Autocratic Regimes Research Articles

The causal effect of economic sanctions on political stability: A two‐stage difference‐in‐differences analysis

AbstractThis study employs the two‐stage difference‐in‐differences (2sDiD) estimator to investigate the causal effect of economic sanctions on political stability. It contributes to existing research by (1) re‐evaluating sanctions' impacts on political stability using newly introduced causal inference methods, and (2) distinguishing the effects of sanctions across various political regimes and economic globalisation levels. The article argues that economic sanctions create economic hardships for the target population, leading to public frustration toward their governments, which stimulates political mobilisation and thereby decreases the country's political stability. However, sanctions hurt democracies more than autocracies because autocratic regimes can suppress public dissent through repression and citizens face higher costs for opposition. Moreover, economic globalisation offers targets alternatives to sanctioned products and services, potentially weakening sanctions thus damaging political stability more in low‐globalised than in high‐globalised countries. Empirical findings from 9230 country‐year observations between 1949 and 2022 largely align with the theoretical predictions, showing that economic sanctions undermine the target's political stability, with these destabilising effects contingent upon its political regime and economic globalisation levels.

Single-party regime, cooptation, and strategic social spending in developing countries

How regime types affect the provision of social spending in the context of developing countries? This article provides a novel political-economic approach, arguing that single-party regimes are more likely to spend on pensions than other types of autocratic states to co-opt the large number of critical members although the regime type does not affect the general welfare spending across autocratic states. The theory emphasizes the effect of institutional and power structure heterogeneity across autocracies in shaping the incentives and strategies that the ruling elites co-opt and respond to the demands of the ruling coalition across different autocratic regimes. Using panel, ordinary least squares (OLS) regression with lagged dependent variable along with several empirical strategies, it finds the evidence supporting this argument with a new dataset from 1990 to 2012. The study provides new insights on how autocratic institutions especially the party utilize strategic social policies to resolve the elite-level dictator dilemma for regime survival that are absent in other autocratic types.

Unravelling the Financial Crisis of Sri Lanka: Exploring Policy Blunders

This study explored the political-economic turmoil in Sri Lanka, with a focus on policy implementation. It delved into the dynamics of autocratic governance and elite control within the country's extractive systems, which had evolved over decades. Employing a case study methodology using data from authenticated published sources, this research unveils how ill-conceived policies, orchestrated by China-backed politicians and naïve administrators, primarily triggered the economic crisis. Mismanagement, policy missteps, and corruption fueled widespread social unrest and protests, culminating in the economic downturn. These policy blunders include tax reductions, bans on fertilizer and agrochemical imports, excessive currency printing, and exchange rate manipulation.

The Systemic Masculinism of Power: the post-Soviet Affliction of History and Ideology

This text is an attempt to outline one of the most deep-rooted systemic challenges of the post-Soviet experience of independence. The article analyzes closely related phenomena of post-Soviet systems of power and their narrative: masculinism and the non-attachment of women in political discourse and their subordinate significance in sociocultural understanding. The diagnosis presented here is an attempt to theorize the systemic masculinism of power through some practical cases that can be attributed to post-Soviet autocratic regimes. Systemic masculinism is presented in this article as a deeply discursive phenomenon that permeates every aspect of public space. The examples outlined in the article refer to Russia, Eastern European countries as well as to the countries of the Central Asian region. The purpose of this territorial scope of the problem described in the article is to show how closely related the experience of colonial dependence was within Russian and Soviet imperialism.

Formulas for Autocratic Stability: A Review Article

Abstract Drawing on the analytical framework of Johannes Gerschewski's The Two Logics of Autocratic Rule, we explore the complexities of autocratic stability by examining the mechanisms through which autocrats preserve their regimes. We review Gerschewski's data set and arguments and provide our assessment regarding the empirical validity of Gerschewski's theory and tests. While Gerschewski's two logics of autocratic rule offer insightful understandings, the role of situational dynamics, international intervention, and political succession in influencing autocratic stability are underrated or neglected. The survival of an autocratic regime is not solely based on the prevention and preemption of challenges from political opponents, but also depends on the performance of regular governance functions along with a monopoly of political power and the resolution of leadership issues. The path-dependent nature of autocratic stability requires analysis of autocratic regime subtypes to effectively contextualize and generalize the patterns of political succession under different logics of autocratic rule. Lacking a comprehensive characterization of autocratic subtypes, the main contribution of Gerschewski's book is more theoretical than empirical.

