Bank Recovery And Resolution Directive Research Articles

Does BRRD mitigate the bank-to-sovereign risk channel?

We investigate the effectiveness of the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) in mitigating the transmission of credit risk from banks to their sovereign, using CDS spreads to capture bank and sovereign credit risk for a sample of 43 banks in 8 Euro Area countries over the period 2009-2020. If the BRRD bail-in framework is credible, changes in bank default risk should not be transmitted to sovereign risk. In a novel approach we use banks earnings announcements to identify exogenous shocks to bank credit risk and investigate to what extent bank risk is transmitted to sovereign risk before and during the BRRD era. We find that bank-to-sovereign risk transmission has diminished after the introduction of the BRRD, suggesting that financial markets judge the BRRD framework as credible. The decline in bank-sovereign risk transmission is particularly significant in the periphery Euro Area countries, especially Italy and Spain, where the bank-sovereign nexus was most pronounced during the sovereign debt crisis. We report that the lower bank-to-sovereign credit risk transmission is associated with the parliamentary approval of the BRRD and not with the OMT program launched by the ECB to affect sovereign yield spreads, nor with specific bail-in or bailout cases which occurred during the BRRD era. Finally, we document that the reduction in risk transmission is most pronounced for banks classified as a Global Systemically Important Bank (G-SIB), stressing the importance of additional capital buffers imposed by Basel III.

Completing the European Banking Union: Capital cost consequences for credit providers and corporate borrowers

The bank recovery and resolution directive (BRRD) regulates the bail-in hierarchy to resolve distressed banks in the European Union (EU). Using the staggered BRRD implementation across 15 member states, we identify banks’ capital cost responses and subsequent pass-through to borrowers towards surprise elements due to national transposition details. Average bank capital costs increase heterogeneously across countries with strongest funding cost hikes observed for banks located in GIIPS and non-EMU countries. Only banks in core E(M)U countries that exhibit higher funding costs increase credit spreads for corporate borrowers and contract credit supply. Tighter credit conditions are only passed on to more levered and less profitable firms. On balance, the national implementation of BRRD appears to have strengthened financial system resilience without a pervasive hike in borrowing costs.

BRRD credibility and the bank-sovereign nexus

ABSTRACT We investigate the effectiveness of the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) in mitigating the bank-sovereign nexus in the Euro Area. Using CDS spreads to measure bank and sovereign credit risk and a DCC-MIDAS model capturing the long-term component of bank-sovereign interconnectedness, we document that the dynamic correlation between banks and sovereigns has decreased in Euro Area countries since the introduction of the BRRD. Panel data analysis reveals that the decline in interconnectedness is not driven by the banks’ capital adequacy, size or holdings of domestic sovereign securities.

Unijne ramy zarządzania kryzysowego w sektorze bankowym – główne problemy do rozwiązania

The Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) introduced into EU legislation a new procedure, i.e. resolution, maintaining at the same time standard insolvency proceedings as a default option for dealing with failing banks. The experience so far indicates that such a shape of EU crisis management framework is not optimal. The article presents six main issues that need to be addressed in order to ensure greater consistency, effectiveness, and credibility of EU crisis management framework. The topics reviewed in the article concern public interest assessment, unalignment between triggers for resolution and triggers for initiating insolvency proceedings, availability of state aid as well as lack of clear regulations for liquidity in resolution. Other topics discussed in the article include resolution of small and medium-sized banks with greater support of deposit guarantee schemes. The paper presents the reasons why the indicated areas need to be addressed as well as tries to provide a direction of desired regulatory changes.

