Awkward Partner Research Articles

Awkward Partners? The View on The Arctic Dimension of The EU Strategic Autonomy in Denmark and Norway

The article deals with the contradictions between the EU strategic autonomy and the national interests of Denmark and Norway in the Arctic regarding foreign policy priorities, defence cooperation and the "green transition". In national diplomacy Nordic countries want to preserve their own voice and freedom of manoeuvre, also in their relations with Russia and China, while the EU is more interested in keeping and expanding its own Arctic cooperation formats rather than coordinating common diplomatic efforts in the Arctic with Copenhagen or Oslo. European defence cooperation currently does not offer meaningful tools to enhance the Arctic presence of Denmark and Norway, since their largest military modernisation projects are implemented either at the national level or intergovernmentally with select countries. Finally, in the area of climate policy, a long search for compromise is likely to be necessary, as Norway is hesitant to implement EU climate regulations and is in direct opposition to Brussels over deep-sea mining, while Denmark struggles with a powerful farmer lobby that seeks postponements and exemptions from various climate measures.

The Kyrgyz Diaspora in the Regions of Russia: Transnationalism and Migrants’ Problems

This article considers the current formation of the Kyrgyz diaspora. Scholarly literature persists in attempting to interpret Kyrgyz communities outside their homeland as diaspora, which makes the issue relevant. Methodologically, the study draws on a transnational approach, which makes it possible to understand the relationships and connections between the place of residence and the local homeland, with reference to Kyrgyz nationals, and to compare the diaspora itself and transnational communities or, as T. Faist puts it, “two awkward partners in the dance”. The author refers to data from the Kyrgyz Diaspora Mapping Project, carried out under the auspices of the International Organisation for Migration in 2021, as well as in-depth unstructured interviews collected during the author’s fieldwork in Chelyabinsk (47 interviewees), Yekaterinburg (19 interviewees), and Krasnoyarsk (14 interviewees). On average, the interviews lasted for half an hour, and the gender ratio in the group of informants was 31 women and 49 men. The author considers the following parameters of belonging to the diaspora: diaspora and transnationalism, participation in the activities of Kyrgyz public organisations, settlement of Kyrgyz migrants, their orientation to their historical homeland, and specificity of identity. This review tells us more about the absence or incompleteness of the Kyrgyz diaspora in Russia. It is noted that, on the one hand, Kyrgyz migrants are disconnected and distrust the activities of diaspora organisations, and, on the other hand, they form dynamic transnational spaces linking the areas of origin and residence, in this case, the Urals and Siberian regional capitals (Chelyabinsk, Yekaterinburg and Krasnoyarsk).

A rival or an awkward partner? Turkey’s relationship with the West in the Balkans

ABSTRACT In the 2000 and 2010s, Turkey embarked on an activist policy in Southeast Europe reliant on personal diplomacy, economic outreach, and the projection of soft power. Coupled with the drift away from the West, such overtures have prompted observers to qualify Turkey as a revisionist power similar to Russia, China and other non-Western actors making inroads into the region. This article seeks to correct this view. It argues that Turkey is not an external player but very much part of the Balkans. Secondly, the article contends that Turkish foreign policy is not posing a frontal challenge to the EU and NATO, the two anchors of regional order. Rather, it benefits from its close relationship and membership in the two institutions. Though it has shifted from multilateralism to unilateralism, Ankara pursues a parallel, as opposed to an adversarial, strategy to that of the West.

