Average Turnout Research Articles

Demokracja bezpośrednia we Francji i w Polsce. Analiza porównawcza

The aim of this article is to conduct a comparative analysis of direct democracy in France and Poland. In the research process, three research questions were formulated: 1) What is the tradition of direct democracy in France and Poland?; 2) What are the solutions characteristics of direct democracy in the constitutions of France and Poland, and other legal acts in these countries?; 3) What are the practical applications of direct democracy tools at the national and local levels in France and Poland?. An analysis of legal acts constituting the legal basis for direct democracy in France and Poland was conducted. Documents related to the practice of direct democracy in these countries were analyzed. France has a long tradition of a direct democracy. Compared to France, Poland has a short tradition of direct democracy. The constitutions of both countries adopted a solution in the form of a national referendum. In addition to the institution of a nationwide referendum, the constitution-makers in France and Poland included the institution of a local referendum. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland also indicates a legislative initiative. Ten national referenda have been held within the Fifth Republic. Turnouts in referendums at the national level ranged from 30.19 to 82.63%. The average turnout in the referendum is 65.82%. In the votes, eight solutions were adopted and two were rejected. Six national referendums have been held in Poland since 1989. Turnouts in referendums at the national level ranged from 7.8 to 58.85%. The average turnout in referendums was 35.87%. Two solutions were adopted in the votes and four were rejected.

Can low-cost, scalable, online interventions increase youth informed political participation in electoral authoritarian contexts?

Young citizens vote at relatively low rates, which contributes to political parties de-prioritizing youth preferences. We analyze the effects of low-cost online interventions in encouraging young Moroccans to cast an informed vote in the 2021 elections. These interventions aim to reduce participation costs by providing information about the registration process and by highlighting the election's stakes and the distance between respondents' preferences and party platforms. Contrary to preregistered expectations, the interventions did not increase average turnout, yet exploratory analysis shows that the interventions designed to increase benefits did increase the turnout intention of uncertain baseline voters. Moreover, information about parties' platforms increased support for the party closest to the respondents' preferences, leading to better-informed voting. Results are consistent with motivated reasoning, which is surprising in a context with weak party institutionalization.

Still second-order? European elections in the era of populism, extremism, and Euroscepticism

The continued relevance of the second-order elections (SOE) theory is one of the most widely debated issues in the study of European Parliament (EP) elections. While the theory has been criticised from many angles, the recent success of populist, extremist, and Eurosceptic parties raises additional questions about the applicability of a model that depicts EP elections as a low-stakes affair revolving around national issues. This article tests the SOE model with party-level data from all 175 EP elections held between 1979 and 2019. While turnout in EP elections remains well below participation rates in national elections, the 2019 EP elections were marked by a significant reduction in the average turnout gap. Across all election years, party size is the most potent predictor of electoral gains and losses in EP elections. Incumbency is associated with electoral losses in most EP election years. These effects are moderated by the electoral cycle and the electoral system in some but not all years. The expectation that the SOE model performs worse in countries with fragmented party systems was not confirmed. All in all, the SOE model continues to wield significant explanatory power in both the West and the East.

Universal vote-by-mail has no impact on partisan turnout or vote share

In response to coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), many scholars and policy makers are urging the United States to expand voting-by-mail programs to safeguard the electoral process. What are the effects of vote-by-mail? In this paper, we provide a comprehensive design-based analysis of the effect of universal vote-by-mail-a policy under which every voter is mailed a ballot in advance of the election-on electoral outcomes. We collect data from 1996 to 2018 on all three US states that implemented universal vote-by-mail in a staggered fashion across counties, allowing us to use a difference-in-differences design at the county level to estimate causal effects. We find that 1) universal vote-by-mail does not appear to affect either party's share of turnout, 2) universal vote-by-mail does not appear to increase either party's vote share, and 3) universal vote-by-mail modestly increases overall average turnout rates, in line with previous estimates. All three conclusions support the conventional wisdom of election administration experts and contradict many popular claims in the media.