Bank Recovery and Resolution Measures’ Restrictive Effects on Appealing Against Them

The article is intended as a step forward from considering only the noble objectives and positive effects associated with the authorities’ bank recovery and resolution powers, for revealing also the inherent effects of these powers on the possibility of banks fighting back against the powers’ unlawful application. Specifically, while the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) sets out the general rule that, under its regime, a bank should have the right to appeal against authorities’ actions, some of the measures established under the BRRD have a natural effect of greatly diminishing bank managers’ motivation to appeal or even completely eliminate any independent decision-making capabilities. This includes choices of whether to file an appeal. This article shows that the properties or outcomes connected with some recovery and resolution measures specified in the BRRD reduce banks’ right of appeal to a fiction and may leave possibilities for uncontrolled unlawful application of powers by the supervisory and resolution authorities.

Financial Narratives. A multimodal analysis of newspaper articles

Financial narratives have always been relevant to economic fluctuations, rationalising current actions, such as spending and investing, inspiring and linking activities to important values and needs (Shiller 2017). In 2014, the European Parliament adopted the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) which includes the bail-in tool. This means that taxpayers would not risk losses, but rather creditors and depositors would take a loss on their holdings. This Directive was applied to four banks and the press and media coverage of both resolutions and their effects was remarkable, influencing several issues regarding these banks’ bondholders. The present study will investigate a corpus of articles from The Financial Times ( FT.com , Europe) and one from The Times ( thetimes.co.uk ), selected around the keyword bail*-in , attempting to highlight how financial information is provided multimodally. The choice of the expression bail*-in was made because of its highly specialised semantic load in the financial field. The use of textual organisation, tables, graphs, and the relationship between text and image will be dealt with and applied to the corpus gathered. Verbal and visual elements have been considered as fulfilling, on the one hand, the three functions of informing, narrating and persuading, characterising news discourse, and, on the other hand, those of informing, evaluating and predicting, typical of financial discourse. This paper is part of an ongoing study on financial newspaper articles and whether and to what extent knowledge dissemination is popularised from specialised to non-specialised texts, recombined and recontextualised to be more intelligible to the layman. The main aim will be to analyse the combination of the verbal and visual structures of these articles, trying to detect any differences in the multimodal strategies employed by a specialised and a non-specialised newspaper.

Norway

Much of the work of the Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) was conducted prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, with the missions ending on February 13, 2020. Given the FSAP’s focus on medium-term challenges and vulnerabilities, however, its findings and recommendations for strengthening policy and institutional frameworks remain pertinent. The report was updated to reflect key developments and policy changes since the mission work was completed. It also includes a risk analysis that quantifies the possible impact of the COVID-19 crisis on bank solvency. Since the previous FSAP in 2015, the Norwegian authorities have taken welcome steps to strengthen the financial system. Regulatory capital requirements for banks were raised and actions were taken to bolster the weak capital position of insurers. Alongside other macroprudential measures, temporary borrower-based measures for residential mortgages were introduced, which seem to have had some moderating impact on segments of the housing market. The resolution framework was also strengthened, with the implementation of the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) and the designation of Finanstilsynet (FSA) as the resolution authority.

Norway

Norway has made substantial progress in strengthening its framework for financial crisis management and bank safety nets since the 2015 FSAP. The Norwegian authorities have implemented the EU framework. The Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) has been transposed into the Norwegian legal framework mainly by amendments to the Financial Institutions and Financial Groups Act and accompanying regulations. Finanstilsynet (the Financial Supervisory Authority of Norway, FSA) has been designated as Norway’s resolution authority. Resolution financing options were broadened by establishing a resolution fund. While the Deposit Guarantee Scheme Directive (DGSD) has yet to be brought into the European Economic Area (EEA) agreement, Norway has, in fact, already transposed it into the Norwegian law. This provides the Norwegian authorities with a broadened and detailed regulatory framework for dealing with weak banks.

Italian bank crisis: flexible application of BRRD rules, or a bailout in disguise?

