Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Research Articles

Real and Imagined Encounters in the Social History of Surveillance: Soviet Migrants and the Petrov Affair

Abstract Soviet intelligence officer Vladimir Petrov’s defection to the West in 1954 was Australia’s first Cold War spy scandal, quickly dubbed the “Petrov Affair.” It was followed by a Royal Commission investigating Soviet espionage, during which the cover of Michael Bialoguski, the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation’s main agent in the Petrov operation, was blown. Bialoguski, a Polish refugee, had been targeting not just Petrov but the pro-Soviet migrant community, infiltrating their lives over a period of six years. This article uses the Petrov Affair as a vantage point to examine pro-Soviet migrants’ experiences of Cold War surveillance in Australia. Soviet migrants arrived in the West with prior experience of ubiquitous security states and anticipated that they would be monitored. But for those involved with pro-Soviet groups like Sydney’s Russian Social Club, brushes with intelligence were not only expected but often desired. They had both real and imagined encounters with surveillance, and imagined encounters shaped their experiences and perceptions of the security state just as actual ones did. A social history of the surveillance of pro-Soviet migrants complicates our understanding of the effects of surveillance and of its panoptic qualities. It also reveals the Australian security state as mutually constituted—not just by the state itself, but by the personalities, perceptions, transnational experiences, and social worlds of its subjects.

Black Power, Aboriginal Genocide, and the Politics of Identity

ABSTRACT In 1970, five Indigenous Australians petitioned the United Nations on behalf of the Aborigines Advancement League, charging the Australian Government with “genocide.” Rather than assessing the applicability of “genocide,” as a scholarly and legal concept, to Indigenous history, this article explores how these historical agents not only conceived of genocide, but how and why it was employed at this crucial moment in Aboriginal activist history. Taking the notion of discursive slippage as a source of generative change, it argues that the AAL’s claim to genocide was dependant on the rise of Aboriginal identity politics at the turn of the 1970s. The article suggests that this slippage between Indigenous identity politics and genocide generated notions of a collective psychological consciousness that encouraged the growth of radical Aboriginal politics. Methodologically, it treats these petitioners – and the range of activists and thinkers who are drawn into the web of our analysis – as intellectuals who conceived of genocide in a profoundly radical way to appeal to the global language of atrocity at the UN. The article draws primarily on archival material from the Office of Aboriginal Affairs, complemented by files from the Australian Security Intelligence Organization. Both archives have preserved material authored by the activists themselves, while opening a window into the state’s perception of them and the knowledge that they produced. The article also draws on concurrent writing and publishing, authored and published by Aboriginal peoples, to access their thinking in the flourishing intellectual context in which Aboriginal genocide discourse emerged. Reframing the traditional source base of intellectual history, this article positions the 1970 utterance of genocide as a profound insight into an emergent Indigenous intellectual history and global discourse around rights to demonstrate the rich Aboriginal stories and discourses held in colonial archives.

ASIO and the Monitoring of Irish Republicans in Australia during the “Troubles”

After the “Troubles” broke out in Northern Ireland in 1969, the Australian government became increasingly concerned that these international tensions would manifest themselves within the Irish diaspora. Sympathy for Irish Republicanism was identified in a number of nationalist and socialist groups in Australia which were monitored by the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO). Although chiefly focused on the Communist Party of Australia, ASIO monitored Irish Republicans alongside other left‐wing groups and social movements. Based on recently released ASIO files, this article explores the extent to which they were surveilled. The article argues that the monitoring of the Irish Republicans can fit into two periods. The first period, from the outbreak of the “Troubles” in 1969 to 1972, was when Irish Republicanism was seen as an extension of the Communist and Trotskyist groups in Australia. The second period, from 1972 through to the late 1970s, saw security services much more concerned about Irish Republicanism as terrorism, as international terrorism and the expansion of the IRA's bombing campaigns outside of Northern Ireland became an increasing concern. This shift in perceptions of Irish Republicanism demonstrates a wider shift in focus for ASIO and the Australian authorities from Cold War counter‐subversion to counter‐terrorism.