British exceptionalism: pride and prejudice and Brexit

The root cause of the current crisis in the United Kingdom is British Exceptionalism which assumed its classic form in the wake of the Napoleonic Wars. During the nineteenth century, the British state focused upon the creation of a global empire and by the 1890s was in a state of ‘splendid isolation’ with respect to Europe. Simultaneously, the rise of Germany meant that Britain could not ignore Europe. During the first half of the twentieth century, Britain became involved in two major wars, which to a considerable extent revolved around the need to curb German power. After the First World War, Britain wanted to focus upon her global interests and this was reflected in her reluctance to embrace integrationist initiatives such as the Briand Plan. Although the Second World War destroyed the basis of Britain’s imperium, the feeling that British superiority had saved the world only reinforced the sense of exceptionalism by adding to it a sense of ‘pride’. After 1945 British power steadily waned and the British state came increasingly under pressure from Washington to join the European Economic Community. The potential of Germany to dominate this grouping and British apprehension of such a development led to prejudice in respect of Germany which later transmitted itself into prejudice against Europe as a whole. Once inside the European Community, Britain accordingly became an awkward partner. Never entirely comfortable within the European Union, a secessionist movement grew which ultimately forced the referendum of 2016.

Too Effective for Europe? The UK, Norm Advocacy and the Case of EU International Cooperation

AbstractDespite being an 'awkward partner' in the EU, Britain has significantly shaped international cooperation in it. The size of Britain's development sector and its accumulated skills have given it a strong voice in the EU, particularly in terms of aid and development cooperation. In the years before the Brexit referendum of 2016, EU development cooperation shifted towards meeting the priorities of subsequent UK governments and against competing priorities. This article traces British participation in EU norm advocacy in development cooperation. The analysis shows how politico‐administrative actors have engaged beyond inter‐state power brokering and across levels of governance to shape EU policy, especially in transnational societal networks and capacity‐building in EU institutions. The article places this case into the wider context of EU norm advocacy to show how actors seek to push EU policy towards their politico‐administrative interests and identities, and it makes suggestions about what this implies for EU–UK relations.

The Historical Roots of the ‘Awkward Partner’ Narrative

The Historical Roots of the ‘Awkward Partner’ Narrative

Introduction: Germany and European Integration

Introduction: Germany and European Integration Germany has played a pivotal role in the process of European integration.1 The “European construction” was begun after 1945 as a response to the catastrophic human and material losses and moral disaster of World Wars I and II. The role of Germany in those events needs no elaboration here; suffice it to say that policy -makers in both Western Europe and the United States were fully aware of the need to ensure that the energies of the defeated nation at the heart of the continent were harnessed for purposes of peace, not war. Other reasons can be found to explain why European nations began to relinquish sovereign control over important parts of their economies, but the twin beliefs that greater economic integration would provide the conditions for lasting peace, and that it would simultaneously act as a means of containing and controlling the Federal Republic, were at the core of the European project. The Schuman Plan, announced on May 9, 1950, was an act of profound political idealism and a calculated exercise in power-sharing by the French state. It gave Konrad Adenauer the opportunity to begin steering the new German republic back into the free society of nations. He was ready to do this even if it meant postponing hopes of unification and permitting neighbouring states to influence the pace and character of German post-war reconstruction. The Federal Republic’s engagement with the European project thus began with a major sacrifice – made in order to win the friendship and esteem of adjacent democratic states. Though Adenauer conceded on this point, he was no pushover in other matters. During the negotiations for the European Defence Community between 1952 and 1954, he bargained hard to end the Occupation Statute and to obtain recognition of West Germany as a sovereign state that could have its own foreign and defence policy – but he did show surpassing realism in grasping that Bonn had to give to Europe in order to gain from it, and that building Europe was in everyone’s interest. Mark Gilbert/Eva Oberloskamp/Thomas Raithel The European Coal and Steel Community and the European Economic Community (EEC) brought clear milieu advantages to all member states, and these 1 With regard to the abundance of syntheses on European integration, we would like to refer to four books published by researchers included in this volume: Mark Gilbert, European Integration . A Concise History, Lanham/MD et al. 2012; Wilfried Loth, Building Europe. A History of European Unification, Berlin/Boston (MA) 2015; Kiran Klaus Patel, Projekt Europa. Eine kritische Geschichte, Munich 2018, and Guido Thiemeyer, Europäische Integration. Motive – Prozesse – Strukturen, Cologne/Weimar/Vienna 2010. 8 Mark Gilbert/Eva Oberloskamp/Thomas Raithel were worth the sacrifice of some immediate economic possession goals.2 It is a caricature to describe the March 1957 Treaty of Rome as a deal by which France conceded market access to German manufacturers in exchange for Europeanization of the costs of its former colonies and access of its farmers to the German domestic market, but not a gross one. The outcome was increased prosperity for all. European integration also encouraged greater equality between the member states – a point that is often overlooked. Although France was primus inter pares in the 1950s, the Federal Republic was able to exercise considerable influence on the EEC’s decision-making, as could the other four member states. Unlike the French, German statesmen showed a consistent willingness to accept a collegial decision-making process: Bonn fought for its interests but never insisted upon vetoing items of policy broadly acceptable to the Community as a whole. West Germany was a “good citizen” of the European project, not an “awkward partner,” as Britain was to be when it entered the Community in the 1970s.3 Collegiality should not be mistaken for ineffectuality. The Federal Republic’s extraordinary economic success – not to mention its comparative political stability – led Bonn to exercise an ever-greater role in the development of the European Community in the 1970s and 1980s. Under Willy Brandt, Helmut Schmidt and Helmut Kohl, West Germany came to imprint its values and political centrality on the Community as a whole. The...