DETERMINANTS OF VOTERS` BEHAVIOR AND VOTING INTENTION IN GHANA; MEDIATING AND MODERATING ROLE OF VOTERS` TRUST AND VOLTERS` LOYALTY RESPECTIVELY

Voters` participation and intention is considered fundamental in an electoral process, as it has consequences on political party`s performance and strengthening of a democratic state. Yet almost half the countries in the world have voter turnouts of (60–79) % whilst only 20% of the countries have voter turnout above 80%. The average turnout trend in Ghana for the past 24 years is 64.34%. When a significant large proportion of the voting population shows apathetic attitudes towards the process that enable participation of the public in democracy, it questions the extent to which our democracy can be consolidated. To be able to predict and influences voters` behavior, political parties and political consultants need to identified determinants of voters` behavior. Given the importance that democratic societies placed on citizens’ participation in the democratic process. Incorporating their views, opinions and feelings on voters` behavior determinants factors such as; political issues, contingency situations, political candidates personality, Epistemic value, Trust for a party candidates as well as loyalty to a party on their intention to participate in presidential election and their choice of a party and candidate will offers an empirical dimension to the evaluation of our democratic consolidation and also help the leadership of the various political parties in Ghana in their quest to develop appropriate strategies with the so aim of winning election. Utilizing a predictive model of voters` behavior, this study is pursued to identify; the theories, models and motivation behind a sample of voters who cast a ballot in the 2012 and 2016 presidential election. Pairwise discriminant analysis and structural equation model are used to identify the motivation behind the choice behavior of voters at both candidate and party level. The objectives of this is to conceptualized a strategic direction practices and propose a theoretical framework of voters` behavior determinants, that can help effectively and efficiently predict voters` participation and intention and also to determine the extent to which western scholarly explanation of voters` behavior can be applied to Ghanaians voters` behavior.

Compulsory Voting: A Defence

AbstractTurnout is in decline in established democracies around the world. Where, in the mid-1800s, 70–80 percent of eligible voters regularly participated in US Presidential elections, turnout has averaged just 53.7 percent since 1972. Average turnout in general elections in the UK has fallen from 76.6 percent during the period 1945–92, to 64.7 percent since 1997. Average turnout in Canadian federal elections has fallen from 74.5 percent during the period 1940–79, to 62.5 percent since 2000. For most democrats, these numbers are a cause for alarm. Compulsory voting is amongst the most effective means of raising turnout. However, compulsory voting is also controversial. Most of us think that coercion may only be employed against the citizenry if it is backed by a justification of the right kind. Opponents of compulsory voting charge that no such justification is available. This article resists this line of argument in two ways. First, I offer an argument from free-riding which, though gestured towards by others, and widely criticized, has yet to be defended in any depth. Second, I consider a range of objections to compulsory voting as such, arguing that none succeeds.

A Close-run Thing? Accounting for Changing Overall Turnout in UK General Elections

ABSTRACTTurnout at UK General Elections has remained stubbornly below post-war levels in the new millennium. Between 1950 and 1997, official turnout averaged 76% and never fell below 71% (in 1997); since 2001 average turnout has been 12 percentage points lower, at 64%. We investigate several possible explanations for that decline: the lack of competitiveness in recent contests; an increase in ideological similarity between the major parties; and partisan dealignment. Although electoral competitiveness affects turnout, and in the expected directions, it cannot readily account for the sudden drop in participation after 2000. But there is evidence that aggregate levels of partisanship are important: the unusually low turnout levels since 2000 are associated with unusually low levels of partisanship, and there are signs of a ‘threshold effect’.

The price of a vote: Diseconomy in proportional elections.

The increasing cost of electoral campaigns raises the need for effective campaign planning and a precise understanding of the return of such investment. Interestingly, despite the strong impact of elections on our daily lives, how this investment is translated into votes is still unknown. By performing data analysis and modeling, we show that top candidates spend more money per vote than the less successful and poorer candidates, a relation that discloses a diseconomy of scale. We demonstrate that such electoral diseconomy arises from the competition between candidates due to inefficient campaign expenditure. Our approach succeeds in two important tests. First, it reveals that the statistical pattern in the vote distribution of candidates can be explained in terms of the independently conceived, but similarly skewed distribution of money campaign. Second, using a heuristic argument, we are able to explain the observed turnout percentage for a given election of approximately 63% in average. This result is in good agreement with the average turnout rate obtained from real data. Due to its generality, we expect that our approach can be applied to a wide range of problems concerning the adoption process in marketing campaigns.

