Bad Decks Research Articles

Not all bad decisions are alike: approach and avoidant bad decisions are associated with distinct network organization.

Decisions under ambiguity occurs daily for everyone. Subsequently, we all deliberate upon options to initiate an action most appropriate for current goal demands. Researchers has attempted to identify factors which contribute to risk taking, alongside the neurocircuitry underpinning it. Empirically, uncertain decision making is frequently assessed using the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT). Research have reliably identified varying regions implicating two broader circuits known as the reward and salience networks. However, considerable work has focused on contrasting "good" versus "bad" decisions. The present investigation attempted a unique approach to analyzing the modified IGT acquired during fMRI (n = 24) and focused on active and passive bad decisions to identify potential internetwork connectivity, dissociable connectivity patterns between approach and avoidant bad decisions, and their relationship with personality traits, which can be linked with behavioral approach styles. Network cluster analyses revealed general internetwork connectivity when passing (avoiding) good decks; however, the OFC was functionally disconnected from the rest of the selected brain regions when playing (approaching) bad decks. Decreased reward responsiveness was linked to increased functional connectivity between the lateral OFC and aSMG, while drive was associated with increased functional connectivity between dACC and aINS. We report evidence that approach and avoidant bad decisions are associated with distinct neural communication patterns. Avoidant decisions were marked by substantial network integration and coherence, contrasted with the general scarcity of internetwork communication observed for approach decisions. Furthermore, the present investigation observed preliminary evidence of personality traits linked with neural communication between salience and reward evaluative networks.

Decision making and implicit suicidality in schizophrenia spectrum disorders

IntroductionResearch shows that mental illnesses increase suicidal risk. Studies have found that suicidal risk is associated with impaired decision-making.ObjectivesTo analyze decision making based on emotional learning in implicit suicidality.Methods56 male patients with schizophrenia spectrum disorder (F20) and denied presence of suicidal ideation were involved into the study (mean age 23±2.7),. Methods: Iowa gambling task (IGT) - integral indicators were used: the prevalence of “good” choices over “bad” ones, total score; and an indicator reflecting the ignorance of consequences of one’s choice - the subject remains on a “bad deck” after a loss. The Rorschach test (Rorschach Comprehensive system) was administered: Suicide Constellation «S-CON» and its components were used.ResultsAccording to the analysis, prevalence of “good” choices (IGT) negatively correlates with «S-CON» (Spearman’s correlation -0.328*, hereinafter significance level: ~ - p<0.1; * - p<0.05). A decrease in the total IGT score is associated with the following cognitive indicators: disregard for social conventions, non-conformism («P») (Spearman’s, 0.337*); a tendency to react defensively to a problem situation, blocking activity in terms of making decisions («R») (0.308*). Ignoring the consequences of one’s choice (IGT) correlates with such emotional factors as emotional incontinence, superficiality of emotions, emotional lability («FC:CF+C») (-.0382*), ambivalence of emotions («Blcol-shd») (statistical tendency, 0.277~), expressed dissatisfaction with the existing situation, internal tension and dysphoria («S») (0.291~).ConclusionsThe relationship of implicit suicidality with decision-making was found to be similar to the relationship of pronounced suicidality with decision-making. Suicidality is associated with impaired ability to make decisions based on emotional learning.DisclosureNo significant relationships.

Normatively Irrelevant Affective Cues Affect Risk-Taking under Uncertainty: Insights from the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT), Skin Conductance Response, and Heart Rate Variability.

Being able to distinguish between safe and risky options is paramount in making functional choices. However, deliberate manipulation of decision-makers emotions can lead to risky behaviors. This study aims at understanding how affective reactions driven by normatively irrelevant affective cues can interfere with risk-taking. Good and Bad decks of the Iowa Gambling Task have been manipulated to make them unpleasant through a negative auditory manipulation. Anticipatory skin conductance response (SCR) and heart rate variability (HRV) have been investigated in line with the somatic marker hypothesis. Results showed fewer selections from Good decks when they were negatively manipulated (i.e., Incongruent condition). No effect of the manipulation was detected when Bad decks were negatively manipulated (i.e., Congruent condition). Higher anticipatory SCR was associated with Bad decks in Congruent condition. Slower heart rate was found before selections from Good decks in Control and Congruent condition and from Bad decks in Incongruent condition. Differences in heart rate between Bad and Good decks were also detected in Congruent condition. Results shed light on how normatively irrelevant affective cues can interfere with risk-taking.