Nordic states and European integration: awkward partners in the north?

Nordic states and European integration: awkward partners in the north?

The United Kingdom and the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU: From Pre-Brexit ‘Awkward Partner’ to Post-Brexit ‘Future Partnership’?

The UK’s decision to leave the European Union (EU) has presented innumerable challenges for both the leaving state and the EU. In these unchartered waters, the future of UK involvement in EU policies is very much in doubt. The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) has not been at the forefront of the debates about Brexit, despite the increasing focus on the EU’s global role, and the UK’s own vision of a ‘Global Britain’. The purpose of this article is to consider the past, present, and future role played by the UK in the CFSP since its inception in the Treaty on European Union. This necessitates consideration of how the CFSP might develop in the future and fulfil the goals of the recent Global Strategy. The article explores the UK’s constant opposition to greater integration in EU foreign policy and how it has purported to distance itself from the CFSP machinery. This can be contrasted with the UK’s apparent post-referendum enthusiasm for pursuing shared foreign policy goals. The future direction of the CFSP may not be affected to a significant degree by the UK’s departure. However, the CFSP will not necessarily become more integrated after Brexit. To achieve this, greater commitment will need to be shown by the EU27 to the aims of the CFSP, and other Member States will no longer be able to count on the UK as the lead voice of opposition or ‘brake’ on integration. If there is a continued desire for the UK to be involved in the CFSP, finding an acceptable model for cooperation is likely to prove a substantial, long-term challenge.

Have we reached a tipping point? The mainstreaming of Euroscepticism in the UK

Stephen George, the eminent scholar of the European Union, famously labelled the UK as the ‘awkward partner’ when analysing the country’s relationship with the EU. The ‘permissive consensus’ evident in most EU nation states, at least prior to Maastricht and more recently the Eurozone crisis, was never ‘clear-cut’ in the UK. However, recent developments have propelled the issue of UK membership to the centre stage of British politics. By analysing some of the key historic variables which have contributed to the UK’s ambivalence and hostility towards the EU as well as more recent factors such as Conservative Party splits over ‘Europe’ and the rise of UKIP, the article focuses on the role and influence of the tabloid press, and in particular the Daily Express, to demonstrate how the debate surrounding UK membership of the EU has completed its journey from the margins to the mainstream of British politics. It concludes that the lack of a ‘level playing-field’ in terms of EU coverage among the UK tabloid press has led to a situation where its citizens, in the context of an ‘in-out’ referendum, are unable to ‘weigh up’ the ‘costs’ and ‘benefits’ of EU membership in a rational and informed fashion.

