Money Banks Research Articles

Economical, Financial and Environmental Evaluation for the Civil Fish Farms in Kafr El-Sheikh Governorate

Fish farming in the private aquaculture sector is the most common. The main objective of the study was to study the economic and environmental assessment of the national fish farms. Field data were obtained through a sample of 138 form representing 16.23% of the total national farms. The most important explanatory variables affect the quantity of the output Of the fish in the sample farms are the number of used labor, the number of fry used, the amount of fodder used, the water area, and the results showed that all the farms of the sample did not achieve economic efficiency for a number of reasons, It was also found that the average size of the average fish production for the three sample groups which below the cost is about 3.57, 49.5, and 5.68 tons / fed. The maximum profit production was also found to be about 0.56, 4.56, 6.5 Ton / fed for the three categories respectively. The internal rate of return for the three categories was 49.8%, 59.4% and 64.5%, respectively, which is higher than the prevailing interest rate of 20% and it was found that the investment in aquaculture So that the most effective economically and financially from depositing money in banks, the study recommended by encouraging the private sector to invest in the field of aquaculture. .

How far is too far?

PurposeRetailers are increasingly adding banks, gas stations, mobile services and even real estate agencies to their portfolio and branding these new ventures with the retailer name, such as Tesco Bank or Asda Money. The purpose of this paper is to test the ability of a retailer brand to stretch from traditional packaged goods categories to very different categories such as banking.Design/methodology/approachUsing data from an online survey collected from 953 UK grocery buyers, this paper examines consumers’ behaviour towards UK retailer brands across four categories: soft drinks, chocolate, fuel and banking.FindingsThe results show that cross-category retailer brand purchasing is stronger between categories with similar buying behaviour (e.g. soft drinks and chocolate) than in categories with very different buying behaviour (e.g. soft drinks and banking). The behavioural spill over effects are stronger for retailer brands from the same chain and persist even for unrelated categories. However, apart from fuel, the strongest cross-purchasing occurs across competing retailer-branded offers within the same category.Research limitations/implicationsThe main implication of this study is that behavioural spill overs for retailer brands are possible even between unrelated categories. The finding about the effects being strongest within a given chain implies that umbrella branded strategy is a key to take advantage of the effects.Practical implicationsThese findings extend past literature about the cross-category buying of umbrella branded store brands to very different categories. This paper highlights the challenges retailers face regarding their ability to extend the retailer brand across categories. The findings also provide insights for cross-selling retailer brands in unrelated categories to current store brand buyers.Originality/valueThis is the first study to examine the use of retailer brands across a wide spectrum of categories from Soft Drinks to Fuel.

Implementation of Accounting Technology and Financial Reporting Quality of Quoted Epos it Money Banks in Nigeria

Implementation of Accounting Technology and Financial Reporting Quality of Quoted Epos it Money Banks in Nigeria

The Dark Side of Licensing Cryptocurrency Exchanges as Payment Institutions

The ultimate objective of cryptocurrencies is to become a payment system substituting, complementing, or competing with the existing conventional fiat-based payment systems. Irrespective of whether such an objective could be accomplished, the functional similarities between certain cryptocurrencies and fiat money has persuaded competent authorities of certain EU Member States to grant payment institution licenses to cryptocurrency exchanges. At first blush, granting such an authorization would seem to be a step forward as it would bring otherwise unregulated cryptocurrency exchanges within the scope of the existing payment regulatory framework. However, such an authorization not only faces major legal challenges related to the definition of a payment institution, but also introduces new lesser-known risks. Aside from the semantic and definitional issues, authorizing cryptocurrency exchanges as payment institutions can bring activities and instruments - with a different risk profile than that of conventional payment instruments - within the scope of payment systems. It appears that such risks embedded in those instruments cannot be fully addressed under the existing payment laws. This paper studies two examples of unattended risks under the cryptocurrency-exchange-as-payment-institution regime. The first risk concerns the use of untethered, non-convertible, illiquid and volatile settlement assets for settlement purposes in cryptocurrency exchanges. The second risk concerns the risks associated with finality of settlements arising from the use of probabilistic finality in some of the most popular cryptocurrency blockchains. Given that in the conventional payment institutions central bank money or commercial bank money is primarily used as the settlement asset, such risks have already been addressed or otherwise taken for granted, however, in cryptocurrency exchanges, the risks involved in the settlement of liabilities with an illiquid and volatile asset relying on probabilistically final settlement mechanism cannot be dealt with by the existing applicable regulations. As the risks cannot be addressed within the current European payment regulation framework, an alternative policy option would be granting a special license to cryptocurrency businesses or introducing ring-fencing mechanism to protect the conventional payment systems from the risks of cryptocurrency payments.