Autonomic responses to choice outcomes: Links to task performance and reinforcement-learning parameters

Previous work has shown that autonomic responses to choice feedback can predict subsequent decision-making. In this study, we tested whether skin conductance responses (SCRs) and heart rate (HR) decelerations following the presentation of choice outcomes predict Iowa Gambling Task performance in nonclinical participants (n = 64). We also examined how these signals related to parameters of a reinforcement-learning (RL) model. Feedback SCRs and HR decelerations were greater following outcomes that included losses and choices from the bad decks defined by their negative expected value. In addition, SCRs predicted task performance. A hierarchical Bayesian RL model indicated that greater feedback SCR for the bad decks compared to good decks was associated with stronger loss aversion and a lower learning rate, both of which predicted higher performance. These results suggest that feedback-related SCRs are linked to individual differences in outcome evaluation and learning processes that guide reinforcement-learning.

0125 Sleep Deprivation Impairs the Ability to Overcome Pre-Existing Framing Bias

Abstract Introduction When presented with a choice between sure gains or losses versus gambles, people tend to select sure gains over gambles, but gambles over sure losses. This pre-existing framing bias is embedded in the Framed Gambling Task (FGT), in which subjects choose between a sure option (gain or loss) and a gamble (card from one of two decks). For optimal performance, subjects need to recognize that one deck (‘good deck’) results in better average outcomes than the other deck (‘bad deck’) and select the gamble or sure option depending on the deck (good/bad) rather than the frame (sure loss/gain). A speeded version of the FGT, with 2s response deadlines to induce time pressure, was used in a laboratory total sleep deprivation (TSD) study to determine the impact of sleep loss on the ability to overcome pre-existing framing bias. Methods Eight-six subjects (ages 21–38; 47 females) were randomized (2:1 ratio) to a TSD condition (n=56) or control condition (n=30). They completed the speeded FGT at 11:00 on the baseline day (session 1), and again the following day (session 2) after 27h of wakefulness (TSD group) or 3h of wakefulness (control group). Performance accuracy was defined in terms of optimal task performance, i.e., gambling when the good deck was presented and not gambling when the bad deck was presented. Each test bout had 72 trials across three trial blocks. Results Accuracy improved across trial blocks (F1,84=20.44, p<0.001). In session 2, the TSD group showed lower accuracy (condition by session interaction: F2,84=4.15, p=0.045) and less improvement across trial blocks (condition by session by trial block interaction: F2,168=3.97, p=0.021) than the control group. Even under TSD, the frequency of response timeouts (RT>2s) was low (<3.5% of trials). Conclusion Sleep deprivation degraded FGT performance under time pressure, indicating reduced ability to overcome pre-existing framing bias. Support PRMRP award W81XWH-16-1-0319

Conceptual Knowledge Influences Decision Making Differently in Individuals with High or Low Cognitive Flexibility: An ERP Study.

ObjectiveStudies using the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) have distinguished between good and bad decision makers and have provided an explanation for deficits in decision making. Previous studies have demonstrated a link between Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST) performance and IGT performance, but the results were not consistent and failed to explain why WCST performance can predict IGT performance. The present study aimed to demonstrate that WCST performance can predict IGT performance and to identify the cognitive component of the WCST that affects IGT performance using event-related potentials (ERPs).MethodsIn this study, 39 healthy subjects (5 subjects were excluded) were divided into a high group and a low group based on their global score on the WCST. A single-choice version of the IGT was used to eliminate the impact of retrieval strategies on the choice evaluation process and interference due to uncorrelated decks. Differences in the underlying neural mechanisms and explicit knowledge between the two groups during the three stages of the decision-making process were described.ResultsBased on the information processing perspective, we divided the decision-making process into three stages: choice evaluation, response selection, and feedback processing. The behavioral results showed that the highly cognitively flexible participants performed better on the IGT and acquired more knowledge of the task. The ERP results showed that during the choice evaluation stage, the P300 recorded from central and parietal regions when a bad deck appeared was larger in the high group participants than in the low group participants. During the response selection stage, the effect of choice type was significant only in the frontal region in the high group, with a larger effect for passing. During the feedback evaluation stage, a larger FRN was evoked for a loss than for a win in the high group, whereas the FRN effect was absent in the low group.ConclusionCompared with the participants with low cognitive flexibility, the participants with high cognitive flexibility performed better on the IGT, acquired more knowledge of the task, and displayed more obvious somatic markers. The low group participants showed reduced working memory abilities during the choice evaluation stage. The appropriate somatic markers reflected by the DPN is formed only when conceptual knowledge is gained in the response selection stage. The absence of an FRN effect in the subjects who performed poorly on the WCST suggests a significant deficit in feedback learning and reward prediction.

