The systematic examination of how social psychological phenomena can be informed by neuroscience methodologies, and how our understanding of neural function can be informed by social psychological research, began approximately 20 years ago. Increased interest in these topics largely coincided with methodological advances in electroencephalography (EEG) and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). The desire to understand how and where the world around us is represented in the brain (and vice versa) ultimately spawned a field of research that is thriving today: social neuroscience. Many early social neuroscience studies were concerned with the basic question of where social-oriented phenomena are represented in the brain. While these studies were obviously of paramount importance for the development of the field, more recently this approach has been likened to modern day phrenology by critics. It is important to note, however, that these early studies were necessarily constrained by methodological and analytical approaches of the time. As these methodological and analytical approaches have evolved, so too has the field of social neuroscience. The ability to assess how different neural regions interact on the order of milliseconds has been particularly important for enhancing our understanding of both the complexity of the brain and the complexity inherent in any given social interaction or social perceptual process. This second phase of social neuroscience, which focuses less on where things are happening in the brain and more on how regions of the brain form networks that interact to engender a psychological process, is poised to have a big impact on existing theories in social psychology. The notion that many different neural regions necessarily interact almost instantaneously and continuously throughout a given cognitive process seems perfectly sensible from a neuroanatomical perspective, but the ramifications this perspective has for prevailing theories in social psychology are pronounced. For instance, take the dual process perspective, i.e., the theory that many, if not all, social cognitive processes (e.g., attitudes, prejudice, attributions, etc.,) are uniquely influenced by implicit\automatic\fast\subconscious processes that occur outside of an individuals' conscious awareness and are uncontrollable, and explicit\controlled\slow\conscious processes that an individual has conscious access to and can control. According to the dual process account, implicit and explicit processes are orthogonal to one another. From a social neuroscience perspective this would suggest some kind of neuroanatomical distinction between implicit and explicit processes as well. Indeed, there is evidence to suggest some functional and neural specificity with regards to implicit and explicit processes. For example, the amygdala has been linked to many implicit social processes such as automatic stereotype activation and perceptions of facial trustworthiness (Cunningham et al., 2004; Todorov and Engell, 2008; Forbes et al., 2012a,b). The orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) appears to be integral for regulating implicit processes and fear conditioned responses, particularly those associated with visceral arousal stemming from the medial temporal lobe, within the context of current goal states (e.g., regulating negative stereotype activation or extinguishing learned fear responses, Soliman et al., 2010; Forbes et al., 2012a,b). As the OFC is highly interconnected with regions in the medial temporal lobe like the amygdala and lateral prefrontal cortical regions such as dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), the functional specificity of the OFC with regards to implicit processing again seems perfectly logical (Rolls and Grabenhorst, 2008). Likewise, as DLPFC is considered a hub for executive function and conscious control of behavior and thoughts, the DLPFC must play an integral role in explicit processes in general such as the generation of explicit attitudes and beliefs, and conscious perceptions of others. Indeed, a bevy of social neuroscience studies implicate this region in explicit social cognitive processes specifically (e.g., Richeson et al., 2003; Cunningham et al., 2004; Forbes and Grafman, 2010; Forbes et al., 2012a,b). Where the waters become much murkier so-to-speak, is when one considers the time at which these processes unfold. A fundamental assumption of dual-process theories is that time is one of the critical determinants of whether social cognition is influenced by implicit or explicit processes. Whereas implicit processes (and products of these processes) occur when individuals make perceptions or decisions quickly, explicit processes can only manifest when one has ample time. This assumption, however, is not consistent with known anatomical and neural conductive properties, where functionally distinct regions of the brain are highly interconnected with one another and neural propagation of action potentials can occur on the order of 0.5–50 ms within the cortex (Fuster, 1997; Buzsaki, 2006). How then can we disentangle the undoubtedly complex relationships inherent in the psychological interplay between implicit and explicit processes? Possibly via assessing interactions between neural correlates that represent these psychological processes (e.g., assessing how the temporoparietal junction and medial PFC, two regions thought to be integral for theory of mind, interact to influence theory of mind processes).
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Sep 1, 2022
Tingting Huang + 1