Technology innovation in Financial Markets : Implications for Money, Payments and Settlement Finality

In this thesis we explore the implications of technology innovation across the areas of settlement finality, cross border payments and money. As a first step, we investigate the topic of settlement finality in the context of Proof-of-Work (PoW) blockchains, exemplified by Bitcoin. This is of particular importance as final settlement plays a crucial role in removing settlement risk between counterparties in support of financial stability. We extend earlier work in Berndsen (2013) on functional modelling of the theoretical settlement problem. By applying his model we provide a functional interpretation of settlement finality and propose a new encompassing definition of settlement finality, which expands the academic field of payment economics. We also assess whether PoW is functionally superior to the backward looking legal framework for settlement finality. In a second step we explore whether and how technological innovation, in conjunction with policy measures, can improve the process of correspondent banking cross-border payments. Following the empirical validation of existing shortcomings by using a questionnaire and industry expert focus group sessions, we identify key requirements based on which we develop several design scenarios for the future of cross-border payments. We then evaluate the different models and complement our findings with policy and standards recommendations, outlining a practical way forward for the industry. Finally we explore an alternative perspective on the future role of central bank money as a retail use digital complement to physical cash. Against a set of future scenarios we develop the rationale for a Eurosystem issued ‘Digital Euro’ and proceed by delivering a high level blueprint for the design of such a solution. As retail cash payments move into the digital age with the associated challenges for citizens’ data, identity as well as financial stability and system security, such a step will become an increasingly relevant consideration for the Eurosystem.

Asymmetric Information versus Banks’ Costumer Trust, Albania Case Linked With SEE Countries

This article examines the impact of information asymmetry on the level of trust customers have towards their banks in Albania. Specifically, the article analyses the implementation of transparency and information symmetry related to pricing and publishing banking interest rates, commissions and fees, clarity of banking products, and reports. The minimal obligation of Albanian banks is to obey the legal and regulatory requirements regarding transparency and information symmetry. However, banks in Albania - for pricing, commissions and fees of their typical services - follow their competition which is a relatively low level of transparency. Comparison of products’ terms and conditions among banks is difficult for the public as a result of the information asymmetry. In addition, some banks are in breach of regulation on transparency for banking and financial products and services. As importantly, expensive bank money transfer commissions increase customer tendency to avoid paying through the banking system, which in turn increase informality and potential forms of tax evasion. These findings are compared with data on other banks in South East Europe to identify the mechanism(s) that affect costumer trust. The article presents several conclusions and implications for Central Banks in Albania and the region to prevent potential costumer distrust by requiring banks to establish a common methodology for pricing and publication of symmetric information for products’ terms and conditions, which will be a good practice for the banking markets in Albania and the region.

The Politics of Shadow Money: The Shadow Banking System, Money Creation and Unconventional Central Banking

In the years since the financial crisis, and for the first time in the history of central banks, the Federal Reserve has been pursuing monetary policies which allow shadow banks to access its reserves. The paper examines these policies in an analysis based on the concept of security structure. The aim is to facilitate a better understanding of complex public and private institutional arrangements which convert specific credit claims into money or enable them to approximate or simulate the money-form. As the financial crisis reached its peak in September 2008, the Federal Reserve was not able to contain the impact precisely because the security structure existing at the time between banks and the Fed did not extend to the shadow banking system, which had meanwhile become the backbone of the global financial system. To address this situation, the Fed initiated new security structures that were specifically designed to also give players in the shadow banking system access to liquidity and collateral. The concept ‘security structure' serves as an analytical tool to explore dynamic forms of safety and liquidity generation and to distinguish between credit expansion and money creation. It also helps to differentiate between three qualitatively different stages of security: central bank money, quasi-money and shadow money. In this way, it foregrounds the politics of money creation and the new role of the shadow banking system.