Wielka Brytania w Unii Europejskiej - przeszłość, teraźniejszość, przyszłość

Britain in the European Union – its past, present and future
 The aim of this article is to depict and analyse Britain’s relations with the European Union, their historical context, the present time and possible scenarios for the future. These relations have always been strained. Europe has been seen as a menace rather than an opportunity. Britain used to slow down the process of integration and consequently has often fallen behind and had no choice but to catch up. However, the portrayal of Britain as an “awkward partner” is only partly justified. Based on its specific understanding of national sovereignty, Britain has developed a much more pragmatic and instrumental approach towards Europe. Nevertheless, the country was a strong driving force of integration in many crucial fields, like the single market, trade or defence policy. Britain has always accepted its membership in the EEC/EU only when exclusion from them could threaten Britain’s national interests, mainly in economic dimension. The European integration has always been a contentious issue and an important tool of domestic policy. Britain decided to join the EEC in 1973 mainly because of its poor economic performance. Nowadays one of the most burning issues is the announced referendum concerning Britain’s further membership in the EU. The withdrawal from the EU is possible, but there is little probability of it, because of strong economic ties. However, if eurozone integration proceeds without Britain and so deeply that the single market starts to fragment, the strongest argument for British membership could be undermined. Generally, we should expect further cooperation between Britain and the EU based on mutual pragmatism.

Introduction: InterpretingBritishEuropean Policy

AbstractBritain has had particular problems reconciling itself to the idea of being a ‘European’ actor and a wholehearted member of theEEC/EUsince 1973. Now, potentially, the ‘awkward partner’ is edging towards the exit door of theEUbecause a membership a referendum gauging the opinion of a sullenly Eurosceptical UK public is a likely prospect in the coming years. The aim of this special issue ofJCMSis to consider how one can account for the present state of affairs by adopting an interpretivist perspective onBritishEuropean policy over the past four decades. The article begins with a comprehensive review of the extant literature onBritain andEurope and an elaboration of the ‘traditions and dilemmas’ framework within which the contributors have studied the empirical material in their articles. It then explains the major themes that connect the articles and suggests how future research might build on the agenda proposed in this special issue.

‘One Woman's Prejudice’: Did Margaret Thatcher Cause Britain's Anti‐Europeanism?

AbstractWere the British fated to clash with the European Union? Powerful traditions in British political culture certainly inclined the UK to be an ‘awkward partner’ in Europe. Yet traditions are material from which politics is constructed, not fixed frameworks for destiny. This article argues that a careful historical reconstruction of the development and consolidation of today's British Euroscepticism – with its stronghold on the political right – passes substantially through the distinctive personal influence of Margaret Thatcher. The Iron Lady's individual action and legacy, magnified by a series of contingencies, generated the core dynamics that soured Britain's ties to Europe so bitterly. Had Thatcher not personally inspired this course, the traditions of British national identity and British Conservatism in particular could very plausibly have evolved in less anti‐European directions.

Dreamwood by Heather Mackey (review)

Reviewed by: Dreamwood by Heather Mackey April Spisak Mackey, Heather Dreamwood. Putnam, 2014 [336p] ISBN 978-0-399-25067-5 $16.99 Reviewed from galleys R Gr. 5-7 Lucy wants to be an adventurer and ghost hunter like her dad, and his leaving her at a boarding school for her own good isn’t going to stop her for long. Off she goes to find him in the wilds of the Pacific Northwest in this parallel version of the past where ghosts exist, the Lupine people protect nature, and magic and realism coexist, even if they are awkward partners. Lucy has a little help from allies she acquires along the way, but it’s mainly her on this quest that quickly turns epic and may involve her saving the world (or at least the nearby territories) from a horrific blight that is killing all of the trees. Although things do end mostly for the good, Lucy makes a refreshing number of wrong turns as she goes, learning to challenge her assumptions in ways that make her a more open, thoughtful, and generous person. In a much-needed afterword, Mackey mentions her liberal use of artistic license in referencing familiar cultural elements, traditions, and iconography of indigenous people of North America, even while she states that her “what if” representation of an alternative past is entirely fictional. While this is a slightly tricky stance to take, in particular when there is just a hint of “noble savage” generalizing throughout, it does at least make clear that this is an intentional exercise. The novel itself is gorgeous, replete with effective plot twists, a memorable protagonist, and a richly developed setting; thoughtful readers will catch the hints of realism and blend it smoothly with the fantasy details. [End Page 42] Copyright © 2014 The Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois

In, out, or half way? The European attitude in the speeches of British leaders

Abstract – It cannot be denied that Britain is normally seen as an awkward partner in EU affairs (George 1994), and in many ways the British have always been half-in: in the two-speed Europe slogan, Britain is seen as a slow traveller (Musolff 2004), as a member that makes slow progress, it if is at all on the European path. The purpose of this paper is to try and unveil, with evidence at hand, the sentiment of the British leaders with respect to the European Union. Interestingly, the current government includes both Conservatives and Lib-Dems leaders, and it is well known that the former have been, more often than not, against Europe whereas the latter are highly passionate about their pro-Europeanism. Interviews, statements and speeches proper are thus analysed and compared: first wordlists are generated, then keywords lists and finally key-clusters lists (Scott 2012), with the purpose of identifying aboutgrams (Warren 2010; Sinclair, Tognini Bonelli 2011), and see what the two governments have in common, but mostly what differentiates them with regard to the European Union, i.e. what is prioritized in one administration and was not in another, clearly signalling a change in priorities (Cheng 2004; Cheng et al. 2006; Cheng et al. 2009). The study is a diachronic analysis, in the attempt to see how previous discourses have been reinterpreted, given that forty years after joining the Union the British are still reluctant Europeans who still consider Europe abroad, thus slowing the ever-closer union envisaged in the Treaty of Rome, and who still have been calling for referendums, even more so after the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty. Keywords : European Union, UK, political speeches, opt out, aboutgrams.

Reluctant Coalitionists: The Conservative Party and the Establishment of the Coalition Government in May 2010

The Conservative party has been the real awkward partner in the Conservative‐Liberal Democrat coalition government because its backbench MPs have rebelled more frequently than their Liberal Democrat counterparts since May 2010. This reflected the fact that the Conservatives were reluctant coalitionists to begin with: they would have preferred to see a minority Conservative government, they had made far too many concessions to the Liberal Democrats, they had been bounced into accepting a coalition deal by a controlling party leadership, and they had lost out on those ministerial positions now held by Liberal Democrats. There was thus no great enthusiasm for the establishment of a coalition government with the Liberal Democrats in the parliamentary Conservative party in May 2010. Conservatives merely resigned themselves to an outcome which they had been given little opportunity to influence and which David Cameron had made it very difficult for them to reject.

Poland within the European Union: new awkward partner or new heart of Europe?

This book examines the first five years of Polish EU membership. The combination of Poland’s potential power as a major, and possibly controversial, player in both the region and Europe as a whole, and the apparent salience of Euroscepticism in domestic electoral politics at the core of the Polish government and party system presented the possibility that Poland would be a ‘new awkward partner’ in Europe. However, although Poles may have voted for EU-critical parties in large numbers no ‘Eurosceptic backlash’ has emerged. In fact, far from being a ‘new awkward partner’, Poland has tried to portray itself as the ‘new heart of Europe’ and it certainly came to be increasingly perceived as such in Brussels and by its European allies. This book focuses on two linked questions. Firstly, what impact has Poland had upon the EU as a new member state? Secondly, how has becoming an EU member impacted upon public attitudes towards the EU and Polish domestic politics, particularly on its party and electoral politics? Szczerbiak provides the first detailed empirical case study of the impact of Poland’s EU membership on its politics and of Poland's impact on the EU. The book also makes broader theoretical contributions to our understanding of EU relations with its member states. As a result of the above, this book will be of interest to students and scholars of European Politics, political science and European integration.