Performance and awareness in the Iowa Gambling Task

Newell & Shanks (N&S) conclude that healthy participants learn to differentiate between the good and bad decks of the Iowa Gambling Task, and that healthy participants even have conscious knowledge about the task's payoff structure. Improved methods of analysis and new behavioral findings suggest that this conclusion is premature.

A Comparison of Reinforcement Learning Models for the Iowa Gambling Task Using Parameter Space Partitioning

The Iowa gambling task (IGT) is one of the most popular tasks used to study decisionmaking deficits in clinical populations. In order to decompose performance on the IGT in its constituent psychological processes, several cognitive models have been proposed (e.g., the Expectancy Valence (EV) and Prospect Valence Learning (PVL) models). Here we present a comparison of three models—the EV and PVL models, and a combination of these models (EV-PU)—based on the method of parameter space partitioning. This method allows us to assess the choice patterns predicted by the models across their entire parameter space. Our results show that the EV model is unable to account for a frequency-of-losses effect, whereas the PVL and EV-PU models are unable to account for a pronounced preference for the bad decks with many switches. All three models underrepresent pronounced choice patterns that are frequently seen in experiments. Overall, our results suggest that the search of an appropriate IGT model has not yet come to an end.

The effect of acute tyrosine phenylalanine depletion on emotion-based decision-making in healthy adults

Despite interest in dopamine's role in emotion-based decision-making, few reports of the effects of dopamine manipulations are available in this area in humans. This study investigates dopamine's role in emotion-based decision-making through a common measure of this construct, the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT), using Acute Tyrosine Phenylalanine Depletion (ATPD). In a between-subjects design, 40 healthy adults were randomized to receive either an ATPD beverage or a balanced amino acid beverage (a control) prior to completing the IGT, as well as pre- and post-manipulation blood draws for the neurohormone prolactin. Together with conventional IGT performance metrics, choice selections and response latencies were examined separately for good and bad choices before and after several key punishment events. Changes in response latencies were also used to predict total task performance. Prolactin levels increased significantly in the ATPD group but not in the control group. However, no significant group differences in performance metrics were detected, nor were there sex differences in outcome measures. However, the balanced group's bad deck latencies speeded up across the task, while the ATPD group's latencies remained adaptively hesitant. Additionally, modulation of latencies to the bad decks predicted total score for the ATPD group only. One interpretation is that ATPD subtly attenuated reward salience and altered the approach by which individuals achieved successful performance, without resulting in frank group differences in task performance.

Reexamining the Validity and Reliability of the Clinical Version of the Iowa Gambling Task: Evidence from a Normal Subject Group

Over past decade, the Iowa gambling task (IGT) has been utilized to test various decision deficits induced by neurological damage or psychiatric disorders. The IGT has recently been standardized for identifying 13 different neuropsychological disorders. Neuropsychological patients choose bad decks frequently, and normal subjects prefer good expected value (EV) decks. However, the IGT has several validity and reliability problems. Some research groups have pointed out that the validity of IGT is influenced by the personality and emotional state of subjects. Additionally, several other studies have proposed that the “prominent deck B phenomenon” (PDB phenomenon) – that is, normal subjects preferring bad deck B – may be the most serious problem confronting IGT validity. Specifically, deck B offers a high frequency of gains but negative EV. In the standard IGT administration, choice behavior can be understood with reference to gain-loss frequency (GLF) rather than inferred future consequences (EV, the basic assumption of IGT). Furthermore, using two different criteria (basic assumption vs. professional norm) results in significantly different classification results. Therefore, we recruited 72 normal subjects to test the validity and reliability of IGT. Each subject performed three runs of the computer-based clinical IGT version. The PDB phenomenon has been observed to a significant degree in the first and second stages of the clinical IGT version. Obviously, validity, reliability, and the practice effect were unstable between two given stages. The present form of the clinical IGT version has only one stage, so its use should be reconsidered for examining normal decision makers; results from patient groups must also be interpreted with great care. GLF could be the main factor to be considered in establishing the constructional validity and reliability of the clinical IGT version.

