Bad Projects Research Articles

Synchronizing decisions: A dynamic programming, real option framework for New Product Development with stage-to-stage correlations

Much research has investigated the application of real options to staged, new product development projects. Still, this literature has not addressed an important intuition�that bad projects may stay bad. A new product development project or a technology startup backed venture capital may include stage-to-stage dependencies. Its �state� at one gate may influence the transition probabilities at later gates. We develop a novel real option model that captures this intuition using dynamic programming and serial correlations. In a subsequent paper, we introduce partial derivatives similar to the Greeks that we named �control maps�. These control maps will assist the firm�s management to assess the financial impact of resource reallocations to project success factors. Such reallocations have the intent of turning bad projects into good ones. Thus, the proposed framework enables management to synchronize its management decision with financial ones.

Sooner or later? A study of report timing

This study examines the optimal reporting time a regulator should choose for firms to report their information when the firms' effort choices influence the outcome of projects. Our analysis shows that, the regulator's optimal choice of reporting time to maximize overall efficiency is contingent on a trade‐off between motivating a firm's effort to improve the outcome and saving the liquidation value for the creditor to reduce the firm's financing cost. We also find that to induce the firm's effort, the reporting time should be either early enough or late enough—depending on the effectiveness of the effort to turn bad projects into successes. Furthermore, we examine the regulator's optimal choice of reporting time for an economy with heterogenous firms/industries, and we show that the optimal reporting time changes nonmonotonically in the probability of good projects in the economy.

How to reward honesty?

An agent and a principal are engaged in an ongoing relationship, where the agent receives project opportunities of random value and is biased towards implementation. Each period, the principal elicits a (non-contractible) recommendation from the agent, compares it to a random outside option and decides whether to implement the project or not. The key distortions in the stationary decision rule used by the principal that will sustain honest reporting by the agent are (i) discrimination against best projects, so that sometimes very good projects are not implemented even if they would benefit the principal, (ii) general favoritism, where proposals other than the best are sometimes implemented even when they have negative value to the principal, and (iii) focused leniency towards average projects, where the bias towards implementation is larger for average projects than for bad or good projects. The first limits the agent’s incentives to exaggerate by decreasing the effectiveness of exaggeration, the second increases the overall value of the relationship to the agent while the last targets the projects for which the incentive to exaggerate is the largest to sustain truth-telling.

A screening perspective on experimental zones

Experimentation, or, setting experimental zones, is essential to many countries' economic success, especially China. Traditional explanations suggest that setting experimental zones is for loss-control or resistance-minimization. In this paper, we provide an alternative rationale that emphasizes the “screening effect” of experimental zones: when proposals—whose qualities are unknown to the central government (principal)—are proposed by informed local officials (agents), providing support gradually over time rather than all at once reduces the local governments' incentives to propose low-quality projects, resulting in a higher proportion of high-quality projects in equilibrium. The main tradeoff facing the central government is between better screening and delayed implementation of good projects. We show that when the central government is more patient, or good projects exhibit a larger positive externality, the reform speed, measured by initial support level, decreases while the reform scale, measured by the number of approved projects, increases. As the negative consequence of bad projects becomes higher, however, both reform speed and scale decrease, implying a steady but stagnant reform. By contrast, in a benchmark case without information asymmetry between the central and local governments, the optimal initial support is either minimal or full and does not depend on the externality.

Financial Development, Cycles and Income Inequality in a Model with Good and Bad Projects

Financial Development, Cycles and Income Inequality in a Model with Good and Bad Projects

Optimal mechanism in governmental project screening: A theory of Kornai's soft budget constraint

Soft budget constraint refers to the phenomenon that money losing inefficient projects keep on getting subsidies and operating. It was first phrased and analyzed by the late Hungarian economist Janos Kornai when he studied former socialist economies and by now, economists generally have agreed that soft budget constraint also exists extensively in market economies. As an important area of research in government and economics, existing explanations of soft budget have focused on the government's lack of commitment to terminate inefficient investment projects. In this paper, we propose a new theory in which soft budget constraint is an optimal governmental mechanism to induce greater effort in project selection. The idea is that if a manager (banker) selects a bad project, he has to keep on subsidizing it and lose more. Anticipating this, soft budget constraint makes the manager work hard to avoid choosing bad projects. Our theory sheds light on research in government and economics from the perspective of mechanism design.