The Increase in TARGET Balances in the Euro Area Since 2015

The TARGET2 platform, which is owned by the Eurosystem, processes payments in euro with reserves, i.e. central bank money. The cross-border payment transactions channelled through this platform give rise to central bank claims and liabilities which, when aggregated and netted, produce the so-called TARGET balances. Since 2015, when various extraordinary monetary stimulus measures were introduced by the ECB, there has been a marked increase in aggregate TARGET balances, to levels above those reached during the sovereign debt crisis which took place in the first few years of the current decade. Unlike then, the recent developments do not reflect financial stress or general funding problems in euro area economies, as during the sovereign debt crisis, but are instead mainly linked to the execution of the Eurosystem’s asset purchase programme (APP).

The Swiss Sovereign Money Initiative

Abstract On 10 June 2018, Switzerland voted against a constitutional amendment to introduce a system of sovereign money or Vollgeld. The proposal foresaw that all money be created by the central bank and that commercial banks be banned from creating demand deposits. Demand deposits would have been required to be held in off-balance sheet accounts at commercial banks. We discuss the specific features of this proposal and compare them to its historical predecessor, the Chicago plan. We argue that the Swiss initiative would not have tangibly enhanced financial, monetary, and economic stability. Specifically, if implemented earlier, it would not have addressed the root causes of the Global Financial Crisis and would have been ineffective in changing its course and its consequences for Switzerland. Though the Vollgeld proposal would have turned commercial bank into central bank money, close-money substitutes would likely have remained on the liability side of commercial bank balance sheets. Vollgeld would also unlikely have redeemed promises of ancillary effects such as a reduction in public debt, more sustainable economic growth, and less complex regulation. Forestalling and tackling financial imbalances requires limiting leverage and safeguarding liquidity buffers through bank-level and system-wide rules and regulation. Zusammenfassung Am 10. Juni 2018 lehnten drei Viertel der Schweizer Stimmberechtigten eine Verfassungsänderung ab, die ein Vollgeldsystem in der Schweiz eingeführt hätte. Der Vorschlag hätte der Notenbank das alleinige Recht zur Geldschöpfung gegeben und den Geschäftsbanken die Schaffung von Sichteinlagen verboten. Zahlungsverkehrskonten hätten von den Geschäftsbanken ausserhalb ihrer Bilanz geführt werden müssen. Wir diskutieren die Einzelheiten des Vorschlags und vergleichen sie mit dessen Vorgänger aus den 1930er Jahren, dem Chicago Plan. Wir argumentieren, dass sich die monetäre und wirtschaftliche Stabilität sowie die Finanzstabilität in der Schweiz durch die Annahme der Initiative nicht wesentlich verbessert hätten. Ein bestehendes Vollgeldsystem hätte nicht bei den Ursachen der Finanzkrise angesetzt und wäre unerheblich für ihren Verlauf und ihre Folgen für die Schweiz gewesen. Obwohl mit Vollgeld Sichteinlagen bei Geschäftsbanken in Zentralbankgeld umgewandelt worden wären, hätten geldnahe Einlagen auf der Passivseite der Bilanz weiter existiert. Vollgeld hätte auch Versprechen wie eine Senkung der Staatsverschuldung, ein nachhaltigeres Wachstum und eine weniger komplexe Bankenregulierung nicht erfüllt. Die Verhinderung und Bewältigung von finanziellen Ungleichgewichten erfordert eine Regulierung sowohl auf Bankenebene als auch für das Finanzsystem insgesamt, um die gesamtwirtschaftliche Verschuldung zu beschränken und Liquiditätspuffer zu schaffen. JEL Classification: E42, E50