Abstract The economic and financial crisis of the year 2008 highlighted the need for banking sector regulation via the creation of the banking union. The Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) represents an important milestone in the formation of the banking union. It is supposed inter alia to replace the existing practice of bailing out failing banks by the opposite principle of bail-in, which makes the bank recapitalized from the internal resources at the detriment of investors and creditors. However, the Italian solution of handling its failing banks took advantage of existing loopholes in the new regulatory system. Eventually, it went against the spirit of the new rules by deploying taxpayers’ money to deal with the banks’ failure. This article evaluates the Italian approach and contemplates the adequacy of the new rules-based system by comparing its potentially beneficial room for flexibility with alleged malfunction and unreliability. Finally, it discusses the potential impact of the Italian approach on the further process of completing the banking union, in particular the establishment of its last pillar, the common deposit guarantee scheme.

The Bail-in Beyond Unpredictability: Creditors\u2019 Incentives and Market Discipline

The market discipline of creditors on the risk-taking behaviour of borrowing banks represents a long-lasting debate. Such a debate gained new attention after the post-crisis stream of reforms concerning resolution policy: creditors should be incentivized to make an optimal effort in monitoring their borrowers and, at the same time, their interests have been aligned with the social ones. Many commentators criticized such an expectation especially in the European context, arguing that the lack of credibility and excessive complexity of the resolution mechanism impair the ability and willingness of creditors to exert a disciplining role. This article aims at taking a step forward in this scientific debate, investigating whether the ability to exert disciplining activity is inherently impaired by the design of the Directive. In other words, this research wants to assess if, assuming an ideal environment, creditors would have optimal incentives to monitor banks’ behaviour and to react accordingly. To do so, the article reviews the literature on market discipline, then carries out a legal analysis of the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD), focusing on those norms shaping the market for bail-inable securities. Eventually, the incentives stemming from those norms are discussed, assuming an ideal environment where a bail-in is certain and credible and the market for bail-inable securities works smoothly. The analysis highlights that the incentives of creditors toward market discipline are inherently diluted by the BRRD’s legal design because of competing policy objectives pursued by the Directive. The direct normative consequence of such a finding is that enhancing information and predictability, though desirable in principle, will never lead to an optimal monitoring effort, leaving the floor to alternative rule-based strategies.

Credibility of Bank Resolution Regimes and Market Discipline: Evidence from Corporate Deposits

This study examines changes in market discipline in European corporate deposit markets in response to different crisis periods and regulatory initiatives in the European Union. We measure market discipline by investigating the risk sensitivity of uninsured corporate deposits, i.e. by analyzing whether depositors demand risk premiums from risky banks. Depositors' risk sensitivity towards German banks substantially increased after the introduction of the German restructuring law. A similar effect can be observed for other eurozone banks after the introduction of the European bank recovery and resolution directive (BRRD). For German banks the introduction of the BRRD has no significant additional effect. Consequently, results suggest that both reforms have contributed to strengthen market discipline in the eurozone. We also document that the ECB's targeted long-term refinancing operations (TLTRO) weakened market discipline. As a response to the reduced liquidity risk of banks, corporate depositors became less risk sensitive.

The Concept of Recovery of Credit Institutions in the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive

New regulations, obligations for credit institutions, and powers for authorities were created by the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD). While resolution of a credit institution is clearly defined, it is less clear whether recovery of a credit institution could and should be treated as a separate concept under the BRRD; which elements it encompasses; and how these elements enhance and are linked with the pre-existing prudential regulation, processes, and tools. The problem is that if recovery is to be deemed a differentiable concept, specific legal rules and principles could be applicable that are separate from the prudential or the resolution framework – whether existing ones or other, easily developed rules and principles. This is particularly crucial when authorities exercise powers related to recovery, because following appropriate rules and principles has a direct connection with state liability. In consideration of these issues, the article presents several important conclusions: Firstly, recovery in the sense applied in the BRRD can be distinguished from both the prudential framework and the concept of resolution, on the basis of function; the concept of recovery can be considered to consist of recovery planning, early intervention measures, and two measures of further intervention that can be employed. Some early intervention measures are recovery-specific and broaden the supervisory powers significantly, while others do not and show overlap with supervisory powers derived from the prudential framework. Recovery planning and exercising early intervention measures can take place in parallel with processes connected with the prudential framework while nonetheless maintaining recovery as a usefully separate concept.