Optimal Design of Limited Partnership Agreements

General partners (GP) are sometimes paid on a deal-by-deal basis and other times on a whole-portfolio basis. When is one method of payment better than the other? I show that when assets (projects or firms) are highly correlated or when GPs have low reputation, whole-portfolio contracting is superior to deal-by-deal contracting. In this case, by bundling payouts together, whole- portfolio contracting enhances incentives for GPs to exert e ort. Therefore, it is better suited to alleviate the moral hazard problem which is stronger than the adverse selection problem in the case of high correlation of assets or low reputation of GPs. In contrast, for low correlation of assets or high reputation of GPs, information asymmetry concerns dominate and deal-by- deal contracts become optimal, as they can efficiently weed out bad projects one by one. These results shed light on recent empirical findings on the relationship between investors and venture capitalists.

Banks, Non Banks, and Lending Standards

We study how competition between banks and non-banks affects lending standards. Banks have private information about some borrowers and are subject to capital requirements to mitigate risk-taking incentives from deposit insurance. Non-banks are uninformed and market forces determine their capital structure. We show that lending standards monotonically increase in bank capital requirements. Intuitively, higher capital requirements raise banks’ skin in the game and screening out bad projects assures positive expected lending returns. Non-banks enter the market when capital requirements are sufficiently high, but do not cause a deterioration in lending standards. Optimal capital requirements trade-off inefficient lending to bad projects under loose standards with inefficient collateral liquidation under tight standards.

The simple economics of white elephants

This paper shows that the concession model discourages firms from acquiring information about the future profitability of a project. Uninformed contractors carry out good and bad projects because they are profitable in expected terms even though it would have been optimal to invest in screening them out according to their value. White elephants are identified as avoidable negative net present-value projects that are nevertheless undertaken. Institutional arrangements that limit the losses that firms can bear exacerbate this distortion. We characterize the optimal concession contract, which fosters the acquisition of information and achieves the first best by conditioning the duration of the concession to the realization of the demand and includes payments for not carrying out some projects.

Repeated delegation

In an ongoing relationship of delegated decision making, a principal consults a biased agent to assess projects' returns. In equilibrium, the principal allows future bad projects to reward fiscal restraint, but cannot commit to indefinite rewards. We characterize equilibrium payoffs (at fixed discounting), showing that Pareto optimal equilibria are implemented via a two-regime ‘Dynamic Capital Budget’. Rather than facing backloaded rewards—as in dynamic agency models with commitment power—the agent loses autonomy as time progresses.

Corporate Governance: Can Creditors Fit in with Companies’ Board of Directors?

How do suppliers of finance make sure that firm managers enforce credit contracts, or do not invest in bad projects? This approach is missing in corporate governance research. To bridge the gap, we take steps towards developing a stakeholder perspective with the focus on examining the effects of creditor participation in a firm’s top decisions, in relation to board performance. Based on a sample of 154 questionnaire survey responses from Nigerian public firms, after relating all measured items to every construct in the statistical tests of exploratory factor analysis (EFA), we employed the use of confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) in a structural equation modelling (SEM) approach for an in-depth analysis to estimate how well the stakeholder model fits the data. Building upon the construct creditor participation, and based on the proposed theory, we confirmed three dimensions – protect risk projects, protect collateral, and enforce contracts – to be confirmed measures of the latent construct. Significant creditors such as banks interfering in the firm’s board, especially in major board decisions, can reduce the potentials of managers to engage in high-risk projects. This has significant positive effects on the board’s role performance. However, items in the two dimensions – protect collateral and enforce credit contracts show weak measurements after EFA. The consequences are a new research agenda for boards has been set. The agenda will focus on the suppliers of debt finance, as significant to the firms akin with their equity shareholders’ counterparts. This will create knowledge; reduce conflicts of interests, and exploitation; and ensure equitable distribution of firm value. The approach exposes firms to access more inclusive strategic inputs especially on important and less risky projects that will yield better margin and sustainable growth. This may stimulate further debates on other stakeholder researches that are vital to debt financiers and boards, thus becoming actionable for practitioners in decisions on projects.

