial offer, concession magnitude and concession frequency on bargaining behavior.

Two laboratory experiments were conducted to determine how a bargainer's aspiration level, offers, and perception of the opponent are affected by a programmed opponent's initial offer, concession magnitude, and concession frequency. Several discrepancies in the research literature relevant to the aspiration level hypothesis of bargaining were also investigated. The results indicated that subjects had lower aspirations and made a more favorable initial and final offer when the opponent made a hard initial offer than when the opponent made a soft initial offer. The subjects made a more favorable final offer, had lower aspirations, and perceived the opponent to be tougher when the opponent made small concessions than when the opponent made large concessions. The superiority of a small-concession strategy occurred only when opponent concessions were frequent and they allowed subjects to obtain positive payoffs from a settlement.

Style of third party intervention, face-saving and bargaining behavior

Four forms of third party intervention were investigated under both high- and low-need to save face in a bargaining study. These forms were: nonbinding suggestion (mediation), binding decision (arbitration), selection of the best of the bargainers own proposals (govplan), and no third party intervention (control). This variable was crossed with high- vs low-need to save face. The interaction of these variables indicated that when there was a high-need to save face bargainers were more conciliatory when no intervention was anticipated. When there was low-need to save face those expecting arbitration were most likely to reach agreement. After intervention, those who received a suggestion for settlement were no more likely to reach agreement than were those who did not receive a suggestion. It was found that in the high face-saving condition there was a negative association between the magnitude of the first concession and the final offer. The relationship was reversed in the low face-saving condition. Finally, the issue of the relative effects of the anticipation of intervention and the actual intervention is posed.

The negotiator's dilemma: Simultaneous in-group and out-group conflict

This study of intergroup bargaining attempted to simulate the dual external and internal conflict a negotiator faces from his opponent and his constituency. Via teletype, subjects ostensibly negotiated management-labor wage contracts with each other and simultaneously interacted with additional subjects who enacted the role of their constituency. Actually, all subjects were management spokesmen. They interacted with a computer program which took the part of the union spokesman and the management constituency. The three independent variables in the 2 × 2 × 2 factorial design were: (1) a cooperative vs an exploitative perception of one's opponent; (2) constituent trust vs constituent distrust; and (3) a noncontingent fee vs a contingent fee. It was found that bargaining behavior in general was best predicted as an interactive effect of the type of opponent factor and the constituent trust factor. Since the former factor is one aspect of external conflict and the latter factor is one aspect of internal conflict, it was concluded that intergroup negotiations cannot be understood simply in terms of the isolated dyadic bargaining process.

BARGAINING BEHAVIOR IN COALITION FORMATION (I)

The theories of a coalition formation appeared to be divided into two-one is derived from the viewpoint of psychology, and the other from the game theory. In this thesis, all the members were permitted an unlimited bargaining behavior, and also permitted to have enough chance of the intervention by the third person in order to make up the situations which were allowed to predict from the game theory viewpoint.Subjects were second-year junior high school students. Each group was composed of three persons, and there were a total of 15 groups. Types of triad used in this experiment were Type II (3-2-2), V (4-3-2), and VIII (4-2-2) proposed by Caplow, and each group, given a simple situation, played six games of each type, or 18 games in all. Every member was assigned random weight.The main results of our experiments were as follows:1. In Type II and V, there happened coalitions between two weaker members most frequently, thus confirming the Caplow's predictions. That is, players behaved basing on perception of initial strength. But in comparison with Vinacke & Arkoff's, the result of this study was closer to the chance distribution than theirs (Table 2).2. In Type VIII, coalitions were formed among two weaker members most frequently (Table 2).3. Each member made the same number of offers in Type II and V, while in Type VIII, weaker initiated offers significantly more often. And the number of offers to ally did not differ significantly between stronger and weaker in Type II and V, but differed significantly in Type VIII. And the number of receipts of alliance differed significantly between stronger and weaker in Type II and V, but did not differ in Type VIII (Table 4).4. In respect to the reward division in the initial offers from stronger to weaker, and from weaker to stronger, no differences were found between stronger's and weaker's, but there were significant differences among the three Types' players significantly more often offered equal split in Type II, and parity split in Type VIII (Table 7, 8).5. Concerning the kinds of reward division in the final coalition formation, parity split was found less than in the previous studies. And on weakers coalitions in Type II and VIII, there was considerable non-equal split in which the member of the coalition who contributed the most resources received the smaller share of the pay-off (Table 5).6. Regarding the pairs which came to an concurrence in the initial offer, whether the concurrence was continued to the end or not was examined. In short, the more difference in resources the pair had, the less the concurrence was continued (Table 9).7. The amount of paper communication on the bargaining was significantly less in Type VIII (Table 10, 11).