Julius Caesar's Rise to Power

Beginning in 69 BCE. Caesar rose in the Roman cursus honorum,2 first as quaestor then to the rank of aedile and subsequently pontifex maximus (one in-charge of state religion) in 63 BCE marking his beginning of ascendency of power.3 Historian Robert C.L. Holmes says Caesar lived through the barbaric invasion of Rome undertaken by General Sulla forcing him to escape and ultimately join the Roman forces with the North Europeans in the Gallic Region of modern day France.4 His command during the successful repression of the invading Helvetii tribe, pressured the existing senate of Rome into acknowledging his leadership and military prowess.5 Historian Plutarch states that along with his military acumen, the political backing of the financially affluent Marcus Licinius Crassus and the then consul of Rome, general Pompey allowed him to gain a strong foothold in the Roman senate system.6 Researcher Phillips states that Caesar’s mighty conquest of Gaul (58-50 BC), was followed by his refusal to disband his war legions against what contemporary practice suggested, thus opposing the senate; breeding a civil war in ancient Rome which became the epicentre of his renowned military exploits.7 Caesar consequently attained the highest position in Rome, that of consul, in 59 BCE with the guarantee of being given a province to rule, by the senate.8 These military achievements allowed Caesar to create and enforce his influence not only on the populace but paved the way for convenient eradication of his competitors. “He (Caesar) played on Pompey's frailties cleverly and offered to resign his command.”9 Apprehensive of the resulting complications and the threat to stability of the administration, “...the Senate dared not entertain such an offer.”10 The subsequent win against Pompey in 49-45 BCE made him the most powerful man in Rome and thus, the senate had to accept his motion of being made ‘Dictator’ followed shortly by ‘Dictator for Life.’11 He reinvented the concept of dictatorship which was previously a set period of time to resemble the autocratic regime now known to the modern public, as the sole ruler for as long as one lives.12

The Double-Edged Sword: How State Capacity Prolongs Autocratic Tenure but Hastens Democratization

This paper is concerned with state capacity and autocrat survival. We argue that state strength in autocracies increases leader tenure but reduces the stability of the regime itself; stronger autocracies run a higher risk of transitioning to democracy. This trade-off arises as a result of how state capacity affects the behavior of elite challengers. A stronger state reduces the likelihood of the ruler being ousted by force, inducing rival elites to switch tactics to peaceful support for democracy. An autocrat may prolong his tenure by investing in state capacity, but this brings on the downfall of the autocratic regime itself. We analyze the implications of our argument using a variety of historical sources providing information on 47 autocracies from 1800 to 2012. Our empirical findings, in part based on original data collection, are in line with the theoretical expectations: in strong states autocrats survive, but autocracies die.

Political stability in authoritarian regimes: the case of Central Asia

ABSTRACT Existing research indicates that political stability is a prerequisite for good governance and economic development in Central Asia. All five countries in the region are authoritarian regimes but it is unclear which factors impact on political stability. Using data for the period 2002–2022, this paper examines the variables which make a significant contribution to political stability and finds that the rule of law, personalist rule, a free media, freedom of assembly, political polarization and gross domestic product (GDP) growth, respectively have a positive effect on political stability while government accountability, exclusions by social group and civil society participation have a negative effect. Some of the findings are at odds with other studies on autocratic regimes, illustrating the importance of geo-political context.

The conditional effects of party system change on economic growth in Africa

AbstractAfrican party systems vary considerably in their patterns of stability and change over time. This article examines how economic growth has been shaped by such party system fluidity—in particular, the frequency, scope and variety of change—while taking account of the constitutional regime (i.e., level of democracy) within which these party system dynamics occur. To do so, we use Arellano-Bond generalized method of moments models to test the impact of party system fluidity and the level of democracy on economic growth in Africa during the post-independence period (1970–2018). We find, consistent with previous research, that democracy has an uncertain effect on growth. However, party system fluidity is reliably and positively correlated with growth. Its effects are particularly strong whenever an unstable party system coexists with an autocratic regime, which suggests that this specific political context—which has often been associated with democratization—is especially conducive to economic growth.