Financing Efficiency of Securities-Based Crowdfunding

Abstract We analyze early-venture fundraising from dispersed, endogenously informed investors. An entrepreneur chooses a payoff-maximizing offering, and investors communicate their information by either contributing capital or abstaining. The entrepreneur uses the information conveyed by fundraising amounts to decide whether or not to undertake a risky venture. His decision threshold hedges investors against bad projects, creating a “loser’s blessing” that encourages contributing without information. Making the offering less attractive to investors mitigates the loser’s blessing but can give rise to a winner’s curse. Both tensions reduce financing efficiency. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.

Banks, Non banks, and Lending Standards

We study how competition between banks and non-banks affects lending standards. Banks have private information about some borrowers and are subject to capital requirements to mitigate risk-taking incentives from deposit insurance. Non-banks are uninformed and market forces determine their capital structure. We show that lending standards monotonically increase in bank capital requirements. Intuitively, higher capital requirements raise banks’ skin in the game and screening out bad projects assures positive expected lending returns. Non-banks enter the market when capital requirements are sufficiently high, but do not cause a deterioration in lending standards. Optimal capital requirements trade-off inefficient lending to bad projects under loose standards with inefficient collateral liquidation under tight standards.

Too Proud to Stop: Regret in Dynamic Decisions

AbstractRegret and its anticipation affect a wide range of decisions. Job-seekers reject offers while waiting for an offer to match their best past offer; investors hold on to badly performing stocks; and managers throw good money after bad projects. We analyze behavior of a decision maker with regret preferences in a dynamic context and show that regret agents have a disposition to gamble until they receive a payoff matching the best past offer. Results from a lab experiment confirm that many subjects exhibit such behavior and are reluctant to stop below the past peak.

The Role of Departmental Thought Worlds in Shaping Escalation of Commitment in New Product Development Projects

The debate over whether and how thought worlds of different departments (especially marketing and research and development [R&D]) affect managers' decision‐making behavior in new product development (NPD) is ongoing. A key challenge of these decisions is to deal with deteriorating NPD projects, which are often subject to escalation of commitment (EoC), with many firms wasting billions of dollars by throwing good money after bad NPD projects. However, understanding departmental thought worlds and their role for EoC in NPD could help firms stop this profusion. Thus, this research provides answers to the question of how thought worlds affect managers' tendency toward EoC in NPD decision‐making—both in general and under certain project characteristics. To do so, we conducted four studies based on real‐life scenarios with 460 highly experienced NPD managers from marketing and R&D, thus ensuring high validity and reliability. Our research is the first to explore the impact of thought worlds on EoC, thereby detecting that the importance of managers' thought worlds for shaping EoC varies with the NPD project's characteristics. Thus, depending on the specific project situation, different types of managers may be more or less capable of making proper NPD decisions. Moreover, results show that belief updating serves as a respective key mediator. Doing so enriches the theory by showing that managers' thought worlds can substantially influence a major mechanism (i.e., belief updating) of coping with cognitive dissonance. Finally, post hoc tests reveal departmental differences in EoC behavior between marketing and R&D that vary with a project's characteristics. These results imply that firms need to carefully consider who is in charge of making decisions on NPD project continuance in different project situations.