Validating the PVL-Delta model for the Iowa gambling task

Decision-making deficits in clinical populations are often assessed with the Iowa gambling task (IGT). Performance on this task is driven by latent psychological processes, the assessment of which requires an analysis using cognitive models. Two popular examples of such models are the Expectancy Valence (EV) and Prospect Valence Learning (PVL) models. These models have recently been subjected to sophisticated procedures of model checking, spawning a hybrid version of the EV and PVL models—the PVL-Delta model. In order to test the validity of the PVL-Delta model we present a parameter space partitioning (PSP) study and a test of selective influence. The PSP study allows one to assess the choice patterns that the PVL-Delta model generates across its entire parameter space. The PSP study revealed that the model accounts for empirical choice patterns featuring a preference for the good decks or the decks with infrequent losses; however, the model fails to account for empirical choice patterns featuring a preference for the bad decks. The test of selective influence investigates the effectiveness of experimental manipulations designed to target only a single model parameter. This test showed that the manipulations were successful for all but one parameter. To conclude, despite a few shortcomings, the PVL-Delta model seems to be a better IGT model than the popular EV and PVL models.

Mirrored prominent deck B phenomenon: frequent small losses override infrequent large gains in the inverted Iowa Gambling Task.

Since Bechara et al. pioneered its development, the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) has been widely applied to elucidate decision behavior and medial prefrontal function. Although most decision makers can hunch the final benefits of IGT, ventromedial prefrontal lesions generate a myopic choice pattern. Additionally, the Iowa group developed a revised IGT (inverted IGT, iIGT) to confirm the IGT validity. Each iIGT trial was generated from the trial of IGT by multiplying by a “−” to create an inverted monetary value. Thus, bad decks A and B in the IGT become good decks iA and iB in the iIGT; additionally, good decks C and D in the IGT become bad decks iC and iD in the iIGT. Furthermore, IGT possessed mostly the gain trials, and iIGT possessed mainly the loss trials. Therefore, IGT is a frequent-gain–based task, and iIGT is a frequent-loss–based task. However, a growing number of IGT-related studies have identified confounding factors in IGT (i.e., gain-loss frequency), which are demonstrated by the prominent deck B phenomenon (PDB phenomenon). Nevertheless, the mirrored PDB phenomenon and guiding power of gain-loss frequency in iIGT have seldom been reexamined. This experimental finding supports the prediction based on gain-loss frequency. This study identifies the mirrored PDB phenomenon. Frequent small losses override occasional large gains in deck iB of the iIGT. Learning curve analysis generally supports the phenomenon based on gain-loss frequency rather than final outcome. In terms of iIGT and simple versions of iIGT, results of this study demonstrate that high-frequency loss, rather than a satisfactory final outcome, dominates the preference of normal decision makers under uncertainty. Furthermore, normal subjects prefer “no immediate punishment” rather than “final reward” under uncertainty.

The interaction between expected values and risk levels in a modified Iowa gambling task

Performance on the Iowa gambling task (IGT) supports somatic marker hypothesis (SMH), which proposes that the process of decision making depends on emotion (Damasio, 1994). However, the bad decks in the IGT are also more risky and that confounds the results. To resolve this issue, the IGT-Yen, a variant of the IGT, was created to independently examine the effects of expected value and risk. After 20 trials, participants selected more high-risk bad decks than low-risk bad decks and more low-risk good decks than high-risk good decks. Greater anticipatory skin conductance levels (SCLs) were associated with choosing high-risk bad decks compared to choosing low-risk bad decks in trials 21–80, and greater anticipatory SCLs were associated with choosing low-risk good decks compared to choosing high-risk good decks in trials 81–100. Therefore, the anticipatory SCLs were associated with expected values of the decks and with their levels of risk.