TARGET Instant Payment Settlement: The Eurosystem’s response to an evolving payments landscape

This paper deals with the TARGET Instant Payment Settlement (TIPS) service, a Eurosystem market infrastructure service that facilitates the immediate settlement of instant payments at pan-European level using central bank money. The service stands to regenerate competitiveness in the European market by acting as an incentive for payment service providers to develop TIPS-enabled innovative and user-friendly solutions for European citizens. The paper recommends that payment service providers embrace TIPS and develop solutions that are not only future-proof but that also allow consumers to use them at pan-European level.

Accounting Meets Economics: Towards an 'Accounting View' of Money

This study lays the foundations of the 'Accounting View' of money. Using international accounting principles, the study argues that state and central bank monies are not debt, and that in fractional reserve regimes only a share of commercial bank money can be regarded as debt. The study determines how the seigniorage associated with the issuance of these monies should be accounted for in the financial statements of the issuing institutions, and examines what this implies for the correct understanding of money. The new view throws light into such issues as the true nature of central bank capital, commercial banks, and digital currencies. Drawing on it, new measurements of seigniorage are derived and applied to the case of the UK (for which recent estimates exist). The results reveal that seigniorage, in particularthat extracted by commercial banks, is a quantitatively relevant phenomenon.

Liquidity Premium and the Substitution between Money and Treasuries

This paper quantifies the substitution between money (bank deposits) and Treasuries. The estimation is significantly different from either zero or perfect substitution. Thus, fixing monetary policy, Treasury supply still affects the liquidity premium. Furthermore, the substitution increases over time. Regressions that miss the economic interactions between quantities and rates are inconclusive, while structural estimations provide superior statistical power. My estimation implies new channels of Treasury supply on the real economy and foreign exchange rates. Furthermore, it helps resolve the government debt valuation puzzle. I also discuss how my findings relate to Nagel (2016).

The Clearing of Euro OTC Derivatives Post Brexit – Why a Uniform Regulation and Supervision of CCPs is Essential for European Financial Stability

With a notional amount outstanding of more than USD 500 trillion, the market for OTC derivatives is of vital importance for global financial stability. A growing proportion of these contracts are cleared via central counterparties (CCPs), which means that CCPs are gaining in importance as critical financial market infrastructures. At the same time, there is growing concern that a new too big to fail problem could arise, as the CCP industry is highly concentrated due to economies of scale. From a European perspective, it should be noted that the clearing of euro-denominated OTC derivatives mainly takes place in London, hence outside the EU in the foreseeable future. For some time there has been a controversial discussion as to whether this can remain the case post Brexit. CCPs, which clear a significant proportion of euro OTC derivatives and are systemically relevant from an EU perspective, should be subject to direct supervision by EU authorities and should be established in the EU. This would represent an important building block for a future Capital Markets Union in Europe, as regulatory or supervisory arbitrage in favour of systemically important third-country CCPs could be prevented. In addition, if a systemically relevant CCP handling a considerable portion of the euro OTC derivatives business were to run into serious difficulties, this may impact ECB monetary policy. This applies both to demand for central bank money and to the transmission of monetary policy measures, which can be significantly impaired, particularly in the event that the repo market or payment systems are disrupted. It is therefore essential for the ECB to be closely involved in the supervision of CCPs. Against this background, the draft amendment of EMIR (European Market Infrastructure Regulation) presented on 13 June 2017 is a step in the right direction. In addition, there is an urgent need to introduce a recovery and resolution mechanism for CCPs in the EU to complement the existing single resolution mechanism (SRM) for banks in the eurozone. Only then can the diverse interdependencies between banks and CCPs be adequately taken into account in the recovery and resolution programmes required in a financial crisis.