Effects of municipal mergers on voter turnout

ABSTRACTWe study the effects of municipal mergers on voter turnout in a difference-in-differences framework, using data from a wave of municipal mergers in Finland in 2009. Analysing two pre-merger elections and three post-merger elections, spanning a total of 17 years, we find that municipal mergers decrease voter turnout by 4 percentage points in the long run in the relatively small municipalities compared to similar small municipalities that did not merge. As the average turnout rate prior to merging in this group was around 69%, this is a substantial effect. We also find that virtually nothing happens to turnout in the municipalities that were relatively large within their merger. Furthermore, mergers are associated with a decrease in voters’ political efficacy and turnout decreases more in those municipalities that experience larger decreases in efficacy.

Trickle-Up Political Socialization: The Causal Effect on Turnout of Parenting a Newly Enfranchised Voter

Scholars have argued that children affect their parents’ political behavior, including turnout, through so-called trickle-up socialization. However, there is only limited causal evidence for this claim. Using a regression discontinuity design on a rich dataset, with validated turnout from subsets of Danish municipalities in four elections, I causally identify the effect of parenting a recently enfranchised voter. I consistently find that parents are more likely to vote when their child enters the electorate. On average across all four elections, I estimate that parents become 2.8 percentage points more likely to vote. In a context where the average turnout rate for parents is around 75%, this is a considerable effect. The effect is driven by parents whose children still live with them while there is no discernible effect for parents whose child has left home. The results are robust to a range of alternative specifications and placebo tests.

Editorial

INTERNATIONAL union rights Page 2 Volume 23 Issue 2 2016 IUR ❐ EDITORIAL Editorial: Trade union rights after the UK’s vote to leave the EU T his edition of IUR looks at the implications of what was, for many, an unexpected development with potentially far-reaching consequences : in June, UK voters voted to leave the European Union, by a margin of 52 to 48 percent in an average turnout of 72.2 percent. Owen Tudor of the British TUC (which campaigned for a Remain vote), but expresses concern : ‘the European Union has played a central role in protecting working people from exploitation , combating discrimination and promoting good employment practices’, while ‘UK governments strongly resisted equal treatment rights for agency workers, working time limits, and rights for workers to receive [workplace information and consultation]. During the referendum, only four trade unions officially called for a vote to leave the EU, while most other unions (including the country’s largest unions) called for a remain vote. Yet, as Alex Gordon points out, ‘analysis of the voting patterns revealed in the referendum result demonstrates a majority of working class voters, particularly in Britain’s former industrial heartlands; the north of England, Midlands and South Wales, voted (and in significantly large numbers) to leave the EU’ Trying to gauge international perspectives on ‘Brexit’, IUR uncovered clear concern at the deteriorating attitude towards Polish workers in the UK being expressed by the Polish trade union centre OPZZ, which has observed that ‘the campaign was won by xenophobia and populism, and as a result of exit from the EU, the situation for the majority of British people will worsen’. Esther Lynch of the ETUC observes that ‘the EU as a whole now faces a very difficult challenge … the anger and disillusionment of working people with the EU is not confined to the UK’, and adds that ‘social rights, in particular […] trade union rights, are not being accorded equal weight and emphasis compared with the protection and promotion of employers’ economic freedoms’. To address this urgent situation , Esther argues that ‘collective bargaining systems have to be restored as a fundamental right and because a pay rise for workers in Europe is central to a fair recovery from the crisis. The adoption of a social progress protocol is urgently required to restore the proper balance between economic freedoms and fundamental social rights in particular trade union rights’. Into this dynamic context, IUR welcomes the timely launch of the Manifesto for Labour Law: towards a comprehensive revision of workers’ rights, produced by the UK’s Institute for Employment Rights (IER). Observing that ‘the UK has ‘a framework of law born out of 19th century conditions, which has bypassed many advances of the 20th century, which ignores today’s economic and workplace realities, and which is not fit for purpose in 21st century Britain’, IER calls for the ‘restoration’ of the principles of collective bargaining ‘to provide a means of workplace democracy , to bring some measure of balance to the otherwise disproportionate power of employers, to redress wage inequality, to prevent the exploitation of migrants, to raise wages, increase demand and reinvigorate the economy, and to fulfil the UK’s binding legal obligations’. As Jon Jeffries reminds us, however, April this year saw the passing into law of the much-criticised Trade Union Act 2016. While parts of the original Bill were stopped (in part due to trade union negotiations linked to the then impending EU referendum) Jon Jeffries examines how the role of the Certification Officer was re-written. Looking at the trade union scene elsewhere; we report on unpopular changes to French labour law and the response of unions and youth movements; on Turkey we assess the trade union rights situation before and in the immediate aftermath of the failed coup attempt; we hear from David Bacon of the appalling treatment meted out to striking teachers in Mexico; report on the shocking sentence handed down to a South Korean trade union leader; and we publish a report back from the Global Labour Institute’s trade union summer school. Daniel Blackburn, Editor Next issue of IUR Articles between 850 and 1,900 words should be sent by email (mail...