Some Variables Affecting Boundary Role Behavior

In this experimental study of boundary role processes, an investigation was made concerning the effect of two independent variables on subjects' bargaining behavior. Subjects believed they had been arbitrarily chosen to represent their dyads in a mixed-motive bargaining situations and would be paid according to the evaluation of their performance by constituents. Independent variables were the perceived visibility of the bargainer's behavior to his constituent and the perceived degree of confidence placed in the bargainer by the constituent; the main dependent variable was the bargainer's deviation from the constituency norm. The effect of visibility was found to be significant: subjects deviated from the constituency norm more often when their bargaining behavior was thought to be unobserved by constituents. The obtained effect of confidence,

Bargaining Strategies with Asymmetric Initiation and Termination

Two experimental studies of bilateral bargaining were conducted, and this paper reports findings related to differences in the conditions under which bargaining began and ended. Asymmetric initiation affected the way the subjects bargained, but not, on the average, the deals they struck. Asymmetric termination affected both bargaining behavior and deals. One surprising conclusion was that following a relatively simple configuration of bargaining strategies increased both one's probability of making a deal and one's benefits from the deal itself.

International Bargaining Behavior

James Rosenau (1967) has suggested that international relations scholars should devote more of their time to playing their respective in their respective ballparks than to taking potshots at others playing other games in other parks. This is a well timed criticism. The last decade has witnessed much intramural squabbling, and this article should not be viewed as simply another international relations scholar once again falling into this easy trap. The focus here is not the question of how to study international relations (which was Rosenau's focus), but what it is that we are studying. It will be argued that we are not focusing on a crucial aspect of international phenomena, that perhaps the nature of the beast prevents us from doing this, and some possible reasons for this deficiency will be suggested. Finally, we will suggest that the practitioners of international relations, the diplomats involved in the day-to-day international bargaining, are in some ways more concerned about this aspect than are international relations scholars.

Customer-Salesman Bargaining Behavior in Retail Transactions

Few attempts have been made to analyze simultaneous behavior of both parties to a transaction. This study examines the bargaining behavior of both salesman and customer as it relates to purchase outcomes on retail appliances.

Customer-Salesman Bargaining Behavior in Retail Transactions

Customer-Salesman Bargaining Behavior in Retail Transactions

Managerial problems and the experimental method: This research strategy has business applications

What is the value of experimental research as a method of studying managerial problems? To what extent can field studies, case work, and intuition produce reliable and practical knowledge? These questions are discussed as the role of experimentation in solving managerial problems is explored. The authors contend that experimental methodology is both useful and practical in clarifying managerial problems and providing guidelines for solutions. To highlight their argument, they discuss a number of important experiments dealing with managerial situations and, finally, summarize some of their own investigations into bargaining behavior and managerial decision making.

The influence of risk-taking propensity on bargaining behavior.

This study investigated experimentally the effects of risk-taking propensity on bargaining behavior under varying information conditions. Risk-taking propensity failed to explain subjects' bargaining successes (profits), but it did influence their initial asking level and their willingness to yield from this level. The degree of influence was moderated by the amount of information in the bargaining channel. Results suggested that the less the information the greater the impact of risk-taking propensity on bargaining behavior.

NEGOTIATION IN LEADER AND DELEGATE GROUPS1

ABSTRACTNegotiations among leaders were compared with negotiations among delegates in order to investigate the effect of role in the reference group on intergroup bargaining behavior. The negotiations of ten groups of leaders and ten groups of delegates matched on initial positions were examined. Because of their greater flexibility and authority, leaders were expected to spend less time negotiating and have fewer deadlocks than delegates. Neither of these hypotheses was supported. Leaders and delegates, however, were found to resolve their conflicts in different ways. While delegates more often reached agreement through compromise, leaders were more likely to choose one party's position. Thus, delegates tended to converge upon the average of their initial positions while leaders showed a significant change in the risky direction. Leaders' and delegates' reactions to their negotiations were also analyzed. In general, the results suggested that leaders can be influenced more by other leaders than delegates can by other delegates.

A personality-attitude schedule for use in experimental bargaining studies.

Abstract : The paper describes the steps used in developing a set of scales to evaluate the effects of individual differences on bargaining behavior. It presents a description of the six scales in the schedule, together with descriptive statistical data and norms for the scales, and gives procedures for administering and scoring the scales. A copy of the currently used form of the schedule is included in the appendix. (Author)

Bargaining Behavior: A Comparison Between Mature Industrial Personnel and College Students

The study reported here was conducted for two purposes. The primary purpose was to provide an experimental test of certain theoretical models of bargaining behavior. A second purpose, emphasized in this paper, was to study the bargaining behavior of experienced personnel in business as contrasted with the bargaining behavior of college students. The design of the study was dictated by the requirements of the theoretical model; the interest in comparing businessmen with students was subordinate, and did not in itself influence the fundamental features of the design. Thus, while the test of the hypothesis is formal and has some rigor, the comparison of the two subject populations is informal, and is suggestive and provocative, perhaps, rather than definitive. In general the groups were notably similar in regard to their bidding patterns and the equilibrium solutions they reached.