Issues in Australian Foreign Policy July to December 2019

Issues in Australian Foreign Policy July to December 2019

Digital surveillance and access to encrypted communications in Australia

Australia’s counterterrorism laws have significantly expanded the powers of its law enforcement and intelligence agencies with regard to digital surveillance. In this article, we explain and evaluate Australia’s counterterrorism laws with respect to intercepting telecommunications, other forms of digital surveillance and access to encrypted communications. We focus on the statutory powers held by federal law enforcement agencies and the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO), Australia’s domestic security intelligence agency. These powers confirm several important trends. They have further blurred the lines between intelligence and evidence and they have granted law enforcement and ASIO extraordinary powers to modify consumer technologies. They also create significant potential for conflict of laws across national boundaries. Significant strengthening of existing accountability mechanisms is needed to ensure public transparency and reduce opportunities for misuse.

The integrity function and ASIO's extraordinary questioning and detention powers

The Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth ) permits ASIO to coercively question and detain non-suspects in order to gather intelligence about terrorism offences. This article examines the extensive checks and balances that constrain these powers, and whether they meet the standard embodied in the emerging concept of the ‘integrity function’. This involves elaboration of the content of the integrity function and its application in a problematic context, as ASIO must be permitted to act with some degree of secrecy, and executive judgments on matters of national security have long been considered unsuited to external scrutiny. This study illustrates the difficulty of holding national security powers to account. It also reveals extant questions about the integrity function, including: whether it incorporates a law reform component; how independent the integrity branch must be; the intersection between the integrity function and judicial review, and whether and how the integrity branch can be silenced to protect national security. In turn, this article raises broader questions about the proper scope of ASIO’s powers.

‘In my file, I am two different people’: Max Gluckman and A.L. Epstein, the Australian National University, and Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, 1958–60

ABSTRACTSecurity services in the Cold War introduced an ethos of secrecy, where state persecution of academics without due process could be justified by the imputation of communism. Australian security services viewed the work of social anthropologists as providing a perfect cover for subversive activities among undeveloped peoples. This applied especially to anthropologists seeking to conduct research in the Australian colony of Papua New Guinea. Australian security services surveillance of suspected subversives was assisted by information from MI5 and security services in the African colonies.

Privacy versus the Use of Location Information for Law Enforcement and Security in Australia

This article reviews existing knowledge regarding the powers of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation and the Australian Federal Police to access and use metadata. The review is primarily based on published research on the privacy impact of the revised metadata retention and collection framework introduced in 2015. The review reveals that, after 2015, no comprehensive study was undertaken in the following areas: how location information is generated and exchanged in the IP-mediated long-term evolution telecommunications network, and how mobile devices are tracked and create more precise location estimates, in the legal and policy context of the exceptions and privacy safeguards introduced after 2015; the discretionary powers of the agencies to use personal and sensitive information to identify inquiries and investigations to pursue, to enforce the law and perform their functions, and to carry out activities related to their functions and purposes; and the flexible oversight principles contained in the guidelines that create conflicts between law enforcement and privacy interests. The review proposes future multidisciplinary research.

Privacy versus the Use of Location Information for Law Enforcement and Security in Australia

This article reviews existing knowledge regarding the powers of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation and the Australian Federal Police to access and use metadata. The review is primarily based on published research on the privacy impact of the revised metadata retention and collection framework introduced in 2015. The review reveals that, after 2015, no comprehensive study was undertaken in the following areas: how location information is generated and exchanged in the IP-mediated long-term evolution telecommunications network, and how mobile devices are tracked and create more precise location estimates, in the legal and policy context of the exceptions and privacy safeguards introduced after 2015; the discretionary powers of the agencies to use personal and sensitive information to identify inquiries and investigations to pursue, to enforce the law and perform their functions, and to carry out activities related to their functions and purposes; and the flexible oversight principles contained in the guidelines that create conflicts between law enforcement and privacy interests. The review proposes future multidisciplinary research.