Effects of Municipal Mergers on Voter Turnout

We study the effects of municipal mergers on voter turnout in a difference-in -differences framework, using data from a wave of municipal mergers in Finland in 2009. Analysing two pre-merger elections and three post-merger elections, spanning a total of 17 years, we find that municipal mergers decrease voter turnout by 4 percentage points in the long run in the relatively small municipalities compared to similar small municipalities that did not merge. As the average turnout rate prior to merging in this group was around 69%, this is a substantial effect. We also find that virtually nothing happens to turnout in the municipalities that were relatively large within their merger. Furthermore, mergers are associated with a decrease in voters’ political efficacy and turnout decreases more in those municipalities that experience larger decreases in efficacy.

Focus: Implications of ‘Brexit’ for trade union rights

INTERNATIONAL union rights Page 6 Volume 23 Issue 2 2016 ‘Leave’ won the referendum vote by a margin of 52 to 48 percent in an average turnout of 72.2 percent (over 30 million people) the highest in a UK-wide vote for decades paign saw eleventh hour negotiations between Cameron’s Tory government and the largest Labour-affiliated unions to scrap government plans in the Trade Union Bill for abolition of automatic payment of union subscriptions through payroll, to delay proposed introduction of ‘opt-in-only’ arrangements for trade union funding of the Labour party and for an e-voting trial for strike ballots. In return for these measures, unions agreed to increase funding to Labour’s pro-EU campaign from £75,000 to £1.7 million. It is unclear whether the deal will survive the wreckage of the referendum result. David Cameron resigned as prime minister the next morning. His Chancellor and chief political ‘strategist’, George Osborne who unwisely promised a ‘punishment budget’ if Britain voted to leave the EU, was unceremoniously sacked by Cameron’s successor Theresa May on taking office. As is now well known, ‘Leave’ won the referendum vote by a margin of 52 to 48 percent in an average turnout of 72.2 percent (over 30 million people) the highest in a UK-wide vote since the 1992 general election almost a quarter of a century earlier. Analysis of the voting patterns revealed in the referendum result demonstrates a majority of working class voters, particularly in Britain’s former industrial heartlands; the north of England, I n a superficial sense Britain’s vote to leave the European Union changed nothing. The day after the referendum workers in the UK continued to experience the ‘most restrictive laws on trade unions in the Western world’ as Tony Blair once boasted. David Cameron’s 2016 Trade Union Act reinforced this by introducing new curbs on collective action (including a 50 percent threshold on ballot turnouts, doubling strike notification periods from 7 to 14 days and identifying ‘picket supervisors’ to police). Yet, Britain’s decision to leave the EU confounded the expectations of financial markets, political commentators and the advice of Britain’s TUC alike. It was the most significant setback since 16 September 1992 (‘Black Wednesday’) to the strategy of the UK’s largest financial and corporate interests to promote integration and completion of the EU single market in the interests of Foreign Direct Investment, opening up the public sector to market competition and ‘wage competitiveness’. During the referendum, only four trade unions (RMT and ASLEF representing transport and railworkers , the bakers’ union BFAWU and NIPSA the Northern Ireland Public Service Alliance) officially called for a vote to leave the EU. On the other side of the debate, the TUC and some of Britain’s largest trade unions endorsed the campaign for a vote for Britain to Remain a member of the EU. Indeed, the referendum camFOCUS ❐ BREXIT Implications of ‘Brexit’ for trade union rights ALEX GORDON is a former President of the RMT railworkers’ union ■ The threat to democracy and from the far right: the majority of the laws which affect our lives are now made in the EU and not the UK. This is a major problem because a distant link between law makers and the electorate creates a vacuum which could be exploited by the far right. Big decisions such as TTIP are being made with very little regard for democratic oversight and cannot be reversed at the ballot box. ■ Internationalism not isolationism: we believe workers throughout the world, in Britain, America and Asia, as well as Europe, have more in common with each other than the heads of big business in their own countries. Out of the EU and into the world. ■ No fortress Britain. No Fortress Europe: we don’t believe Britain should be an island unto itself. Our country, and indeed many countries, are nations of immigrants.We want everyone to get a fair rate for the job and everyone to have the same rights at work.We don’t support fortress Britain and so we don’t support fortress Europe.We profoundly regret that children and families fleeing poverty, persecution...