Affective bias in complex decision making: Modulating sensitivity to aversive feedback

The present study investigated the conflict between well-developed attitudes and incentive rewards using the Iowa Gambling Task. In particular, the incorporation of emotional labels allowed us to model the role of affective biases and their impact on complex decision making over time. Two experiments manipulated the class of deck label (emotional pictures and racial faces) using both congruent and incongruent association to the deck incentives. Both experiments demonstrated that an incongruent association can lead to striking and persistent decision making biases. Thus, a common theme was a general inability to tolerate conflict between rewards and goal-irrelevant labels. Notably, Experiment 2 demonstrated that this ‘incongruency’ effect appeared to result from positive labels interfering with aversive experiences from bad decks. More generally, sensitivity to accumulating losses from punishing decks was primarily associated with successful performance on these Gambling Task variants. These results suggest emotional biases are readily harmful in complex decision making, and that flexibility in the extent to which we permit emotional influences to guide our decisions is crucial.

Playing with a Bad Deck: The Caveats of Card Sorting as a Web Site Redesign Tool

Card sorting is a simple, low-tech usability assessment tool that can help Web designers restructure Web site navigation to better reflect user preferences. After employing card sorting in its Web redesign process, the Galter Health Sciences Library had great difficulty analyzing and understanding the results. Many methodological mistakes could have been avoided if certain caveats were observed throughout the process. These caveats are presented in detail, ensuring that other librarians and Web designers wishing to employ card sorting will be able to use the tool to its maximum efficacy.

Symbol labelling improves advantageous decision-making on the Iowa Gambling Task in people with intellectual disabilities

Individuals with intellectual and developmental disabilities often have difficulties foregoing short-term loss for long-term gain. The Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) has been extensively adopted as a laboratory measure of this ability. In the present study, we undertook the first investigation with people with intellectual disabilities using a two-choice child version of the IGT, with measures of intellectual and executive functioning. Compared to a group of matched controls, people with intellectual disabilities performed advantageously and showed high levels of subjective awareness about the relative goodness and badness of the decks. A symbol labelling intervention, in which participants were taught to label the good and bad decks at regular intervals significantly improved advantageous decision-making to levels approximating that of controls. Factor analysis of executive functioning scores identified working memory and mental flexibility (response initiation and set shifting), with a near-significant inverse correlation between the extent to which the intervention was required and mental flexibility. These findings show, for the first time, that people with intellectual disabilities are capable of performing advantageously on the IGT and add to the growing clinical literature on decision-making.

Why are maximizers less happy than satisficers? Because they maximize positive and negative outcomes

AbstractAlthough extant research suggests maximizing is related to objectively positive outcomes (e.g., job offers), I propose maximizing may be simultaneously and positively related to objectively negative outcomes (e.g., job rejections). Specifically, I argue maximizers bear more instances of positive and negative outcomes than satisficers, and that in spite of their positive outcomes—yet because of their negative outcomes—maximizers are less happy than satisficers. In Study 1, participants took the alternate uses test; as expected, maximizing was related to seeking alternatives, yet, maximizing was also related to seeking low‐quality alternatives. Moreover, the number of low‐quality alternatives partially mediated the relationship between maximizing and negative affect. In Study 2, the impact of maximizing on experiencing negative affect was further assessed by examining whether maximizing is related to seeking and choosing low‐quality alternatives. Participants played the Iowa Gambling Task; it was found maximizing was related to alternating among decks, and in particular, sampling bad decks; ultimately, maximizing was related to winning less money, and experiencing more negative affect. Finally, in Study 3, participants responded to questionnaires about positive and negative life outcomes; it was found that maximizing was simultaneously related to experiencing more positive and more negative outcomes, and that negative outcomes predicted happiness to a greater degree than positive outcomes. These findings suggest an irony of maximizing: It produces both positive and negative outcomes, contributing to literature explaining why maximizers are less happy than satisficers, and ultimately whether happiness is a matter of choice. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Immediate gain is long-term loss: Are there foresighted decision makers in the Iowa Gambling Task?