TRENDS OF TV NEWS COVERAGE IN BANGLADESH

The media booming especially the rise of satellite television channels is a significant phenomenon in the landscape of Bangladesh media which was initiated after the fall of autocratic regime in 1990. At present, twenty four satellite TV channels are in operation under the corporate ownership. These satellite channels are presenting hour-round news and views on different events and affairs. The state-owned BTV was the sole medium to cover and disseminate news, information and entertainment to the country-wide audience till 1999. Within a period of one and a half decade, ‘the media boom’ that Bangladesh is experiencing is not noticed in many other countries of the South-Asian region. In spite of this significant change in terms of quantity and ownership pattern, there still lacks a comprehensive broadcast policy to guide day-to-day operations of the channels. The article, in this backdrop, presents trend of the ever-growing satellite channels in covering news. The article also explores interests of the TV channels in terms of news selection, treatment and presentation

A diversionary benevolent media strategy: Lobbying Saudi Arabia's humanitarian aid in Arabic and English

AbstractHumanitarian aid is often accompanied by broad media coverage. In academic research, there is a dominant bias toward Western studies on the topic. Following studies that emphasize the negative role of autocratic regimes using their media to frame threats as an intra‐state diversionary strategy, this study contributes to our understating of how autocratic regimes use the media and illuminates how they employ a diversionary benevolent strategy in the media through framing humanitarian activities. We illustrate this theory by using the case of media strategy models used by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) that frame its provision of humanitarian aid to global and national audiences. The empirical approach is based on an analysis of 263 articles from four leading Saudi newspapers published online in English and Arabic. The result indicates that the KSA encourages two different diversionary benevolent strategies. The first strategy is aimed at increasing the KSAs international community prestige, focusing on mediatization that depicts its alliance with global efforts while employing “threat” strategy towards its adversaries. The second strategy is aimed mainly at Saudi nationals with the purpose of increasing their support of the royal family.

Economic and political freedoms as indicators for determining the political regimes of today

Economic and political freedoms are often used as key indicators to classify types of political regimes. These freedoms, which include freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and economic freedoms such as freedom of business and freedom of trade, significantly affect how a country is perceived as a democracy or an autocracy. Democracies are typically characterized by high levels of these freedoms, allowing open expression and market regulation that encourages competition and fair trade. In contrast, autocratic regimes often impose restrictions on both speech and economic activity, limiting the scope of political discourse and centralizing economic control. These freedoms not only reflect, but also shape the political landscapes of modern states. The synthesis of freedoms with political governance not only determines the internal dynamics of nations, but also affects their relationships on the global stage. Ensuring the development and protection of these freedoms is of paramount importance to the development of stable, prosperous and just societies around the world. Economic and political freedoms are the foundation of democratic government and are essential to the personal and economic well-being of citizens.The purpose of the work is to conduct a study of the influence of the scope of economic and political rights and freedoms on the formation of the political regime in the country. The object of the research iseconomic and political freedoms as key criteria for the classification of types of political regimes. The subject of the research is social relations that arise, change and cease in the process of consolidation and implementation of economic and political rights and freedoms and their influence on the formation and functioning of democratic and autocratic political regimes. Research methodology includes methodological approaches (active, systemic, comparative, axiological), general scientific methods of thinking (analysis, synthesis, abstraction, generalization), philosophical (dialectical, metaphysical, hermeneutic, epistemological), general scientific (historical, synergistic, functional, structural) and specifically scientific (formal-legal, comparative-legal) methods. As a result of the study, problematic issues related to the problem were analyzedwith the realization of economic and political freedoms as key indicators of the country's political regime, which significantly affect the trajectory of its development and international position.