Digital currencies and the concept of money as a social agreement

The first appearance of digital ‘currency’ tokens following the implementation of Bitcoin was a catalyst for discussion about the nature of money and the future development of both fiat monies and central bank money. Indeed, the discussion today remains dominated by arguments concerning the definition of money and the role of central banks. However, ‘money’ must be understood as a social agreement between economic agents who confer legitimacy and value upon it by agreeing to accept it, both now and in the future. This paper presents a framework to understand money as a social agreement in the age of digitisation using four different mechanisms: game theory with tokens, market-driven development of account-based money, liabilities (of banks to their clients and central banks to commercial banks), and a trust-based mechanism for digital coins provided by a central institution. Any development of money in the digital age must consider its users’ perception of stability, security, convenience, freedom of choice and trust in its ‘reusability’. Complementing the current discussion within central banks, this paper considers how social dynamics in the 21st century might challenge the traditional definition and acceptance of money.

Banking, Money and Credit: A Systemic Perspective

AbstractContemporaneous banking theories appear to understand financial institutions as intermediaries, relegating bank money creation through money multiplication outside the core of banking activity. This article takes a different systemic perspective, pointing to the dynamic and collective features that generate a banking system within and across financial institutions. Classic features such as bank credit creation, as well as classic issues such as bank runs, are reconsidered under the notion of a ‘banking system’ requiring coordination over time and circumstances.Our conceptual framework develops a heuristic model of the basic mechanisms on which bank money creation lays upon. This model disentangles the link between functional and institutional dimensions of the money system, aiming to include minimal institutions in economic theory and economic analysis of money. These basic mechanisms include: monetary financial institutions (bank entities) issue claims which function as money; they facilitate payments across agents in the economy over time and space; they increase the money base through credit creation; they hold fractional reserves and lend to each other. Ongoing bank activity involves cash and non-cash (accrual) processes occurring within each bank entity and across them. Each bank keeps currency money in bank deposits on behalf of other agents. But the bank activity is further characterised by the capacity or privilege to use these deposits, although the latter remain available for payment and redemption at will and at par. Moreover, the bank can create deposit by granting a loan to, or buy a security from a borrower. This bank capacity or privilege involves money generation that enables the bank credit manufacturing process. In this way, all the banks become interdependent on the flow of payments that are performed across them, generating the ‘banking system’. Since each bank is structurally unbalanced due to money generation, inter-bank coordination is required to maintain the banking system in operation over time and circumstances. Both inter-bank clearing and credit arrangements provide this coordination at the inter-bank level, which is effectuated through central bank intervention, clearing houses and the money market.From this systemic perspective, ‘systemic risk’ and ‘macro-prudential’ management and regulation are new labels for recurrent concerns of systemic coordination. A careful combination of design and policy is therefore required to reach coordination in view to prevent or respond to local and systemic crises. Drawing upon this conceptual framework, this article develops institutional economic analysis and implications for shadow banking; systemic risk, interdependency and interconnectedness; the relationship between money and credit and the real economy; and the systemic consistency between functions and institutions in monetary regimes.

The Clearing of Euro OTC Derivatives Post Brexit Why a Uniform Regulation and Supervision of CCPs Is Essential for European Financial Stability

With a notional amount outstanding of more than USD 500 trillion, the market for OTC derivatives is of vital importance for global financial stability. A growing proportion of these contracts are cleared via central counterparties (CCPs), which means that CCPs are gaining in importance as critical financial market infrastructures. At the same time, there is growing concern that a new too big to fail problem could arise, as the CCP industry is highly concentrated due to economies of scale. From a European perspective, it should be noted that the clearing of euro-denominated OTC derivatives mainly takes place in London, hence outside the EU in the foreseeable future. For some time there has been a controversial discussion as to whether this can remain the case post Brexit. CCPs, which clear a significant proportion of euro OTC derivatives and are systemically relevant from an EU perspective, should be subject to direct supervision by EU authorities and should be established in the EU. This would represent an important building block for a future Capital Markets Union in Europe, as regulatory or supervisory arbitrage in favour of systemically important third- ountry CCPs could be prevented. In addition, if a systemically relevant CCP handling a considerable portion of the euro OTC derivatives business were to run into serious difficulties, this may impact ECB monetary policy. This applies both to demand for central bank money and to the transmission of monetary policy measures, which can be significantly impaired, particularly in the event that the repo market or payment systems are disrupted. It is therefore essential for the ECB to be closely involved in the supervision of CCPs. Against this background, the draft amendment of EMIR (European Market Infrastructure Regulation) presented on 13 June 2017 is a step in the right direction. In addition, there is an urgent need to introduce a recovery and resolution mechanism for CCPs in the EU to complement the existing single resolution mechanism (SRM) for banks in the eurozone. Only then can the diverse interdependencies between banks and CCPs be adequately taken into account in the recovery and resolution programmes required in a financial crisis.