Whistleblowing, National Security and the Constitutional Freedom of Political Communication

Whistleblowers promote the values of responsible government and the rule of law by drawing attention to criminal or other forms of wrongdoing in publicly accountable organisations. This article explores the relationship between whistleblowing, national security and the implied freedom of political communication under the Australian Constitution. Legislation such as the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) (‘ Crimes Act’), the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) (‘ ASIO Act’) and the Australian Border Force Act 2015 (Cth) (‘ Border Force Act’) makes it an offence to reveal certain types of information obtained as a Commonwealth officer. The Public Interest Disclosure Act 2013 (Cth) (‘ PIDA’) offers limited protection to whistleblowers in the Commonwealth public sector, but this protection does not extend to information relating to intelligence operations. We argue that blanket criminalisation of unauthorised disclosure by Commonwealth officers or contractors under s 70 of the Crimes Act, along with similar prohibitions in s 35P of the ASIO Act and s 42 of the Border Force Act, offend the implied freedom of political communication by failing to strike an adequate balance between national security and organisational secrecy, on the one hand, and public debate and discussion, on the other. The courts should read down these laws to protect disclosures that hold significant public interest for discussion and debate over government policy or the performance of government officials.

When the Personal Became Too Political: ASIO and the Monitoring of the Women’s Liberation Movement in Australia

ABSTRACTIn the official history of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO), there is only one mention of the women’s liberation movement, amongst a collection of other social movements that emerged in Australia in the late 1960s and early 1970s, alongside the anti-Vietnam War and Aboriginal rights movements. However, we know from files released by the National Archives of Australia that ASIO heavily monitored the women’s liberation movement in Australia, just as it did with most social and protest movements that existed at the time. Concerned about the crossover between the women’s liberation movement and other protest movements, ASIO were particularly worried about the entry of the various far left groups, such as Communists, Trotskyists and Maoists, into the women’s liberation movement, even though these groups were very much divided about the issue of women’s rights during this period. This article examines the ASIO files on the Australian women’s liberation movement and the anxiety that the authorities felt about the ‘threat’ of the personal becoming too politicised.

Listening for Subversion: The Bugging of the Communist Party, 1958–59

Because of its conviction that the Communist Party of Australia (CPA) was a subversive organisation whose members, meetings and policies needed close monitoring, the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) intercepted telephone conversations, installed listening devices in offices, filmed and photographed Party members, and employed agents to penetrate state committees, branches and front organisations. This research note reveals for the first time the details of a bugging operation targeting the CPA in the late 1950s. Today, of course, the targets of state surveillance are different, counter-terrorism has replaced counter-subversion, and the bugging operations are far more sophisticated. But the underlying principles remain the same: to monitor the target, evaluate intelligence and pre-empt attacks, direct or indirect, on national security, however defined.

ASIO’s ‘official history’: More unanswered questions

The Secret Cold War, Volume 3 of the official history of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO), leaves many unanswered questions, particularly about the 1978 Sydney Hilton Hotel bombing and the ongoing lawlessness of ASIO’s activities. These questions undermine the central claim of Volume 3, that ASIO has become a reformed and accountable agency, shedding the notorious record of politically motivated surveillance, victimisation, harassment and ‘dirty tricks’ that the agency acquired in its first quarter century.

ASIO, the ‘Protest Years’ and Whitlam's Dismissal

The Protest Years, the second instalment of the government-funded ‘official history’ of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, published late last year, is part of a multi-volume project commissioned to defend ASIO’s role as the central domestic intelligence agency of Australia’s political, corporate and military-security establishment. Nevertheless, the book, like Volume 1 (reviewed in (2015) 40(4) AltLJ) partially reveals the lawlessness with which ASIO operated for decades, and no doubt still does. This volume also sheds light on the dismissal of the Whitlam government in 1975.

The Legal Assault on Australian Democracy

<p><em>Recent years have seen fierce public debate on whether Australia’s parliaments are passing laws that undermine fundamental democratic values, such as freedom of speech and freedom of association. Such debate has tended to focus on a few contentious laws, including s 18C of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth), s 35P of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) and Queensland’s anti-bikie legislation. This article conducts a survey of the federal, state and territory statute books in order to determine whether such examples are isolated, or indicative of a broader trend. It identifies 350 instances of laws that arguably encroach upon rights and freedoms essential to the maintenance of a healthy democracy. Most of these laws have entered onto the statute book since September 2001. The article finds that the terrorist attacks of that month marked a watershed moment in the making of Australian laws, and that since that time parliamentarians have been less willing to exercise self-restraint by not passing laws that undermine Australia’s democratic system.</em></p>