Union Organizing Decisions in a Deteriorating Environment

It is well known that the organizing environment for labor unions in the United States has deteriorated dramatically over a long period of time, a situation that has contributed to the sharp decline in the private-sector union membership rate and resulted in many fewer representation elections. What is less well known is that since the late 1990s, average turnout in the representation elections that are held has dropped substantially. These facts are related. The author develops a model of how unions select targets for organizing through the NLRB election process that clearly implies that a deteriorating organizing environment will lead to systematic change in the composition of elections held. The model implies that a deteriorating environment will lead unions not only to contest fewer elections but also to focus on larger potential bargaining units and on elections where they have a larger probability of winning. A standard rational-voter model implies that these changes in composition will lead to lower turnout. The author investigates the implications of these models empirically, using data on turnout in more than 140,000 NLRB certification elections held between 1973 and 2009. The results are consistent with the model and suggest that changes in composition account for about one-fifth of the decline in turnout between 1999 and 2009.

Jammu & Kashmir’s Repeated Reaffirmed Faith in the Democratic Setup of India: A Study of the State’s Public Participation in the General Elections of India (1967-2014)

Purpose: - The up-rise of social unrest in the state of Jammu & Kashmir (the federal constituent of the Union of India) towards the end of the 20th century with the demand to secede from the union of India has somewhere earned the Jammu & Kashmir as a conflict zone in the South Asia. The present study has been conceived to examine the public participation of the Jammu & Kashmir state in the democratic process of the country, by participating in the general elections of India (A referendum or plebiscite of its own kind, whereby people of the state, time and again have reaffirmed their faith in the democratic process of the country) since its accession with the union of India. Some of the aspects evaluated in the present study include, electoral participation, participation of national and local level political parties, participation and performance of national level political parties, representation given to women candidates, etc.Scope: - The study is confined to the state of Jammu & Kashmir, India and the findings have direct bearing with the state, which has altogether a different geopolitical setup, where public interests stand safeguarded by the constitution of India under article 370. There is every need to observe caution, while generalizing the findings of the study.Methodology/Approach: - The study is empirical in nature, undertaken on the secondary data, retrieved from the official website of the Election Commission of India on August 02, 2014.Findings: - The state of Jammu and Kashmir has so far undergone through 12 general elections in the country. The average voter turnout during these elections from the state remained about 46.76%. At gender level the average voter turnout percentage among males remained 60% & for females 39.90%, which compared to voter turnout at national level during the same period at gender level remained 62.39% and 55.45% respectively. The voter turnout percentage from the state remained far better than various other states of the country for the same period. The threat perception to not to participate in the electoral process of the country that prevailed over state populace post 1989 got reflected in the subsequent 7 general elections held in the state, especially among female folk, resulting decline in their turnout percentage, when compared to their male counterparts.Social Implications: - The study is an eye opener to the public at large and to those, who are abetting the Jammu & Kashmir’s secession movement by crying that the state is devoid of democracy. The secession movement which is being backed by the money & the munitions questions its own credibility & justification.

Revisiting the political life-cycle model: later maturation and turnout decline among young adults

Turnout among young adults has declined steadily in various advanced industrial democracies in recent decades. At the same time, as a consequence of delayed transitions to adulthood, many life-cycle events considered important for the development of electoral participation are experienced later in life. These combined trends call for a revaluation of the political life-cycle model and the way in which it explains voter turnout among young adults. More specifically, in this paper it is argued that variation in the timing of life events has been overlooked as an explanatory factor of generational differences in young adults’ propensity to turn out to vote. With accumulating evidence that the decision to vote is to some extent habitual, a lack of life experiences may cause young adults to form the habit to abstain rather than to vote. If the mechanisms of the life-cycle model are indeed correct, later maturation should at least partially explain why young adults these days are less inclined to vote than their parents or grandparents in their younger years. Based on the British Election Studies from 1964 to 2010, the findings of this study confirm generally observed patterns of a delayed assumption of adult roles by young citizens. This trend toward later maturation negatively affects turnout levels of young citizens. If maturation levels had remained at pre-war levels, the average turnout among Britain’s post-seventies generation would have been no less than 12 percentage points higher.