Die Politik von Caligari: Totalitarian Anxieties in Adaptations of Robert Weine’s Das Cabinet des Dr. Caligari

Contemporary politics is filled with anxiety about the survival of democracy—particularly within a framework pitting liberal representative democracy against authoritarianism. In times of anxiety about authoritarianism, Western artists repeatedly return to a masterpiece of relatively early cinema: Robert Weine’s silent film Das Cabinet des Dr. Caligari, or The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari. This essay examines three twenty-first century adaptations: David Lee Fisher’s 2005 remake of the film; James Morrow’s 2017 novel, The Asylum of Dr. Caligari; and Georgie Bailey’s 2022 play Caligari. I argue that while the direct politico-cultural anxieties of Weine’s film have often been overstated, the emergence of adaptations during periods of heightened concern about authoritarianism reflects a deep-seated reception of the film as anticipating autocratic governance. However, for all its fears about power, control, and the loss of self-determination, Weine’s movie also contains the seeds of liberation. Cesare ultimately sacrifices his own life rather than murdering Jane. And it is this gesture that the adaptations examined here seek—a gesture of resistance. The sleepwalker can awaken and assert a form of just resistance in the world, even if the penalties are steep.

Why do autocracies enfranchise their citizens abroad? A large-N event history analysis, 1990–2010

ABSTRACT Autocratic ruling elites allow elections as a survival strategy. Many authoritarian regimes have taken this tactic one step further, also inviting their diaspora to vote from afar. This may seem puzzling given that elections abroad are difficult to control and provide a platform for exiled regime critics. So far, however, the reasons for autocracies to grant their diaspora voting rights have rarely been explored. In this article, we address this shortcoming. We employ a cross-national, autocratic regime dataset and a discrete-time event history model. We argue that autocracies use diaspora suffrage to repress and co-opt their citizens abroad while legitimizing their rule domestically and internationally. Autocrats are risk-averse and the decision to enfranchise hinges on the characteristics of the diaspora and the regime’s need for legitimacy, repression and co-optation after power transitions. We substantiate these claims by demonstrating that autocrats are less likely to enfranchise a diaspora that largely resides in democracies or consists of refugees in democracies. In turn, successful coups render diaspora suffrage adoption more probable. In sum, external voting rights present a critical case to better understand why authoritarian states adopt democratic institutions and wish to connect with their internationally mobile population.

Transparency, institutions, and investment: The case of the extractive industries transparency initiative (EITI)

Since the establishment of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), many resource-rich countries have joined international transparency initiatives. Considering that resource-rich countries have historically preferred opacity, this trend is surprising. Once a country joins the EITI, the country reports on its revenues, contracts, and licenses related to natural resources. The disclosure of information on resource revenues could threaten the survival of the leadership in less transparent democratic and autocratic regimes. In the face of the threats posed by enhanced transparency, these countries maintain their EITI membership, but for what reason? Using newly released data, this study argues that countries participate in international transparency initiatives to signal a favorable economic environment to international investors. This study demonstrates that under the self-reporting mechanism, investors reward or punish a country according to the level of its EITI membership. Based on an empirical analysis of 128 countries using two-stage least squares regression and the instrumental variable estimation in order to deal with selection bias and endogeneity (2002–2015), this study finds that joining in the EITI has a stronger positive effect on the inflow of foreign direct in-vestment (FDI) in less transparent countries, than in more transparent ones.

Концепт «Європа» в українському суспільному дискурсі наприкінці першої чверті 21 ст.

The article analyzes the conceptual features of the European phenomenon that formed in Ukrainian public discourse at the end of the first quarter of the 21st century. The purpose of the article is to determine the content of the concept of "Europe" that was in Ukrainian public discourse at the end of the first quarter of the 21st century, when the civilizational choice of Ukrainians received a new impetus for realization through the decision of the European Council to begin negotiations on Ukraine's accession to the European Union. The main research method is conceptual analysis, which involves studying various substrate mental units – representations, scenarios, and gestalts associated with the phenomenon of Europe in the collective consciousness of Ukrainian society. Additionally, the method of discourse analysis is applied at the stage of processing the mass media objectification of the concept of "Europe". Results. The following conceptual features have been identified: Europe as a space for the comprehensive realization of the individual; well-being and freedom as fundamental civilizational principles aspired to by Ukrainian society; democracy built on the rule of law and respect for individuals; partnership relations among all states and nations without domination by the stronger; unity of diverse cultures; civilizational choice for progress into the future; an influencing factor on Ukraine; a state of crisis associated with the weaknesses of liberal democracy on the one hand, and the dominance of consumer interests in European societies on the other; and the vulnerability of the political system to hybrid expansion by totalitarian and autocratic regimes. Conclusion. The analysis of the verbal explication of the conceptual features of the phenomenon of Europe in Ukrainian public discourse leads to the conclusion that the content of the studied linguistic construct in the collective consciousness of Ukrainians at the end of the first quarter of the 21st century is formed by the following main frames: institutional Eurocentrism with the system-forming role of the European Union, civilizational values, socio-cultural unity of diversity, production culture, and Eurointegration aspirations as a path to the future.