Spies and Scientologists: ASIO and a controversial minority religion in Cold War Australia, 1956–83

Among all the controversial New Religious Movements to emerge since the Second World War, the Church of Scientology has arguably been subject to more scrutiny by domestic and international intelligence agencies than any other non-Islamic alternative religious group. While owing to the nature of intelligence gathering scholarly accounts of this have often been one-dimensional and brief, the situation in Australia resulting from the Archives Act 1983 has meant that historians of both intelligence agencies and new religions now have access to a significant amount of documentation illustrating the interactions between the Church of Scientology and the Australian Security Intelligence Organization (ASIO) for the period from 1956 to 1983. This period witnessed vacillating fortunes for the Church of Scientology which saw it become the subject of legislative bans in three Australian state jurisdictions during the late 1960s, as well as it launching a high profile, but ultimately unsuccessful, legal case against ASIO in 1979. While never considered a serious security risk by ASIO, the Church of Scientology played a minor role in a number of important events in the history of ASIO particularly during the 1970s, including participating in a wider activist campaign which sought to curtail ASIO’s operations during this period and making submissions to the first Royal Commission into the Australian Intelligence Services under Justice Robert Marsden Hope.

‘Days of Rage’ Downunder: Considering American Influences on ‘Home-Grown’ Terrorism and ASIO's response in 1970s Australia

Between late 1969 and mid-1972 there were 176 premeditated and politically motivated attacks against a range of mostly government, military, judicial, diplomatic and commercial targets in Australia. Most were undertaken by radical left-wing actors. Such incidents and the organisations and individuals who carried them out can be examined through the lens of ‘home-grown’ terrorism. This article corrects the popular and historiographical amnesia associated with these events and demonstrates that like the moderate social movements of the ‘long Sixties’ that sustained Australia's ‘Years of Hope’, the home-grown terrorist actors who contributed to Australia's ‘Days of Rage’ were, most especially, influenced by American developments, cultural productions and actors. Further, in its attempts to understand and deal with these new threats, elements of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) were similarly influenced by a range of American ideas and events including social science research methodologies.

Is ASIO’s Corporate Governance an Oxymoron?

This paper investigates corporate governance in the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO), Australia's domestic intelligence agency. The paper seeks to determine and understand the extent to which ASIO's approach to corporate governance emulates that of organisations in the wider public sector and the private sector. This examination of ASIO's corporate governance considers the organisation's purpose, functions and extraordinary powers focusing on the importance of secrecy to achieving its objectives. The paper will also assess whether it is appropriate to attempt to assess ASIO's corporate governance in the same terms, and according to like standards, as are used to evaluate governance in 'normal' or 'regular' public and private sector organisations. Finally, the paper provides an overall evaluation of ASIO's approach to corporate governance and considers how this approach affects the organisation's treatment of its stakeholders and the extent to which it serves their interests.

NATIONAL SECURITY REFORMS AND FREEDOM OF THE PRESS

In October 2014, the Abbott government introduced a ‘special intelligence operations’ (‘SIOs’) regime which provides immunity for Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (‘ASIO’) officers who commit unlawful acts in the course of specially-approved undercover operations. Attached to this regime is a secrecy offence, in s 35P of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth), which prohibits the disclosure of any information relating to SIOs. This article considers the impact of s 35P on press freedom in Australia, and considers options for striking a more appropriate balance between secrecy and accountability. It suggests that a limited public interest exemption based on whistleblower protections in the Public Interest Disclosure Act 2013 (Cth) would provide the most viable solution for reducing the impact of s 35P on press freedom.

Coercive questioning and detention by domestic intelligence agencies

In response to the terrorist attacks in Washington and New York, the Commonwealth Parliament bestowed new powers of coercive questioning and detention upon the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation in 2003. These powers were extremely controversial. They raise critical issues about the role of a domestic intelligence agency in a democratic nation and the safeguards that should attach to the exercise of its powers. This article will undertake a country survey to determine if similar powers of coercive questioning and detention have been given to domestic intelligence agencies in four comparable countries—the UK, Canada, the USA, Israel and India. This provides an important insight into whether the response of the Australian Parliament to the threat of terrorism is an exception or rather part of an international trend towards the vesting of coercive questioning and detention powers in domestic intelligence agencies.