The Awkwardness of Australian Engagement with Asia: The Dilemmas of Australian Idea of Regionalism

AbstractAustralia has experienced difficulties engaging with Asia-Pacific regional integration. Despite Australian attempts to punch above its weight in regional forums and to be a regional leader, it is still not regarded as a full member or as quite fitting into the region. It is an ‘awkward partner’ in the Asian context, and has experienced the ‘liminality’ of being neither here nor there. The former Rudd government's proposal for an ‘Asia Pacific Community’ (APC) by the year 2020 was a substantive initiative in Australia's ongoing engagement with Asia. It has, however, attracted a high level of criticism both at home and abroad. The main critical analysis of the proposal has focused on institutional building or architecture, or its relationship with existing regional institutions, but overlooks a host of often fraught questions about culture, norms, identities, and international power relations. The APC concept needs to be scrutinized in terms of these questions with a critical eye. This paper examines the cultural, cognitive, and normative dimensions of Rudd's proposal. It analyses four dilemmas or awkward problems that the APC faces.

リスボン条約とイギリス

What was British role in the making of the Lisbon Treaty? Is Britain still “an awkward partner” in the European Union? This article aims to examine British policy towards the European Union from the failure of the ratification of European Constitutional Treaty in 2005 to the signing of the Lisbon Treaty in December 2007. Soon after the failures of the Treaty ratification both in France and in the Netherlands in June 2005, British Prime Minister Tony Blair declared to introduce “a period of reflection” to freeze the process of ratification. From the next month, Britain had hold the presidency of the European Council. Due partly to his domestic stalemate on the ratification, Blair exploited this opportunity to postpone difficult ratification of European Constitutional Treaty. This difficulty originated in Blair’s decision for a referendum on the ratification of the Constitutional Treaty in April 2004. European Constitutional Treaty which was signed on 29 October 2004 caused a big political debate in Britain. Both the Conservative Party and Eurosceptic medias represented by Rupert Murdoch criticized the government for its intention to further transfer political power to Brussels. Having faced with this serious political difficulty, Blair naturally was “off the hook”. He simply felt “the waves of relief”. Blair’s task was two-fold. First, he had to find a solution to this political stalemate as he would soon preside the European Council. Second, he was necessary to sell a new treaty to British people. To avoid a referendum, the British government needed to find a device which indicated that a new treaty was not “constitutional” one. In other words, a new treaty had to be a “reform treaty” without any new transfer of sovereignty. A new French president, Nicolas Sarkozy, supported Britain to advance towards a “reform treaty”. Both French and British governments were contended with omitting any symbol of “federalism” or “constitution”. Within British government, it was generally agreed that Britain needed to defend the “red line” which prevented further transfer of power to the European Union. After having persuaded Angela Merkel, German Chancellor, Britain successfully secured the “red line”, and this meant that British government did not have to go into a national referendum. With this “success”, the EU could reach an agreement on the drafting of the Lisbon Treaty which would become signed in December 2007. After the referendum crises of 2005, British government led the argument on the future of failed Constitutional Treaty. The answer was to save the essence of it by abandoning “federal” and “constitutional” features of the Treaty. This British policy was basically motivated by its own domestic rivalry on the future of Europe. Although Britain might be “an awkward partner” within the EU, the Labour governments tried to find out a way to go out of the crises of 2005 by abandoning some of hopes and wishes that people dreamed.

An Awkward Partner: Explaining France's Troubled Relationship to the Single Market in Financial Services

Globalization and Europeanization have forced the French government to reform profoundly its traditional control over the French economy. However, these institutional changes have masked a striking continuity in the ideas and values that characterize the state–society relationship in the French financial services sector. The continued dependence of the French financial services industry on the state has had deleterious consequences for France at the European level, forcing France to punch well below its weight in this sector and undermining its ability to ‘upload’ its preferred model of financial services to the European level.