Five Laws of Politics

Political scientists tend to shy away from claiming that there are laws of politics. This diffidence is unwarranted. Here, I present five empirical laws of politics. By a of politics I mean an empirical regularity that is invariant, or almost invariant, that is descriptive of intrinsic properties of politics, democracy, and the state. The laws, four spanning democracies and autocracies, and one setting a boundary between the two regime types, are drawn from data on 452 in 27 democracies, 15 from the Ibero-America (Latin America plus Spain and Portugal), and most of the rest from North America, Europe, and the Pacific Rim (the OECD countries), plus ritualistic elections and referendums in 14 dictatorships. Law #1. The law of minority rule. All governments are minority governments. This is a given in dictatorships, but even in democracies parties capture or retain the presidency or the parliament with the votes of a minority of the selectorate (registered or eligible voters). In democracies, average turnout is about 75% and the mean incumbent share of the vote is around 40%. Therefore, the average winning coalition averages 30%.Law #2. The law of incumbent advantage. In democracies, on average incumbents are reelected more than half the time. Law #3. The law of shrinking support. On average, incumbents lose between 3 and 8 percent points per term, the former representing the cost of governing in the OECD region, the latter in Ibero-America. Their illusions of unanimity and perpetual power notwithstanding, dictatorships are not exempt from this law, as evidence drawn from transition in autocracies from several continents, cultures, and region of the world attest. Formerly ruling parties crashed, their share of the vote plummeting from the 90-99% they used to claim in single party elections to as low as the single digits or low teens.Law #4. The law of 60 percent. In democracies, it is rare for incumbents to win more than 60 percent of the vote, and it never happens twice within the same spell in office. The average maximum incumbent share of the vote across all democracies is 53.5%, the one variable on which there is no difference between regions. This law serves as a boundary separating all democracies from most dictatorships.Law #5. The law of alternation or shared power. In democracies, control of the government alternates between political parties or coalitions of parties. This is because no party is capable to encompassing the totality of the values and interests of any society. As well as presenting the data that demonstrate these patterns, I place these laws in the context of related scholarly literature, and offer possible explanations for the laws in light of it.

Are People More Inclined to Vote at 16 than at 18? Evidence for the First-Time Voting Boost Among 16- to 25-Year-Olds in Austria

Potential consequences of lowering voting age to 16 have been discussed in recent scientific and public debates. This article examines turnout of young voters aged 16 to 17 in Austria, the first European country that lowered the general voting age to 16. For this purpose we use unique data taken from electoral lists of two recent Austrian regional elections. The results support the idea that the so-called “first-time voting boost” is even stronger among the youngest voters as turnout was (a) higher compared to 18- to 20-year-old first-time voters and (b) not substantially lower than the average turnout rate. We conclude that our findings are encouraging for the idea of lowering voting age as a means to establish higher turnout rates in the future.

Electoral Turnout and State Redistribution

This study explores the relationship between electoral participation and income redistribution by way of social transfers, using data from the European Social Survey, the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, and the Luxembourg Income Study. It extends previous research by measuring the income skew of turnout rather than using average turnout as a proxy for its income bias. We find that, controlling for a number of other variables, the income skew of turnout is negatively related to transfer redistribution and that electoral participation by those in poverty is positively associated with redistribution in their favor.

Shareholder Activism in Belgium: The Belgian AGMs and EGMs in 2011

This paper studies the voting turnout, the voting behavior of large and small shareholders and the resolutions voted at annual general meetings (AGMs) and extra-ordinary general meetings (EGMs) of Belgian listed companies in 2011. The average voting turnout was 49,9 per cent in 2011, down from 51,3 per cent in 2010. The shareholders had to vote on 9 resolutions of the board of directors on average and on 11 resolutions during the accompanying EGM. Only three resolutions are part of all agendas of general meetings. All ordinary resolutions were adopted and average approval rates are above 90 per cent. EGMs rejected two of the 340 resolutions. We conclude that shareholder activism is limited, that voting turnouts are stable and are (only) influenced by the ownership structure of the company. We criticize the position and role of the AGM as instrument for shareholder activism: some items are superfluous while shareholders are not allowed to vote for other issues. We encourage studying the options for shareholders’ participation in the determination of the long term direction of the company, its mission, its expansion strategies, its risk policies and the like.