The European Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive: A market assessment

This paper provides evidence of the impact of the new European bank resolution regime on the sovereign-bank nexus. The implementation of the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) is considered as an exogenous shock which provides the setting for a natural experiment. This investigation tests the financial markets’ perception of the effectiveness of the new rules in weakening the tight interconnectedness between sovereign and bank risk. A Difference-in-Differences (DiD) approach is adopted, building evidence from the Credit Default Swap (CDS) market for banks and non-financial corporates over the period 2011-18. The main findings do not indicate a significant weakening in the interaction between bank and sovereign CDS spreads, compared to the corresponding evidence for the non-financial corporate sector. An overall narrowing of the gap between bank and sovereign risk occurs, which initially implies a lack of credibility of the BRRD in financial markets. However, substantial cross-country variations are identified, particularly for Italy and non-euro area countries. These insights make a significant contribution to the policy debate on effective regulation of the sovereign-bank nexus, in the light of recent developments in the EU post-crisis reform agenda.

International Environment: Recovery and Resolution Regimes as the Pillar of the Banking Union

Abstract The purpose of the article is to present the possible regimes of bank resolution in the euro system and to highlight open questions concerning additional capital buffers and the valuation of assets according to the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD). The bail-in tool is used to write down or to convert certain liabilities with the purpose of restoring the capital adequacy. The valuation exercise would determine the amount of loss absorbtion to restore viability of the institution and capital adequacy. The bridge bank tool offers deeper restructuring powers to the competent resolution authority. Sale of the business tool is actually a variation of the bridge bank tool, enabling the resolution authority to transfer assets and liabilities to investors. The asset separation tool always is combined with another tool. The write-down is not a resolution tool, as it affects equity, while a bail-in tool goes further to other subordinated debt and senior debt. It is possible to establish additional resolution tools in the national legislation, as long as these tools are compatible with the principles of directive and national legislation in order to support cross-border group resolution. The issue of bank overregulation and the ability to meet the requirements without negative effects on the economy is emphasized.

European Significant Bank Stock Market Volatility: Is there a Bail-In Effect?

In 2016 the “bail-in” tool, set by the European Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD), started to enter into force: shareholders of European banks lose their money in the case of bank rescue. Before the “bail-in” mechanism was introduced, governments often performed bail-out of distressed banks. The larger risk born by shareholders can be observed in the growth of stock market volatility. We implement a panel data analysis on a sample of large European banks and find that in 2016 stock market volatility changes in a way that is theoretically consistent with the introduction of the “bail-in”. Moreover, Italy shows an even higher volatility, probably due to retail investors owning bank shares, who could have understood the risk only after the burden sharing of four Italian banks in November 2015. These findings can be a warning about market efficiency, with implications for the systemic risk of a “bail-in” procedure.

Proportionality at the Resolution Stage: Calibration of Resolution Measures and the Public Interest Test

By their very nature, resolution actions under the legal framework for the management of bank insolvencies created by the European Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) and the Regulation establishing the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRMR) come with infringements of rights of shareholders and creditors. Just as any expropriation of private property by public authorities, resolution actions therefore have to comply with the principle of proportionality, as required by the applicable provisions of the EU Charter on Human Rights and the European Convention of Human Rights. Analysing parallels and differences between general insolvency law on the on hand and the special resolution framework on the other hand, the present Chapter explores the functions and operationalisation of the principle of proportionality in bank resolution. Special attention is given to the ‘public interest test’ which, as part of the statutory ‘conditions for resolution’ under both the BRRD and the SRMR translates general proportionality considerations into a clear-cut set of requirements designed to prevent the application of the resolution tools to cases that do not give rise to systemic stability considerations.