Decisions Under Persuasion

Many decisions are made based on persuasion. In the persuasion process, self-interested agents produce information to convince an evaluator to approve their proposals. Whether an evaluator will discount the agents’ suggestions and reject their proposal is neither clear nor obvious. We highlight that persuasion efforts do not necessarily invalidate the value of agents’ information production. Specifically, our study sheds light on why evaluators say “yes” to proposals even if self-interested agents have the intention to persuade the evaluator. The agents are reluctant to discover unfavorable information, which increases the probability of misidentifying bad projects as good ones. However, their efforts in producing favorable information allow the evaluator to identify more good projects out of a pool of unobservable good and bad projects. Following agents’ suggestions can be an optimal decision rule as it takes advantage of agents’ information to identify good projects.

The Culture of Overconfidence

Perceptions of overconfidence can exacerbate the tendency of reputationally concerned leaders to continue bad projects. Reputation concerns alone induce a bias toward inefficient continuation in a leader receiving information privately. When she is overconfident— or holds a more favorable prior than observers—this tendency is aggravated. This remains true even when she is not really overconfident, but merely perceived to be so. Higher-order beliefs regarding overconfidence induce inefficient equilibrium selection even when there is “almost common knowledge” that the leader is not over-confident. This provides a novel perspective on how culture selects among equilibria: via higher-order beliefs. (JEL D82, D83, Z13)

Penalties, Manipulation, and Investment Efficiency

In this study, we examine whether imposing a penalty based on an earlier positive signal and a bad realized outcome can be welfare-improving. We find that imposing a penalty helps to improve investment efficiency, but it also brings a deadweight cost of potential penalty for entrepreneurs with good projects. We show that when a good project has a much larger chance to achieve a good outcome than a bad project or when a large proportion of the penalty can be reimbursed to the investor, it is optimal to impose a penalty to deter entrepreneurs with bad projects from reporting positive signals to the greatest degree, as the benefit from reducing the investment inefficiency outweighs the expected deadweight cost. Otherwise, it is optimal not to impose any penalty. We also find that a larger penalty may induce more manipulation by a good entrepreneur. This is because, although a larger penalty directly discourages manipulation for both good and bad types by increasing the expected penalty cost, it also encourages upward manipulation by lowering the implicit financing cost upon a high signal. The encouraging effect is mostly pronounced for the good entrepreneur when the good entrepreneur has a much larger chance of success than the bad entrepreneur or when the reimbursement proportion is very high. This paper was accepted by Shiva Rajgopal, accounting.

A Theory of Efficient Short-Termism

This paper develops a theory in which the owners of firms pursue short-termism in project choice to limit managerial rent-seeking behavior. Unlike in previous theories, a short-term bias in investment horizons maximizes firm value in the second-best case, whereas managers themselves prefer long-horizon projects. Short-termism benefits the firm in two ways: it limits managerial rent extraction by preventing investments in bad projects that delay information revelation about project quality and managerial ability, and it enables faster learning about managerial ability which allows more efficient subsequent decisions. This result does not depend on any stock mispricing or managerial desire to manipulate stock prices. The likelihood of short-termism is higher when corporate governance is stronger, and at lower levels of the corporate hierarchy. Numerous testable predictions of the analysis are discussed.

Revisiting the model of credit cycles with Good and Bad projects

We revisit the model of endogenous credit cycles by Matsuyama (2013, Sections 2–4). First, we show that the same dynamical system that generates the equilibrium trajectory is obtained under a much simpler setting. Such a streamlined presentation should help to highlight the mechanism through which financial frictions cause instability and recurrent fluctuations. Then, we discuss the nature of fluctuations in greater detail when the final goods production function is Cobb–Douglas. For example, the unique steady state possesses corridor stability (locally stable but globally unstable) for empirically relevant parameter values. This also means that, when a parameter change causes the steady state to lose its local stability, its effects are catastrophic and irreversible so that even a small, temporary change in the financial friction could have large, permanent effects on volatility. Other features of the dynamics include an immediate transition from the stable steady state to a stable asymmetric cycle of period n≥3, along which n−1≥2 consecutive periods of gradual expansion are followed by one period of sharp downturn, as well as to a robust chaotic attractor. These results demonstrate the power of the skew-tent map as a tool for analyzing a regime-switching dynamic economic model.