BackgroundThe Somatic Marker Hypothesis suggests that normal subjects are "foreseeable" and ventromedial prefrontal patients are "myopic" in making decisions, as the behavior shown in the Iowa Gambling Task. The present study questions previous findings because of the existing confounding between long-term outcome (expected value, EV) and gain-loss frequency variables in the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT). A newly and symmetrically designed gamble, namely the Soochow Gambling Task (SGT), with a high-contrast EV between bad (A, B) and good (C, D) decks, is conducted to clarify the issue about IGT confounding. Based on the prediction of EV (a basic assumption of IGT), participants should prefer to choose good decks C and D rather than bad decks A and B in SGT. In contrast, according to the prediction of gain-loss frequency, subjects should prefer the decks A and B because they possessed relatively the high-frequency gain.MethodsThe present experiment was performed by 48 participants (24 males and 24 females). Most subjects are college students recruited from different schools. Each subject played the computer version SGT first and completed a questionnaire for identifying their final preference. The IGT experimental procedure was mostly followed to assure a similar condition of decision uncertainty.ResultsThe SGT experiment demonstrated that the prediction of gain-loss frequency is confirmed. Most subjects preferred to choose the bad decks A and B than good decks C and D. The learning curve and questionnaire data indicate that subjects can not "hunch" the EV throughout the game. Further analysis of the effect of previous choice demonstrated that immediate gain increases the probability to stay at the same deck.ConclusionSGT provides a balanced structure to clarify the confounding inside IGT and demonstrates that gain-loss frequency rather than EV guides decision makers in these high-ambiguity gambles. Additionally, the choice behavior is mostly following the "gain-stay, lose-randomize" strategy to cope with the uncertain situation. As demonstrated in SGT, immediate gain can bring about a long-term loss under uncertainty. This empirical result may explain some shortsighted behaviors in real life.

Does Autonomic Arousal Distinguish Good and Bad Decisions?

The somatic marker hypothesis (SMH) proposes that physiological feedback to the brain influences cognitive appraisal and human decisions, however, the strength of evidence in support of the SMH is equivocal. We examined the validity of the SMH by measuring physiological arousal in a population of healthy individuals playing the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT), which is a computerized card game designed to assess real-life decisions. We also examined the influence of reinforcer type on IGT performance and physiological reactivity. Skin conductance level (SCL) reactivity was measured in 41 participants performing the IGT using either facsimile or real money. Participants were categorized as normal (i.e., nonimpaired) or impaired on the basis of their IGT performance, and differences in performance and physiological reactivity between groups were examined. No differences in SCL were found between normal and impaired groups. However, greater SCL rises were borderline significant when anticipating choices from bad decks compared with good decks, and a significantly greater SCL rise followed a reward from a bad deck. The effect of reinforcer type also revealed marginally greater performance when using facsimile money. This was corroborated physiologically by Deck × Reinforcer Type interactions, showing a marginally significant tendency for a greater SCL rise when anticipating a choice from a bad deck using facsimile but not real money, and a significantly greater SCL rise following a reward from a bad deck when using facsimile but not real money. Findings constrain the SMH, suggesting that autonomic activity may discriminate between good and bad decks (i.e., good vs. bad decision-making) by reflecting the magnitude of gains and losses, but is independent of long-term consequences and does not discriminate between overall good and bad performance (i.e., normal vs. impaired decision-makers).

Is deck B a disadvantageous deck in the Iowa Gambling Task?

BackgroundThe Iowa gambling task is a popular test for examining monetary decision behavior under uncertainty. According to Dunn et al. review article, the difficult-to-explain phenomenon of "prominent deck B" was revealed, namely that normal decision makers prefer bad final-outcome deck B to good final-outcome decks C or D. This phenomenon was demonstrated especially clearly by Wilder et al. and Toplak et al. The "prominent deck B" phenomenon is inconsistent with the basic assumption in the IGT; however, most IGT-related studies utilized the "summation" of bad decks A and B when presenting their data, thereby avoiding the problems associated with deck B.MethodsTo verify the "prominent deck B" phenomenon, this study launched a two-stage simple version IGT, namely, an AACC and BBDD version, which possesses a balanced gain-loss structure between advantageous and disadvantageous decks and facilitates monitoring of participant preferences after the first 100 trials.ResultsThe experimental results suggested that the "prominent deck B" phenomenon exists in the IGT. Moreover, participants cannot suppress their preference for deck B under the uncertain condition, even during the second stage of the game. Although this result is incongruent with the basic assumption in IGT, an increasing number of studies are finding similar results. The results of the AACC and BBDD versions can be congruent with the decision literatures in terms of gain-loss frequency.ConclusionBased on the experimental findings, participants can apply the "gain-stay, loss-shift" strategy to overcome situations involving uncertainty. This investigation found that the largest loss in the IGT did not inspire decision makers to avoid choosing bad deck B.