O Tell Me The Truth About Bail-In: Theory and Practice

This Article analyzes the functioning of the European regulatory approach to the crisis of credit institutions, in the framework of EU banking supervision and in light of its early applications, with a special focus on bail-in. We investigate how the new resolution mechanisms — rooted in the principle of private sector involvement in banking restructurings — have inter-played with legal and institutional contexts still characterized by an attitude to bail-out rescues and by non-harmonized national insolvency rules. We show how and well-experimented restructuring tools have influenced the application of the new ones and, in many cases, have emphasized the defects, pitfalls and inconsistencies of the new regime, suggesting paths for reform. The Article is organized as follows. Part II sets out a summary of the common regime applicable to credit institutions within the EU, based on harmonized requirements for capital and liquidity. Part III focuses on the pre-crisis and crisis tools, as spelled out in the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD), in coordination with bordering regulatory areas, such as the regimes applicable to the liquidation of insolvent banks and State aids in the context of banking rescues. After a brief comparison with the US system (Part IV), we dwell, in Part V, on the practice of restructurings, before and after the BRRD. We specifically discuss two cases (the resolution of Banco Popular Espanol and the liquidation of Italian “Banche Venete”) that, in our view, illustrate very well the pros and cons of the new regime. Part VI concludes offering some suggestions for possible reform.

Measuring the Implementation of the FSB Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions in the European Union

There are lingering concerns about the health of European banks and extensive market commentary about whether post-crisis regulatory reforms in Europe have adequately addressed these concerns. In June 2012, European policymakers released the broad outlines of a proposal for a "European banking union" to strengthen the banking sector and help assuage concerns of investors and depositors, however, uncertainty remains regarding how the new EU bank resolution regime, the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD), will work in practice. This paper addresses whether the BRRD has fulfilled the requirements of the FSB Key Attributes for Resolution Regimes, which many take to be the gold standard bank resolution framework. We find that the BRRD diverges from the FSB Key Attributes or allows variation at the Member State level in multiple areas. The majority of these variations point to slight inconsistencies with the FSB recommendations. That said, some variations may have a larger impact than others.

Burden Sharing Arrangements vs. Shareholders and Creditors: Kotnik, Dowling and the Current State Aid Policy in the Banking Sector

State aid policy to banks has developed extensively throughout the financial crisis. After outlining the main features of State aid policy in the banking sector, this article analyses the Kotnik and Dowling judgments where the application of burden sharing arrangements was assessed. In particular, the paper looks at the impact of these judgments on the approach of the Commission on State aid policy and examines the nature of burden sharing arrangements set out in State aid policy. In this context, the paper discusses more generally the relationship between burden sharing arrangements and fundamental rights, in particular the right of property. Then, the article shows that State aid policy to banks still remains highly relevant and controversial in the Banking Union framework where, under certain conditions, Member States can still grant State support measures. This is for instance the case of precautionary recapitalisation as State aid aimed at preventing a bank from going under resolution. Furthermore, the Banking Union framework raises questions such as how burden sharing is related to the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) and what the relation is between burden sharing and bail-in.

Too Complex to Work: A Critical Assessment of the Bail-in Tool under the European Bank Recovery and Resolution Regime

This article analyses the bail-in tool under the European Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) and predicts that it will not reach its policy objective. To make this argument, this article first describes the policy rationale that calls for mandatory private sector involvement (PSI). From this analysis the key features for an effective bail-in tool can be derived. These insights serve as the background to make the case that the European resolution framework is likely ineffective in establishing adequate market discipline through risk-reflecting prices for bank capital. The main reason for this lies in the avoidable embeddedness of the BRRD’s bail-in tool in the much broader resolution process which entails ample discretion of the authorities also in forcing PSI. Moreover, the idea that nearly all positions on the liability side of a bank’s balance sheet should be subjected to bail-in is misguided. Instead, a concentration of PSI in instruments that fall under the minimum requirements for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL) is preferable. Finally, this article synthesizes the prior analysis by putting forward an alternative regulatory approach that seeks to disentangle PSI as a precondition for effective bank-resolution as much as possible from the resolution process as such.