Undermining liberal international organizations from within: Evidence from the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe

AbstractInternational organizations promoting democratic governance and human rights are increasingly challenged by some of their own member states. To better understand this dynamic, we propose a distinction between the illiberal ideology of political parties and their regime environment, aiming to examine the international behavior of actors extending beyond autocratic governments. We argue that the domestic regime environment plays a pivotal role in influencing the extent to which illiberal parties engage in contestation to undermine liberal norms on the international stage. We expect contestation behavior to be primarily driven by illiberal parties seeking to diminish the influence of liberal international politics on domestic power structures. Moreover, we contend that government participation moderates illiberal parties’ contestation behavior. To test our expectations empirically, we study roll call votes in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), one of the most powerful international parliaments promoting liberal values. Drawing on an original dataset that records approximately 500,000 individual votes cast in PACE decisions, we find evidence for substantive contestation by illiberal parties, especially those representing illiberal regimes. Only illiberal governments in liberal systems moderate themselves at the amendment stage. Our study has implications for the potential threat that emerging illiberal actors pose to international liberal institutions.

Democracy Matters (To Some Extent): Autocracies, Democracies and the Forced Return of Migrants from the EU

ABSTRACT This article analyses whether the European Union returns more irregular migrants to democratic or autocratic states. It establishes the EU’s return rates with the whole world over a period of twelve years (2008–2019) and connects it to non-EU countries’ democratic credentials. Democracy mattered to some extent in the sense that the EU had generally fewer return orders and higher return rates with democratic states. Yet, a macro perspective indicates that the EU was driven by an interest to maximise returns to non-EU countries, irrespective of the regime type. Some autocratic regimes – and those that became more autocratic – had high return rates and were actively targeted for achieving more returns. A non-EU country’s change towards more or less democratic standards had a comparatively minor likelihood of impacting the EU return rate.

Revisiting the relationship between economic freedom and development to account for statistical deception by autocratic regimes

The literature connecting economic freedom indexes to income levels and growth generally points in the direction of a positive association. In this paper, we argue that this finding is a conservative one as the data is biased against finding any effects. The bias emerges as a result of the tendency of dictatorial regimes to overstate their GDP level. Dictatorships also tend to have lower scores of economic freedom. This downwardly biases any estimations of the relation between income and economic freedom. In this paper, we use recent corrections to GDP numbers – based on nighttime light intensity – to estimate the bias. We find that the true effects of economic freedom on income levels are between 1.1 and 1.62 times greater than commonly estimated. For economic growth, the bias is far smaller. Finally, we find suggestive evidence that the relationship between changes in economic freedom and economic growth is being underestimated as a result of the lies of dictators regarding GDP.

Autocracies and the International Criminal Court: Civil Society Engagement, Dissident ngo s, and the Pursuit of Justice

Abstract The rising tide of autocratization does not bode well for the International Criminal Court (icc), which has almost exclusively intervened in contexts of autocratic rule. As the Court is dependent not only on state cooperation but also on non-governmental organizations (ngo s) for effectiveness and legitimacy, this article explores the role—if any—of dissident ngo s in the pursuit of justice for international crimes committed under autocratic regimes. It shows that, while ngo s have been fundamental to the working of the icc, autocratic states are particularly challenging for the icc and ngo s to operate in. Despite this, ngo s may have found new ways of holding autocratic states to account for international crimes—with or without the icc.