Broadening Narrow Money: Monetary Policy with a Central Bank Digital Currency

This paper discusses central bank digital currency (CBDC) and its potential impact on the monetary transmission mechanism. We first offer a general definition of CBDC which should make the concept accessible to a wide range of economists and policy practitioners. We then investigate how CBDC could affect the various stages of transmission, from markets for central bank money to the real economy. We conclude that monetary policy would be able to operate much as it does now, by varying the price or quantity of central bank money, and that transmission may even strengthen for a given change in policy instruments.

Banking in the Digital Age - Who is Afraid of Payment Disintermediation?

Throughout the ages, banks have evolved as intermediaries taking deposits of funds, lending money, and providing payment services. In the process they became also suppliers of commercial bank money, now only in the form of bank deposits. Following a historical review as to how money changers and goldsmiths became bankers, the paper points out that money and payment digitization has brought some challenges to the traditional role of banks as intermediaries. First, the digital age is about to facilitate the availability of central bank money balances or their equivalent to the public. Second, cryptocurrencies and blockchains were born. Third, claim-check centralized digital currencies have been created. This paper argues that availability to the public of central bank money, in the form of either full-reserve banking or plain sovereign money, is unlikely to affect the role of banks other than in money creation. The paper goes on to argue that cryptocurrencies are mostly not a new form of money and that in essence blockchains do not pose a major threat to the traditional interbank settlement system; at most they spur improvements in legacy systems. Finally, the argument goes, the creation of claim-check centralized digital currencies will give banks enough space to continue their role in providing payment services and even create alternative currencies fully backed by fiat ones. Ultimately banks will retain their role as intermediaries; Fintech does not have a payment services model which will supersede banking so that, in order to competitively provide payment services, IT firms will have to become banks.

Consumption Dynamics, Housing Collateral and Stabilisation Policies: A Way Forward for Policy Co-Ordination?

We decompose aggregate consumption of heterogeneous consumers by modelling both savers and their links to collateral constrained borrowers through a bank which prices credit risk. Savers own both firms and the commercial bank while borrowers require loans from the commercial bank to e¤ect their consumption plans. The bank lends at a premium over the interest rate on central bank money in proportion to the riskiness of loans, the demand for loans, the asset price and the quantity of housing collateral. We show that even though house prices do not represent wealth, aggregate consumption is closely related to movements in house prices. House price-induced changes may lead to large variations in household spending via the collateral effect with important policy implications. We consider the case for jointly determined macro-prudential, fiscal and monetary policies in order to minimise losses for a representative household. We also analyse the implications when there is uncertainty over some of the policy parameters such as the loan default rate.

Monetary Transmission through Shadow Banks

I find that shadow bank money creation significantly expands during monetary tightening cycles. This “shadow banking channel” offsets reductions in commercial bank deposits and dampens the impact of monetary policy. Using a structural model of bank competition, I show that the difference in depositor clienteles between commercial and shadow banks quantitatively explains their different responses to monetary policy. Facing a more yield-sensitive clientele, shadow banks pass through more rate hikes to depositors, thereby attracting more deposits when the Federal Reserve raises rates. My results suggest that monetary tightening could unintentionally increase financial fragility by driving deposits into the uninsured shadow banking sector.